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Abstract	  
	  It	   looks	   as	   though	  many1	  philosophers	   assume	   that	   the	   intuitive	   variability	   of	  proper	  assertion	  with	  practical	  stakes	  motivates	  the	  following	  dilemma:	   	  either	  (1)	  we	  embrace	  a	  knowledge	  norm	  of	  assertion	  (KNA),	  and	  are	  forced	  into	  a	  view	  that	  takes	  knowledge,	  or	  ‘knowledge’	  to	  be	  sensitive	  to	  practical	  stakes,	  or	  (2)	  we	  stick	   to	  our	  classical	   invariantist	   (CI)	  guns,	  but	   then	  KNA	  goes	  out	   the	  window	  and	  we	  get	  practical	   sensitivity	   in	   the	  normativity	  of	   assertion.	  Let	  us	  dub	   this	  The	  Sensitivity	  Dilemma.	  	  	   This	  dissertation	  aims	  to	  bring	  this	  implicitly	  assumed	  dilemma	  to	  centre	  stage	   in	   order	   to	   then	   take	   a	   step	   back.	   It	   is	   argued	   here	   that	   the	   Sensitivity	  Dilemma	   is	   a	   false	   dilemma:	   a	   biconditional	   knowledge	   norm	   of	   assertion,	   I	  argue,	   is	   perfectly	   compatible	   with	   Classical	   Invariantism.	   And,	   more	  ambitiously,	  the	  dissertation	  aims	  to	  offer	  independent	  reason	  to	  believe	  that,	  if	  Classical	  Invariantism	  and	  KNA	  are	  true,	  shiftiness	  in	  assertability	  is	  exactly	  what	  we	  should	  expect.	  To	  this	  effect,	  I	  put	  forth	  a	  functionalist	  rationale	  for	  KNA,	  in	  a	  classical	   invariantist	   framework.	   I	   argue	   that	   not	   only	   are	   the	   data	   at	   hand	  friendly	  to	  CI	  and	  KNA,	  but,	  if	  we	  look	  at	  the	  main	  epistemic	  function	  of	  assertion,	  KNA	  readily	  follows.	  	  	   I	   begin	   by	   arguing	   that	   the	   Sensitivity	   Dilemma	   rests	   on	   deontic	  equivocation.	  To	  this	  effect,	  Chapter	  #1	  draws	  an	  important	  distinction	  between	  epistemic	   norms	   and	   mere	   norms	   with	   epistemic	   content.	   In	   the	   light	   of	   this	  distinction,	  I	  argue	  that	  a	  knowledge	  norm	  for	  assertion	  need	  not	  imply	  context	  sensitivity	  of	  either	  knowledge/knowledge	  attribution	  or	  proper	  assertion.	  Now,	  say	   that	   it	   turns	  out	   that	   the	  knowledge	  norm	  of	   assertion,	   in	   its	  biconditional	  form,	   is	  perfectly	  compatible	  with	   the	  shiftiness	  data.	  Does	   that	  also	  mean	  that	  KNA	   is	   correct?	   The	   answer,	   of	   course,	   is	   ‘no’.	   After	   all,	   empirical	   adequacy	   is	  shared	   by	   several	   of	   the	   competing	   views	   on	   the	   market.	   We	   need	   further	  reasons	  to	  believe	  KNA	  is	  the	  correct	  account.	  Chapter	  #2	  looks	  at	  several	  extant	  attempts	  to	  provide	  a	  rationale	  for	  KNA,	  and	  finds	  them	  wanting.	  	   In	   Chapter	   #3,	   I	   offer	   an	   alternative	   answer	   to	   the	   rationale	   question:	  assertion,	  I	  argue,	  is	  governed	  by	  a	  particular	  epistemic	  norm	  in	  virtue	  of	  serving	  a	   particular	   epistemic	   function.	   More	   precisely,	   according	   to	   the	   proposed	  account,	   a	   biconditional	   knowledge	   norm	   of	   assertion	   drops	   right	   out	   of	  assertion’s	  epistemic	  function	  of	  generating	  testimonial	  knowledge.	  Chapters	  #4	  and	  #5	  defend,	   in	   turn,	   the	  necessity	  and	   sufficiency	  directions	  of	  KNA	  against	  the	   classical	   objections	   in	   the	   literature.	   I	   argue	   that:	   (1)	   The	   necessity	   claim	  involved	   in	   KNA	   scores	   better	   than	   weaker	   norms	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   both	  accommodating	   linguistic	  data	  and	  explaining	  how	  a	  speaker	  can	  be	  blameless,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  For	  an	  explicit	  statement	  of	  the	  Sensitivity	  Dilemma,	  see	  (DeRose	  2002).	  For	  people	  embracing	  the	  first	  horn	  thereof,	  see,	  e.g.	  DeRose	  (2002),	  Hawthorne	  (2004).	  For	  champions	  of	  the	  second	  horn,	  see	  e.g.	  Brown	  (2010),	  Gerken	  (2012),	  Goldberg	  (2015),	  Greenough	  (2010).	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Introduction	  	  There	  are	  good	  and	  bad	  assertions.	   It	  often	   feels	  natural	   to	  say	   things	  like	  ‘Good	  that	  you	  said	  so!‘	  but	  also	  to	  criticize	  speakers	  by	  asking	  ‘Why	  would	  you	  say	  such	  a	  thing?’	  when	  their	  assertions	  seem	  inappropriate.	  On	   top	   of	   this,	   it	   looks	   as	   though	   assertions	   can	   be	   good	   or	   bad	   in	   a	  distinctively	   epistemic	   way:	   notions	   such	   as	   knowledge	   or	   justified	  belief	  figure	  prominently	  in	  our	  evaluations	  of	  each	  other’s	  speech	  acts.	  We	   do,	   for	   instance,	   challenge	   assertions	   by	   ‘Do	   you	   know	   that?’	  questions,	   when	   we	   suspect	   the	   speaker	   does	   not	   find	   herself	   in	   a	  strong	  enough	  epistemic	  position	  to	  assert.	  	  	   In	   the	   light	   of	   this,	   it	   comes	   as	   no	   surprise	   that	   epistemic	  normative	   constraints	   on	   assertion	   are	   of	   central	   concern	   in	   recent	  literature.	  Also,	  we	  should	  expect	  questions	  pertaining	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  corresponding	  epistemic	  standings	  to	  carry	  significant	  weight	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  normativity	  of	  assertion.	  	  	   Now,	  here	  are	  two	  attractive	  theses,	  both	  of	  which	  enjoy	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  popularity:1	  	  
The	   Knowledge	   Norm	   of	   Assertion	   (KNA):	   One’s	   assertion	   is	  epistemically	  permissible	  iff	  one	  knows	  that	  p.	  	  	  And	  	  
Classical	   Invariantism	   (CI):	   The	   truth	   value	   of	   knowledge	   claims	   is	  insensitive	  to	  practical	  matters.	  	  I,	   alongside	   many	   other	   epistemologists,	   care	   a	   lot	   about	   these	   two	  claims.	   In	   fact,	   if	   there	   is	   anything	   philosophical	   I	   find	   extremely	  plausible,	   these	   two	   theses	   are	   it.	   Furthermore,	   theoretical	  considerations	   speak	   in	   favour	   of	   not	   quickly	   abandoning	   either	   of	  them.	   First,	   friends	   and	   foes	   alike	   agree	   that	   CI	   is	   the	   default	  epistemological	   position:	   we	   need	   to	   be	   argued	   out	   of	   it.	   Given	   its	  centrality	   to	   epistemological	   affairs,	   the	   argument	   on	   offer	   should	   be	  good.	  	  	  	   Second,	   if	   knowledge	   is	   both	   necessary	   and	   sufficient	   for	  epistemically	   permissible	   assertion,	   we	   have	   a	   very	   straightforward	  and	  elegant	  way	  of	  explaining	  quite	  a	  few	  otherwise	  puzzling	  linguistic	  data,	   such	  as:	   the	  paradoxical	   soundingness	  of	  Moorean	  statements	  of	  
                                                1	  For	  support	   for	  KNA,	  see	  e.g.	  Williamson	  (2000,	  2005),	  DeRose	  (2002),	  Hawthorne	  (2004).	   For	   attempts	   to	   defend	   KNA	   in	   a	   classical	   invariantist	   framework,	   see	   e.g.	  Williamson	  (2005)	  and	  Turri	  (2010).	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the	   form	   ‘p	   but	   I	   don’t	   know	   that	   p’;	   the	   unassertability	   of	   lottery	  propositions;	   ‘How	   do	   you	   know?’	   challenges;	   last	   but	   not	   least,	  (intuitively	  permissible)	  criticisms	  such	  as	  ‘Why	  didn’t	  you	  say	  so?	  You	  knew	  it	  all	  along!’.	  	   Now,	   plausible	   (and	   popular)	   as	   they	   might	   be,	   surprisingly	  enough,	  CI	   and	  KNA	  are	  widely	   taken	   to	  be	   incompatible.	  Here	   is	   one	  prominent	  argument	  for	  their	  incompatibility,	  by	  Keith	  DeRose	  (2002):	  intuitively,	   standards	   for	   proper	   assertability	   vary	   across	   practical	  contexts:	   in	  high	  stakes	  but	  not	   in	   low	  stakes	  scenarios,	  more	  warrant	  seems	  to	  be	  needed	  for	  one	  to	  be	  in	  a	  good	  enough	  epistemic	  position	  to	  assert.	   Given	   this,	   we	   cannot	   have	   an	   invariant	   standard	   for	   proper	  assertability:	   a	   knowledge	   norm	   of	   assertion	   is	   incompatible	   with	  classical	   invariantism.	   Since	   we	   need	   to	   place	   the	   source	   of	   the	   felt	  sensitivity	  somewhere,	  one	  of	  the	  two	  has	  to	  go.	  	   It	   looks	   as	   though	  many2	  actors	   in	   the	   debate	   assume	   that	   the	  intuitive	  variability	  of	  proper	  assertion	  with	  practical	  stakes	  motivates	  the	  following	  dilemma:	  	  either	  1)	  we	  embrace	  KNA,	  and	  are	  forced	  into	  a	  view	  that	  takes	  knowledge,	  or	  ‘knowledge’	  to	  be	  sensitive	  to	  practical	  stakes	   (henceforth	   knowledge	   sensitivism),	   or	   2)	   we	   stick	   to	   our	  classical	   invariantist	  guns,	  but	   then	  KNA	  goes	  out	   the	  window	  and	  we	  get	   practical	   sensitivity	   in	   the	   normativity	   of	   assertion	   (henceforth	  assertion	  sensitivism).	  Let	  us	  dub	  this	  The	  Sensitivity	  Dilemma.	  	  	   This	  thesis	  is	  in	  the	  business	  of	  bringing	  this	  implicitly	  assumed	  dilemma	  to	  centre	  stage	  in	  order	  to	  then	  take	  a	  step	  back.	   It	   is	  argued	  here	   that	   the	   Sensitivity	   Dilemma	   is	   a	   false	   dilemma:	   a	   biconditional	  knowledge	   norm	   of	   assertion,	   I	   argue,	   is	   perfectly	   compatible	   with	  Classical	   Invariantism.	  And,	  more	  ambitiously,	   the	   thesis	  aims	   to	  offer	  independent	   reason	   to	   believe	   that	   if	   Classical	   Invariantism	   and	   KNA	  are	   true,	   shiftiness	   in	   assertability	   is	   exactly	   what	   we	   should	   expect.	  Furthermore,	   I	   offer	   a	   functionalist	   rationale	   to	   back	   up	   KNA	   in	   a	  classical	   invariantist	   framework.	   I	   argue	   that	   not	   only	   are	   the	   data	   at	  hand	   friendly	   to	  CI	   and	  KNA,	  but,	   if	  we	   look	  at	   the	  epistemic	   function	  assertion	  is	  plausibly	  meant	  to	  fulfil,	  KNA	  readily	  follows.	  	  	  
Outline	  	  Very	  briefly,	  here	  is	  the	  outline	  of	  the	  thesis:	  	  
                                                2	  For	  an	  explicit	  statement	  of	  the	  Sensitivity	  Dilemma,	  see	  (DeRose	  2002).	  For	  people	  embracing	   the	   first	   horn	   thereof,	   see,	   e.g.	   DeRose	   (2002),	   Hawthorne	   (2004).	   For	  champions	   of	   the	   second	   horn,	   see	   e.g.	   Brown	   (2010),	   Gerken	   (2012),	   Goldberg	  (2015),	  Greenough	  (2010).	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Chapter	  #1.	  This	  chapter	  clears	  up	  some	  matters	  concerning	  epistemic	  normativity	   that	   have	   been	   generally	   ignored	   in	   the	   assertion	   debate.	  That	  is,	  I	  argue,	  there	  is	  an	  important	  distinction	  to	  be	  drawn	  between	  epistemic	  norms	  and	  mere	  norms	  with	  epistemic	  content.	  In	  the	  light	  of	  this,	   I	   argue	   that	   a	   knowledge	   norm	   for	   assertion	   need	   not	   imply	  context	   sensitivity	   of	   either	   knowledge/knowledge	   attribution	   or	  proper	  assertion.	  	  	  
Chapter	  #2.	  Say	  that	  it	  turns	  out	  that	  the	  knowledge	  norm	  of	  assertion,	  in	   its	   biconditional	   form,	   is	   perfectly	   compatible	   with	   the	   shiftiness	  data.	  Does	  that	  also	  mean	  that	  KNA	  is	  correct?	  The	  answer,	  of	  course,	  is	  ‘no’.	  After	  all,	  empirical	  adequacy	  is	  shared	  by	  several	  of	  the	  competing	  views	   on	   the	  market.	  We	   need	   further	   reasons	   to	   believe	   KNA	   is	   the	  correct	   account.	   This	   chapter	   looks	   at	   several	   extant	   attempts	   to	  provide	  a	  rationale	  for	  KNA,	  and	  finds	  them	  wanting.	  	  
Chapter	   #3.	   I	   offer	   an	   alternative	   answer	   to	   the	   rationale	   question:	  assertion,	  I	  argue,	  is	  governed	  by	  a	  particular	  epistemic	  norm	  in	  virtue	  of	  serving	  a	  particular	  epistemic	  function.	  More	  precisely,	  according	  to	  the	   proposed	   account,	   a	   biconditional	   knowledge	   norm	   of	   assertion	  drops	   right	   out	   of	   assertion’s	   epistemic	   function	   of	   generating	  testimonial	  knowledge.	  	  A	  functionalist	  explanation	  of	  the	  overriding	  picture	  proposed	  in	  Chapter	   #1	   is	   put	   forth.	   Furthermore,	   it	   is	   argued,	   if	   the	   proposed	  functionalist	  picture	  is	  correct,	  we	  have	  an	  argument	  for	  non-­‐normative	  commonality	  for	  belief,	  action	  and	  assertion.	  	   I	   close	   by	   looking	   at	   a	   few	   possible	   objections	   to	   the	   view	  defended	   here,	   and	   answering	   them	   in	   turn.	   First,	   I	   answer	  contextualist	  worries	  concerning	  the	  denial	  of	  knowledge	  in	  high	  stakes	  scenarios.	   Second,	   I	   consider	   and	   reject	   alternative,	   truth-­‐centred	   and	  justification	  centred	  functionalist	  pictures.	  Third	  and	   last,	   I	  argue	  that,	  although	  a	  variety	  of	  epistemic	  consequentialism,	  the	  account	  defended	  here	  can	  steer	  clear	  of	  the	  classical	  problems	  of	  this	  view.	  	  	  
Chapter	  #4.	  Recent	   literature	  argues	   that	  knowledge	   is	  not	  necessary	  for	   epistemically	   proper	   assertion.	   The	   most	   prominent	   competing	  account	  on	  the	  market	   imposes	  a	  weaker,	  rational	  credibility	  norm	  on	  assertion	   (RCNA).	   Defenders	   of	   RCNA	   argue	   that	   (1)	   theoretical	  considerations,	  such	  as	  a	  priori	  simplicity,	  speak	  in	  favour	  of	  RCNA,	  (2)	  the	  weaker	  norm	  scores	  equally	  well	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  accommodating	  linguistic	   data	   and	   (3)	   KNA,	   as	   opposed	   to	   RCNA,	   has	   a	   hard	   time	  explaining	   cases	   in	  which	   assertions	   on	   lesser	   epistemic	   standings	  do	  not	   render	   the	   speakers	   subject	   to	   criticism.	   This	   chapter	   tips	   the	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balance	   back	   in	   favour	   of	   knowledge	   necessity.	   I	   argue	   that:	   (1)	   the	  argument	  for	  the	  a	  priori	  simplicity	  of	  RCNA	  does	  not	  go	  through,	  and	  KNA	  scores	  better	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  (2)	  accommodating	  linguistic	  data	  and	  (3)	  explaining	  how	  a	  speaker	  can	  be	  blameless,	  yet	  in	  breach	  of	  the	  norm.	  	   	  
Chapter	   #5.	   This	   chapter	   looks	   at	   two	   prominent	   objections	   to	   the	  sufficiency	   claim	   involved	   in	   the	   knowledge	   norm	   of	   assertion	   (KNA-­‐Suff,)	   due	   to	   Jessica	   Brown	   and	   Jennifer	   Lackey,	   and	   argues	   that	   they	  miss	   their	   target	   due	   to	   value-­‐theoretic	   inaccuracies.	   It	   is	   argued	   that	  (1)	  the	  intuitive	  need	  for	  more	  than	  knowledge	  in	  Brown’s	  high-­‐stakes	  contexts	  does	  not	  come	   from	  the	  epistemic	  norm	  governing	  assertion,	  but	   from	   further	   norms	   stepping	   in	   and	   raising	   the	   bar,	   and	   that	   (2)	  Lackey’s	  purported	  quality-­‐driven	  case	  against	  KNA-­‐Suff	  boils	  down	  to	  a	   quantitative	   objection.	   If	   that	   is	   the	   case,	   Lackey’s	   argument	  will	   be	  vulnerable	  to	  the	  same	  objections	  as	  Brown’s.	  	  
Chapter	   #6.	   I	   argue	   that	   several	   theoretical	   virtues	   favour	   the	  functionalist	  account	  defended	  here	  over	  competing	  explanations	  of	  the	  shiftiness	  data.	  	  I	  begin	  by	  briefly	  looking	  at	  knowledge	  sensitivism	  with	  an	  eye	  towards	  both	  empirical	  adequacy	  and	  theoretical	  virtues,	  and	  I	  find	  that	  the	  invariantist	  view	  defended	  in	  this	  thesis	  wins	  on	  all	  fronts.	  	  	   Second,	  I	  turn	  to	  scoring	  my	  view	  against	  alternative	  invariantist	  accounts.	   I	   look	  at	  Patrick	  Rysiew’s	  pragmatic	  warranted	  assertability	  move	   against	   contextualism,	   and	   argue	   that	   it	   fails,	   due	   to	   not	  generalizing	   to	   assertions	   that	   do	   not	   feature	   knowledge	   attributions.	  Further	  on,	   I	   show	   that	   assertion	   sensitivism	   is	   strongly	   incompatible	  with	   the	   received	   value-­‐theoretic	   view	   regarding	   the	   relationship	  between	   the	   axiological	   and	   the	   deontic:	   one	   of	   the	   two	   has	   to	   go.	   I	  argue	  that	  the	  one	  to	  go	  is	  assertion	  sensitivism.	  	  	   Last	  but	  not	  least,	  I	  examine	  KNA-­‐friendly	  invariantist	  accounts.	  According	   to	   Tim	   Williamson	   and	   John	   Turri,	   what	   explains	   the	  shiftiness	   intuition	   is	   a	   need	   for	   second	   order	   knowledge	   for	   proper	  assertability	   in	  high	  stakes	  situations.	   I	  argue	   that	  both	  simplicity	  and	  plausibility	  considerations	  speak	   in	   favour	  of	   the	   functionalist	  account	  defended	  here	  over	  their	  view.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   5	  
Chapter	  I.	  	  
The	  Context	  Sensitivity	  Dilemma	  	  For	   the	   most	   part,3	  the	   epistemological	   literature	   of	   the	   last	   decade	  implicitly	  assumes	  that	  the	  intuitive	  variability	  of	  proper	  assertion	  with	  practical	  stakes	  motivates	  the	  following	  sensitivity	  dilemma:	  either	  we	  embrace	  a	  biconditional	  knowledge	  norm4	  of	  assertion,	  and	  are	  forced	  into	  holding	  a	  view	  that	  takes	  knowledge/knowledge	  attribution	  to	  be	  sensitive	   to	   practical	   considerations,	   or	   we	   stick	   to	   our	   classical	  invariantist	  guns,	  but	   then	   the	  knowledge	  norm	  goes	  out	   the	  window,	  together	  with	  all	  its	  theoretical	  benefits.	  	  	   As	   a	   result	   of	   this	  widespread	   assumption,	  we	   are	   offered	   two	  package	  deals.	  Some	  people	  defend	  one	  form	  or	  another	  of	  knowledge	  sensitivism	  (SK).	  Contextualism5	  and	  pragmatic	  encroachment6	  are	  the	  two	  main	   incarnations	   of	   this	   view.7	  While	   the	   former	   holds	   that	   the	  relevant	  contextual	  determiners	  lie	  with	  the	  attributor,	  the	  latter	  takes	  it	   that	   it	   is	  all	  about	   the	  practical	   interests	  of	   the	  subject.	  Both	  defend	  KNA.8	  	  	   Note,	   however,	   that	   defending	   this	   combination	   of	   views	   is	   a	  fairly	  theoretically	  costly	  affair.	  After	  all,	  it	  requires	  a	  radical	  departure	  from	   the	   historically	   received	   view,	   according	   to	   which	   whether	   one	  knows	  (or	  ‘knows’)	  does	  not	  depend	  on	  practical	  considerations.	  	  	   As	  such,	  unsurprisingly,	  many	  feel	  that	  knowledge	  sensitivism	  is	  too	  high	  a	  theoretical	  cost	  to	  pay	  for	  accommodating	  the	  data,	  and	  give	  up	   the	  knowledge	  norm	  in	   favour	  of	  a	  stakes-­‐sensitive	  view	  of	  proper	  assertability	  (assertion	  sensitivism,	  or	  SA	  for	  short).	  According	  to	  these	  philosophers,	  epistemic	  propriety	  of	  assertion	  is	  a	  shifty	  affair:	  it	  varies	  with	   a	   number	  of	   contextual	   determiners,	   among	  which,	   prominently,	  practical	  stakes.	  	  	   Note,	  though,	  that	  losing	  KNA	  is	  not	  that	  great	  a	  bargain	  either;	  after	   all,	   with	   knowledge	   as	   the	   norm	   of	   assertion,	   we	   have	   a	   very	  straightforward	   and	   elegant	   way	   of	   explaining	   quite	   a	   few	   otherwise	  puzzling	  linguistic	  data.	  
                                                3	  But	  see	  Chapter	  #6	  for	  a	  few	  attempts	  to	  argue	  otherwise.	  4	  Champions	  of	  KNA	  include	  Peter	  Unger	  (1975),	  Michael	  Slote	  (1979),	  Keith	  DeRose	  (2002),	   John	   Hawthorne	   (2004)	   John	   Turri	   (2011)	   and	   most	   famously	   Timothy	  Williamson	  (1996,	  2000).	  	  5	  E.g.	  Cohen	  (1998),	  DeRose	  (2002).	  6	  E.g.	  Hawthorne	  (2004),	  Stanley	  (2005).	  	  7	  Given	   its	   central	   focus,	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	   this	   thesis,	   I	   am	   setting	   relativism	   (e.g.	  MacFarlane	  2005)	  aside.	  See	  Greenough	  (2011)	  for	  discussion.	  8	  Stanley’s	   (2008)	   defense	   of	   a	   certainty	   norm	   of	   assertion	   makes	   for	   a	   notable	  exception.	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   This	   chapter	   aims	   to	   bring	   this	   implicitly	   assumed	   dilemma	   to	  centre	  stage	  and	  take	  a	  step	  back;	  it	  argues	  that	  the	  sensitivity	  dilemma	  is	   a	   false	   dilemma,	   resting	   on	   deontic	   equivocation:	   the	   knowledge	  norm	   of	   assertion,	   it	   is	   argued,	   is	   perfectly	   compatible	   with	   classical	  invariantism.	  	  	  	  
1.1	  Bank	  Cases	  and	  the	  Generality	  Objection	  	  	  It	   looks	  as	   though,	   in	  high	  stakes	  practical	   contexts,	   assertability	  does	  not	   come	   cheap:	   intuitively,	   more	   warrant	   is	   required	   for	   being	   in	   a	  position	  to	  assert.	  Let	  us	  dub	  this	  the	  Shiftiness	  Intuition.	  	   This	   phenomenon	   is	   hardly	   a	   newly	   arrived	   guest	   at	   the	  epistemology	   table;9	  however,	   popularity	   wise,	   the	   golden	   age	   of	   the	  Shiftiness	   Intuition	   began	   once	   being	   employed	   to	   defend	  contextualism.10	  Epistemic	   contextualism	   is	   a	   semantic	   thesis	   about	  attributions	  of	  knowledge:	  it	  holds	  that	  the	  truth	  conditions	  of	   ‘knows’	  are	   context-­‐dependent.	   But	   why	   think	   that	   ‘knows’	   works	   in	   this	  fashion?	  Here	  is	  a	  pair	  of	  famous	  cases	  by	  Keith	  DeRose	  (1992:	  913):	  	  	  
BANK	  CASE	  A.	  My	  wife	  and	  I	  are	  driving	  home	  on	  a	  Friday	  afternoon.	  We	  plan	  to	  stop	  at	  the	  bank	  on	  the	  way	  home	  to	  deposit	  our	  pay	  checks.	  But	  as	  we	  drive	  past	  the	  bank,	  we	  notice	  that	  the	  lines	  inside	  are	  very	  long,	  as	  they	  often	  are	  on	  Friday	  afternoons.	  Although	  we	  generally	  like	  to	   deposit	   our	   pay	   checks	   as	   soon	   as	   possible,	   it	   is	   not	   especially	  important	   in	   this	   case	   that	   they	  be	  deposited	   right	   away,	   so	   I	   suggest	  that	  we	   drive	   straight	   home	   and	   deposit	   our	   pay	   checks	   on	   Saturday	  morning.	  My	  wife	  says,	  ‘Maybe	  the	  bank	  won’t	  be	  open	  tomorrow.	  Lots	  of	  banks	  are	  closed	  on	  Saturdays.’	  I	  reply,	  ‘No,	  I	  know	  it’ll	  be	  open.	  I	  was	  just	  there	  two	  weeks	  ago	  on	  Saturday.	  It’s	  open	  until	  noon.’	  	  
BANK	  CASE	  B.	  My	  wife	  and	  I	  drive	  past	  the	  bank	  on	  a	  Friday	  afternoon,	  as	   in	  Case	  A,	  and	  notice	  the	   long	   lines.	   I	  again	  suggest	  that	  we	  deposit	  our	  pay	  checks	  on	  Saturday	  morning,	  explaining	  that	  I	  was	  at	  the	  bank	  on	   Saturday	  morning	   only	   two	  weeks	   ago	   and	   discovered	   that	   it	  was	  open	  until	  noon.	  But	  in	  this	  case,	  we	  have	  just	  written	  a	  very	  large	  and	  very	   important	   check.	   If	   our	   pay	   checks	   are	   not	   deposited	   into	   our	  checking	   account	   before	   Monday	   morning,	   the	   important	   check	   we	  wrote	  will	  bounce,	  leaving	  us	  in	  a	  very	  bad	  situation.	  And,	  of	  course,	  the	  
                                                9	  Austin	  (1979,	  180),	  for	  instance,	  observes	  that,	  while	  in	  normal	  contexts	  the	  fact	  that	  your	  hat	  is	  in	  the	  hall	  seems	  to	  be	  good	  enough	  reason	  for	  me	  to	  say	  that	  you	  are	  in,	  when	  a	  lot	  hinges	  on	  it,	  I	  would	  be	  quite	  reticent	  to	  do	  the	  same.	  10	  E.g.	  (DeRose	  1992,	  2002),	  (Cohen	  1986,	  1999).	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bank	   is	   not	   open	   on	   Sunday.	  My	  wife	   reminds	  me	   of	   these	   facts.	   She	  then	  says,	  ‘Banks	  do	  change	  their	  hours.	  Do	  you	  know	  the	  bank	  will	  be	  open	  tomorrow?’	  Remaining	  as	  confident	  as	  I	  was	  before	  that	  the	  bank	  will	  be	  open	  then,	  still,	   I	   reply,	   ‘Well,	  no,	   I	  don’t	  know.	   I’d	  better	  go	   in	  and	  make	  sure.’	  	  Assume	  that	  the	  bank	  will,	  in	  fact,	  be	  open	  on	  Saturday.	  Still,	  it	  feels	  as	  though	  in	  CASE	  B,	  as	  opposed	  to	  CASE	  A,	  DeRose	  is	  right	  not	  to	  attribute	  knowledge	   to	   himself. 11 	  Contextualism	   has	   a	   straightforward	  explanation	   of	   this	   intuition:	   the	   truth	   conditions	   of	   knowledge	  ascribing	   sentences	   vary	   with	   changes	   in	   the	   relevant	   contextual	  parameters.	  	  	   Now,	  one	  notable	  difficulty	  for	  the	  view	  is	  what	  DeRose	  himself	  dubs	   ‘The	   Generality	   Objection’,	   that	   is,	   the	   observation	   that	   the	   said	  shiftiness	  need	  not	  concern	  knowledge	  attributions;	  rather,	  it	  seems	  to	  equally	   affect	   the	   assertability	   of	   the	   embedded	  propositions	   alone.	   It	  looks	  as	  though	  the	  high	  stakes	  contexts	   in	  which	  it	   is	  very	  difficult	  to	  properly	  assert	  ‘S	  knows	  that	  p’	  are	  also	  contexts	  where	  it	  feels	  wrong	  to	  assert	  the	  simple	  ‘p’.	  For	  instance,	  in	  the	  BANK	  CASE	  B	  above,	  where,	  intuitively,	   DeRose	   can’t	   assert	   that	   he	   knows	   that	   the	   bank	   will	   be	  open,	  it	  looks	  as	  though	  it	  would	  also	  be	  equally	  wrong	  for	  him	  to	  flat-­‐out	  assert	  ‘The	  bank	  is	  open	  on	  Saturdays’	  (DeRose	  2002,	  177).	  	   In	   the	   light	   of	   these	   data,	   the	   contextualist	   leans	   on	   the	  independent	  plausibility	  of	   the	  knowledge	  norm	  of	  assertion.	  Roughly,	  the	   thought	   goes	   as	   follows:	   very	   plausibly,	   one	   is	   in	   a	   good	   enough	  position	  to	  make	  an	  epistemically	  proper	  assertion	  that	  p	  if	  and	  only	  if	  one	   knows	   that	   p.12	  If	   that	   is	   the	   case,	   however,	   it	   follows	   that	   the	  standards	  for	  knowledge	  go	  hand	  in	  hand	  with	  the	  standards	  for	  proper	  assertability.	   But,	   the	   contextualist	   line	   goes,	   standards	   for	   proper	  assertability	  definitely	  seem	  to	  vary	  with	  practical	  context.	  Consider,	  for	  further	  illustration,	  the	  following	  knowledge-­‐attribution-­‐free	  cases:	  	  
ASPIRIN-­‐1.	  You	  remember	  having	  bought	  aspirin	   last	  month.	  As	  such,	  when	  you	  head	  together	  with	  your	  sister	  towards	  your	  place	  for	  dinner,	  
                                                11	  In	  the	  said	  Bank	  Case,	  DeRose	  is	  not	  merely	  abstaining	  from	  attributing	  knowledge	  to	  himself;	  he	  denies	  that	  he	  knows.	  See	  Section	  #3.3.1	  for	  discussion.	  12	  The	   locus	   classicus	   for	   the	   defense	   of	   the	   necessity	   claim	   involved	   in	   KNA	   is	  Williamson	  (2000).	  For	  support	  for	  the	  sufficiency	  claim,	  see	  Williamson	  (2005)	  and	  Simion	   (2015).	  While	   (Williamson	   2000)	   does	   not	   explicitly	   endorse	   the	   sufficiency	  direction	   of	  KNA,	   there	   are	   several	   passages	  which	   afford	   a	   sufficiency	   reading.	   For	  instance,	  notably,	  Williamson	  claims	  that	  “only	  knowledge	  warrants	  assertion”	  (2000,	  243).	  Since	  	  ‘knowledge	  warrants	  assertion’	  is	  a	  sufficiency	  claim,	  and	  ‘only	  p’	  implies	  p,	  the	  claim	  easily	  affords	  a	  sufficiency	  reading.	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and	   she	   lets	   you	  know	   she	  has	   a	  minor	  headache,	   you	   flat	   out	   assert:	  ‘Don’t	  worry,	  I	  have	  aspirin	  at	  home’.	  	  	  
ASPIRIN-­‐2.	   You	   remember	   having	   bought	   aspirin	   last	   month.	   Your	  sister’s	   two	   years	   old	   baby	   is	   having	   a	   fever,	   and	   needs	   an	   aspirin	   as	  soon	  as	  possible.	  Plausibly,	  were	  your	   sister	   to	   ask	  you:	   ‘Do	  you	  have	  aspirin	  at	  home,	  or	  should	  we	  go	  to	  the	  pharmacy?’	  you	  would	  be	  less	  inclined	   to	   flat	   out	   assert	   that	   you	   have	   aspirin	   at	   home.	   You	   would	  rather	   say	   something	   along	   the	   lines	   of:	   ‘Well,	   let’s	   drop	   by	   the	  
pharmacy,	  just	  in	  case’.	  	  	  Thus,	   it	   looks	  as	  though,	   in	  high	  stakes	  contexts,	  assertability	  does	  not	  come	  cheap:	  intuitively,	  more	  warrant	  is	  required	  in	  ASPIRIN2	  than	  in	  ASPIRIN1	   for	   being	   in	   a	   position	   to	   properly	   assert	   that	   you	   have	  aspirin	  at	  home.	  But	  if	  KNA	  is	  true,	  i.e.	  if	  the	  standards	  for	  knowledge	  go	  hand	   in	   hand	   with	   the	   standards	   for	   proper	   assertability,	   the	  contextualist	  argues,	  given	  that	  the	  latter	  vary	  with	  context,	  so	  will	  the	  former.	  	  	  	  
1.2	  DeRose’s	  Incompatibility	  Claim	  	  We	  have	  seen	  that	  the	  Shiftiness	  Intuition	  was	  taken	  to	  force	  us	  in	  one	  of	   the	   following	   two	   directions:	   either	   we	   embrace	   knowledge	  sensitivism	   and	   we	   get	   to	   have	   KNA,	   or	   we	   stick	   to	   our	   classical	  invariantist	  guns,	  but	  then	  KNA	  goes	  out	  the	  window,	  together	  with	  all	  its	  theoretical	  benefits.	  Here	  is	  DeRose	  on	  the	  matter:	  	  	   If	  the	  standards	  for	  when	  one	  is	  in	  a	  position	  to	  warrantedly	  assert	   that	  P	   are	   the	   same	   as	   those	   that	   constitute	   a	   truth	  condition	   for	   ‘I	   know	   that	  P,’	   then	   if	   the	   former	   vary	   with	  context,	  so	  do	  the	  latter.	  In	  short:	  The	  knowledge	  account	  of	  assertion	   together	   with	   the	   context	   sensitivity	   of	  assertability	   […]	   yields	   contextualism	   about	   knowledge	  (2002,187).13	  	  As	  such,	  DeRose	  argues,	  the	  knowledge	  account	  of	  assertion	  demands	  a	  sensitivist	  account	  of	  knowledge:	  	  
                                                13	  Note	  that	  DeRose’s	  argument	  goes	  a	  bit	  too	  fast	  from	  KNA	  and	  the	  shiftiness	  data	  to	  contextualism;	  any	  variety	  of	  pragmatic	  encroachment	  will	  share	  in	  the	  goods	  here.	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What	  of	  the	  advocate	  of	  the	  knowledge	  account	  of	  assertion	  who	   does	   not	   accept	   contextualism?	   Such	   a	   character	   is	   in	  serious	   trouble.	   Given	   invariantism	   about	   knowledge,	   the	  knowledge	   account	   of	   assertion	   is	   an	   untenable	   attempt	   to	  rest	   a	   madly	   swaying	   distinction	   upon	   a	   stubbornly	   fixed	  foundation.	   […]	   The	   knowledge	   account	   of	   assertion	  demands	  a	  contextualist	  account	  of	  knowledge	  and	  is	  simply	  incredible	  without	  it	  (2002,	  182).	  	  Let	  us	  unpack	  what	   is	  claimed	  here;	   it	   looks	  as	   though	  we	  are	  offered	  the	  following	  incompatibility	  claim:	  	  	  
The	  Incompatibility	  Claim	  (IC):	  Given	  that	  proper	  assertability	  varies	  with	  practical	  stakes,	  KNA	  is	  incompatible	  with	  Classical	  Invariantism.	  	  	   Now,	   crucially,	   in	   spite	   of	   its	   initial	   plausibility,	   in	   its	   present	  formulation,	  DeRose’s	  Incompatibility	  Claim	  is	  false.	  Here	  is	  why:	  note,	  first	   that	   as	   they	   stand,	   the	   Shiftiness	   Intuition	   and	   IC	   alike	   only	   talk	  about	  general	  propriety	  of	  assertability.	  Crucially,	  though,	  everybody	  in	  this	   debate	   is	   in	   the	   business	   of	   providing	   an	   epistemic	   norm	   of	  assertion,	  so	  what	  matters	  for	  them	  is	  not	  just	  any	  sort	  of	  propriety,	  but	  specifically	  epistemic	  propriety.	  Unqualified	  appeals	  to	  propriety,	  then,	  will	  not	  help	  us	  settle	  the	  case.	  	  	   Furthermore,	  our	  intuitions	  need	  not	  track	  epistemic	  propriety.	  This	  assumption	  affords	  argument.	  To	  see	  this,	  note	  that	  assertion	  is	  a	  type	  of	  action.	  Now,	  all	  actions	  are	  governed	  by	  several	  general	  norms	  in	  virtue	  of	   their	  being	  actions	  as	  such	  –	  prudential	  and	  moral	  norms,	  for	  instance.	  But	  also,	  many	  actions	  are	  subject	  to	  norms	  specific	  to	  the	  particular	  type	  they	  belong	  to:	  chess	  moves	  are	  governed	  by	  norms	  of	  chess,	  driving	  by	  traffic	  norms	  etc.	  (henceforth,	  I	  will	  refer	  to	  any	  type	  specific	   norm	   as	   norm	   N).	   Propriety	   by	   general	   norms	   will	   not,	  however,	  necessarily	  coincide	  with	  propriety	  by	  type	  specific	  norms.	  It	  might	  be	  that	  your	  act	   is	  proper	  in	  one	  sense	  –	  say,	  prudentially	  –	  but	  improper	  by	  norm	  N,	  or	  the	  other	  way	  around.	  	   Also,	   an	   act	   may	   be	   subject	   to	   an	   all-­‐things-­‐considered	  evaluation;	   as	   such,	   it	   might	   be	   the	   case	   that,	   even	   though	   your	   act	  conforms	  to	  norm	  N,	  it	  is	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	  improper.	  Requirements	  according	   to	  a	  particular	  norm	  are	  defeasible:	   they	  can	  be	  overridden	  by	  more	  stringent	  requirements	  stepping	  in.	  If	  I	  have	  to	  move	  the	  rook	  diagonally	   in	   order	   to	   save	   my	   life,	   my	   doing	   so	   will	   be	   all-­‐things-­‐considered	  proper,	  as	  the	  prudential	  considerations	  override	  the	  norms	  of	   chess.	   Still,	   my	   action	   is	   improper	   according	   to	   norm	   N	   of	   chess	  playing.	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   In	  the	  light	  of	  all	  this,	  and	  insofar	  as	  we	  take	  KNA	  to	  amount	  to	  an	   epistemic	   norm,	   in	   its	   present	   formulation,	   DeRose’s	   IC	   is	   strictly	  speaking	   false:	   an	   epistemic	  knowledge	  norm	  of	   assertion	   is	   perfectly	  compatible	  with	  practical	  sensitivity	  of	  permissible	  assertion,	  insofar	  as	  the	  permissibility	  at	  stake	  is	  not	  epistemic.	  	  	  	  	  
1.2.1	  The	  Epistemic	  Shiftiness	  Assumption	  	  In	  order	  to	  hold,	  IC	  needs	  be	  reformulated	  as	  follows:	  	  
The	   Incompatibility	   Claim*	   (IC*):	   Given	   that	   epistemic	   proper	  assertability	   varies	   with	   practical	   stakes,	   KNA	   is	   incompatible	   with	  Classical	  Invariantism.	  	  	  Note,	   however,	   that	   the	   mere	   Shiftiness	   Intuition	   in	   itself	   fails	   to	  motivate	  IC*;	  after	  all,	  again,	   the	  former,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	   latter,	  only	  regards	  general	  propriety.	  A	  further	  assumption	  needs	  to	  be	  in	  place,	  to	  complete	  the	  rationale	  behind	  IC*:	  the	  felt	  variation	  of	  propriety	  needs	  be	   epistemic	   in	   nature.	   Let	   us	   call	   this	   the	   Epistemic	   Shiftiness	  Assumption:	  	  	  
The	  Epistemic	  Shiftiness	  Assumption	  (ESA):	  The	  intuitive	  variation	  in	  propriety	  of	  assertion	  with	  stakes14	  regards	  epistemic	  propriety.	  	  	   However,	  as	  it	  turns	  out,	  ESA	  is	  not	  so	  readily	  defensible.	  To	  see	  this,	   consider	   the	   following	  question:	  given	   the	  normative	  distinctions	  mentioned	   above,15	  how	   is	   one	   to	  distinguish	   the	   requirements	   of	   the	  norm	  one	  is	  interested	  in	  –	  in	  our	  case,	  the	  epistemic	  norm	  –	  from	  the	  requirements	  of	   further	  norms	  stepping	  in	  and	  overriding	  it?	  After	  all,	  for	  all	   it	   is	  being	  said,	   it	  might	  be	  that	  our	  intuitions	  mirror	  all-­‐things-­‐
                                                14	  For	   now,	   this	   discussion	   is	   restricted	   to	   variability	   of	   propriety	   with	   practical	  stakes.	   For	   variability	   with	   tabled	   error	   possibilities,	   see	   Section	   #6.2.	   For	   a	   view	  taking	  propriety	  of	  assertion	  to	  also	  vary	  with	  changes	  in	  epistemic	  environments,	  see	  Goldberg	  (2015).	  For	  a	  view	  that	  takes	  a	  variety	  of	  types	  of	  contextual	  determiners	  to	  be	   relevant	   for	   permissible	   assertion,	   see	   (Gerken	   2012).	   Space	   considerations	  prevent	  me	  from	  discussing	  these	  views	  in	  detail.	  Insofar,	  however,	  as	  both	  Goldberg	  and	  Gerken	   take	  practical	   stakes	   to	  be	   among	   the	   relevant	  determiners,	   their	   views	  are	  relevant	  to	  the	  present	  discussion.	  	  15	  Jennifer	  Lackey	  expresses	  a	  similar	  worry	  regarding	  excuse	  maneuvers	  brought	   in	  defense	  of	  KNA:	  “For	  now,	  whenever	  evidence	  is	  adduced	  that	  concerns	  the	  epistemic	  authority	   requisite	   for	   proper	   assertion,	   it	  may	   bear	   on	   the	   norm	   of	   assertion	   or	   it	  may	   bear	   on	   these	   other	   […]	   norms.	   […]	   [I]t	   will	   be	   extremely	   difficult,	   if	   not	  impossible,	  to	  tell	  which	  is	  being	  defended	  (Lackey	  2011,	  277).	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considered	   propriety;16 	  if	   our	   intuitions	   need	   not	   be	   triggered	   by	  epistemic	   propriety,	   however,	   it	   looks	   as	   if	   we	  will	   hardly	   be	   able	   to	  assess	   the	   explanatory	   power	   of	   one	   norm	  of	   assertion	   or	   another	   or	  the	  plausibility	  of	  ESA,	  by	  merely	  looking	  at	  our	  intuitions	  about	  cases.	  More	  needs	  to	  be	  done:	  we	  need	  to	  supplement	  our	  methodology	  with	  a	  principled	  way	   to	  distinguish	   the	   requirements	  of	   the	  epistemic	  norm	  we	  are	  after	  from	  further	  requirements	  stepping	  in.	  	   	   	  	   Now,	   here	   is	   a	   widely17 	  endorsed	   view	   about	   individuating	  epistemic	  normative	  requirements:	  
	  
The	   Content	   Individuation	   Thesis	   (CIT):	   If	   a	   norm	   N	   affects	   the	  amount	  of	  epistemic	  support	  needed	  for	  permissible	  φ-­‐ing,	  then	  N	  is	  an	  epistemic	  norm.	  	  One	  can	  find	  CIT	  implicitly	  assumed	  in	  most	  of	  the	  literature	  discussing	  the	   epistemic	   normativity	   of	   belief,	   assertion	   or	   action	   in	   the	   last	  decade.18	  Furthermore,	  often,	  CIT	   is	  also	  explicitly	  endorsed;	   take,	  e.g.,	  the	  following	  passages:	  	   [T]he	  problem	  with	  the	  agents	  in	  the	  above	  cases	  is	  that	  it	  is	  not	  epistemically	  appropriate	  for	  them	  to	  flat-­‐out	  assert	  that	  
p	   […].	   One	   reason	   this	   is	   clear	   is	   that	   the	   criticism	   of	   the	  agents	   concerns	   the	   grounds	   for	   their	   assertions	   	   (Lackey	  2013,	  38).	  	  	   Assertions	  are	  governed	  by	  an	  alethic	  or	  an	  epistemic	  norm	  –	  that	  is,	  a	  norm	  that	  specifies	  that	  it	  is	  appropriate	  to	  assert	  something	   only	   if	   what	   is	   asserted	   is	   true,	   or	   justifiably	  believed,	  or	  certain	  or	  known	  (Maitra	  2011,	  277).	  	  	   Note	   that,	   if	   CIT	   is	   a	   viable	   way	   of	   distinguishing	   between	  genuinely	   epistemic	   norms	   and	   norms	   of	   different	   sorts,	   ESA	   is	   true;	  after	   all,	   the	   variation	   at	   stake	   here	   is	   a	   variation	   in	  what	   the	   proper	  degree	   of	   warrant	   for	   assertion	   is	   concerned:	   a	   higher	   degree	   of	  warrant	   seems	   to	   be	   needed	   in	   high	   stakes,	   but	   not	   in	   low	   stakes	  scenarios.	  	  
                                                16 	  Plausibly,	   on	   most	   occasions,	   our	   intuitions	   are	   merely	   tracking	   all-­‐things-­‐considered	  propriety.	  This	  claim,	  however,	  affords	  separate	  argument,	  and	  is	  stronger	  claim	  the	  one	  needed	  for	  the	  argument	  made	  here.	  I	  will,	  therefore,	  set	  it	  aside.	  17	  For	  exceptions,	  see	  pragmatic	  warranted	  assertability	  moves	  against	  contextualism	  (à	   la	   Rysiew	   (2001),	   Brown	   (2006)).	   See	   Section	   #	   6.2	   for	   discussion.	   For	   explicit	  doubts	  about	  this	  recipe	  for	  individuating	  epistemic	  norms,	  see	  e.g.	  Hazlett,	  McKenna	  and	  Pollock	  (2012).	  	  18	  See	  e.g.	  Gerken	  (2012).	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   Alas,	   unless	   we	   have	   good	   reason	   to	   believe	   epistemic	  normativity	  is	  relevantly	  special,	  CIT	  is	  false,	  and	  therefore	  will	  not	  help	  with	  offering	   support	   for	  ESA.	  Here	   is,	  why:	  take	   the	   case	   of	   action	   in	  general.	   Recall	   the	   chess	   case:	   in	   this	   particular	   instance,	   it	   looks	   like	  my	  norm	  N-­‐proper	  action	  –	  that	  is,	  refusing	  to	  move	  the	  rook	  diagonally	  –	   is	   all-­‐things-­‐considered	   inappropriate.	   Crucially,	   though,	   rendering	  the	  action	  altogether	   inappropriate	   is	  not	  the	  only	  way	   in	  which	  more	  stringent	  requirements	  can	  override	  a	  norm	  governing	  a	  particular	  type	  of	   action.	  Consider	   traffic	  norms:	  driving	  one’s	   car	  within	   city	  bounds	  will	   surely	  be	   subject	   to	  whatever	   the	   local	   traffic	   regulations	  have	   to	  say	  about	  it.	  Say	  that	  the	  relevant	  traffic	  norm	  forbids	  one	  from	  driving	  faster	  than	  50	  km/h.	  However,	  say,	   for	   instance,	  that	  a	  terrorist	  group	  placed	  a	  bomb	  in	  centre	  town	  and	  I	  am	  the	  only	  one	  able	  to	  diffuse	  it.	  In	  order	  to	  get	  there	  in	  time,	  I	  have	  to	  break	  the	  traffic	  norm	  and	  drive	  70	  km/h.	   Clearly,	   the	   latter	   requirement	   overrides	   the	   traffic	   norm	   and	  renders	  driving	  70	  km/h	  the	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	  proper	  thing	  to	  do.	  	  	   Notice	   that,	   in	   the	   cases	   above,	   additional	   norms	   stepping	   in	  modify	   the	  normative	  picture	   in	   two	   importantly	  different	  ways.	  First,	  in	  the	  chess	  case,	  my	  norm	  N-­‐proper	  action	  –	  i.e.,	  refusing	  to	  move	  the	  rook	  diagonally	  -­‐	  becomes,	  due	  to	  prudential	  considerations,	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	  altogether	  inappropriate.	  In	  contrast,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  driving,	  the	  standards	  of	  propriety	  are	  modified:	  the	  bomb	  threat	  pushes	  the	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	   proper	   speed	   up	   to	   70	   km/h.	   In	   sum,	   it	   looks	   as	   if	  overriding	  norms	  can:	  	  
Override1:	  Make	  my	  token	  action	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	  inappropriate.	  	  
Override2:	  Modify	  the	  standards	  for	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	  propriety	  up	  or	  down.	  	  About	   Override2:	   notice	   that	   the	   case	   of	   driving	   is	   hardly	   isolated.	  Similar	  examples	  can	  be	  construed	   for	  many	  types	  of	  action,	  provided	  that	   the	   norms	   in	   question	   regulate	  how	  much	  of	  a	  gradable	  property	  one’s	   action	   needs	   to	   enjoy	   in	   order	   to	   be	   permissible.	   It	   can	   be	  prudentially	  or	  morally	  appropriate	  to	  drive	  faster	  or	  slower,	  to	  have	  a	  better	   or	   a	  worse	   grade	   average,	   to	  wear	   a	   longer	   or	   a	   shorter	   skirt.	  Thus,	   it	   looks	  as	  if,	  when	  permissible	  action	  requires	  more	  or	  less	  of	  a	  gradable	  property	  G,	  norms	  regulating	  that	  particular	  type	  of	  action	  can	  fix	   the	   threshold	   for	   N-­‐proper	   performance	   lower	   or	   higher	   on	   the	   G	  spectrum.	   Just	   because	   a	   norm	   is	   regulating	   the	   appropriate	   speed,	   it	  need	   not	   be	   a	   traffic	   norm;	   just	   because	   a	   norm	   regulates	   the	  appropriate	  length	  of	  one’s	  skirt,	  it	  need	  not	  follow	  it	  is	  a	  fashion	  norm.	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1.3	  Epistemic	  Norms	  and	  Norms	  with	  Epistemic	  Content	  	  To	   return	   to	   our	   subject	   matter,	   assertion	   is	   a	   type	   of	   action,	   and	  justification	  is	  a	  gradable	  property.	  If	  that	  is	  the	  case,	  though,	  unless	  we	  have	   reason	   to	   believe	   that	   epistemic	   normativity	   functions	   in	   a	  different	  way	  than	  other	  types	  of	  normativity	  in	  this	  respect,	  we	  should	  expect	   norms	   pertaining	   to	   the	   normativity	   of	   action	   in	   general,	   like	  prudential	  or	  moral	  norms,	   to	  be	  able	   to	  override	   the	  epistemic	  norm	  we	   are	   talking	   about	   in	   both	  ways	   identified	   above:	   either	   by	  making	  one’s	   epistemically	   proper	   assertion	   altogether	   inappropriate,	   or	   by	  modifying	   the	   degree	   of	   warrant	   for	   all-­‐things-­‐considered	   proper	  assertion	  –	  like	  in	  the	  case	  of	  driving.	  But,	  again,	  if	  that	  is	  the	  case,	  CIT	  is	  false:	   just	   because	   a	   norm	  N	   affects	   the	   amount	   of	   epistemic	   support	  needed	   for	  proper	  assertion,	   it	  need	  not	   follow	   that	  N	   is	   an	  epistemic	  norm.	  It	  can	  be,	  of	  course,	  the	  case	  that	  it	  is;	  but	  it	  can	  also	  be	  the	  case	  that	  what	  we	  are	  dealing	  with	   is	  a	  norm	  of	  a	  different	  nature	  –	   say,	   a	  prudential	  or	  moral	  norm	  –	  with	  epistemic	  content;	   that	   is,	  modifying	  the	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	  proper	  degree	  of	  epistemic	  warrant.	  	  Thus,	  we	  should	  expect	   that	   just	  because	  a	  norm	  has	  epistemic	  content,	   it	  need	  not	  follow	  it	  is	  an	  epistemic	  norm.	  	   Now,	   recall	   that	   we	   were	   in	   the	   business	   of	   checking	   the	  plausibility	   of	   IC*;	   that	   is,	   the	   claim	   according	   to	   which	   KNA	   is	  untenable	  in	  conjunction	  with	  classical	  invariantism.	  Also,	  we	  have	  seen	  that	   IC*	   crucially	   depends	   on	   ESA,	   i.e.	   the	   assumption	   that	   the	   felt	  shiftiness	  in	  assertion’s	  propriety	  is	  epistemic	  in	  nature.	  Now,	  crucially,	  we	  are	  missing	  any	  reason	  to	  believe	  ESA	  holds;	  after	  all,	  other	  types	  of	  norms	  can	  override	  the	  epistemic	  norm	  and	  affect	  the	  felt	  propriety	  of	  the	   target	   assertion.	   Furthermore,	   just	   because	   the	   propriety	   at	   stake	  regards	   the	   amount	   of	   epistemic	  warrant,	   it	   need	  not	   follow	   that	   it	   is	  epistemic	   propriety:	   other	   types	   of	   norms	   can	   affect	   the	   appropriate	  amount	  of	  epistemic	  warrant	  also.	  	  	   If	   that	   is	   the	   case,	   however,	   we	   have	   no	   reason	   to	   believe	   IC*	  holds	   either:	   insofar	   as	   the	   shiftiness	   of	   proper	   assertability	   with	  practical	   context	  need	  not	  concern	  epistemic	  proper	  assertability,	  and	  insofar	   as	  KNA	   is	  meant	   as	   an	   epistemic	  norm	  of	   assertion,	   it	  may	  be	  perfectly	   compatible	   with	   Classical	   Invariantism.	   After	   all,	   if	   the	  shiftiness	  intuition	  regards,	  say,	  the	  prudential	  propriety	  of	  assertion,	  it	  can	  still	  be	   the	  case	   that,	  epistemically,	   invariantist	  knowledge	   is	  both	  necessary	  and	  sufficient	  for	  proper	  assertion.	  	   To	  see	   the	  plausibility	  of	  an	  explanation	  of	   the	  data	  along	  such	  lines,	  let	  us	  have	  a	  quick	  glance	  back	  at	  the	  cases.	  Recall:	  in	  the	  high,	  but	  not	  in	  the	  low	  stakes	  context,	  intuitively,	  it	  felt	  inappropriate	  of	  DeRose	  
	   14	  
to	   say	   that	   he	   knew	   the	   bank	   would	   be	   open	   on	   Saturday,	   based	   on	  merely	   having	   been	   there	   two	  weeks	   before.	   Now,	   in	   the	   light	   of	   the	  above	   distinction	   between	   genuine	   epistemic	   norms	   and	   other	   non-­‐epistemic	  norms	  with	  epistemic	  content,	  let	  us	  ask	  ourselves:	  what	  kind	  of	  considerations	  are	  the	  ones	  plausibly	  generating	  the	  impermissibility	  at	  stake	  in	  BANK	  CASE	  B?	  Is	  it	  the	  case	  that	  epistemic	  concerns	  of	  sorts	  are	   at	  work,	   or	   rather	   that	   it	   is	   prudentially	   unadvisable	   to	  make	   the	  relevant	  assertion,	  since	  it	  might	  result	  in	  a	  fairly	  risky	  course	  of	  action,	  with	  high	  practical	  costs	  attached?	  It	  looks	  as	  though	  the	  more	  plausible	  answer	  is:	  ‘the	  latter’.	  Similarly,	  in	  the	  high	  stakes	  version	  of	  ASPIRIN,	  it	  looks	   as	   though	   the	   reason	   why	   I	   should	   abstain	   from	   making	   the	  corresponding	   assertion	   is	   because	   I	   would	   thereby	   be	   putting	   the	  health	  of	  my	  nephew	  at	  risk.	   	  Again,	  this	  looks	  like	  a	  prudential	  rather	  than	  at	  epistemic	  concern.	  	  	   Chapter	   #3	   below	   will	   offer	   a	   principled	   way	   to	   individuate	  epistemic	  norms	  that	  vindicates	  this	  thought.	  For	  now,	  at	  the	  very	  least,	  one	  thing	  is	  clear:	  we	  have	  had	  a	  false	  dilemma	  on	  our	  hands	  to	  begin	  with,	   viz.	   the	   Shiftiness	   Dilemma.	   A	   Classical	   Invariantist	   Knowledge	  Norm	   of	   Assertion	   is	   perfectly	   able	   to	   explain	   the	   data	   at	   hand:	  
epistemically,	   knowledge	   is	   both	   necessary	   and	   sufficient	   for	   proper	  assertion.	  However,	  often	  enough,	  the	  epistemic	  norm	  gets	  overridden	  by	   practical,	   moral	   etc.	   concerns,	   which	   explain	   the	   felt	   (all-­‐things-­‐considered)	  impropriety.	  	   	  	  	  
1.4	  Conclusion	  	  This	  chapter	  has	  identified	  a	  widely	  assumed	  dilemma	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  accounting	   for	   the	   intuitive	   variability	   of	   proper	   assertion	   with	  practical	   stakes:	   it	   is	   commonly	   thought	   that	   one	   can	   either	  hold	   that	  knowledge	   is	   the	   norm	  of	   proper	   assertion	   and	  be	   a	   sensitivist	   about	  knowledge,	   or	   abandon	  KNA	   in	   favour	  of	   a	   context	   sensitive	   standard	  for	  proper	  assertability	  in	  order	  to	  remain	  under	  a	  Classical	  Invariantist	  umbrella	   (what	   I	  have	  dubbed	   the	  Shiftiness	  Dilemma).	   I	  have	  argued	  that	   the	   Shiftiness	   Dilemma	   is	   a	   false	   dilemma,	   resting	   on	   an	  unmotivated	   normative	   assumption,	   i.e.	   the	   assumption	   that	   the	   felt	  variation	   in	   assertability	   with	   stakes	   is	   epistemic	   in	   nature	   (ESA).	  Further	  on,	  I	  have	  shown	  how,	  as	  soon	  as	  we	  give	  up	  this	  assumption,	  Classical	   Invariantism	   is	   perfectly	   compatible	  with	   a	   knowledge	  norm	  of	  assertion.	  	   Of	   course,	   for	   all	   I’ve	   argued	   so	   far,	   the	   explanation	   involving	  overriding,	   KNA	   friendly	   is	   just	   one	   out	   of	   many	   available	   ways	   to	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account	  for	  the	  data	  at	  hand.	  One	  separate	  question,	  of	  course,	  regards	  the	  independent	  plausibility	  of	  KNA,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  available	  rationale	  to	  believe	   KNA	   is	   true	   to	   begin	   with.	   This	   is	   precisely	   what	   the	   next	  chapter	  is	  all	  about.	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Chapter	  II.	  	  
Rationales	  for	  the	  Knowledge	  Norm	  	  	  Say	   that	   it	   turns	  out	   that	  knowledge	   is,	   indeed,	   the	  norm	  of	  assertion;	  will	  that	  fully	  meet	  our	  concern	  with	  the	  relevant	  norm?	  The	  answer	  is	  ‘no’.	  One	  crucial	  question	  still	  remains	  to	  be	  answered,	  i.e.,	  the	  rationale	  question	  (RC):	  	  why	  is	  assertion	  governed	  by	  a	  knowledge	  norm	  in	  the	  first	  place?	  	  	   As	  it	  turns	  out,	  with	  very	  few	  exceptions,	  RC	  is	  not	  addressed	  by	  contributors	   to	   the	   debate;	   little 19 	  has	   been	   done	   to	   explore	   the	  rationale	   behind	   one	   epistemic	   norm	   or	   another,	   KNA	   included.	  However,	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   a	   rationale,	   it	   is	   not	   clear	  why	   a	   different	  norm	  might	  not	  have	  come	  to	  be	  governing	  the	  speech	  act	  of	  assertion.	  Since	  it	  is	  rather	  implausible	  that	  this	  might	  have	  occurred,	  the	  need	  for	  a	   rationale	   is	   pressing	   in	   its	   own	   right,	   independently	   of	   finding	   a	  satisfactory	  account	  of	  what	  the	  correct	  norm	  is.	  	  	   This	   chapter	   looks	   at	   three	   proposed	   rationales	   for	   KNA	   	   -­‐	  crucially,	  all	  targeting	  the	  necessity	  direction	  thereof	  -­‐	  and	  argues	  that	  they	   fail	   to	   do	   the	   intended	   work.	   The	   first	   two	   I	   dub	   inheritance	  arguments; 20 	  according	   to	   these	   proposals,	   assertion	   inherits	   the	  knowledge	  norm	  from	  some	  other	  relevantly	  related	  entity;	  belief	  and	  action	  are	  the	  usual	  suspects.	  In	  contrast,	  according	  to	  the	  last	  proposal	  this	  chapter	  examines,	  the	  knowledge	  norm	  is	  constitutive	  of	  assertion	  itself,	  rather	  than	  derived	  from	  a	  related	  entity.	  That	  is,	  the	  speech	  act	  itself	  is	  defined	  by	  the	  very	  fact	  that	  all	  instances	  thereof	  are	  governed	  by	  KNA.	  	  	  
2.1	  Inheritance	  #1:	  Belief	  	  It	  looks	  as	  though	  there’s	  a	  clear	  sense	  in	  which	  you	  should	  only	  assert	  things	  you	  actually	  believe;	  after	  all,	  we	  criticize	  each	  other	  all	  the	  time	  for	   doing	   otherwise:	   ‘You	  don’t	   believe	   that	   yourself!’,	   or	   ‘Why	  would	  you	   say	   such	   a	   thing?	   Do	   you	   really	   believe	   it	   to	   be	   true?’	   are	   fairly	  common	  ways	  to	  challenge	  assertions.	  Several	  philosophers	  take	  this	  to	  suggest	  that,	   if	  there	  is	  such	  a	  thing	  as	  a	  particular	  epistemic	  standard	  governing	  belief,	  it	  will	  also	  get	  inherited	  by	  the	  speech	  act	  of	  assertion.	  	  	   I	  identify	  two	  broad	  types	  of	  defence:	  first,	  there	  are	  people	  who	  believe	   that,	   in	  a	  relevant	  way,	  belief	  and	  assertion	  are	  essentially	   the	  
                                                19	  Exceptions	   include	  Kent	  Bach	  (2008),	   Igor	  Douven	  (2006),	  Frank	  Hindriks	  (2007),	  Sandy	  Goldberg	  (2009),	  Tim	  Wiliamson	  (2000).	  20	  I	  borrow	  this	  terminology	  from	  Jessica	  Brown	  (2012).	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same	   kind	   of	   beast,	   only	   manifested	   in	   different	   environments	   (“the	  belief-­‐assertion	   parallel”,	   notably	   defended	   in	   Adler	   (2002)).	  Importantly,	  these	  philosophers	  also	  take	  this	  metaphysical	  parallelism	  to	  have	  import	  in	  the	  normative	  realm.	  	  	   Secondly,	   I	  move	  to	  deontic	  transmission	  arguments.	  According	  to	   people	   like	  Kent	  Back	   and	  Frank	  Hindriks,	   belief	   and	   assertion	   are	  governed	  by	  one	  and	  the	  same	  epistemic	  norm	  in	  virtue	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  one	  inherits	  it	  from	  the	  other.	  	  	  
2.1.1	  Normative	  Correspondence	  and	  the	  Belief-­‐Assertion	  Parallel	  	  One	   very	  widely	   spread	   assumption	   in	   recent	   literature	   on	   epistemic	  norms	   is	   that	   the	   ‘belief-­‐assertion	   parallel’	   (henceforth	   BAP)	   has	   a	  special	   kind	   of	   normative	   import.	   That	   is,	   several	   prominent	  philosophers	   (e.g.	   Williamson	   (2000),	   Douven	   (2006),	   Sosa	   (2010))	  employ	  the	  thesis	  that,	  roughly	  put,	  belief	  stands	  to	  assertion	  like	  inner	  to	   outer,	   to	   argue	   from	   the	   epistemic	   norm	   governing	   one	   to	   the	  epistemic	   norm	   governing	   the	   other.	   It	   is	   assumed,	   then,	   that	  metaphysical	  parallelism	  licenses	  norm	  correspondence.	  Now,	  say	  that	  turns	   out	   to	   be	   true.	   And	   say	   that	   we	   have	   strong	   independent	  motivation	  to	  believe	  that	  knowledge	  is	  the	  norm	  of	  belief	  –	  that	  is,	  that	  one	  must:	  believe	  p	  only	  if	  one	  knows	  that	  p.	  After	  all,	  the	  claim	  has	  a	  lot	  going	   for	   it:	   among	   other	   things,	   it	   does	   seem	   right	   to	   say	   that	   only	  knowledgeable	   belief	   is	   good	   belief.	   Or,	   even	   more	   plausibly,	   that	  ignorant	  belief	  is	  epistemically	  defective.	  If	  this	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  right,	  in	  conjunction	   with	   BAP,	   it	   delivers	   a	   pretty	   solid	   rationale	   for	   the	  necessity	  claim	  involved	  in	  KNA.21	  	  	   This	  section	  questions	  this	  way	  to	  go	  about	  deriving	  KNA.	  To	  this	  effect,	   I	   first	   argue	   that,	   in	   its	   most	   plausible	   formulation,	   the	   belief-­‐assertion	  parallel	   lacks	  any	  normative	   import.	  Further	  on,	   I	   turn	  to	  an	  alternative	  reading	  of	  the	  BAP	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  shed	  serious	  doubts	  on	  its	  plausibility	  and	  normative	  strength.	  	   To	  begin	  with,	  I	  want	  to	  get	  one	  worry	  out	  of	  the	  way:	  one	  might	  be	  tempted	  to	  object	  to	  BAP	  on	  metaphysical	  grounds;	  after	  all,	  belief	  is	  a	  state	  while	  assertion	  is	  an	  action.	  This	  line,	  however,	  will	  not	  concern	  us	  here,	  since	  I	  take	  it	  not	  to	  constitute	  an	  insurmountable	  difficulty	  for	  the	   champion	   of	   BAP1;	   she	   could,	   for	   instance,	   replace	   belief	   for	  judgement,	  or	  belief-­‐formation.22	  	  
                                                21	  I	   take	   it	   to	   be	   a	   contingent	   matter	   of	   fact	   that	   the	   BAP	   has	   traditionally	   been	  employed	   to	  only	  defend	   the	  necessity	  direction	  of	  KNA.	  However,	   given	   that	   this	   is	  the	  case,	  I	  discuss	  it	  accordingly.	  	  22	  E.g.	  (Frege	  1918,	  22).	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   Let	   us	   get	   down	   to	   business;	   in	   Tim	  Williamson’s	   reading,	   the	  belief	  assertion	  parallel	  amounts	  to	  the	  claim	  that:	  	  
BAP:	  Believing	  p	  stands	   to	  asserting	  p	  as	   the	   inner	   stands	   to	   the	  outer	  (2000,	  255-­‐56).	  	  Furthermore,	   Williamson	   (2000,	   255-­‐256)	   takes	   BAP	   to	   warrant	   the	  following	  normative	  claim:	  	  	  
Norm	  Correspondence	  (NC):	  If	  belief	  (assertion)	  is	  governed	  by	  norm	  N,	  then	  assertion	  (belief)	  is	  governed	  by	  norm	  N	  also.23	  	  To	   check	   the	   plausibility	   of	   this	   claim,	   let	   us	   ask	   ourselves	   how	   one	  should	  read	  BAP	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  After	  all,	  the	  fact	  that	  some	  x	  stands	  to	  some	  y	  like	  inner	  to	  outer	  affords	  two	  possible	  readings:	  first,	  it	  could	  be	   that	   x	   and	   y	   are	   species	   of	   the	   same	   genus,	   active	   in	   different	  environments.	  Alternatively,	  one	  might	  be	  a	  species	  of	  the	  other:	  x	  but	  an	   inner	  manifestation	  of	  y,	  or	   the	  other	  way	  around.	   I	  will	   start	  with	  the	   most	   plausible	   reading,	   which	   also	   seems	   to	   be	   the	   one	   readily	  suggested	  by	  Williamson’s	  formulation:	  	  
BAP1:	  Belief	  stands	  to	  assertion	  like	  inner	  φ-­‐ing	  to	  outer	  φ-­‐ing,	  	  where	  phi	   is	   to	  be	  replaced	  by	  whatever	   it	   is	   that	  belief	  and	  assertion	  share,	   in	   spite	   of	   their	   differences	   in	   environment.	   Now,	   what	   phi	  stands	   for	   is	   of	   little	   importance	   for	   us	   here,	   but	   just	   for	   illustrative	  purposes,	   let	   us	   go	   along	  with	   Sosa	   (2010)	   and	   call	   it	   affirmation.	   As	  such,	  we	  get:	  	  
BAP1*:	   Belief	   stands	   to	   assertion	   like	   inner	   affirmation	   to	   outer	  affirmation.	  	  	   Note	   that,	   at	   least	   at	   first	   glance,	   this	   formulation	   looks	   fairly	  plausible:	   intuitively,	   belief	   does	   seem	   to	  be,	   in	   some	   sense,	   the	   inner	  counterpart	  of	  assertion.	  	  	   Note,	   however,	   that	   BAP1	   fails	   to	   offer	   the	   desired	   kind	   of	  normative	   import,	   i.e.,	   norm	   correspondence.	   That	   is,	   one	   cannot	   use	  BAP1	  together	  with	  one’s	  preferred	  account	  of	  the	  normativity	  of	  either	  
                                                23	  Given	   BAP,	   and	   having	   offered	   extensive	   argument	   for	   a	   knowledge	   norm	   of	  assertion,	  Williamson	  argues	  for	  a	  knowledge	  norm	  of	  belief:	  “It	   is	  plausible	  […]	  that	  occurrently	  believing	  p	  stands	  to	  asserting	  p	  as	  the	  inner	  stands	  to	  the	  outer.	  If	  so,	  the	  knowledge	  rule	  for	  assertion	  corresponds	  to	  the	  norm	  that	  one	  should	  believe	  p	  only	  if	  one	  knows	  p	  (2000,	  255-­‐256)”	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belief	  or	  assertion	  to	  derive	  the	  relevant	  corresponding	  norm.	  After	  all,	  on	   this	   reading,	   belief	   and	   assertion	   are	   but	   species	   belonging	   to	   the	  same	  type.	  The	   fact	   that	  one	   is	  governed	  by	  a	  particular	  norm	  tells	  us	  precious	  little	  about	  what	  norm	  governs	  the	  other.	  To	  see	  this,	  consider	  waltzing	  and	  tango	  dancing;	  though	  they	  are	  both	  species	  of	  dancing,	  it	  does	  not	  follow	  that	  if	  N	  is	  a	  norm	  for	  waltzing,	  then	  N	  is	  also	  a	  norm	  for	  tango	  dancing.	  Similarly,	  on	  BAP1,	  one	  cannot	  argue	   from	  N	  being	   the	  norm	   for	   belief	   to	   N	   being	   the	   norm	   of	   assertion.	   On	   this	   reading,	  metaphysical	  parallelism	  does	  not	  warrant	  norm	  correspondence.	  	   On	   a	   first	   approximation,	  what	   seems	   to	   be	   needed	   is	   that	   the	  genus	  is	  itself	  governed	  by	  the	  relevant	  norm;	  if	  N	  is	  a	  norm	  for	  dancing	  in	   general,	   it	  will	   be	   inherited	   by	   all	   of	   its	   species.	   If	   that	   is	   the	   case,	  what	  is	  needed	  here	  is	  that	  N	  is	  a	  norm	  governing	  the	  genus,	  i.e.,	  in	  our	  example,	   affirmation,	   and	   thus	   gets	   inherited	   by	   both	   belief	   and	  assertion.	  	  	  	   Crucially	   though,	  even	  so,	   the	  desired	  normative	  claim	  will	   still	  fail	   to	   come	   through.	   To	   see	  why,	   it	  will	   be	   useful	   to	   first	   turn	   to	   the	  alternative	   possible	   reading	   of	   the	   BAP	   and	   its	   purported	   normative	  import:	   on	   this	   reading,	   the	   claim	  would	   amount	   to	   taking	   belief	   and	  assertion	   to	  be	   such	   that	   one	   is	   a	   species	   of	   the	   other,	  which	   triggers	  norm	  transfer.	  Given	  that	  what	  we	  are	  interested	  in	  here	  is	  deriving	  the	  norm	  of	  assertion	  from	  the	  norm	  of	  belief,	  the	  formulation	  in	  question	  goes	  along	  the	  following	  lines:24	  	  	  
BAP2:	  Assertion	  is	  a	  species	  of	  belief,	  to	  wit,	  vocalized	  belief.	  	  	   The	   thought	  would	  be,	   then,	   that	  norm	  correspondence	   readily	  drops	   out	   of	   this	   way	   of	   reading	   BAP,	   since	   whatever	   the	   norm	   for	  belief,	  it	  will	  govern	  all	  species	  thereof,	  including	  the	  vocalized	  one,	  i.e.	  assertion.	  	  	   At	   first	  glance,	  BAP2	  seems	   to	  do	   the	  required	  normative	   trick.	  Think	   about	   dancing	   again:	   it	   looks	   as	   though,	   if	   there	   is	   a	   norm	  requiring	  one	  to	  wear	  light	  shoes	  for	  all	  dancing,	  one	  must,	  thereby,	  also	  wear	  light	  shoes	  for	  waltzing.	  	  	  	  	   Alas,	   this	   normative	   import	   claim	   does	   not	   withstand	   closer	  value-­‐theoretic	   scrutiny	   either:	   norm	   transfer	   need	   not	   imply	   norm	  correspondence.	  To	  see	  why,	  note	  that	  the	  relevant	  norm	  for	  the	  type	  of	  shoe	   required	   for	   waltzing	   might	   be	   more	   demanding	   than	   the	   one	  governing	  dancing	  in	  general.	  This	  should	  be	  fairly	  easy	  to	  see:	  after	  all,	  what	  distinguishes	  waltzing	   from	   just	  any	  dancing	   is	   the	   fact	   that	   it	   is	  
                                                24	  People	   like	   Jonathan	   Adler	   (2002)	   and	   Igor	   Douven	   (2006)	   defend	   a	   formulation	  that	   takes	  belief	   to	  be	  a	  species	  of	  assertion	   -­‐	   subvocalized	  assertion	  or	  assertion	   to	  oneself.	  The	  argument	  that	  follows	  applies,	  mutatis	  mutandis,	  to	  this	  formulation	  also.	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governed	  by	  some	  distinctive	  norms	  on	   top	  of	   the	  ones	  governing	   the	  type	  it	  belongs	  to.	  In	  virtue	  of	  this,	  it	  can	  be	  that	  the	  relevant	  norm	  for	  waltzing	   is	   stronger	   than	   the	   one	   for	   dancing	   in	   general:	   and,	   as	   a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  waltz	  shoes	  are	  not	  just	  any	  light	  shoes,	  but	  medium	  heel,	  pointy,	  cross	  strapped	  light	  shoes.	  	  	   If	  that	  is	  the	  case,	  though,	  again,	  correspondence	  need	  not	  follow	  from	  BAP2	  either.	  That	   is,	   just	   as	   in	   the	   case	  of	  waltz	   shoes,	   it	   can	  be	  that	  the	  epistemic	  requirement	  on	  the	  species	  is	  stronger	  than	  that	  on	  the	  genus.	  BAP2	  does	  nothing	  to	  exclude	  a	  normative	  picture	  whereby	  assertion	   is	   only	   epistemically	   permissible	   if	   knowledgeable,	   while	  belief	   is	   governed	   by	   a	   less	   demanding	   norm.	   If	   that	   is	   the	   case,	  however,	   we	   will	   not	   be	   able	   to	   tell,	   just	   by	   looking	   at	   the	   norm	  governing	  belief,	  what	  norm	  governs	  assertion.	  	   Of	   course,	   correspondence	   may	   follow	   in	   the	   following	   trivial	  way:	  given	  that	  we	  are	  talking	  about	  a	  necessity	  claim,	  if	  assertion	  will	  be	   governed	   by	   the	   stronger	   norm,	   the	   weaker	   condition	   governing	  belief	  will	  also	  be	  necessary	  for	  proper	  assertion.	  This	  result,	  however,	  is	   hardly	   interesting:	   surely,	   for	   instance,	   defenders	   of	   a	   knowledge	  norm	  of	  assertion	  would	  not	  want	  to	  say	  that	  they	  agree	  with	  defenders	  of	  a	  truth	  norm,	  just	  because	  the	  former	  entails	  the	  latter.	  What	  we	  care	  about	  here	  –	  and	  what	   the	   literature	   is	   concerning	   itself	  with	   –	   is	  not	  merely	   identifying	   a	   necessary	   condition	   on	   epistemically	   proper	  assertion,	  but	  identifying	  the	  strongest	  such	  necessary	  condition.	  	   All	   in	  all,	  we	  don’t	  seem	  to	  have	  much	  in	  the	  way	  of	  motivation	  for	   believing	   that	   normative	   correspondence	   is	   true.	   I	   say	   ‘not	  much’	  rather	   than	   ‘any’	   because,	   for	   all	   has	   been	   said	   here,	   there	   remains	  room	   for	   correspondence	   insofar	   as	  what	   is	   defended	   is	   a	  maximally	  strong	  norm	   for	  both	  assertion	  and	  belief.	  That	   is,	  BAP	   in	  all	   readings	  will	   do	   the	   intended	   work	   unaffected	   by	   the	   argument	   made	   by	   this	  paper,	   if	  what	   is	  at	  stake	  is	  a	  certainty	  norm,	  for	   instance.	   It	   is	  easy	  to	  see,	   then,	   that	   the	   normative	   requirement	   will	   merely	   be	   transferred	  from	  type	  to	  species	  unaffected.	  	  	   Note,	  though,	  a	  few	  things:	  first,	  again	  –	  depending,	  of	  course,	  on	  how	   the	   relevant	  notion	  of	   certainty	   is	   spelled	  out	   -­‐	  many	  people	  will	  most	   likely	   fail	   to	   feel	   the	   attraction	   of	   defending	   such	   a	   demanding	  norm	   for	   either	   assertion	   or	   belief.	  25	  Second,	   more	   importantly	   for	  present	   purposes,	   note	   that	   this	   still	   robs	   BAP	   of	   its	   advertised	  normative	   strength:	   after	   all,	   on	   this	   picture,	   BAP	   will	   only	   work	   in	  conjunction	   with	   a	   good	   defence	   of	   the	   relevant	   epistemic	   norm	   for	  whichever	  of	  the	  two	  –	  assertion	  or	  belief	  –	  is	  taken	  to	  be	  the	  genus.	  
                                                25 	  Importantly,	   Williamson	   defends	   a	   knowledge	   norm	   where	   knowledge	   is	  understood	  to	  imply	  epistemic	  probability	  1.	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   And	  third,	  even	  if	  we	  set	  all	  this	  aside,	  on	  closer	  inspection,	  there	  is	   reason	   to	   doubt	   that	   even	   this	   pale	   claim	   to	   normative	   relevance	  stands.	  Here	   is	  why:	  note	   that	  BAP2,	   taken	  at	   face	   value,	   suffers	   from	  some	  degree	  of	  metaphysical	  awkwardness.	  It	  is,	  after	  all,	  a	  bit	  weird	  to	  claim	  that	  a	  speech	  act	  is	  a	  species	  of	  a	  mental	  state.	  What	  needs	  be	  the	  case,	  then,	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  such	  aberration,	  is	  that	  we	  read	  BAP2	  non-­‐literally,	  as	  making	  a	  restricted	  claim	  of	  the	  form:	  	  	  
BAP2*:	   Assertion	   is,	   in	   a	   relevant	   way,	   a	   species	   of	   belief,	   to	   wit,	  vocalized	  belief.	  	  	  What	  BAP2*	  attempts	  to	  do	  is	  get	  rid	  of	  the	  metaphysical	  awkwardness	  at	   issue	   in	   the	   original	   formulation.	   The	   claim	   is	   that,	   for	   all	  we	   care,	  that	   is,	   in	   all	   respects	   that	   are	   relevant	   for	   the	   present	   discussion,	  assertion	  is	  a	  species	  of	  belief.	  Not	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  is,	  itself,	  a	  mental	  state	  rather	  than	  a	  speech	  act,	  but	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  these	  considerations	  do	  not	  matter	  for	  present	  purposes.	  	   Note,	  though,	  that	  this	  restriction	  robs	  BAP	  of	  even	  its	  last	  bit	  of	  normative	   flavour:	  after	  all,	  what	   this	   restriction	  amounts	   to	   saying	   is	  that	   belief	   and	   assertion	   share	   some	   features,	   and	   others	   not.	   Again,	  however,	  just	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  them	  being	  species	  of	  the	  same	  genus,	  the	  features	   they	   don’t	   have	   in	   common	   can	   make	   all	   the	   normative	  difference.	  	   One	  last	  thing	  still	  needs	  to	  be	  discussed:	  recall	  what	  was	  said	  at	  the	  end	  of	  section	  #2.1	  about	  affirmation:	   I	  was	  suggesting	   there	   that,	  even	  if	  we	  take	  assertion	  and	  belief	  to	  be	  species	  of	  the	  same	  genus,	  i.e.	  affirmation,	   and	  we	   find	   that	   a	   particular	   norm,	   call	   it	   N,	   governs	   the	  genus,	   norm	   correspondence	   will	   still	   fail	   to	   hold.	   Now	   we	   are	   in	   a	  position	   to	   easily	   see	  why:	   first,	   it	   can	   still	   be	   the	   case	   that,	   although	  both	   assertion	   and	   belief	   inherit	   N	   from	   affirmation,	   one	   of	   them	   is	  governed	  by	  a	  stronger	  norm	  N+.	  Second,	  even	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  what	   is	  at	  stake	  is	  a	  maximally	  strong	  norm,	  the	  normative	   import	  we	  get	   is	   less	   than	   satisfactory;	   again,	   normative	   correspondence	   fails	   to	  obtain.	  Recall	  that	  the	  thought	  was	  that	  what	  we	  wanted	  was	  to	  be	  able,	  in	  virtue	  of	  BAP,	  to	  come	  to	  deduce	  the	  norm	  of	  assertion	  from	  knowing	  the	  norm	  of	  belief.	  On	  the	  picture	  we	  are	  left	  with,	  however,	  this	  will	  not	  work.	  After	  all,	  if	  we	  buy	  into	  BAP1,	  and	  come	  to	  discover	  that	  the	  norm	  of	  belief	  is	  certainty,	  we	  will	  still	  not	  be	  able	  to	  ascertain	  whether	  that	  particular	  norm	  is	   inherited	   from	  the	  genus	  –	  affirmation	  –	  as	   is,	  with	  the	   result	   that	  we	  may	   expect	   it	   to	   govern	   assertion	   also,	   or	  whether	  affirmation	   is	  governed	  by	  a	  weaker	  normative	  requirement,	   in	  which	  case	  there	  is	  little	  we	  can	  ascertain	  about	  assertion.	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   To	   sum	   up:	   we	   have	   looked	   at	   two	   possible	   readings	   of	   the	  belief-­‐assertion	   parallel	   and	   argued	   that	   the	   BAP	   does	   not	   have	   the	  normative	   import	   it	   is	   often	   thought	   to	   have.	   On	   the	   one	   plausible,	  metaphysically	   unproblematic	   reading,	   on	   which	   belief	   and	   assertion	  are	   related	   to	   one	   another	   as	   inner	   to	   outer,	   nothing	   of	   normative	  interest	   follows	   from	   BAP.	   We	   then	   explored	   the	   readily	   available	  thought	   that,	   in	   order	   to	  make	   sense	   of	   its	   employment	   in	   support	   of	  one	   normative	   account	   or	   another,	   BAP	   needs	   to	   be	   spelled	   out	   as	  making	  a	  (metaphysically	  weird)	  genus-­‐species	  claim.	  However,	  it’s	  not	  at	  all	   clear	   that	   the	  price	   is	  dialectically	  worth	  paying	  given	   that,	   as	   it	  turns	  out,	  even	  on	  this	  reading,	  BAP	  fails	  to	  deliver.	  	  	  	  
2.1.2	  Deontic	  Transmission	  	  If	  norm	  commonality	  does	  not	  follow	  from	  the	  belief-­‐assertion	  parallel,	  that	   is,	   from	  metaphysical	  relations	  of	  sorts	  between	  the	  two,	  perhaps	  the	   target	   norm	   can	   be	   plausibly	   inherited	   through	   some	   variety	   of	  normative	  relations.	  Stipulating	  normative	  dependence	  is	  one	  way	  that	  has	  been	  exploited	   in	   the	   literature;	   this	   is	   the	  route	  pursued	  by	  Kent	  Bach	   (2008)	   and	   Frank	   Hindriks	   (2007).	   Roughly,	   the	   idea	   is	   that	   a	  knowledge	   norm	   for	   assertion	   (KNA)	   can	   be	   derived	   from	   taking	  assertion	  to	  be	  the	  linguistic	  expression	  of	  belief,	  which	  gives	  rise	  to	  a	  belief	   rule	  on	  assertion,	   and	  a	  knowledge	   rule	  on	  belief.	  This	   idea	  has	  been	  developed	  in	  more	  detail	  by	  Hindriks.	  He	  starts	  from	  the	  following	  idea:	  	  (1)	  To	  assert	  that	  p	  is	  to	  utter	  a	  sentence	  that	  means	  that	  p	  and	  thereby	  expresses	  the	  belief	  that	  p.	  	  Hindriks	   goes	   on	   to	   argue	   that,	   in	   situations	   of	   normal	   trust,	   which	  obtain	  unless	  it	  is	  permissible	  to	  lie,	  assertion	  is	  governed	  by	  a	  sincerity	  rule	   to	   the	   effect	   that	   one	  must	   express	   an	   attitude	  only	   if	   one	  has	   it.	  This	  gives	  us:	  	  (2)	  In	  situations	  of	  normal	  trust,	  one	  must:	  express	  the	  belief	  that	  p	  only	  if	  one	  believes	  that	  p.	  	  	  (1)	  and	  (2)	  imply	  	  (3)	   In	   situations	   of	   normal	   trust,	   one	   must:	   assert	   that	   p	   only	   if	   one	  believes	  that	  p.	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Furthermore,	  Hindriks	  takes	  (3)	  to	  ground	  norm	  inheritance;	  that	  is,	  he	  takes	  it	  to	  be	  the	  case	  that,	  if	  (3)	  holds,	  and	  say:	  	  (4)	   One	   must	   only	   believe	   what	   one	   knows	   (the	   knowledge	   norm	   of	  belief,	  KNB),	  	  	  it	  follows	  that	  	  (5)	  In	  situations	  of	  normal	  trust,	  one	  must	  only	  assert	  what	  one	  knows	  (the	  knowledge	  norm	  of	  assertion,	  KNA).	  	  In	   sum,	   the	   thought	  behind	   the	  Bach/Hindriks	  normative	  dependence	  line	  is	  simple	  and	  elegant:	  since	  it	  is	  plausible	  that	  there	  is	  a	  belief	  norm	  on	   assertion,	   whatever	   the	   norm	   for	   belief	   is,	   it	   will	   get	   inherited	   by	  assertion.	  	  	  	   Now,	  plausible	  as	  this	  might	  sound,	  there	  are,	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  two	   important	   ways	   in	   which	   normative	   inheritance	   might	   fail	   to	   go	  through,	  in	  spite	  of	  normative	  dependence;	  first,	  there	  is	  a	  quantitative	  problem:	   transmission	  might	   fail.	  That	   is,	   it	  might	  be	   that,	  somewhere	  down	   the	   road,	   the	   norm	   in	   question	   gets	   affected	   –	   for	   instance,	  weakened	   or	   strengthened	   –	   by	   further	   normative	   requirements	  stepping	  in	  and,	  as	  a	  result,	  it	  fails	  to	  be	  inherited	  in	  its	  initial	  shape.	  	  	   Second,	   there	   is	   a	   qualitative	   danger,	   pertaining	   to	   the	   type	   of	  norm	  we	  are	   talking	  about.	  That	   is,	  given	   that	  what	  we	  are	  after	   is	  an	  epistemic	   norm,	   we	   want	   to	   make	   sure	   the	   requirement	   that	   gets	  inherited	  strictly	  pertains	  to	  epistemic	  normativity.	  	  	   Now,	   concerning	   the	   latter,	   doubts	   have	   been	   expressed	   in	  several	   places	   in	   the	   literature	   (e.g.	   Ball	   (2014),	   Kelp	   and	   Simion	  (2016))	   regarding	   the	   validity	   of	   the	   Bach/Hindriks	   derivation,	  worrying	   that	   an	   equivocation	   on	   ‘must’	   is	   at	   play	   in	   the	   argument.	  Roughly,	  the	  thought	   is	  that	  the	  Bach/Hindriks	   line	  attempts	  to	  derive	  an	   epistemic	  must	   –	   the	   epistemic	   norm	   of	   assertion	   in	   (5)	   –	   from	   a	  moral	  must	  governing	  ‘normal	  trust’	  situations	  ((3)).	  	  	   Even	   so,	   it	  may	   yet	   be	   possible	   to	   rescue	  Hindriks’s	   argument.	  Why	  exactly	  should	  a	  moral	  sincerity	  rule	  be	  governing	  assertion	  in	  the	  first	   place?	   Why	   should	   we	   find	   it	   morally	   objectionable	   to	   make	  insincere	  assertions?	  One	  plausible	  answer	  is	  that	   insincere	  assertions	  are	  prone	  to	  induce	  false	  beliefs	  in	  others	  and	  that’s	  something	  bad.	  But	  now	  notice	   that	   false	  beliefs	  are	   in	   the	   first	   instance	  an	  epistemic	  bad.	  One	   might	   think,	   then,	   that	   the	   moral	   sincerity	   rule	   is	   ultimately	  grounded	  in	  an	  epistemic	  sincerity	  rule,	  which,	   in	  turn,	  exists	   in	  order	  to	  minimize	  the	  epistemic	  bad	  of	  false	  belief.	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   What	   I	   will	   argue	   next,	   however,	   is	   that	   even	   if	   we	   charitably	  interpret	   the	   Bach/Hindriks	   line	   to	   keep	   with	   sheer	   epistemic	  obligation	  from	  beginning	  till	  end,	  their	  conclusion	  still	  fails	  to	  follow.	  	   Here	  is	  why:	  according	  to	  the	  Bach-­‐Hindriks	  line,	  	  	  (1)	   In	   normal	   trust	   situations,	   it	   is	   permissible	   to	   assert	   p	  only	   if	   you	  believe	  p.	  (2)	  It	  is	  permissible	  to	  believe	  p	  only	  if	  you	  know	  p,	  	  (3)	   Therefore,	   in	   normal	   trust	   situations,	   it	   is	   permissible	   to	   assert	  p	  only	  if	  you	  know	  p.	  	  It	   is	   easy	   to	   see	   that,	   since	   the	   first	   premise	   features	  belief,	  while	   the	  second	  stipulates	  necessary	  conditions	  for	  permissible	  belief,	  and	  since	  belief	   does	   not	   imply	   permissible	   belief,	   the	   Bach-­‐Hindriks	   Line	   fails:	  deontic	  'possible'	  does	  not	  work	  like	  this.	  26	  There	  will	  be	  worlds	  where	  you	   believe	   impermissibly,	   but	   you	   still	   do,	   therefore	   you	   can	  permissibly	  assert.	  	   Obligation	   just	   does	   not	   transmit	   like	   the	  Bach/Hindriks	  line	  needs	  it	  to	  transmit.	  The	  lesson	  to	  take	  home,	  then,	  is	  the	  following:	  you	  might	  be	  criticisable	  for	  your	  beliefs,	  for	  breaking	  the	   norm	   of	   belief	   (say,	   for	   believing	   non-­‐knowledgeably).	   	   However,	  insofar	   as	   you	   keep	   with	   the	   norm	   of	   assertion	   –	   in	   our	   case,	   the	  sincerity	   norm	   requiring	   you	   not	   to	   say	   things	   you	   don’t	   believe	  yourself	  -­‐	  your	  assertions	  will	  be	  criticism-­‐proof.	  	  	  	   One	  way	  to	  save	  the	  Bach/Hindriks	  argument	  that	  readily	  comes	  to	  mind,	  then,	  is	  to	  modify	  the	  second	  premise	  as	  to	  feature	  permissible	  belief:	  	  	  (1)	   In	   normal	   trust	   situations,	   it	   is	   permissible	   to	   assert	   p	  only	   if	   you	  permissibly	  believe	  p.	  (2)	  It	  is	  permissible	  to	  believe	  p	  only	  if	  you	  know	  p,	  	  (3)	   Therefore,	   in	   normal	   trust	   situations,	   it	   is	   permissible	   to	   assert	  p	  only	  if	  you	  know	  p.	  	  However,	   while	   this	   refurbished	   version	   of	   the	   Bach/Hindriks	  argument	   is,	   indeed,	   valid,	   it	   is	   not	   clear	   what	   in	   the	   Bach/Hindriks	  story	   can	  be	   taken	   to	  offer	   support	   to	  premise	   (1).	   It	   is	  plausible	   that	  normal	  trust	  situations	  are	  such	  that	  you	  should	  not	  assert	   things	  you	  don’t	   believe	   yourself,	   i.e.,	   as	   Bach	   and	   Hindriks	   would	   put	   it,	   you	  
                                                26	  Note	  that,	  although	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  Bach/Hindriks	  line	  closely	  resembles	  the	  so-­‐called	  Deontic	  Transmission	  principle	  (DT),	  the	  appearance	  is	  misleading;	  here	  is	  DT:	  If	  one	  ought	  to	  X	  in	  order	  to	  Y	  and	  Z	  in	  order	  to	  X,	  then	  one	  ought	  to	  Z	  in	  order	  to	  Y.	  Again,	   in	   virtue	  of	  moving	   from	  discussing	  belief	   in	   the	   first	   premise	   to	  permissible	  belief	  in	  the	  second,	  the	  Bach/Hindriks	  line	  fails	  to	  instantiate	  DT.	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should	  not	  express	  a	  belief	  that	  you	  don’t	  have.	  	  However,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  why	  trust	  situations	  should	  also	  imply	  the	  stronger	  requirement	  of	  only	  expressing	  permissible	  beliefs.	  After	  all,	  plausibly,	  and	  according	  to	  the	  Bach/Hindriks	  line	  itself,	  assertion	  is	  a	  mere	  expression	  of	  belief,	  not	  of	  permissible	  belief.27	  	  	  	  
2.2	  Inheritance	  #2:	  Action	  	  We	   have	   seen	   that	   arguments	   counting	   on	   describing	   some	   sort	   of	  normative	   inheritance	   for	   assertion	   from	   belief	   suffer	   from	   value	  theoretic	   inaccuracies:	   metaphysical	   parallelism	   was	   shown	   to	   fail	   to	  support	   normative	   correspondence,	   while	   doubts	   were	   shed	   on	   the	  trustworthiness	   of	   deontic	   transmission	   in	   the	   case	   of	   stipulated	  normative	  dependence	  between	  the	  two.	  	  	  	   Now,	  here	  is	  one	  plausible	  claim:	  likely,	  our	  epistemic	  capacities	  are	  mainly	  meant	   to	   help	   us	   act	  well;	   as	   such,	   the	   kinds	   of	   things	  we	  believe	   and	   assert	   will,	   all	   things	   being	   equal,	   be	   the	   kinds	   of	  considerations	  we	   act	   upon.	   Here	   is,	   for	   instance,	   Robin	  McKenna	   on	  this	   issue:	   “[…]	  beliefs	   are	   the	   sorts	   of	   things	   that	   lead	   to	   actions	   and	  assertions.	   What	   each	   of	   us	   believes	   influences	   what	   we	   act	   on	   and	  assert,	  and	  in	  turn	  influences	  what	  those	  around	  us	  believe,	  act	  on,	  and	  assert	  (McKenna,	  Forthcoming).	  	   In	  the	  light	  of	  this,	  another	  popular	  inheritance	  argument	  in	  the	  literature	   takes	   the	   norm	   of	   assertion	   to	   follow	   from	   pragmatic	  considerations	  concerning	  what,	  at	   the	  end	  of	   the	  day,	  both	  belief	  and	  assertion	   are,	   plausibly,	   for:	   storing/transmitting	   actionable	  information.	  As	  such,	  it	  seems	  fairly	  plausible	  that,	  whatever	  the	  norm	  for	   action	  will	   turn	   out	   to	   be,	   belief	   and	   assertion	   alike	  will	   stand	   to	  inherit	  it.	  	  	  	   Note,	   though,	   that	   this	   argument	   very	   closely	   resembles	   the	  Bach-­‐Hindriks	  line,	  with	  the	  exception	  that	  the	  source	  of	  inheritance	  is	  taken	  to	  be	  an	  external	  one.	  That	  is,	  people	  defending	  this	  line	  want	  to	  get	  normative	  dependence	  between	  action	  on	  one	  hand,	  and	  belief	  and	  assertion	  on	  the	  other,	  to	  deliver	  normative	  inheritance.	  But,	  of	  course,	  one	   worry	   that	   readily	   arises	   is:	   if	   this	   line	   is	   but	   an	   external	  incarnation	  of	   the	  Bach-­‐Hindriks	   argument,	  will	   it	   not	   suffer	   from	   the	  same	  transmission	  problems?	  	  
                                                27	  But	   see	  Chapter	  #3	   for	  an	  argument	  along	  similar	   lines,	  which	  supports	   the	  claim	  that	  one	  should	  only	  assert	  what	  one	  permissibly	  believes	  (i.e.,	  knows)	  by	  arguing	  that	  1.	  the	  function	  of	  assertion	  is	  generating	  permissible	  (i.e.	  knowledgeable)	  belief	  in	  the	  hearer,	   and	   	   2)	   generating	   permissible	   belief	   in	   the	   hearer	   requires,	   in	   the	   vast	  majority	  of	  cases,	  permissible	  belief	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  speaker.	  
	   26	  
	   Fortunately,	  the	  answer	  is	   ‘no’.	  And	  here	  is	  why.	  Recall	  that	  the	  Bach/Hindriks	   line	   turned	   out	   to	   be	   invalid.	   The	   problem	   was	   that,	  while	   the	   permissibility	   claim	   for	   assertion	   featured	   mere	   belief,	  knowledge	  was	  only	  necessary	   for	  permissible	   belief.	   Since	   the	   former	  does	   not	   imply	   the	   latter,	   the	   derivation	   failed.	   Now	   consider,	   in	  contrast:	  	  	  (1)	  It	  is	  permissible	  to	  believe/assert	  p	  only	  if	  it	  is	  permissible	  to	  act	  on	  p.	  (2)	  It	  is	  permissible	  to	  act	  on	  p	  only	  if	  you	  know	  p.	  (3)	  Therefore	  it	  is	  permissible	  to	  believe/assert	  p	  only	  if	  you	  know	  p.	  	  This	  derivation,	  of	   course,	   is	   fine,	   transmission-­‐wise:	   the	   first	  premise	  stipulates	   necessary	   conditions	   for	   permissible	   assertion/belief	   that	  pertain	   to	   permissible	   action.	   Further	   on,	   the	   second	   premise	   also	  stipulates	   necessary	   conditions	   for	  permissible	   action.	   As	   such,	   in	   this	  case,	  normative	  transmission	  is	  successful.28	  	   Here	  is	  this	  my	  worry	  concerning	  this	  line	  of	  argument,	  though;	  consider:	  	  	  
I.	  One	  must:	  dance	  only	  to	  songs	  one	  knows.	  	  
II.	  One	  must:	  jump	  in	  the	  lake	  only	  if	  one	  knows	  how	  to	  swim.	  	  
III.	  One	  must:	  only	  assert	  that	  p	  if	  one	  knows	  that	  p.	  	  It	   seems	  pretty	   obvious	   that	   III,	   in	   contrast	   to	   I	   and	   II,	   is	   a	   genuinely	  epistemic	   norm.	   What	   can	   we	   say	   about	   I	   and	   II?	   Well,	   for	   what	   is	  worth,	   they	   surely	   are	   norms	   guiding	   particular	   types	   of	   action;	  furthermore,	   they	   specify	   a	   particular	   amount	   of	   epistemic	   support	  needed	   for	   permissible	   action	   of	   these	   particular	   types.	  What	   type	   of	  permissibility	   are	   we	   talking	   about,	   however?	   Plausibly,	   aesthetic	  permissibility	  in	  the	  case	  of	  I	  (if	  there	  is	  such	  a	  norm	  as	  I	  to	  begin	  with,	  it	  is	  plausibly	  there	  to	  insure	  people	  don’t	  fail	  really	  badly	  on	  the	  dance	  floor)	   and	   prudential	   in	   the	   case	   of	   II	   (after	   all,	   it	   is	   in	   view	   of	   the	  desirability	  of	  staying	  alive	  that	  the	  above	  norm	  holds).	  	  
                                                28	  Also,	  DT	  is,	  in	  this	  case,	  instantiated.	  Here	  is	  how	  the	  argument	  goes	  if	  we	  make	  DT	  explicit:	   (1)	   One	   ought	   to	   be	   in	   a	   position	   to	   permissibly	   act	   on	   p	   in	   order	   to	  permissibly	  believe/assert	  that	  p.	  (2)	  One	  ought	  to	  know	  in	  order	  to	  be	  in	  a	  position	  to	  permissibly	  act	  on	  p.	  	  (3)	  If	  one	  ought	  to	  X	  in	  order	  to	  Y	  and	  Z	  in	  order	  to	  X,	  then	  one	  ought	  to	  Z	  in	  order	  to	  Y	  (DT).	  (4)Therefore,	  one	  ought	  to	  know	  in	  order	  to	  permissibly	  assert	  (from	  (1),	  (2)	  and	  (3)).	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   Recall	   what	   we	   have	   seen	   in	   Chapter	   #1:	   the	   content	  individuation	   thesis	   (CIT)	   for	   epistemic	   norms	   is	   false:	   just	   because	   a	  norm	  regulating	  action	  features	  epistemic	  content	  –	  that	  is,	  just	  because	  it	  stipulates	  a	  particular	  amount	  of	  warrant	  needed	  for	  permissible	  φ-­‐ing	  –	  it	  need	  not	  follow	  it	  is	  an	  epistemic	  norm.	  Again,	  this	  should	  hardly	  be	   surprising;	   after	   all,	   the	   same	   is	   the	   case	   everywhere	   in	   the	  normative	   landscape:	   just	   because	   a	   norm	   regulates	   the	   appropriate	  length	  of	  one’s	  skirt,	   it	  need	  not	  follow	  it	  is	  a	  fashion	  norm	  –	  it	  can	  be,	  for	   instance,	   a	   norm	   pertaining	   to	   religious	   practice;	   just	   because	   a	  norm	  regulates	   the	  appropriate	  speed,	   it	  need	  not	   follow	   it	   is	  a	   traffic	  norm,	   rather	   than,	   for	   instance,	  a	  moral	  norm.	  Several	   types	  of	  norms	  can	  regulate	  the	  degree	  of	  a	  gradable	  property	  needed	  for	  permissible	  action	  in	  a	  given	  context.	  	   If	  that	  is	  the	  case,	  though,	  that	  is,	  if	  the	  ‘must’	  at	  stake	  in	  (2)	  need	  not	  be	  an	  epistemic	  must,	  the	  above	  derivation	  fails	  to	  go	  through.	  The	  defender	   of	   external	   inheritance	   needs	   to	   narrow	   down	   the	  permissibility	  at	  stake	   in	  her	  argument	  such	  that	   it	   is	  not	  at	  danger	  of	  equivocating	  on	  the	  relevant	  notion	  of	  ‘must.’	  	  	   Given	   that	   what	   we	   are	   interested	   in	   are	   epistemic	   norms	  governing	   assertion	   and	   belief	   –	   as	   opposed	   to,	   say,	   prudential,	  aesthetic	   or	   moral	   norms	   –	   we	   want	   to	   make	   sure	   that	   we	   are	  employing	  an	  epistemic	  must	  all	   through	   the	  argument.	  To	   this	  effect,	  what	  we	  will	  need,	  now	  that	  we	  have	  seen	  that	  the	  widely	  assumed	  CIT	  does	  not	  work,	  is	  a	  new,	  principled	  way	  to	  individuate	  epistemic	  norms	  for	   action	   from	   their	   prudential,	   aesthetic	   etc.	   counterparts.	   Absent	  such	   an	   account,	   the	   external	   inheritance	   derivation	   does	   not	   go	  through.	  	   Now,	  given	  that	  her	  argument	  will	  only	  work	  in	  conjunction	  with	  an	  individuation	  proposal	  for	  epistemic	  norms	  for	  action,	  I	  take	  it	  that	  it	  is	  on	  the	  shoulders	  of	  the	  defender	  of	  external	  inheritance	  commonality	  to	   put	   forth	   an	   account	   that	   does	   not	   assume	   CIT	   but	   serves	   her	  purposes	  well.	  	  	   In	   the	   Chapter	   #3,	   though,	   I	   propose	   one	   way	   to	   go	   about	  epistemic	  norm	  individuation	  that	  draws	  on	  epistemic	  functions	  which,	  if	  true,	  will	  give	  us	  further	  reason	  to	  believe	  normative	  inheritance	  from	  belief	  and/or	  action	  to	  assertion	  is	  implausible.	  	   For	  now,	  let	  us	  take	  stock:	  we	  have	  seen	  that	  extant	  inheritance	  arguments,	  which	  aim	  to	  offer	  a	  rationale	  for	  the	  norm	  of	  assertion,	  fail.	  First,	  as	   it	  turns	  out,	  metaphysical	  parallelism	  (i.e.,	   the	  belief-­‐assertion	  parallel)	  does	  not	  support	  normative	  correspondence.	  Second,	  we	  have	  looked	  at	  people	  trying	  to	  derive	  normative	  inheritance	  from	  normative	  dependence.	  The	  internal	  variety	  thereof	  was	  shown	  to	  not	  go	  through	  due	  to	  transmission	  failure.	  The	  external	  incarnation,	  while	  successfully	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transmitting,	   was	   shown	   to	   be	   in	   danger	   of	   normative	   equivocation,	  absent	  a	  principled	  way	  to	  individuate	  epistemic	  norms.	  	  	   Now,	  let	  us	  ask	  ourselves	  the	  following	  question:	  If	  whatever	  the	  norm	  of	  assertion	   is,	   it	  does	  not	  plausibly	  get	   inherited	   from	  the	  most	  obvious	   candidates	   –	   i.e.	   belief	   and	   action	   -­‐,	   what	   is	   there	   still	   left	   to	  explain	  the	  source	  of	  its	  normative	  strength?	  	  	   Tim	  Williamson	  has	  a	  metaphysical	  answer	  to	  this	  question:	  the	  very	  nature	  of	  the	  speech	  act.	  	  	  
2.3	  The	  Constitutivity	  Story:	  A	  Negative	  Result	  	  According	  to	  Tim	  Williamson	  (1996,	  2000),	  KNA	  is	  a	  constitutive	  rule	  of	  assertion	   just	   like	   rules	   of	   games	   are	   constitutive,	   that	   is,	   each	   and	  every	  instance	  of	  this	  speech	  act	  is	  governed	  by	  KNA.	  In	  fact,	  according	  to	  him,	  KNA	  is	  the	  unique	  constitutive	  rule	  of	  assertion	  and	  assertion	  is	  the	  only	  speech	  act	  whose	  unique	  constitutive	  rule	   is	  KNA	  (Williamson	  2000).	   If	   that	   is	   the	   case,	   of	   course,	   what	   we	   seem	   to	   get	   is	   a	   pretty	  strong	   rationale	   for	   KNA:	   after	   all,	   its	   normative	   strength	   will	   be	  sourced	  in	  the	  very	  nature	  of	  the	  speech	  act	  itself.	  	  	   Now,	   while	   KNA	   is	   fairly	   popular	   in	   the	   literature,	   the	  constitutivity	  claim	  fails	  to	  enjoy	  the	  same	  widespread	  support	  as	  many	  take	  it	  to	  be	  implausibly	  strong.	  Herman	  Cappelen	  (2011),	  for	  instance,	  notably	  worries	  about	  both	  its	  plausibility	  and	  the	  reasons	  we	  are	  given	  to	  believe	  it	  to	  be	  true.29	  Here	  is	  Cappelen:	  	  
                                                29	  Aside	  for	  the	  line	  discussed	  here,	  Cappelen	  offers	  three	  more	  arguments	  against	  the	  constitutivity	   claim.	   The	   first	   two	   concern	   issues	   pertaining	   to	   criticisability	   and	  blame	  attribution	  related	  to	  the	  practice	  of	  assertion.	  Since	  I	  look	  very	  closely	  at	  these	  issues	   when	   I	   discuss	   the	   case	   pro	   and	   con	   the	   KNA	   necessity	   claim	   (Chapter	   #4	  below),	  I	  skip	  this	  discussion	  for	  now.	  	  	   The	   last	   argument	   by	   Cappelen	   pertains	   to	   his	   doubts	   that	   there	   is	   such	   a	  thing	   as	   a	   speech	   act	   of	   assertion	   to	   begin	   with,	   and	   it	   concerns	   the	   scarcity	   of	  assertion	   attribution	   in	   everyday	   talk.	   In	   the	   interest	   of	   relevance,	   this	   thesis	   only	  focuses	   on	   anti-­‐constitutivity	   arguments	   that	   employ	   considerations	   pertaining	   to	  normativity	  of	  speech	  acts	  rather	  than	  speech-­‐act	  theory.	  	   As	   such,	   I	   set	   this	  argument	  aside	  also.	  	   Another	   speech-­‐act	   theoretic	   argument	  against	   the	   constitutivity	   claim	   I	   am	  setting	   aside	   is	   due	   to	   Peter	   Pagin	   (2016).	   In	   a	   nutshell,	   Pagin	   worries	   that	   our	  everyday	   competence	   in	   employing	   the	   speech-­‐act	   of	   assertion,	   together	   with	   the	  widespread	  disagreement	  regarding	   just	  what	  norm	  governs	   it	   in	  the	   literature,	  give	  us	   reason	   to	   distrust	   normative	   accounts	   of	   assertion.	   After	   all,	   Pagin	   argues,	   if	  assertion	  is	  essentially	  defined	  by	  the	  norm	  governing	  it,	  and	  we	  don’t	  seem	  to	  know	  what	  the	  latter	  is,	  how	  is	  it	  that	  we	  are	  so	  successful	  at	  employing	  this	  speech	  act?	  To	  stick	  to	  the	  games	  analogy,	  we	  don’t	  seem	  to	  be	  able	  to	  play	  a	  particular	  game	  without	  knowing	  its	  rules.	  	   I	   take	   it,	   though,	   contra	   Pagin,	   that	   it	   is	   not	   the	   case	   that	   knowing	   the	  constitutive	  norm(s)	   for	  φ-­‐ing	   is	  necessary	   for	  engaging	   in	  φ-­‐ing.	  Take	   language,	   for	  example:	  many,	   if	  not	  most	  of	  us,	   surely	   come	   to	  know	   the	   rules	  of	   grammar	  of	  our	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   According	  to	  [Williamson],	  there	  is	  a	  norm,	  N,	  such	  that	  it	  is	  impossible	  for	  there	  to	  be	  an	  assertion	  that	  is	  not	  governed	  by	  N.	  […]	  Even	  though	  Williamson	  defends	  a	  view	  about	  the	  essence	  of	  assertion,	  none	  of	  his	  arguments	  are	  modal.	  The	  arguments	  Williamson	  uses	  at	  best	  show	  that	  we	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  fact	  follow	  the	  knowledge	  rule;	  at	  best	  they	  show	  that,	  as	  a	  matter	   of	   fact,	   the	   knowledge	   rule	   is	   the	   default	   rule	   for	  evaluating	   utterances	   of	   declarative	   sentences.	   Williamson	  develops	  no	  argument	  to	  support	  the	  claim	  that	  we	  couldn’t	  have	   performed	   the	   act	   in	   question	   governed	   by	   another	  default	  rule.	  	  Furthermore,	  Cappelen	  argues	  that,	  given	  that	  conceivability	  is	  a	  guide	  to	   possibility,	   and	   that	   since	   “we	   can	   conceive	   of	   paradigmatic	  assertions	   as	   governed	   by	   norms	   other	   than	   N,	   we	   have	   evidence	  against	  N-­‐theories”.	  	  	   In	   order	   to	   make	   his	   case,	   Cappelen	   asks	   us	   to	   consider	   a	  common	  speech	  act,	  call	   it	  E:	  Mia	  saying	  that	  Mandy	  forgot	   to	  pay	  her	  cell	   phone	   bill	   last	   week.	   Now,	   ask	   yourself,	   for	   instance:	   could	   Mia	  perform	  E	   if	   the	  default	  assumption	  was,	   for	   instance,	   that	  she	  should	  only	  assert	  E	  if	  she	  believed	  E?	  The	  intuition	  reported	  by	  Cappelen	  here	  is	  that	  the	  answer	  is	  ‘yes’.	  He	  further	  asks	  us	  to	  consider,	  in	  contrast,	  the	  case	  of	  games:	  “Could	  Mia	  have	  played	  tennis,	  if	  serves	  were	  thrown	  by	  hand,	  without	  a	  racket,	  and	  no	  ball	  could	  be	  hit	  by	  a	  player	  unless	  she	  had	  a	  foot	  on	  one	  of	  the	  lines	  …?”	  Hardly;	  it	  looks	  as	  though	  Mia	  would	  definitely	  be	  playing	  quite	  a	  different	  game.	  If	  that	  is	  the	  case,	  Cappelen	  argues,	   it	   looks	  as	  though	  we	  have	  strong	  reason	  to	  doubt	  that	  KNA	  is	  constitutive	  of	   assertion	   in	   the	  way	   rules	  of	   games	  are	   constitutive:	   it	  looks	   as	   though	   one	   can	   continue	   to	   assert	   under	   the	   stipulation	   of	   a	  different	  norm	  being	  in	  play,	  while,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  this	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  the	  case	  for	  games.	   	  	   A	  couple	  of	   things	  about	   the	  Cappelen	   line,	  however:	   first,	  note	  that	   one	   important	   notion	   at	  work	   in	   the	   cases	   above	   is	   the	   one	   of	   a	  ‘default	  assumption’.	  Mia	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  able	  to	  assert	  although	  ‘the	  default	  assumption’	  is	  that	  she	  can	  only	  assert	  p	  if	  she	  believes	  p.	  What	  is	  not	  clear,	  however	  –	  since	  Cappelen	  does	  not	  say	  much	  about	  it	  –	   is	  what	   exactly	  we	   are	   supposed	   to	  make	   of	   the	   relation	   between	  φ-­‐ing	  
                                                                                                                       own	  mother	  tongue	  way	  after	  having	  become	  speakers	  of	  the	  respective	  language.	  Of	  course,	  Pagin	  could	  object	  to	  this	  and	  argue	  that	  we	  will	  have	  had	  implicit	  knowledge	  of	   the	   respective	   rules	   of	   grammar	   all	   along.	   Note,	   though,	   that	   the	   same	   can	   be	  plausibly	  thought	  about	  the	  norms	  governing	  various	  speech	  acts.	  On	  this	  view,	  what	  philosophers	  are	  trying	  to	  do	  is	  merely	  make	  the	  norms	  at	  stake	  explicit.	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being	  constitutively	  governed	  by	  norm	  N	  –	  the	  issue	  we	  are	  interested	  in	  here	  –	  and	  N	  being	  ‘the	  default	  assumption’	  when	  φ-­‐ing.	  Presumably,	  Cappelen	  takes	  the	  two	  to	  be	  somehow	  equivalent,	  since	  otherwise	  his	  cases	   would	   fail	   to	   be	   relevant	   to	   the	   issue	   under	   discussion.	   Note,	  though,	   that	   this	   is	   hardly	   a	   trivial	   thesis,	   and	   therefore	   in	   need	   of	  independent	  defence.	  After	   all,	   the	  default	   assumption	   in	  many	  places	  on	   the	   planet	   is	   still,	   unfortunately,	   that	   women	   are	   inferior	   to	   men.	  Surely,	   though,	   in	   spite	  of	   this,	  we	  would	  not	  want	   to	   say	   that	   it	   is	   all	  right	  –	  by	  any	  norm	  –	  for	  them	  to	  be	  treated	  as	  such	  in	  those	  societies.	  Of	  course,	  it	  might	  be	  that	  what	  makes	  the	  difference	  has	  to	  do	  with	  the	  contrast	  between	  constitutive	  and	  non-­‐constitutive	  norms.	  However,	  it	  is	  surely	  on	  Cappelen’s	  shoulders	   to	  argue	  as	  much;	  until	  he	  does,	   the	  cases	  will	  not	  do	  much	  against	  Williamson.	  	   Second,	   more	   importantly,	   note	   that	   Cappelen’s	   cases	   are	  disanalogous	   in	   two	   crucial	   respects:	   on	   one	   hand,	   the	   stipulated	  alternative	  norm	   for	   assertion	   in	  Mia’s	   case	   is	   fairly	   closely	   related	   to	  (i.e.,	  implied	  by)	  KNA.	  As	  opposed	  to	  this,	  the	  proposed	  departure	  from	  the	  actual	  norms	  for	  tennis	  playing	  is	  quite	  significant.	  To	  see	  how	  this	  plays	  a	  crucial	   role,	   consider	  a	  case	   in	  which	   the	  proposed	  alternative	  norm	  for	  assertion	  is:	  assert	  that	  p	  only	  if	  you	  are	  wondering	  whether	  p.	  Plausibly,	  the	  speech	  act	  performed	  would	  fail	  to	  qualify	  as	  an	  assertion.	  Or,	  the	  other	  way	  around,	  consider	  a	  case	  in	  which	  the	  alternative	  norm	  for	  tennis	  is:	  Only	  use	  a	  red	  racket!	  Surely,	  the	  game	  at	  stake	  would	  still	  qualify	  as	  tennis.30	  	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   note	   that	  Williamson’s	   constitutivity	   thesis	  comes	  with	  a	  uniqueness	  thesis:	  as	  such,	  the	  proper	  analogy	  would	  be	  with	  a	  game	   that	   is	   governed	  by	  one	  and	  only	  one	  norm.	   In	   this	   case,	  however,	   arguably,	   Cappelen’s	   argument	   would	   fail	   to	   go	   through:	  changing	  the	  norm	  would	  change	  the	  game	  that	  is	  being	  played.	  	  	   More	   about	   this,	   however,	   in	   the	   next	   section,	   which	   aims	   to	  argue	  against	  the	  plausibility	  of	  Williamson’s	  uniqueness-­‐constitutivity	  claim.31	  	  	   	  	  
2.3.1	  Constitutive	  Norms	  and	  Conditions	  of	  Engagement	  
	  Let’s	   begin	   by	   following	   Williamson	   in	   distinguishing	   two	   questions	  that	   one	   can	   ask	   about	   activities	   that	   are	   governed	   by	   constitutive	  
                                                30	  Williamson	  would	  likely	  disagree.	  See	  below	  for	  a	  response.	  31	  	  The	  argument	  to	  follow	  only	  targets	  the	  constitutivity	  claim	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  uniqueness	  claim.	  As	  such,	   it	  does	  not	  strictly	  speaking	  show	  that	  KNA	  could	  not	  be	  one	  constitutive	  rule	  of	  assertion	  among	  others.	  For	  doubts	  about	  the	  force	  of	  such	  a	  picture	  to	  provide	  a	  rationale	  for	  KNA,	  though,	  see	  below.	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rules.32	  The	   first	   is	  what	   the	   rules	   governing	   the	   activity	   actually	   are,	  the	  second	  concerns	  the	  conditions	  that	  people	  must	  satisfy	  to	  engage	  in	   the	   activity.	   While	   Williamson’s	   main	   concern	   is	   with	   the	   first	   of	  these	  two	  questions	  and,	  in	  particular,	  with	  mounting	  a	  case	  for	  KNA,	  he	  does	   make	   two	   points	   about	   the	   second	   question.	   First,	   “constitutive	  rules	   do	   not	   lay	   down	   necessary	   conditions	   for	   performing	   the	  constituted	  act.”	  [2000:	  240]	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  one	  can	  break	  a	  constitutive	  rule	  and	  still	  continue	  to	  engage	  in	  the	  constituted	  activity.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  draughts,	  for	  instance,	  one	  can	  cheat	  without	  thereby	  ceasing	  to	  play	  draughts.	  Williamson	  even	  grants	  that	  one	  may	  break	  constitutive	  rules	  often.	  Second,	  “some	  sensitivity	  to	  the	  difference	  –	  in	  both	  oneself	  and	  others	  –	  between	  conforming	  to	  the	  rule	  and	  breaking	  it	  presumably	  is	  a	   necessary	   condition	   of	   playing	   the	   game,	   speaking	   the	   language,	   or	  performing	  the	  speech	  act.”	  [Ibid.]	  In	  the	  case	  of	  draughts,	  for	  instance,	  if	  one	  is	  completely	  insensitive	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  players	  who	  move	  pieces	  diagonally	   conform	   with	   the	   rules	   and	   players	   who	   move	   them	  vertically	   don’t,	   then	   one	   won’t	   be	   playing	   draughts,	   even	   if	   one	  happens	  to	  move	  pieces	  only	  diagonally.	  This	  section	  grants	  Williamson	  both	  of	  these	  claims.33	  	   That	  said,	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  while	  Williamson	  does	  take	  the	  above	  condition	  to	  be	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  engaging	  in	  an	  activity	  that	   is	  governed	  by	  constitutive	  rules,	  he	  does	  not	  claim	  that	   it	   is	  also	  sufficient.	  It	   is	  thus	  compatible	  with	  what	  Williamson	  has	  to	  say	  about	  the	   conditions	   for	   engaging	   in	   activities	   that	   are	   governed	   by	  constitutive	   rules	   that	   there	   are	   further	   necessary	   conditions,	   besides	  the	  one	  he	  himself	   countenances.	  This	   section	  will	   argue	   for	  one	  such	  condition.	  The	  point	  is	  that,	  if	  the	  argument	  made	  here	  is	  successful,	  we	  will	   have	   identified	   one	   necessary	   condition	   on	   unique	   constitutive	  rules	  which	  KNA	  fails	   to	  meet	  and,	  as	  such,	  we	  have	  reason	  to	  believe	  KNA	  is	  not	  a	  constitutive	  rule	  of	  assertion.	  	   Finally,	  note	  that	  while	  the	  issues	  the	  two	  questions	  touch	  upon	  are	   indeed	  different,	   they	  are	  not	  unrelated.	  To	  see	   this	  consider	  once	  more	  Williamson’s	  proposed	  condition	  according	  to	  which	  engaging	  in	  an	  activity	  governed	  by	  a	  constitutive	  rule	  requires	  some	  sensitivity	  to	  the	  difference	  between	  conforming	  to	  a	  constitutive	  rule	  and	  breaking	  
                                                
32 For the purposes of this dissertation, I use rules and norms interchangeably. 33	  For	   the	  record,	   the	  second	  claim	  seems	   implausibly	  strong:	   it	   looks	  as	   though	  one	  can	  engage	   in	  an	  activity	  A	  such	   that	  r	   is	  a	  constitutive	  rule	  of	  A	  even	  though	  one	   is	  entirely	   insensitive	   to	   the	   difference	   between	   conforming	   to	   r	   and	   breaking	   it.	   For	  instance,	  one	  may	  speak	  English	  even	  though	  one	  is	  entirely	  unaware	  of	  the	  rule	  that	  requires	  one	   to	  add	   ‘s’/‘es’	   to	  present	   tense	  verbs	   in	   the	   third	  person	  singular.	  That	  said,	  there	  is	  a	  true	  claim	  in	  the	  vicinity	  of	  Williamson’s	  second	  claim:	  one	  cannot	  be	  insensitive	  to	  the	  difference	  between	  conforming	  and	  breaking	  too	  many	  of	  the	  rules	  constitutive	   of	   an	   activity.	   Since,	   however,	   this	   issue	   is	   of	   little	   consequence	   for	   the	  purposes	  of	  this	  section,	  I	  set	  it	  aside.	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it.	   Now	   (i)	   let	   A	   be	   an	   arbitrary	   activity	   (putatively)	   governed	   by	  constitutive	  rules,	   (ii)	   let	  r	  be	  an	  arbitrary	  (putative)	  rule	  governing	  A	  and	  (iii)	  suppose	  that	  one	  can	  engage	  in	  A	  even	  though	  one	  is	  not	  at	  all	  sensitive	   to	   the	  difference	  between	  conforming	  with	  r	   and	  breaking	  r.	  From	  Williamson’s	  condition	   in	  conjunction	  with	  (i)	  and	  (ii)	   it	   follows	  that	  engaging	  in	  A	  requires	  some	  sensitivity	  to	  the	  difference	  between	  conforming	   to	   r	   and	   breaking	   it.	   However,	   this	   evidently	   contradicts	  (iii).	  This	  means	  that,	  for	  any	  A	  such	  that	  (iii)	  holds	  for	  A,	  it	  follows	  from	  Williamson’s	   necessary	   condition	   on	   engaging	   in	   activities	   that	   are	  governed	   by	   constitutive	   rules	   that	   either	   (i)	   is	   false	   and	   A	   is	   not	  governed	  by	  constitutive	   rules	  at	  all,	   or	  else	   (ii)	   is	   false	  and	  r	   is	  not	  a	  constitutive	   rule	   of	   A.	   In	   this	   way,	   then,	   the	   correct	   answer	   to	   the	  question	  of	  what	  the	  necessary	  and	  sufficient	  conditions	  on	  engaging	  in	  activities	  governed	  by	  constitutive	  rules	  are	  may	  have	  implications	  for	  the	   correct	   answer	   to	   the	   question	   as	   to	   what	   the	   constitutive	   rules	  governing	   a	   certain	   activity	   are.	   The	   issues	   the	   two	   question	   raise,	  whilst	  different,	  are	  thus	  related.	  	  	   I	  agree	  with	  Williamson	  that	  conforming	  with	  a	  constitutive	  rule	  is	  not	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  engaging	  in	  the	  constituted	  activity	  and	  that	  it	  may	  even	  be	  possible	  to	  break	  constitutive	  rules	  frequently.	  	  	   Even	  so,	  there	  are	  limits	  to	  how	  persistently	  and	  systematically	  one	  can	  break	  the	  constitutive	  rules	  of	  an	  activity	  and	  still	  engage	  in	  the	  constituted	   activity.	   To	   see	   why,	   suppose	   you	   are	   playing	   a	   game	   of	  draughts	  with	  a	  friend.	  It	  may	  be	  that	  your	  friend	  cheats,	  perhaps	  even	  often.	  But	  now	  suppose	  you	  are	  attempting	  to	  play	  a	  game	  of	  draughts	  with	  a	  friend	  only	  to	  find	  that	  he	  persistently	  and	  systematically	  moves	  the	   pieces	   horizontally	   and	   vertically	   rather	   than	   diagonally.	   In	   this	  case,	  your	   friend	   is	  not	   really	  playing	  draughts.	  Alternatively,	   suppose	  you	  wanted	  to	  strike	  up	  a	  conversation	  in	  English	  with	  him.	  It	  may	  be	  that	  he	  breaks	  the	  rules	  of	  English	  and	  perhaps	  he	  does	  so	  frequently.	  But	   now	   consider	   a	   case	   in	   which	   he	   persistently	   and	   systematically	  utters	   only	   strings	   of	   the	   phoneme	   ‘ka’.	  When	   you	   ask	   him	  how	  he	   is	  doing	   he	   responds:	   ‘Kakaka‘,	  when	   you	   ask	   him	  whether	   he	   has	   gone	  mad	   his	   answer	   is:	   ‘Kaka	   kakaka	   ka‘,	   and	   so	   on.	   If	   he	   persists	   in	   this	  behaviour	  too	  systematically,	  he	  is	  not	  speaking	  English.	  	   These	   considerations	   seem	   to	  motivate	   the	   following	   condition	  on	  engaging	  in	  activities	  that	  are	  constituted	  by	  constitutive	  rules:34	  	  
                                                34	  Ishani	   Maitra	   (2011)	   adduces	   an	   argument	   that	   can	   at	   least	   be	   reconstructed	   as	  proceeding	  along	  similar	  lines.	  Here	  is	  the	  condition	  on	  engaging	  in	  activities	  that	  are	  constituted	  by	  rules	  she	  proposes:	   ‘If	   r	   is	  a	  constitutive	  rule	  of	  some	  activity	  A,	   then	  one	  cannot	  violate	  r	  flagrantly	  without	  ceasing	  to	  engage	  in	  A.’	  According	  to	  Maitra,	  a	  violation	  is	  flagrant	  “if	  it	  is	  intentional	  and	  sufficiently	  marked”	  (2011:	  282).	  However,	  it	   looks	  as	  though	  one	  can	  violate	  KNA	  flagrantly	  and	  still	  count	  as	  asserting.	  While	  I	  am	   sympathetic	   to	   something	   in	   the	   vicinity	   of	   the	   Maitra	   line,	   I	   don’t	   think	   that	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  Engagement	   Condition:	   If	   some	   activity	  A	   is	   constituted	   by	   a	   set	   of	  constitutive	   rules,	  R,	   then	  one	   cannot	   violate	   too	  many	  members	   of	  R	  too	  systematically	  without	  ceasing	  to	  engage	  in	  A.	  	  	  	  Two	  comments	  by	  way	  of	  clarification:	  First,	  we	  may	  want	  to	  allow	  for	  variation	   in	   what	   counts	   as	   violating	   too	   many	   members	   of	   a	   set	   of	  constitutive	  rules	  and	  what	  counts	  as	  violating	  them	  too	  systematically.	  In	  the	  draughts	  case,	  your	  friend	  is	  not	  playing	  even	  though	  he	  violates	  only	   one	   rule,	   albeit	   with	   near	   maximum	   systematicity.	   (Note	   that	  maximum	  systematicity	  is	  not	  required.	  If	  your	  friend	  were	  to	  move	  the	  pieces	  vertically	  and	  horizontally	  nearly	  all	  of	  the	  time,	  he’d	  still	  not	  be	  playing.)	  In	  contrast,	  in	  the	  English	  case,	  your	  friend	  violates	  many	  rules	  with	  a	  very	  high	  degree	  of	   systematicity.	  Here,	  we	  may	  want	   to	  allow	  that	  systematically	  violating	  a	  single	  rule	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  one	  ceases	  to	  speak	  English.	  If	  your	  friend	  were	  to	  systematically	  fail	  to	  add	  an	  ‘s’	  to	   present	   tense	   verbs	   in	   the	   third	   person	   singular,	   we	  may	   want	   to	  allow	  that	  he	  still	  speaks	  English.	  	  	   Second,	   Engagement	   Condition	   is	   plausible	   even	   when	   your	  friend	   breaks	   the	   rules	   non-­‐deliberately	   or	   otherwise	   blamelessly,	  when	  he	  tries	  to	  follow	  the	  rules	  or	  when	  he	  thinks	  he	  is	  following	  the	  rules.	  Suppose,	   in	  the	  draughts	  case,	  your	  friend	  is	  misinformed	  about	  the	   rules	   of	   draughts,	   say	   because	   he	   was	   told	   that	   pieces	   move	  horizontally	  and	  vertically.	  When,	  in	  this	  case,	  he	  systematically	  moves	  the	   pieces	   in	   these	   ways,	   he	   will	   systematically	   break	   the	   rules	   of	  draughts	   whilst	   doing	   so	   non-­‐deliberately	   and	   blamelessly,	   whilst	  trying	  to	  follow	  them	  and	  thinking	  that	  he	  is	  following	  them.	  Even	  so,	  he	  is	  not	  playing	  draughts.	  The	  same	  goes	  for	  the	  case	  of	  speaking	  English.	  Even	   if	   your	   friend	  were	  not	   to	  blame,	   etc.	   for	   violating	  nearly	   all	   the	  rules	  of	  English	  with	  near	  maximum	  systematicity,	  say	  because	  he	  had	  been	  told	  that	  ‘ka’	  is	  the	  only	  phoneme	  in	  English,	  he	  would	  still	  not	  be	  speaking	  English.	  	  	   If	  Engagement	  Condition	  is	  plausible,	  then	  so	  is	  the	  following:	  	  	  
                                                                                                                       Maitra’s	  condition	  really	  is	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  engaging	  in	  activities	  constituted	  by	   rules.	   That	   is	   to	   say,	   it	   does	   not	   look	   as	   though	   engaging	   in	   activities	   that	   are	  constituted	  by	  rules	  really	  does	  not	  admit	  of	   flagrant	  violations	  of	   these	  constitutive	  rules.	   To	   see	   why,	   consider	   the	   case	   of	   English.	   It	   is	   clear	   that	   one	   may	   flagrantly	  violate	   a	   constitutive	   rule	   of	   English,	  without	   thereby	   ceasing	   to	   speak	   English.	   For	  instance,	  were	   I	   to	   say	   ‘Maitra’s	   argument	   just	   don’t	  work’,	   I	  would	   have	   flagrantly	  violated	   the	   rule	   that	   requires	  one	   to	  add	   ‘s’/‘es’	   to	  present	   tense	  verbs	   in	   the	   third	  person	  singular.	  While	  I	  would	  be	  speaking	  bad	  English,	  I	  would	  not	  thereby	  cease	  to	  speak	  English	  altogether.	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Engagement	   Condition’.	   If	   activity,	  A,	   is	   constituted	   by	   only	   a	   single	  constitutive	   rule,	   r,	   and	   if	   one	   violates	   r	   with	   near	   maximum	  systematicity,	  then	  one	  does	  not	  engage	  in	  A.	  	  	  Consider,	   for	  instance,	  a	  card	  game,	  call	   it	   ’Ace	  of	  Spades’	   in	  which	  the	  only	  constitutive	  rule	  is	  that	  one	  must	  continue	  to	  turn	  over	  cards	  from	  a	   standard	   deck	   until	   one	   turns	   over	   the	   ace	   of	   spades.	   If	   you	   violate	  this	  rule	  with	  near	  maximum	  systematicity,	   say	  because	  you	  regularly	  stop	  turning	  over	  cards	  when	  and	  only	  when	  you	  turn	  over	  the	  three	  of	  hearts,	  you	  are	  not	  playing	  Ace	  of	  Spades.	  	  	   It	  is	  easy	  to	  see	  that	  we	  can	  run	  an	  argument	  parallel	  to	  the	  one	  featuring	  Williamson’s	  proposed	  condition	  above	  to	  establish	  a	  relation	  between	   Engagement	   Condition’	   and	   the	   issue	   of	   which	   constitutive	  rules,	   if	   any,	   govern	   a	   given	   activity.	   Again,	   (i*)	   let	  A	   be	   an	   arbitrary	  activity	   (putatively)	   governed	   by	   constitutive	   rules,	   (ii*)	   let	   r	   be	   an	  arbitrary	  rule	  that	  (putatively)	  is	  the	  only	  constitutive	  rule	  governing	  A.	  Suppose,	   furthermore,	  (iii*)	   that	  one	  can	  engage	   in	  A	  even	  though	  one	  violates	   r	   with	   near	   maximum	   systematicity.	   From	   Engagement	  Condition’	  in	  conjunction	  with	  (i*)	  and	  (ii*)	  it	  follows	  that	  engaging	  in	  A	  requires	   not	   breaking	   r	   with	   near	   maximum	   systematicity.	   However,	  this	  evidently	   contradicts	   (iii*).	  This	  means	   that	   if	   for	  any	  A	   such	   that	  (iii*)	  holds	  for	  A,	  it	  follows	  from	  Engagement	  Condition’	  that	  either	  (i*)	  is	  false	  and	  A	  is	  not	  governed	  by	  constitutive	  rules	  at	  all,	  or	  else	  (ii*)	  is	  false	  and	  r	  is	  not	  the	  only	  constitutive	  rule	  governing	  A.	  Crucially,	  either	  way,	  it	  cannot	  be	  the	  case	  that	  r	  is	  the	  only	  constitutive	  rule	  governing	  
A.	  As	  a	  result,	   for	  any	  A,	  establishing	  (iii*)	   it	  will	  be	  sufficient	   to	  show	  that	  the	  relevant	  r	  is	  not	  the	  only	  constitutive	  rule	  governing	  A.	  	   The	  next	  section	  argues	  that	   instances	  of	  (iii*)	  are	  true	  of	  KNA.	  As	   a	   result,	   KNA	   cannot	   be	   the	   only	   constitutive	   rule	   governing	  assertion.	  	  
	  	  
2.3.2	  The	  Uniqueness-­‐Constitutivity	  Claim	  	  Consider	  the	  following	  case:	  	  	   	  	  	  	   	   	  	  
COMPULSIVE	   LIAR.	   Bob	   is	   a	   compulsive	   liar:	   Bob	   is	   strongly	  disposed—perhaps	   even	   hard-­‐wired—to	   assert	   p	   only	   when	   he	  believes	  p	  to	  be	  false.	  	  	  At	  least	  the	  following	  is	  plausible	  about	  Bob	  concerning	  Case	  2:	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Possible	   Assertion.	   It	   is	   possible	   for	   Bob	   to	   assert	   a	   wide	   range	   of	  propositions.	  	  	  I	  take	  Possible	  Assertion	  to	  be	  eminently	  plausible.	  However,	  for	  those	  in	  doubt,	   there	   is	   independent	  reason	   to	   think	   that	   it	   is	   true.	  After	  all,	  Bob’s	  relevant	  speech	  acts	  may	  have	  a	  number	  of	  hallmark	  features	  of	  assertions,	  including	  the	  following:	  they	  present	  their	  contents	  as	  true,	  they	   furnish	   others	   with	   a	   prima	   facie	   entitlement	   to	   believe	   their	  contents,	   and	   we	   will	   hold	   Bob	   accountable	   for	   the	   truth	   of	   their	  contents.	  	  	   Of	  course,	  the	  presence	  of	  these	  features	  is	  not	  put	  forth	  here	  as	  infallible	   reason	   to	  believe	   that	  Possible	  Assertion	   is	   true;	   rather,	   it	   is	  merely	   taken	   to	   offer	   some	   support	   to	   its	   plausibility.	   On	   the	   other	  hand,	   note	   that	   not	  much	  more	   than	   this	   can	  be	   offered	   at	   this	   point,	  without	  already	  presupposing	  a	  view	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  assertion.	  On	  the	  upside,	  however,	  my	  opponent	  will	  also	  have	  difficulties	  in	  arguing	  that	   Possible	   Assertion	   is	   false	   without	   such	   an	   assumption.	  Furthermore,	  given	  the	  overwhelming	   intuitive	  plausibility	  of	  Possible	  Assertion,	  I	  take	  it	  that	  it	  is	  on	  the	  shoulders	  of	  its	  foes	  to	  come	  up	  with	  a	  solid	  error	  theoretic	  way	  to	  dismiss	  this	  intuition.	  Given	  this,	  I	  will,	  in	  what	  follows,	  rely	  on	  Possible	  Assertion.	  	   Now,	  let	  us	  move	  on	  and	  assume,	  as	  we	  may,	  that	  Bob	  happens	  to	  be	  not	  only	  rather	  chatty	  but	  also	  an	  exceptionally	  reliable	  cognitive	  agent	  who	   lives	   in	   an	  exceptionally	  hospitable	   epistemic	   environment	  with	   the	   result	   that	   nearly	   all	   of	   his	   beliefs	   qualify	   as	   knowledge.	  We	  then	  get:	  	  	  
Systematic	  Counter-­‐Knowledge.	  Bob	  makes	  assertions	  that,	  with	  near	  maximum	  systematicity,	  are	  false	  and	  run	  counter	  to	  what	  Bob	  knows.	  	  
	  However,	   it	   is	   easy	   to	   see	   that	   Engagement	   Condition’,	   together	  with	  Possible	   Assertion	   and	   Systematic	   Counter-­‐Knowledge	   deliver	   the	  result	   that	   KNA	   cannot	   be	   the	   unique	   constitutive	   norm	   of	   assertion.	  Here	  is	  how:	  By	  Systematic	  Counter-­‐Knowledge,	  Bob	  makes	  assertions	  that,	   with	   near	   maximum	   systematicity,	   run	   counter	   to	   what	   Bob	  knows.	   Therefore,	   Bob	   makes	   assertions	   that,	   with	   near	   maximum	  systematicity,	  violate	  KNA.	  We	  thus	  have	  our	  relevant	  instance	  of	  (iii*)	  for	   assertion	   and	   KNA.	   Since	   establishing	   an	   instance	   of	   (iii*)	   will	   be	  enough	   to	   show	   the	   falsity	  of	   the	   thesis	   that	   r	   is	   the	  only	   constitutive	  rule	   governing	   A	   for	   any	   putative	   constitutive	   rule	   r	   and	   any	   A,	   it	  follows	  that	  KNA	  is	  not	  the	  unique	  constitutive	  norm	  of	  assertion.	  
	   Here	   is	  one	   line	  of	  defence	   that	  could	  be	  pursued	  at	   this	  point:	  maybe	  what	  Williamson	  is	  best	  understood	  as	  advancing	  is	  not	  a	  thesis	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about	   the	   constitutive	   rules	   of	   assertion,	   but	   a	   thesis	   about	   the	  constitutive	  rules	  of	  the	  practice	  of	  making	  assertions	  in	  the	  population.	  According	   to	   this	   view,	   while	   systematically	   breaking	   KNA	   by	   one	  member	  of	  the	  population	  would	  not	  amount	  to	  her	  failing	  to	  assert,	  if	  the	   entire	   population	   would	   follow	   suit,	   the	   practice	   would	   soon	  disappear.	  After	  all,	  if	  the	  practice	  of	  assertion	  were	  to	  be	  constituted	  by	  KNA	   and	   KNA	   only,	   we	   would	   expect	   that	   if	   an	   entire	   population	   of	  speakers	  were	   to	   systematically	   violate	  KNA,	   the	  practice	  of	   assertion	  would	  at	  some	  point	  be	  discontinued.	  After	  all,	  if	  assertion	  stops	  being	  a	  trustworthy	   epistemic	   vehicle,	   it	   is	   far	   from	   clear	   why	   we	   should	  continue	  engaging	  in	  this	  practice;	  the	  uniqueness	  constitutivity	  thesis	  is	  confirmed	  about	  the	  practice	  of	  assertion.	  	  	   Unfortunately,	   there	   is	   reason	   to	   believe	   that	   the	   uniqueness	  constitutivity	  claim	  is	  false	  even	  when	  understood	  as	  a	  thesis	  about	  the	  practice	  of	  making	  assertions.	  Let’s	  grant	  the	  objector	  (i)	  that	  practices	  of	   engaging	   in	   activities	   can	   be	   constituted	   by	   rules	   and	   (ii)	   that	   an	  important	  necessary	  condition	  on	  operating	  such	  a	  practice	  is:	  	  	  
Engagement	  Condition*.	  If	  a	  population’s	  practice,	  P,	  of	  engaging	  in	  an	  activity,	  A,	  is	  constituted	  by	  a	  set	  of	  constitutive	  rules,	  R,	  and	  if	  too	  many	  members	   of	   the	   population	   violate	   too	   many	   members	   of	   R	   too	  systematically,	  then	  the	  population	  does	  not	  operate	  P.	  	  	  	  If	  Engagement	  Condition*	  is	  plausible,	  then	  so	  is:	  	  	  
Engagement	  Condition**.	  If	  a	  population’s	  practice,	  P,	  of	  engaging	  in	  a	  rule	   governed	   activity,	   A,	   is	   constituted	   by	   only	   a	   single	   constitutive	  rule,	  r,	  and	  if	  nearly	  all	  members	  of	   the	  population	  violate	  r	  with	  near	  maximum	  systematicity,	  then	  the	  population	  does	  not	  operate	  P.	  	  	  The	   uniqueness-­‐constitutivity	   claim	   understood	   as	   a	   thesis	   about	   the	  practice	   of	  making	   assertions	   and	  Engagement	   Condition**	   do	   indeed	  entail:	  	  	  
No	  Practice.	   If	   too	  many	  members	  of	  a	  population	  of	  speakers	  violate	  KNA	  with	   near	  maximum	   systematicity,	   then	   the	   population	   does	   not	  operate	  a	  practice	  of	  making	  assertions.	  	  	  What’s	  not	  so	  clear	  is	  that	  No	  Practice	  is	  really	  correct.	  To	  see	  why	  not,	  consider:	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Compulsive	   Liars.	   phi	   is	   a	   population	   of	   agents	   such	   that	   (i)	   all	   its	  members	  only	  ever	  say	  what	  they	  believe	  to	  be	  false,	  (ii)	  this	  is	  common	  knowledge	   and,	   consequently,	   (iii)	   whenever	   a	   member	   of	   the	  population	   says	   that	   p,	   members	   of	   the	   audience	   will	   infer	   and	  thereupon	  come	  to	  believe	  that	  not-­‐p.	  	  	  It	  seems	  that	  the	  following	  is	  plausible	  about	  Compulsive	  Liars:	  	  	  
Possible	   Assertion*.	   It	   is	  possible	   for	   the	  members	  of	  phi	   to	  assert	  a	  wide	  range	  propositions.	  	  	  Furthermore,	  it	  looks	  as	  though	  this	  is	  because	  there	  is	  little	  reason	  to	  discontinue	   the	   practice	   of	   assertion	   in	   such	   a	   population,	   since,	  together	  with	   the	   common	   knowledge	   concerning	   the	   peculiarities	   of	  the	   said	   population,	   it	   constitutes	   a	   pretty	   reliable	   epistemic	   vehicle.	  Now,	   let	  us	  assume,	  as	  we	  may,	  that	  the	  members	  of	  phi	  happen	  to	  be	  not	  only	  very	  chatty	  but	  also	  otherwise	  exceptionally	  reliable	  cognitive	  agents	  who	   live	   in	   an	  exceptionally	  hospitable	   epistemic	   environment	  with	  the	  result	  that	  nearly	  all	  of	  their	  beliefs	  qualify	  as	  knowledge.	  We	  then	  get:	  	  	  
Systematic	  Counter-­‐Knowledge*.	  The	  members	  of	  phi	  make	  assertions	  that,	   with	   near	   maximum	   systematicity,	   are	   false	   and	   run	   counter	   to	  what	  they	  know.	  	  	  	  It	   is	   easy	   to	   see	   that	   the	   previous	   argument,	   with	   Engagement	  Condition**	  in	  place	  of	  Engagement	  Condition’	  and	  Systematic	  Counter-­‐Knowledge*	   in	   place	   of	   Systematic	   Counter-­‐Knowledge,	   will	   serve	   to	  show	   that	   No	   Practice	   is	   incompatible	   with	   the	   uniqueness-­‐constitutivity	  claim.	  	  	   Here	   is	  one	   final	  possible	  objection	   I’d	   like	   to	  consider.	  Doesn’t	  Williamson	   offer	   an	   account	   of	   constitutive	   rules	   according	   to	   which	  constitutive	  rules	  are	  essential	   to	   the	  constituted	  act	   in	   the	  sense	   that	  “necessarily,	   the	   rule	   governs	   every	   performance	   of	   the	   act”	  (Williamson	  2000,	  239)?	  And	  doesn’t	  KNA	  come	  out	  to	  be	  a	  constitutive	  rule	  on	  this	  account?	  	   By	  way	  of	  response,	  note	  that	  while	  Williamson	  does	  claim	  that	  the	  above	  is	  a	  necessary	  condition	  on	  constitutive	  rules,	  he	  once	  again	  does	   not	   claim	   that	   it	   is	   also	   sufficient.	   Note,	   furthermore,	   that	  Williamson	  will	  do	  well	  not	  to	  strengthen	  this	  necessary	  condition	  into	  a	  sufficient	  condition.	  After	  all,	  moral	  and	  practical	  norms	  also	  govern	  every	   performance	   of	   a	   given	   act	  with	   necessity.	  However,	  we	   take	   it	  that	   it	   would	   be	   rather	   implausible	   to	   say	   that	   moral	   and	   practical	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norms	   qualify	   as	   constitutive	   rules	   of	   say,	   moves	   in	   draughts,	  utterances	   in	   English	   or	   assertions.35	  Williamson’s	   claim	   is	   thus	   only	  plausible	  if	  taken	  to	  be	  a	  necessary	  condition	  on	  constitutive	  rules.	  As	  a	  result,	  it	  is	  compatible	  with	  further	  necessary	  conditions	  on	  constitutive	  rules	  as	  well	  as	  necessary	  conditions	  on	  what	  it	  takes	  to	  engage	  in	  acts	  constituted	   by	   constitutive	   rules.	   In	   particular,	   it	   is	   compatible	   with	  Engagement	  Condition	  and	  Engagement	  Condition’.	  Since	  we	  have	  seen	  these	  conditions	  are	  independently	  plausible,	  the	  prospects	  of	  blocking	  the	  argument	  by	  appeal	  to	  the	  necessity	  claim	  are	  also	  dim.	  	  	  
2.3.3	  Force	  	  Recall	   that	   this	   discussion	   of	   Williamson’s	   view	   was	   meant	   to	   check	  whether	   it	   could	   provide	   a	   satisfactory	   answer	   to	   the	   question	   of	  rationale	   for	   KNA,	   i.e.	   an	   answer	   to	   the	   question	   of	   why	   KNA	   should	  govern	  assertion	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  We	  have	  seen	  that	  there	  is	  reason	  to	  believe	   that	   the	   Williamson	   uniqueness-­‐constitutivity	   claim	   is	   false.	  Even	   so,	   we	  may	   think	   that	   this	   is	   because	   it	   is	   too	   strong.	   After	   all,	  maybe	  Williamson’s	   constitutivity	   claim	   is	   correct	   and	  his	  uniqueness	  claim	   mistaken	   as	   there	   are	   more	   constitutive	   norms	   of	   assertion.	  Would	   constitutivity	   alone	   not	   be	   enough	   to	   serve	   as	   a	   rationale	   for	  KNA?	  Think	  of	  games	  again:	  why	  should	  one	  not	  move	  a	  rook	  diagonally	  when	  playing	   chess?	  Because	   that’s	   just	   how	   the	   game	   is	   played:	   it	   is	  constitutive	   of	   chess	   that,	   among	   other	   rules,	   one	   is	   supposed	   to	   not	  move	  the	  rook	  diagonally.	  	   Note,	  however,	   first,	   that	   it	   is	   far	   from	  clear	   that,	  once	  we	  have	  some	  proposals	  for	  further	  constitutive	  norms	  of	  assertion	  on	  the	  table,	  the	  argument	  made	  here	  will	  not	  generalize.	  After	  all,	  what	  we	  would	  then	  get	  would	  come	  in	  the	  shape	  of	  a	  conjunctive	  constitutive	  norm	  of	  assertion	   of	   which	   KNA	  would	   be	   one	   conjunct.	   At	   that	   point,	   all	   we	  need	   for	   the	   argument	   to	   generalize	   is	   to	   show	   that	   the	   uniqueness-­‐constitutivity	  claim	  fails	  for	  the	  conjunctive	  norm,	  along	  similar	  lines	  as	  above	   –	   i.e.,	   by	   showing	   that	   one	   can	   engage	   in	   assertion	   while	  systematically	  breaking	  the	  conjunctive	  norm.	  	  
                                                35	  	  In	  fact,	  it	  seems	  that	  one	  very	  plausible	  way	  of	  distinguishing	  between	  constitutive	  rules	  and	  other	  norms	  that	  govern	  acts	  necessarily,	  such	  as	  moral	  and	  practical	  norms,	  is	   that	   constitutive	   rules	   come	   with	   conditions	   on	   what	   it	   takes	   to	   engage	   in	   the	  constituted	  act	  like	  the	  one	  Williamson	  mentions	  and	  the	  one	  defended	  above.	  While	  constitutive	  rules	  are	   like	  moral	  and	  practical	  norms	  in	  that	  they	  are	  not	  contingent,	  they	  differ	   from	   the	   latter	   in	   that	   one	   cannot	   engage	   in	   a	   constituted	   act	  unless,	   for	  instance,	   one	   is	   sensitive	   to	  what	   counts	   as	   conforming	   to	   the	   constitutive	   rule	   and	  breaking	   it.	   In	   contrast,	   in	   the	   case	   of	  moral	   and	   practical	   norms,	   such	   insensitivity	  does	  not	  prevent	  one	  from	  engaging	  in	  the	  act.	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   What’s	  more,	   to	  my	  knowledge,	  no	  one	  has	  defended	  a	  view	  of	  assertion	   according	   to	   which	   KNA	   is	   one	   constitutive	   rule	   among	  others.	  It	  looks	  as	  though,	  then,	  for	  the	  time	  being,	  it	  is	  on	  the	  shoulders	  of	  those	  who	  want	  to	  pursue	  this	  route	  to	  put	  forth	  some	  candidates	  for	  further	   constitutive	   rules	   of	   assertion	   and	   to	   show	   that	   the	   argument	  made	  here	  does	  not	  generalize	  to	  the	  resulting	  proposal.	  	   Furthermore,	  even	  so,	  that	  is,	  even	  if	  a	  successful	  proposal	  is	  put	  forth,	  there	  is	  reason	  to	  doubt	  the	  force	  of	  the	  resulting	  rationale.	  To	  see	  this,	   note	   that,	   importantly,	   constitutivity	   without	   uniqueness	   looses	  much	  of	  its	  normative	  strength.	  That	  is	  because	  it	  looks	  as	  though,	  while	  for	  a	  game	  governed	  by	  one	  and	  only	  one	  constitutive	  norm,	  the	  game	  lives	   and	   dies	   with	   the	   norm,	   that	   is	   less	   plausibly	   the	   case	   when	   it	  comes	   to	   non-­‐unique	   constitutive	   norms.	   Let’s	   first	   take	   chess	   as	   an	  example	  again.	  Why	  should	  chess	  be	  governed	  by	  one	  set	  of	  rules	  rather	  than	   another?	   For	   instance,	   why	   should	   chess	   be	   governed	   by	   a	   rule	  according	   to	  which	   the	   pawn	   can	  move	   two	   squares	   forward	   if	   it	   has	  not	  yet	  been	  moved,	  but	  only	  one	  square	  if	   it	  has	  already	  been	  moved	  (R1),	  rather	  than	  by	  a	  rule	  according	  to	  which	  it	  can	  always	  only	  move	  one	  square	  (R2)?	  Note	  that	  games	  evolve	  over	  time:	  some	  rules	  get	  lost	  in	   the	   process,	   new	   ones	   come	   into	   play.	   It	   is,	   of	   course,	   plausible	   to	  think	  that	  we	  are,	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  playing	  a	  different	  game	  if	  many	  rules,	  or	  one	  of	   the	   central	   rules	  are	   lost	  over	   time.	  However,	   it	   looks	  somewhat	   implausible	   to	   believe	   that,	   say,	   just	   because,	   for	   user-­‐friendliness	  considerations,	  R1	  comes	  to	  replace	  R2	  in	  time,	  we	  thereby	  stopped	  playing	  chess	  altogether.	  Even	  more	  implausibly,	  consider	  the	  case	   of	   languages:	   as	   Williamson	   himself	   acknowledges	   (2000,	   239)	  natural	  languages	  gradually	  change	  their	  rules	  over	  time	  without	  losing	  their	  identity.	  	  	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   it	   seems	  also	   implausible	   that,	   in	   the	   case	  of	  norms	  of	  assertion,	  KNA	  could,	  at	  any	  point,	  disappear	  or	  be	  replaced	  by	  a	  different	  norm.	  In	  sum,	  supposing	  that	  assertion	  really	  is	  governed	  by	  KNA,	   it	   is	  somewhat	   less	  than	  plausible	  to	  think	  that	  we	  might	  end	  up	  using	  a	  speech	  act	  that	  is	  governed	  by	  a	  different	  rule	  instead	  at	  any	  point.	  For	  instance,	   it	   is	  rather	  implausible	  that	  we	  might	  as	  well	  have	  end	  up	  using	  a	  speech	  act	  governed	  by	  the	  following	  rule	  of	  assertion:	  	  	  	  
The	   Wondering	   Norm	   of	   Assertion.	   One	  must:	   assert	   p	   only	   if	   one	  wonders	  whether	  p.	  	  	   Williamson	   (2000,	   239)	   acknowledges	   as	   much,	   that	   is,	   he	  agrees	  that	  rules	  of	  games	  and	  languages	  change	  over	  time,	  but	  argues	  that	  what	  he	  is	  interested	  in	  is	  not	  the	  ordinary	  sense	  of	  game,	  language	  or	  assertion,	   for	  that	  matter,	  but	  rather	  a	  technical	  one,	   for	  which	  it	   is	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the	   case	   that	   “a	   rule	   will	   count	   as	   constitutive	   of	   an	   act	   only	   if	   it	   is	  essential	  to	  that	  act:	  necessarily,	  the	  rule	  governs	  every	  performance	  of	  the	  act”.	  He	  motivates	  this	  by	  fruitfulness	  considerations:	  	  	   [I]n	  a	   technical	   sense	  of	   ‘language’	  which	   the	  philosophy	  of	  language	   has	   found	   fruitful,	   the	   semantic,	   syntactic,	   and	  phonetic	   rules	   of	   a	   language	   are	   essential	   to	   it	   […].	   The	  richer	   ordinary	   sense	   of	   ‘language’	   introduces	   needless	  complications.	   Linguistic	   conventions	   and	   the	   consequent	  possibility	  of	  linguistic	  change	  can	  then	  be	  accommodated	  at	  a	   different	   point	   in	   the	   theory:	   a	   population	   which	   at	   one	  time	  has	  the	  convention	  of	  speaking	  a	  language	  L	  may	  later	  change	   to	   a	   convention	   of	   speaking	   a	   distinct	   language	   L*,	  constituted	  by	  slightly	  different	  rules”	  (2000,	  239).	  	  	  Similarly,	  Williamson	  wants	  a	  technical	  sense	  of	  assertion,	  which	  avoids	  the	  issue	  of	  normative	  change:	  	  	  	   Likewise,	   in	   the	  present	   technical	   sense	  of	   ‘speech	   act’,	   the	  rules	  of	  a	  speech	  act	  are	  essential	  to	  it.	  A	  population	  which	  at	  one	   time	   has	   the	   convention	   of	   using	   a	   certain	   device	   to	  perform	  a	  speech	  act	  A	  may	  later	  change	  to	  a	  convention	  of	  using	   that	   device	   to	   perform	   a	   distinct	   speech	   act	   A*,	  governed	  by	  slightly	  different	  rules	  (2000,	  239).	  	  	  	   Two	   things	   about	   this:	   first,	   it	   is	   not	   clear	   how	   fruitfulness	  considerations	  are	  supposed	  to	  work	  in	  this	  case.	  Say,	  for	  instance,	  that	  the	  speech	  act	  governed,	  among	  other	  constitutive	  norms,	  by	  KNA,	  and	  called	  assertion	  –	  in	  its	  technical	  sense	  –	  disappeared	  about	  6	  centuries	  ago,	  and,	  due	   to	  simplicity	  considerations,	  was	  replaced	  by	  assertion*,	  governed	  by	  a	  justified	  true	  belief	  norm	  (JTBNA).	  After	  all,	  Gettier	  cases	  are	   so	   weird	   and	   rare,	   that	   imposing	   a	   stronger	   epistemic	   constraint	  than	  JTB	  seems	  like	  a	  waste	  of	  resources.	  One	  first	  question	  that	  arises,	  if	   that	   is	   the	   case	   is:	  why	   should	  we	   care	   about	   philosophizing	   about	  assertion	   rather	   than	   about	   assertion*?	   Secondly,	   what	   about	   a	  defender	   of	   JTBNA,	   bringing	   linguistic	   data	   forward	   to	   support	   his	  account?	  He	  will,	  presumably,	  have	  to	  be	  satisfied	  with	  a	  Williamsonian	  response	   along	   the	   following	   lines:	   ‘Strictly	   speaking,	   assertion	   is	  governed	  by	  KNA,	  therefore	  I	  am	  right	  and	  you	  are	  wrong.	  It’s	  just	  that	  it	   disappeared	   6	   centuries	   ago,	   and	   was	   replaced	   by	   this	   different	  speech	  act,	  which	  your	   linguistic	  data	  makes	  reference	  to.	   ’	   It	  would,	   I	  submit,	  be	  rather	  surprising	   if	   the	   JTBNA	  fellow	  will	  rest	  content	  with	  this	  reply.	  And,	  last	  but	  not	  least,	  note	  that	  Williamson	  himself	  adduces	  
	   41	  
quite	  a	   lot	  of	   linguistic	  data	  in	  support	  of	  KNA,	  which	  suggests	  that	  he	  takes	  intuitions	  about	  what	  is	   ‘ordinarily’	  taken	  to	  be	  an	  assertoric	  act	  seriously.	  	  	   As	   such,	   all	   in	   all,	   it	   looks	   as	   though	   the	   defender	   of	   the	  Williamsonian	   account	   faces	   the	   following	   dilemma	   at	   this	   point:	   she	  can	  retreat	  to	  merely	  defending	  a	  technical	  sense	  of	  assertion,	  but	  then	  (1)	   she	   can’t	   avail	   herself	   of	   (at	   least	   some)	   of	   the	   linguistic	   data	  	  Williamson	  puts	  forth	  in	  support	  of	  KNA,	  and	  (2)	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  why	  we	  should	   care	   about	   the	   epistemic	   norm	   governing	   Williamsonian	  assertion	   rather	   than	   assertion.	   Alternatively,	   she	   can	   abandon	   the	  mere	   technical	   sense,	  but	   then	   the	   constitutivity	   claim	   is	  not	   left	  with	  much	  in	  the	  way	  of	  force	  to	  offer	  a	  rationale	  for	  KNA.36	  	  	  	  
2.4	  Conclusion	  	  This	  chapter	  looked	  at	  several	  extant	  attempts	  to	  provide	  a	  rationale	  for	  the	  knowledge	  norm	  of	  assertion.	  First,	  the	  belief-­‐assertion	  parallel	  was	  shown	   to	   lack	   the	   advertised	   normative	   strength	   to	   ground	   norm	  correspondence.	   Second,	   the	   claim	   that	   assertion	   inherits	   the	  norm	  of	  belief	  in	  virtue	  of	  being	  an	  expression	  thereof	  turned	  out	  to	  rest	  on	  an	  invalid	  derivation.	  Third,	   the	   inheritance	  argument	   from	   the	  norm	   for	  action	  was	  proven	  suspicious	  of	  deontic	  equivocation.	  	   Last	   but	   not	   least,	   I	   have	   looked	   at	   the	   potential	   of	   Tim	  Williamson’s	  constitutivity	  claim	  of	  delivering	  a	  good	  rationale	  for	  KNA,	  and	  tried	  to	  cast	  doubt	  on	  both	  its	  plausibility	  and	  its	  force.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
                                                36	  	   Alternatively,	   champions	   of	   the	  Williamson	   line	  might	  maintain	   that	   the	   analogy	  between	   rules	   of	   assertion	   and	   rules	   of	   games	   does	   not	   extend	   to	   the	   rationale	  question.	  Note,	  however,	  that,	  in	  that	  case,	  Williamsonians	  will	  not	  only	  shoulder	  the	  burden	   of	   offering	   a	   satisfactory,	   independent	   answer	   to	   the	   rationale	   question.	   In	  addition,	  they	  will	  also	  need	  to	  offer	  good	  reason	  why	  the	  analogy	  between	  norms	  of	  assertion	   and	   games	   does	   not	   extent	   to	   just	   the	   point	  where	   it	   becomes	   potentially	  problematic	  for	  them.	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Chapter	  III	  
A	  Function	  First	  Rationale	  	  So	  far,	  this	  dissertation	  has	  come	  with	  some	  good	  and	  some	  bad	  news.	  On	   the	   bright	   side,	   as	   it	   turns	   out,	   we	   were	   wrong	   all	   along:	   the	  shiftiness	   data	   are	   not	   forcing	   us	   into	   a	   sensitivity	   dilemma.	   To	   the	  contrary,	   Classical	   Invariantism	   is	   perfectly	   compatible	   with	   a	  knowledge	   norm	   of	   assertion.	   As	   such,	   we	   are	   free	   to	   rip	   the	   nice	  theoretical	  fruit	  on	  both	  sides.	  	  	   Alas,	   though,	   as	   it	   turns	  out,	   the	   rationale	  question,	   that	   is,	   the	  question	   as	   to	   why	   we	   should	   think	   assertion	   is	   governed	   by	   a	  knowledge	   norm	   in	   the	   first	   place,	   does	   not	   seem	   to	   afford	   an	   easy	  answer.	  	  	  	   Now,	   arguably,	   several	   competing	   accounts	   share	   in	   the	   goods	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  empirical	  adequacy,	  to	  some	  extent	  or	  another.	  If	  that	  is	  the	  case,	  in	  the	  end,	  it	   is	  to	  be	  expected	  that	  what	  is	  going	  to	  decide	  between	   competing	   views	   are	   theoretical	   virtues,	   such	   as,	   crucially,	  independent	   plausibility.	   An	   answer	   to	   the	   rationale	   question,	   then,	  might	  make	   all	   the	  difference.	   This	   chapter	   is	   attempting	   to	   offer	   just	  that.	  	  	  	  
3.1	  What	  Assertion	  is	  Good	  for	  	  Recall	   that,	   as	   early	   as	   in	  Chapter	  #1,	  we	  have	  distinguished	  between	  epistemic	   norms	   and	   norms	  with	   epistemic	   content.	   That	   is,	  we	   have	  seen	   that,	   just	   because	   a	   norm	   regulates	   the	   appropriate	   amount	   of	  epistemic	  support	  for	  proper	  φ-­‐ing,	  it	  need	  not	  follow	  it	  is	  an	  epistemic	  norm.	   Now,	   one	   problem	   that	   still	   remains	   is	   the	   following:	   if	   this	  distinction	   is	   correct,	   how	   is	   one	   to	   distinguish	   the	   requirements	  pertaining	   to	   norms	   of	   the	   former	   sort	   from	   the	   requirements	  pertaining	   to	   norms	   of	   the	   latter	   sort?	   How	   is	   one	   to	   know	   when	  epistemic	   normativity	   proper	   is	   the	   one	   triggering	   the	   relevant	  intuitions	  of	  permissibility,	  rather	  than,	  say,	  prudential	  normativity?	  	  	  
3.1.1	  Association	  Typing	  	  Here	   is	   a	   pretty	   straightforward	   –	   and	   value-­‐theoretically	   innocent	   -­‐	  way	  to	  go	  about	  it:	  go	  by	  the	  type	  of	  good	  the	  target	  norm	  is	  associated	  with!	  Prudential	  norms	  will	  be	  associated	  with	  prudential	  goods,	  moral	  norms	  will	  be	  associated	  with	  moral	  goods,	  etc.	   In	   the	  same	  spirit,	  we	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should	   expect	   epistemic	   norms	   to	   come	   in	   a	   package	   with	   epistemic	  goods.	  	  	   Think	  again	  about	  my	  driving	  towards	  the	  city	  centre	  to	  diffuse	  the	  bomb:	  the	  moral	  norm	  there	  has	  traffic-­‐related	  content,	  it	  regulates	  the	  appropriate	  speed	  to	  70	  km/h.	  This,	  however,	  in	  no	  way	  makes	  it	  a	  traffic	  norm;	  this	  is	  easy	  to	  see,	  given	  that	  it	  is	  associated	  with	  the	  moral	  good	  of	  saving	  hundreds	  of	  lives,	  rather	  than	  with	  safely	  getting	  to	  your	  destination,	  which	  is	  the	  good	  commonly	  associated	  with	  traffic	  norms.	  Similarly,	   prudential	   norms	   can	   have	   epistemic	   content;	   take,	   for	  instance,	   the	  norm:	   ‘Do	  not	   jump	   in	   the	   lake	  unless	  you	  know	  how	   to	  swim’.	   What	   makes	   this	   a	   prudential	   constraint	   rather	   than	   an	  epistemic	  one	  is	  the	  good	  associated	  with	  it,	  which	  is	  life	  preservation.	  We	  get,	  therefore:	  	  
The	  Value	  Individuation	  Thesis	  (VIT):	  Norms	  of	  type	  X	  are	  associated	  with	  goods	  of	  type	  X.	  	  Crucially,	   notice	   that	   the	   above	   proposal	   about	   how	   to	   go	   about	  distinguishing	   genuinely	   epistemic	   requirements	   from	   other	   types	  thereof	  is	  not	  only	  innocent	  from	  a	  value-­‐theoretic	  perspective,	  but	  also,	  pretty	  much,	  the	  received	  view	  in	  value	  theory	  concerning	  the	  relation	  between	   the	   axiological	   and	   the	   deontic.	   37 	  That	   is	   because	   the	  
association	   claim	  between	  norms	  and	  goals	  of	   the	  same	   type	  does	  not	  imply	   any	   direction	   of	   explanation,	   and	   thus	   any	   substantial	   value-­‐theoretic	   commitment.	   It	   holds	   on	   both	   the	   most	   notable	   views	  regarding	   the	   relationship	   of	   the	   good	   to	   the	   deontic.	   The	   teleologist	  explains	  the	  ‘ought’	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  ‘good’;	  he	  will	  say	  that	  the	  norm	  of	  type	   X	   is	   there	   to	   guide	   us	   in	   reaching	   the	   goal	   of	   type	   X.	   The	  deontologist	   reverses	   the	   order	   of	   explanation:	   according	   to	   ‘Fitting	  Attitude’	  accounts	  of	  value,	   the	  goal	  of	  type	  X	   is	  only	  valuable	  because	  the	  norm	  of	  type	  X	  gives	  us	  reasons	  to	  favour	  it.	  In	  either	  case,	  the	  mere	  
association	  claim	  holds.38	  	  	  	  
3.1.2	  Etiology	  	  In	   the	   light	   of	   the	   previous	   discussion	   regarding	   the	   type-­‐association	  between	  norms	  and	  goods,	  I	  will	  be	  asking	  the	  obvious	  question:	  what	  is	  assertion	  good	  for	  (epistemically)?	  The	  aim	  is	  to	  develop	  a	  function-­‐first	   account	   of	   the	   normativity	   of	   assertion,	   in	   conjunction	   with	   a	  
                                                37	  For	  discussion,	  see,	  for	  instance,	  Schroeder	  (2012).	  38	  I	  will	  return	  to	  the	  issue	  in	  section	  #3.2.3,	  where	  I	  discuss	  possible	  objections	  to	  a	  consequentialist	  reading	  of	  VIT.	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general	  account	  of	  etiological	  functions	  and	  their	  normative	  import.	  At	  the	  heart	  of	   this	  account	   is	   the	   thesis	   that	  assertion	  has	  an	  etiological	  epistemic	  function	  that	  gives	  rise	  to	  an	  epistemic	  norm.	  	   Here	   is	   the	  normative	  picture	  proposed	  by	  this	  paper:	   in	   traits,	  artefacts	   and	   actions	   alike,	   functions	   generate	   norms.	   There	   is	   such	   a	  thing	  as	  a	  properly	  functioning	  heart,	  a	  properly	  functioning	  can	  opener	  and	  a	  proper	  way	  to	  engage	  in	  sexual	  intercourse	  in	  order	  to	  serve	  the	  function	  of	  reproduction.	  We	  should	  expect,	  then,	  that	  if	  there	  is	  such	  a	  thing	   as	   a	   proper	   assertion,	   it	   will	   somehow	   associated	   with	   the	  function	   it	   serves.	   It	   would	   be	   useful,	   then,	   given	   VIT,	   and	   given	   that	  what	   we	   are	   after	   is	   the	   epistemic	   norm	   of	   assertion,	   to	   begin	   by	  identifying	   the	   epistemic	   function	   thereof.	   To	   this	   effect,	   in	   what	  follows,	  I	  will	  be	  employing	  an	  etiological	  account	  of	  functions.	  39	  	   On	  the	  etiological	  theory	  of	  functions,	  functions	  turn	  on	  histories	  that	  explain	  why	  the	   item	  exists	  or	  operates	   the	  way	   it	  does.	  Take	  my	  heart;	  plausibly,	  tokens	  of	  the	  type	  pumped	  blood	  in	  my	  ancestors.	  This	  was	  beneficial	  for	  my	  ancestors’	  survival,	  which	  explains	  why	  tokens	  of	  the	   type	   continued	   to	   exist.	   As	   a	   result,	   my	   heart	   acquired	   the	  etiological	   function	   (henceforth	   also	   e-­‐function)40	  of	   pumping	   blood.	  Acquiring	  an	  etiological	  function	  is	  a	  success	  story:	  traits,	  artefacts	  and	  actions	   get	   etiological	   functions	   of	   a	   particular	   type	   by	   producing	   the	  relevant	   type	   of	   benefit.	   My	   heart	   acquired	   a	   biological	   etiological	  function	  by	  generating	  biological	  benefit.	  Through	  a	  positive	   feedback	  mechanism	  –	   the	  heart	  pumped	  blood,	  which	  kept	   the	  organism	  alive,	  which,	   in	   turn,	   insured	   the	   continuous	   existence	   of	   the	   heart	   -­‐	   our	  hearts	  acquired	  the	  etiological	  function	  of	  pumping	  blood.	  	  	   Now,	   one	   question	   that	   arises	   concerns	   how	   much	   history	   is	  needed	  for	  function	  acquisition.	  After	  all,	  surely,	  not	  all	  functional	  items	  follow	  the	  model	  of	  the	  heart:	  there	  will	  be	  cases	  where	  a	  requirement	  of	   selection	   over	   generations	   for	   function	   acquisition	   will	   seem	  
                                                39	  Defended	   by	   people	   like	   David	   J.	   Buller	   (1998),	   Ruth	   Millikan	   (1984),	   Karen	  Neander	   (1991),	   Peter	   Godfrey-­‐Smith	   (1994)	   and,	   last	   but	   not	   least,	   Larry	   Wright	  (1973).	  The	  etiological	  theory	  of	  functions	  is,	  by	  far,	  the	  most	  widely	  endorsed	  view	  in	  the	   literature.	   Its	   main	   competitor	   is	   the	   ‘systemic’	   theory	   of	   functions,	   notably	  defended	   in	   (Cummins	  1975).	   Systemic	   functions	  describe	  how	  something	  works	  or	  operates—what	   it	  does—as	  a	  part	  of	  a	   larger	  system	  (Cummins	  1975).	  Functions,	   in	  this	  sense,	  are	   the	  causal	  role	  capacities	  of	  parts	   that	  contribute	   to	  some	  capacity	  of	  the	   containing	   system.	   Systemic	   functions	   are	   widely	   believed	   to	   lack	   normative	  import,	  which	  is	  what	  explains,	  to	  a	  large	  extent,	  both	  the	  popularity	  of	  the	  competing,	  etiological	   account	   and	   why	   the	   latter	   is	   thought	   to	   be	   much	   better	   suited	   for	  applications	  to	  normative	  domains	  like	  epistemology.	  40	  For	   application	  of	   the	   etiological	   account	  of	   functions	   to	   the	  normativity	  of	   belief,	  see	   e.g.	   (Millikan	   1984)	   and	   (Graham	   2012).	   For	   a	   knowledge-­‐first	   incarnation	  thereof,	  see	  (Simion	  In	  Progress).	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implausibly	   strong	   (Sosa	   1993).41	  The	   paradigmatic	   case	   is	   that	   of	  beneficial	  macro-­‐mutations,	  also	  known	  as	  hopeful	  monsters	   (Graham	  2014,	  30).	  Most	  mutations	  are	  harmful	  (think	  of	  extreme	  birth	  defects);	  once	   in	   a	   while,	   though,	   a	   happy	   accident	   happens:	   someone	   is	   born	  with	  an	  almost	  entirely	  new	  trait	  or	  organ,	  very	  different	  in	  kind	  from	  its	  ancestral	   trait,	  which	  actually	  benefits	   the	  recipient.	  Since	   they	  are	  mutations,	   they	   don’t	   have	   an	   evolutionary	   history;	   they	   are	   “first	  generation”	   traits.	   Still,	   many	   biologists	   would	   say	   that	   they	   have	  functions.	  	   In	  response	  to	  this	  worry,	  Graham	  (2014)	  goes	  into	  detail	  about	  what	  the	  etiological	  historical	  constraint	  consists	   in.	  According	  to	  him,	  while	  etiology	  does	  require	  some	  history,	   it	  does	  not	  require	  an	  awful	  lot	  of	  it;	  there	  are	  several	  ways	  to	  cash	  out	  the	  etiological	  requirement	  that	   do	   not	   presuppose	   directional	   selection,	   i.e.	   selection	   over	  generations.	  A	   trait	  can	  also	  acquire	  a	  particular	   function	  by	  on	  going,	  maintenance	   selection,	   or	   through	   a	   learning	   process,	   or	   even	   by	   the	  metabolic	   activity	   of	   the	   organism	   itself.	   What	   it	   all	   amounts	   to,	  eventually,	   is	   explaining	   the	   existence/continuous	   existence	   of	   a	   trait	  through	  a	  through	  a	  longer	  or	  shorter	  history	  of	  positive	  feedback:	  	   Functions	  arise	  from	  consequence	  etiologies,	  etiologies	  that	  explain	  why	  something	  exists	  or	  continues	  to	  exist	  in	  terms	  of	   its	   consequences,	  because	  of	   a	   feedback	  mechanism	   that	  takes	  consequences	  as	  input	  and	  causes	  or	  sustains	  the	  item	  as	  output	  (Graham	  2014,	  35).	  	  Here	  is,	  then,	  on	  a	  first	  approximation,	  what	  it	  takes	  for	  a	  trait	  to	  have	  an	  etiological	  function	  of	  a	  particular	  type:	  	  
E-Function: A token of type T has the e-function of producing effect E in 
system S iff  (1) tokens of T produced E in the past, (2) producing E 
benefitted S/S’s ancestors and (3) producing E’s having benefitted S’s 
ancestors contributes to the explanation of why T exists in S.42  
                                                41	  Take	   Davidson’s	   Swampman,	   for	   instance	   (1987,	   443).	   Swampman	   comes	   into	  existence	   as	   a	   result	   of	   a	   lightning	   hitting	   a	   swamp	   and	   strangely	   rearranging	   gas	  molecules	   into	   the	   exact	   duplicate	   of	   some	   ordinary	   person.	   Now,	   according	   to	  Graham,	   justified	   beliefs	   are	   beliefs	   formed	   via	   cognitive	   processes	   that	   have	   the	  function	  of	  reliably	  producing	  true	  beliefs;	  since	  function	  acquisition	  requires	  history,	  and	   since	   Swampman’s	   processes	   lack	   any,	   it	   would	   seem	   as	   though,	   on	   Graham´s	  account	  of	   justification,	  he	  cannot	  have	  justified	  beliefs.	  However,	   intuitively,	  at	   least	  after	   acquiring	   the	   necessary	   concepts,	   Swampman´s	   belief	   that	   he	   is	   sitting	   in	   a	  swamp	  seems	  perfectly	  justified	  (Sosa	  1993).	  	  42 	  I	   adapted	   this	   definition	   from	   the	   ones	   on	   offer	   in	   Buller	   (1998)	   and	   Kelp	  (Forthcoming).	  The	  account	  departs	   in	   a	   crucial	  way	   from	  Millikan	   (1984)	   in	   that	   it	  drops	  the	  requirement	  for	  selection	  over	  generations.	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   Before	  moving	  on,	  one	  more	   important	   thing	  to	  be	  discussed	   is	  the	   typing	   of	   the	   relevant	   e-­‐functions;	   after	   all,	   functions	   can	   be	   of	  different	  sorts:	  	  there	  are	  biological	  functions,	  aesthetic	  functions,	  social	  functions,	   etc.	   The	   account	   defended	   here	   departs	   from	   the	   way	   in	  which	   the	   e-­‐functionalist	   picture	   has	   been	   traditionally	   applied	   to	  epistemological	  matters	  (and	  outside	  biology	  in	  general)	  by	  people	  like	  Graham	   and	   Millikan	   in	   one	   crucial	   way:	   Graham	   and	   Millikan	   take	  biological	   benefit	   to	   correspond	   to	   the	   acquisition	   of	   all	   types	   of	   e-­‐functions.	   However,	   this	   way	   to	   apply	   the	   etiological	   account	   to	  normative	  domains	  outside	  biology	  quickly	   runs	   into	   trouble	  with	   the	  corresponding	   normative	   claims:	   In	   a	   nutshell,	   if	   biological	   positive	  feedback	   is	   taken	   to	   be	   essential	   for	   the	   acquisition	   of	   any	   type	   of	  function,	   since	   a	   trait	   cannot	   be	   properly	   functioning	   unless	   it	   has	   a	  function	   to	   begin	  with,	   it	  would	   look	   as	   though	   proper	   functioning	   of	  any	   type	   is	  depends	  on	  a	   (history	  of)	  biological	  positive	   feedback.	  But	  this	  does	  not	  seem	  right:	  to	  see	  why,	  consider,	  for	  instance,	  e-­‐functions	  acquisitioned	  via	  a	   learning	  process.	  It	  does	  not	  seem	  right	  to	  say	  that	  whether	  I	  am	  tying	  my	  shoelaces	  properly	  depends	  on	  whether	   it	  was	  ever	   beneficial	   to	   me	   to	   tie	   them	   up.	   It	   is	   easy	   to	   imagine	   scenarios	  where	   that	   is	   not	   the	   case,	   which,	   however,	   will	   do	   little	   to	   affect	  whether	  I’m	  properly	  tying	  up	  my	  shoelaces.	  Since	  I	  have	  argued	  this	  in	  detail	  in	  several	  places,43	  though,	  and	  since	  this	  issue	  is	  only	  of	  marginal	  relevance	  to	  our	  purposes,	  I	  will	  not	  go	  more	  into	  detail	  about	  this	  here.	  44	  I	   will	   come	   back	   to	   this	   matter	   in	   Section	   #3.2.4	   below,	   where	   I	  answer	  a	  closely	  related	  objection	  to	  my	  account.	  	  	   For	  now,	  it	   is	  important	  to	  keep	  in	  mind	  that,	   in	  contrast	  to	  the	  Graham/Millikan	  view,	  the	  account	  defended	  here	  takes	  functions	  to	  be	  typed	  by	  the	  corresponding	  benefit.	  As	  such,	  if	  a	  trait	  produces	  a	  benefit	  of	  type	  B	  in	  a	  system,	  the	  function	  thereby	  acquired	  will	  be	  a	  function	  of	  
                                                43	  E.g.	  (Simion	  2016).	  44	  The	  problem,	  roughly,	  is	  that	  biological	  benefit	  and	  any	  other	  type	  of	  benefit	  	  -­‐	  call	  it	  benefit	   of	   type	  B	   -­‐	   can	   come	   apart,	   they	   need	   not	   be	   instantiated	   at	   the	   same	   time,	  even	   if	   they	   normally	   are.	   However,	   if	   we	   have	   a	   biological	   benefit	   requirement	   on	  functions	  of	  type	  B,	  since	  norms	  are	  taken	  to	  drop	  out	  of	  the	  corresponding	  functions,	  we	  will	  have	  a	  biological	  benefit	  requirement	  of	  the	  norm	  of	  type	  B	  being	  met.	  In	  cases	  where	   the	   two	   types	   of	   benefit	   will	   come	   apart,	   that	   will	   give	   the	   wrong	   result:	  intuitively,	  propriety	  by	  norm	  B	  will	   co-­‐vary	  with	  benefit	  of	   type	  B	  rather	   than	  with	  biological	  benefit.	   	  To	  see	  why,	   think	  of	  Swampman	  again;	   say	   that	  none	  of	   the	   true	  beliefs	  he	  ever	  acquires	   in	   the	  swamp	  benefit	  him	  biologically,	   since	   they	  result	   in	  a	  terrible	   depression;	   rather,	   he	   would	   have	   been	   better	   off	   not	   believing	   any	   truths	  about	  his	  horrible	  environment.	  Still,	  after	  acquiring	  the	  relevant	  concepts,	  he	  seems	  perfectly	  justified	  in	  believing	  he	  is	  sitting	  in	  a	  swamp.	  In	  contrast,	  if,	  say	  Swampman	  engages	  in	  wishful	  thinking	  and	  thereby	  forms	  a	  bunch	  of	  beliefs	  about	  him	  sitting	  in	  a	  heavenly	  garden,	  no	  matter	  how	  much	  this	  benefits	  him	  biologically,	  he	  would	  still	  not	  end	  up	  being	  epistemically	   justified	   in	  so	  believing.	  For	  more	  discussion,	   see	  Simion	  (2016).	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type	  B.	   If	   it	   is	  biological	  benefit	  that	   is	  at	  stake	  in	  function	  acquisition,	  what	   we	   get	   is	   a	   biological	   function.	   On	   this	   account,	   the	   heart’s	  function	  to	  pump	  blood	  is	  a	  biological	  function	  in	  virtue	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  the	   produced	   benefit	   is	   also	   biological	   –	   i.e.,	   survival.	   The	   function	   of	  music	   is	   an	   aesthetic	   function	   in	   virtue	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   produced	  benefit	   is	   an	   aesthetic	   benefit.	   And	   so	   on.	   Now,	   of	   course,	   aesthetic	  benefit	   might,	   and	   often	   will,	   also	   result	   in	   biological	   benefit.	   This,	  however,	  in	  no	  way	  renders	  the	  function	  at	  stake	  a	  biological	  function.	  What	  is	  important	  to	  keep	  in	  mind	  is	  that	  the	  benefit	  that	  is	  essential	  to	  aesthetic	   function	   acquisition	   is	   the	   aesthetic	   one.	   The	   fact	   that	  biological	  benefit	  is	  also	  associated	  with	  the	  latter	  is	  a	  mere	  contingent	  matter	  of	  fact.	  Here	  is,	  then,	  the	  full	  etiological	  account	  to	  be	  employed	  throughout	  this	  dissertation:	  	  
E-Function: A token of type T has the e-function of type B of producing 
effect E in system S iff  (1) tokens of T produced E in the past, (2) 
producing E resulted in benefit of type B in S/S’s ancestors and (3) 
producing E’s having B-benefitted S’s ancestors contributes to the 
explanation of why T exists in S. 	  	   Now,	   with	   the	   full	   account	   in	   play,	   note	   that	   the	   etiological	  account	  is	  an	  account	  of	  functions	  as	  purposes:	  by	  being	  selected	  for	  it,	  our	   hearts	   have	   acquired	   the	   purpose	   of	   pumping	   blood	   in	   our	  organisms	   (Graham	   2012,	   449).	   Reaching	   that	   purpose	   –	   i.e.,	  successfully	   pumping	   blood	   –	   will	   amount	   to	   function	   fulfilment.	   But	  purposes	   will	   also	   come	   with	   associated	   norms	   prescribing	   the	   right	  way	   to	  proceed	   in	  order	   to	   reliably	   reach	   the	   corresponding	  purpose.	  Because	  its	  function	  contributes	  to	  the	  explanation	  of	  its	  very	  existence,	  the	  trait	   in	  question	  ought	   to	  perform	  in	  a	  way	  that	   is	  associated	  with	  likely	   function	   fulfilment.	   Now,	   according	   to	   the	   etiological	   theory	   of	  functions,	   this	   is	  but	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  trait	   functioned	  back	   in	  the	  day	  when	  it	  acquired	  its	  function.	  Your	  heart	  will	  pump	  blood	  in	  normal	  conditions,	   i.e.,	   conditions	   similar	   to	   those	   in	   which	   it	   was	   selected,	  when	   functioning	   normally,	   that	   is,	   when	   functioning	   in	   the	   way	   in	  which	  it	  was	  functioning	  when	  it	  was	  selected	  for	  its	  beneficial	  effects.	  Plausibly,	   in	  normal	  conditions,	  a	  normally	   functioning	  heart	  will	   fulfil	  its	   function	  of	  pumping	  blood	  in	  your	  system	  by	  beating.	  According	  to	  the	  etiological	  theory,	  then,	  normal	  functioning	  is	  proper	  functioning:	  a	  heart	  functions	  in	  the	  way	  it	  should	  (i.e.,	  by	  the	  norm)	  when	  it	  functions	  in	  the	  way	  it	  did	  back	  in	  the	  day	  when	  it	  acquired	  its	  function:	  when	  it	  beats.	  	   Note,	  then,	  that	  there	  are	  two	  ways	  a	  functional	  device	  might	  go	  right,	  and	  two	  ways	  it	  may	  go	  wrong.	  The	  unhappy	  cases	  are:	  breach	  of	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the	   norm,	   i.e.,	  malfunction	   (in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   heart,	   not	   beating)	   and	  failure	   to	   reach	   the	   corresponding	   purpose,	   i.e.	   failure	   to	   fulfill	   its	  function	   (not	   pumping	   blood)	   (Graham	   2012,	   449).	   The	   happy	  scenarios	   are,	   of	   course,	   proper	   functioning	   (beating)	   and	   function	  fulfillment	  (pumping	  blood).	  	  	   Crucially,	   failure/success	   in	   one	   respect	   need	   not	   imply	  failure/success	   in	   the	   other.	   A	   trait	   can	   be	   malfunctioning	   –	   thus,	   in	  breach	  of	  the	  norm	  –	  and	  still	  fulfil	  its	  function	  (i.e.,	  reach	  its	  aim),	  and	  the	   other	   way	   around:	   proper	   functioning	   need	   not	   imply	   function	  fulfilment.	   To	   see	   this,	   think	   of	   a	   situation	  where	   a	   surgeon	   takes	   the	  heart	   out	   of	   your	   chest,	   places	   it	   in	   a	   vat	   full	   of	   nutrients	   for	   a	   short	  while	  and	  plugs	  it	  to	  a	  pipe	  circuit	  filled	  with	  orange	  juice.	  Your	  heart,	  of	  course,	   will	   fail	   to	   fulfil	   its	   function	   of	   pumping	   blood	   under	   these	  circumstances;	  it	  will,	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  be	  pumping	  orange	  juice.	  But	  this	  does	  not	  make	  it	  into	  a	  malfunctioning	  heart;	  to	  see	  this,	  compare	  it	  to	  a	  heart	  that	  has	  stopped	  pumping	  blood	  because	  it	  has	  been	  stabbed	  by	   a	   dagger.	   When	   functioning	   normally	   –	   whether	   in	   normal	  conditions	  or	  not	  –	  your	  heart	  will	  function	  properly,	  i.e.	  it	  will	  meet	  the	  norm	   constitutively	   associated	  with	   the	   purpose	   of	   pumping	   blood.	   It	  will	   work	   the	   way	   it	   is	   supposed	   to	   work,	   where	   the	   right	   way	   of	  working	   is	   partly	   constituted	   by	   fulfilling	   its	   function	   in	   normal	  conditions.	  	  	   Also,	   not	   only	   need	   proper	   functioning	   not	   imply	   function	  fulfilment,	   but	   the	   other	   direction	   of	   the	   entailment	   need	   not	   hold	  either.	  After	  all,	  your	  dagger-­‐stabbed	  heart	  can	  fulfil	  its	  function	  in	  spite	  of	  being	  malfunctioning,	  through	  some	  lucky	  circumstance,	  say,	  a	  blood	  circulation	  triggering	  magnetic	  field	  of	  sorts	  being	  in	  place.	  	   Let	  us	  take	  stock:	  the	  etiological	  theory	  of	  functions	  aims	  to	  give	  a	   respectable	   naturalistic	   gloss	   to	   otherwise	   suspicious	   entities	   like	  norms	  and	  purposes:	  on	  this	  account,	  norms	  drop	  right	  out	  of	  functions,	  which,	   in	   turn,	   explain	   why	   the	   trait	   in	   question	   still	   exists.	   A	   trait’s	  ‘purpose’	   is	   identified	   with	   function	   fulfilment,	   while	   the	   associated	  norm	  corresponds	  to	  normal	  functioning.	  Your	  heart	  ‘aims’	  at	  pumping	  blood	   because	   successfully	   reaching	   this	   aim	   contributes	   to	   its	  continuous	   existence.	   Also,	   your	   heart	   ‘ought’	   to	   beat,	   because	   that	   is	  the	  way	   in	  which	   it	   fulfilled	   its	   function	   back	   at	   the	   point	   of	   function	  acquisition,	   and,	   as	   such,	   in	   normal	   conditions,	   if	   it	   beats,	   it	   reliably	  reaches	  its	  aim	  to	  pump	  blood.	  	   It	   turns	   out,	   then,	   that	   the	   e-­‐functionalist	   picture	   constitutes	  itself	  in	  a	  fairly	  straightforward	  norm-­‐identification	  machinery;	  here	  is	  how:	   first,	   what	   we	   need	   is	   to	   take	   a	   look	   at	   the	   relevant	   function	  plausibly	   served	   by	   the	   trait/artefact/action	   in	   question.	   Once	   the	  function	  is	  identified,	  the	  question	  we	  need	  to	  ask	  ourselves	  is:	  how	  did	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the	   trait/artefact/action	   plausibly	   fulfil	   its	   function	   at	   the	  moment	   of	  function	   acquisition?	  The	   answer	   to	   this	   question	  will	   give	   us	   normal	  functioning	   which,	   on	   the	   etiological	   account,	   corresponds	   to	   proper	  functioning;	  therefore,	  the	  answer	  to	  this	  question	  delivers	  the	  content	  of	  the	  norm	  we	  are	  after.	  	   Furthermore,	  on	  this	  picture,	  we	  also	  get	  an	  easy	  way	  to	  identify	  the	   type	   of	   norm	   at	   stake,	   compatible	   with	   the	   Value	   Individuation	  Thesis:	  norms	  will	  be	   typed	  by	   the	  corresponding	   functions,	  which,	   in	  turn,	  are	  typed	  by	  the	  produced	  benefit.	  The	  norm	  ‘hearts	  ought	  to	  beat’	  is	   a	   biological	   norm	   in	   virtue	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   it	   serves	   a	   biological	  function	   –	   pumping	   blood	   –	   which,	   in	   turn,	   produces	   a	   biological	  benefit.	  	  	  
3.1.3	  A	  Function-­‐First	  Account	  of	  Assertion	  	  To	  see	  how	  this	  works	  in	  practice,	  let	  us	  return	  to	  assertion:	  our	  actions	  too	  can,	  and	  most	  –	  hopefully!	  -­‐	  will	  serve	  etiological	  functions,	  which,	  again,	  will	  come	  with	  associated	  norms.	  	  	   Now,	  here	  is	  one	  plausible	  thought:	  if	  there’s	  such	  a	  thing	  as	  an	  epistemic	  norm	  for	  assertion	  out	  there	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  it	  is	  likely	  there	  to	  ensure	  that	  assertion	  delivers	  the	  epistemic	  goods	  we	  are	  using	  it	  for.	  Now,	  what	  epistemic	  goods	  is	  assertion	  meant	  to	  deliver?	  	   Although	  not	  essentially	  –	  I	  can,	  say,	  make	  assertions	  in	  a	  diary,	  which	   are	   usually	   not	   intended	   to	   affect	   any	   audience	   in	   any	   way	   –,	  characteristically,	   assertions	   will	   aim	   at	   generating	   testimonial	  knowledge	   in	   the	   audience.	   Plausibly,	   this	   is	   the	   main	   epistemic	  function	   of	   assertion	   (see,	   e.g.,	   (Goldberg	   2015),	   (Kelp	   Forthcoming),	  (Reynolds	   2002),	   (Turri	   In	   press)).	   Due	   to	   our	   physical	   and	   cognitive	  limitations,	   a	   lot	   of	   the	   knowledge	   we	   have	   is	   testimonial;	   thus,	  assertion	   is	   one	   of	   our	   main	   epistemic	   vehicles.	   Now,	   of	   course,	   one	  could	  wonder	  whether	  all	   knowledge	   is	  on	  a	  par	   in	   this	   respect;	   after	  all,	  some	  items	  thereof	  seem	  entirely	  useless	  (e.g.	  about	  the	  number	  of	  blades	  of	  grass	  on	  my	  lawn).	  Perhaps,	  then,	  it	  is	  more	  plausible	  to	  think	  that	   the	   epistemic	   function	   of	   assertion	   is	   generating	   interesting	  knowledge.	   For	   the	   purposes	   of	   this	   paper,	   I	   will	   take	   any	   such	  restriction	  on	  the	  relevant	  epistemic	  goal	  as	  read.	  	   Just	   like	   hearts	  were	   selected	   for	   their	   reliability	   in	   generating	  biological	   benefit,	   I	   submit,	   the	   speech	   act	   of	   assertion	   has	   been	  selected	   for	   its	   reliability	   in	   generating	   epistemic	   benefit,	   i.e.	  testimonial	   knowledge.	   As	   such,	   our	   assertoric	   practice	   acquired	   the	  epistemic	   etiological	   function	   of	   generating	   testimonial	   knowledge	   in	  hearers.	  Because	  it	  generated	  testimonial	  knowledge	  in	  our	  ancestors,	  it	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enabled	  them	  to	  survive	  –	  find	  out	  about	  the	  whereabouts	  of	  dangerous	  predators,	  find	  food	  and	  so	  on	  –	  and	  reproduce,	  thereby	  replicating	  the	  same	  practice	  with	  the	  same	  function	  in	  their	  descendants.	  As	  such,	  the	  fact	  that	  assertion	  generates	  testimonial	  knowledge	  in	  hearers	  explains	  the	   continuous	   existence	   of	   the	   practice.	   Dan	   Sperber	   puts	   this	   point	  succinctly:	   “From	   the	   point	   of	   view	   of	   receivers,	   communication,	   and	  testimony	  in	  particular,	  is	  beneficial	  only	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  is	  a	  source	  of	  genuine	  […]	  information”	  (2001,	  404).	  However,	  if	  the	  practice	  stops	  being	  beneficial	  to	  the	  hearers,	  it	  will	  plausibly	  be	  discontinued.	  Here	  is,	  also,	  Peter	  Graham	  on	  the	  issue:	  	   Speakers	   and	   hearers	   both	   need	   some	   reason	   (motive)	   to	  participate.	   Speakers,	   presumably,	   benefit	   in	   some	   way	   by	  affecting	  hearers.	  If	  hearers	  receive	  no	  benefit	  from	  being	  so	  affected,	   they	  will	   probably	   stop	   responding	   in	   the	   desired	  way.	   So	   unless	   hearers	   get	   something	   out	   of	   accepting	  reports,	  they	  will	  not	  accept	  them.	  And	  if	  they	  will	  not	  accept	  them,	  speakers	  will	  not	  benefit	  by	  making	   them.	  Then	   they	  will	   not	   get	  made.	  Hearer	  benefits	   (partly)	   explain	   speaker	  production.	  	  Just	   like	   your	   heart’s	   pumping	   blood	   keeps	   you	   alive	   which,	   in	   turn,	  contributes	  to	  the	  explanation	  of	  the	  continuous	  existence	  of	  the	  heart,	  the	  function	  of	  assertion	  is	  a	  stabilizing	  one,	  for	  it	  “encourages	  speakers	  to	  keep	  using	  the	  device	  and	  hearers	  to	  keep	  responding	  to	  it	  with	  the	  same	  (with	  a	  stable)	  response”	  (Millikan	  2005,	  94).	  	   Now,	   recall	   that	   functions	   of	   a	   particular	   type	   come	   with	  associated	  norms	  of	  the	  corresponding	  type,	  which	  regulate	  the	  correct	  procedure	   to	   follow	   in	   order	   to	   reliably	   reach	   them.	   My	   heart	   will	  reliably	   pump	   blood	   in	   my	   system	   when	   in	   normal	   conditions,	   i.e.	  conditions	   similar	   to	   those	   of	   function	   acquisition,	   when	   functioning	  normally,	   i.e.	   in	   the	   way	   in	   which	   it	   did	   when	   it	   was	   selected	   for	  pumping	  blood.	  Given	  its	  biological	  etiological	  function,	  then,	  my	  heart	  will	  count	  as	  functioning	  properly	  –	  i.e.,	  by	  the	  biological	  norm	  -­‐	  when	  functioning	  normally,	  i.e.	  when	  it	  functions	  in	  the	  way	  it	  did	  back	  when	  it	   acquired	   its	   biological	   e-­‐function.	   A	   biologically	   proper	   heart,	  therefore,	   will	   pump	   blood	   in	   my	   system	   in	   normal	   conditions	   by	  beating.	  	   Similarly,	   the	   speech-­‐act	   of	   assertion	   will	   reliably	   generate	  testimonial	  knowledge	   in	  hearers	   in	  normal	  conditions,	   i.e.,	  conditions	  similar	   to	   those	   in	  which	   it	  was	   selected,	  when	   functioning	   normally,	  that	  is,	  when	  functioning	  in	  the	  way	  in	  which	  it	  was	  functioning	  when	  it	  was	   selected	   for	   its	   beneficial	   epistemic	   effects.	   When	   functioning	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normally,	   the	   speech	   act	   of	   assertion	   will	   fulfil	   the	   epistemic	   norm	  constitutively	   associated	   with	   its	   epistemic	   e-­‐function	   of	   reliably	  generating	   testimonial	  knowledge;	   it	  will	  work	   the	  way	   it	   is	   supposed	  to	   work,	   where	   the	   right	   way	   of	   working	   is	   partly	   constituted	   by	  reliably	  delivering	   the	  epistemic	  goods	   in	  normal	   conditions.	  Thus,	   an	  epistemically	   proper	   assertion	  will	   be	   one	   that,	   in	   normal	   conditions,	  generates	   knowledge	   in	   the	   hearer	   in	   the	   way	   it	   did	   back	   when	   it	  acquired	  its	  epistemic	  function.	  	  	   The	  question	  to	  ask,	  then,	  if	  we	  want	  to	  know	  the	  content	  of	  the	  epistemic	  norm	  we	  are	  after	   is:	  how	  did	  assertion	   fulfil	   its	   function	  of	  generating	   knowledge	   in	   hearers	   at	   the	   moment	   of	   function	  acquisition?	  	   I	  submit	   that	   the	  overwhelmingly	  plausible	  answer	   is:	  by	  being	  knowledgeable.	  And	  here	  are	  some	  reasons	  that,	  in	  my	  view,	  leave	  room	  for	  very	   little	  doubt	   that	   this	   is	   so:	   first,	  on	  most	   if	  not	  all	  accounts	  of	  testimony	   in	   the	   literature,45	  in	   the	  vast	  majority	  of	  cases,	   the	  speaker	  needs	  to	  know	  in	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  generate	  knowledge	  in	  the	  hearer.	  Furthermore,	  knowledge	  is	  all	  the	  speaker	  needs	  to	  this	  effect	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  her	  epistemic	  standing	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  p.	  46	  	   Also,	   exceptions	   to	   this	   rule	   describe	   extremely	   unusual	  scenarios,47	  which	  renders	  them	  highly	  unlikely	  to	  affect	  the	  argument	  from	   testimony	   to	   the	   knowledge	   norm	   in	   any	   way.	   After	   all,	   if	   the	  function	   of	   assertion	   is	   generating	   testimonial	   knowledge,	   and	   in	   the	  vast	  majority	  of	  the	  cases	  knowledge	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  speaker	  is	  both	  needed	  and	  enough	  for	  generating	  testimonial	  knowledge	  in	  the	  hearer,	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  have	  a	  knowledge	  norm	  governing	  assertion.	  To	  see	  this,	  consider	  driving:	  norms	  regulating	  speed	  limit	  within	  city	  bounds	  are	   presumably	   there	   to	   make	   it	   so	   that	   we	   arrive	   safely	   at	   our	  destination.	  Surely,	   though,	  driving	  50	  km/h	  within	  city	  bounds	   is	  not	  
always	   the	   ideal	   speed;	   there	   are	   instances	   when,	   for	   instance,	  overtaking	   at	   80	   km/h	   will	   avoid	   a	   major	   accident.	   However,	  presumably,	   the	   reason	   why	   the	   norm	   says	   ‘Drive	   at	   most	   50	   km/h	  
                                                45	  See	  Lackey	  (2008)	  for	  a	  nice	  overview.	  46	  Williamson	  (2000,	  256)	  makes	  a	  similar	  point,	  although	  he	  does	  not	  pursue	  this	  line	  any	  further:	  “Although	  there	  are	  special	  cases	  in	  which	  someone	  comes	  to	  know	  p	  by	  hearing	  someone	  who	  does	  not	  know	  p	  assert	  p	  […],	  the	  normal	  procedure	  by	  which	  the	  hearer	  comes	  to	  know	  p	  requires	  the	  speaker	  to	  know	  p	  too.”	  47	  Exceptions	  are	  few,	  and	  they	  roughly	  boil	  down	  to	  two	  types	  of	  cases:	  first,	  we	  have,	  again,	   ‘selfless	   asserters’,	   asserting	   on	   knowledge-­‐level	   justification	   without	   belief	  (Lackey	  2007).	  These	  speakers	  assert	  to	  what	  is	  best	  supported	  by	  evidence,	  although	  they	  cannot	  get	  themselves	  to	  believe	  it	  due	  to	  some	  rationality	  failures.	  Secondly,	  we	  have	  ‘Compulsive	  Liar’	  cases	  (Lackey	  2008).	  Roughly,	  what	  happens	  in	  these	  cases	  is	  that,	  although	  the	  speaker	  intends	  to	  lie	  on	  a	  regular	  basis,	  some	  external	  intervention	  makes	  it	  so	  that	  she	  safely	  asserts	  the	  truth.	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within	  city	  bounds!’	  is	  because,	  most	  of	  the	  time,	  that	  is	  the	  ideal	  speed	  for	  safety	  purposes.	  	   On	   top	   of	   all	   this,	   note	   that,	   in	   the	   friendly	   epistemic	  environment	   we	   inhabit,	   knowledge	   is	   readily	   available	   (Kelp	   and	  Simion	  2015).	  As	  such,	  KNA	  is	  not	  a	  very	  stringent	  norm,	  it	  amounts	  to	  a	  fairly	  user-­‐friendly	  way	  to	  ensure	  reliable	  function	  fulfilment.	  If	  that	  is	  the	   case,	   again,	   it	   is	   plausible	   that,	   back	   at	   the	   time	   of	   function	  acquisition,	   assertion	   fulfilled	   its	   function	   of	   generating	   knowledge	   in	  hearers	  by	  being	  knowledgeable.	  	  	   To	  see	  this,	  consider	   first	  perceptual	  beliefs	  about	  middle-­‐sized	  dry	  goods.	  On	  any	  non-­‐sceptical	  account	  of	  knowledge,	  given	  formation	  by	  suitable	  processes	  (alternatively:	  on	  suitable	  grounds)	  in	  sufficiently	  hospitable	   epistemic	   environments,	   these	   beliefs	   will	   qualify	   as	  knowledge.	  For	  instance,	  my	  belief	  that	  there	  is	  a	  computer	  on	  the	  desk	  before	  me	   qualifies	   as	   knowledge:	   it	   is	   produced	   by	   a	   highly	   reliable	  ability	   to	   recognize	   computers	   in	   an	   epistemically	   hospitable	  environment.	   Now	   the	   crucial	   point	   is	   that	   formation	   by	   suitable	  processes	  in	  hospitable	  environments	  is	  the	  norm;	  formation	  of	  beliefs	  by	  unsuitable	  process,	  or	  in	  inhospitable	  environments	  is	  the	  exception.	  If	   this	   isn’t	   immediately	   clear,	   consider	  again	  my	  belief	   that	   there	   is	   a	  computer	  on	  the	  desk	  before	  me	  and	  ask	  yourself	  what	  would	  have	  to	  be	   the	   case	   for	  my	  belief	   to	   fall	   short	  of	   knowledge.	  Those	  with	   some	  training	  in	  epistemology	  will	  find	  it	  easy	  to	  answer	  this	  question:	  I	  am	  hallucinating,	   or	   I	   am	   mistaking	   a	   hologram	   for	   a	   computer,	   whilst	  unbeknownst	  to	  me	  there	  is	  a	  computer	  somewhere	  else	  on	  the	  desk,	  or	  I	   acquire	  my	  belief	   by	   a	  highly	  unreliable	  process	   such	  as	   a	   coin-­‐toss,	  etc.	  While	   any	   of	   this	   might	   come	   to	   pass,	   it	   is	   undeniable	   that,	   as	   a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  it	  only	  rarely	  does.	  Perceptual	  beliefs	  about	  middle-­‐sized	  dry	   goods	   are	   not	   the	   only	   cases	   in	   point.	   Consider	   testimonial	   belief	  about	   propositions	   of	   crucial	   practical	   importance	   in	   our	   lives:	  propositions	  about	  bills	  that	  need	  to	  be	  paid,	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  sickness	  of	  your	  cat	  and	  the	  medication	  that	  will	  cure	  it,	  what’s	  available	  at	  the	  local	   restaurant	   etc.	   Or	   consider	   inferentially	   supported	   beliefs	   that	  exploit	   a	   variety	   of	   natural	   and	   social	   regularities:	   that	  my	   car	   is	   still	  parked	   outside	   the	   institute	   etc.	   Here	   too,	   when	   beliefs	   are	   true	   and	  formed	   by	   suitable	   processes	   in	   sufficiently	   hospitable	   epistemic	  environments,	   they	   will	   qualify	   as	   knowledge.	   Here	   too,	   cases	   of	  knowledge	   are	   the	   norm	   and	   cases	   of	   belief	   that	   falls	   short	   of	  knowledge	  are	  the	  exception.	  	  	   These	   considerations	   suggest	   that,	   in	   wide	   range	   of	   cases,	  knowledge	  is	  widely	  and	  readily	  available.	  All	  we	  have	  to	  do	  to	  acquire	  knowledge	  is	  open	  our	  eyes,	   listen	  to	  what	  other	  people	  tell	  us,	  attend	  to	  our	  feelings,	  etc.	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   In	  sum,	  things	  seem	  to	  stand	  as	  follows:	  In	  the	  friendly	  epistemic	  environment	  we	  inhabit,	  knowledge	  is	  readily	  available.	  On	  top	  of	  this,	  knowledge	   on	   the	   speaker	   side	   is	   both	   necessary	   and	   sufficient	   for	  generating	   knowledge	  on	   the	  hearer’s	   side	   in	   the	   vast	  majority	   of	   the	  cases.	   Since	   what	   we	   are	   trying	   to	   describe	   here	   is	   a	   naturalistically	  plausible	   story,	   the	   oddity	   of	   the	   exceptions	   constitutes	   itself	   in	   very	  good	   reasons	   to	   dismiss	   them:	   very	   plausibly,	   the	   way	   in	   which	  assertion	   generated	   knowledge	   in	   hearers	   at	   the	  moment	   of	   function	  acquisition	  was	  by	  being	  knowledgeable.	  As	  such,	  KNA	  is	  vindicated:	  an	  epistemically	  proper	  assertion	  will	  be	  one	  that,	  in	  normal	  conditions,	  is	  able	  to	  fulfil	   its	  epistemic	  function	  of	  generating	  knowledge	  in	  hearers	  by	  being	  knowledgeable.	  	  	  	  
3.1.4	  Overriding	  Functions	  	  A	   trait/artefact/act	   can	  have	   several	   e-­‐functions	   simultaneously,	   even	  several	   e-­‐functions	   of	   different	   types;	   take,	   for	   instance,	   the	   functions	  served	  by	  food	  for	  humans.	  One	  important	  such	  function	  will	  surely	  be	  a	  biological	  one,	  a	  nourishment	   function.	  Plausibly	  enough,	   though,	  on	  top	   of	   this,	   food	   also	   serves	   an	   aesthetic	   function	   for	   us,	   that	   of	  generating	  pleasant	  gustatory	  experiences.	  Now,	  normally,	  the	  aesthetic	  function	  complements	  the	  nourishing	  function.	  It	  serves,	  as	  it	  were,	  the	  greater	   goal	   of	   survival,	   by	   increasing	   the	   probability	   of	   us	   ingesting	  nourishing	  substances.	  This	  need	  not	  be	  the	  case,	  however;	  there	  can	  be	  situations	  where	  the	  two	  functions	  come	  in	  conflict,	  at	  which	  point	  the	  more	  stringent	  requirement	  will	  take	  precedence	  and	  dictate	  what’s	  the	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	  good	   to	  observe.	  Think	  about	  a	   case	  where	   I	   am	  on	  a	  deserted	  island	  and	  all	  I	  can	  eat	  in	  order	  to	  stay	  alive	  are	  my	  boots;	  surely,	  against	  my	  aesthetic	  well	  being,	  that	  is	  exactly	  what	  I	  should	  do,	  all-­‐things-­‐considered.	  	   Similarly,	   it	   is	   highly	   plausible	   that	   the	   epistemic	   function	   is	  merely	  one	  of	   the	  many	   functions	   served	  by	   assertion.	   Surely,	  when	   I	  tell	   you	   that	   the	   weather	   is	   nice	   while	   sitting	   with	   you	   in	   a	   café,	  generating	  testimonial	  knowledge	  in	  you	  with	  regard	  to	  meteorological	  states	   of	   affairs	   is	   hardly	   among	   my	   chief	   concerns.	   In	   this	   case,	  assertion	  rather	  serves	  a	  social	  bonding	  function.	  	  	   One	  of	  the	  most	  important	  functions	  of	  assertion,	  as	  with	  action	  in	  general,	  will	  be	  a	  prudential	  one,	  serving	  our	  survival.	  Again,	  just	  like	  in	   the	   case	   of	   food,	   the	   epistemic	   function	   will,	   in	   most	   cases,	  complement	   this	   prudential	   function.	   Generating	   testimonial	  knowledge	  in	  one’s	  hearer	  with	  regard	  to	  an	  imminent	  threat,	  or	  about	  the	  whereabouts	  of	  resources	  are	  paradigm	  cases.	  However,	  again,	  this	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need	  not	  be	  the	  case.	  For	  instance,	  even	  if	  one	  knows	  that	  one’s	  boss	  is	  bald,	  it	  may	  not	  be	  polite,	  prudent,	  or	  relevant	  to	  point	  this	  out	  to	  him	  ((Jessica	   Brown	   2010,	   550),	   henceforth,	   BALD)):	   surely,	   here,	   the	  prudential	   function	   comes	   in	   conflict	   with	   the	   epistemic	   one	   and	  overrides	  it.	  	  
	   Here	  is,	  then,	  my	  proposal:	  both	  Classical	  Invariantism	  and	  KNA	  hold.	   In	  virtue	  of	   the	   function	  of	  assertion	  of	  generating	  knowledge	   in	  hearers,	   one	   is	   in	   a	   good	   enough	   epistemic	   position	   to	   make	   an	  epistemically	  proper	  assertion	  that	  p	  if	  and	  only	  if	  one	  knows	  that	  p.	  In	  turn,	   where	   whether	   one	   knows	   (or	   ‘knows’)	   that	   p	   is	   insensitive	   to	  practical	  matters.	   Crucially,	   on	   the	   account	   defended	   here,	   what	   KNA	  claims	   is	   mere	   epistemic	   propriety.	   The	   standards	   for	   all-­‐things-­‐considered	  propriety	  of	  assertion	  –	  as	  for	  action	  in	  general	  –	  will	  vary	  with	   context,	  while	   standards	   for	   both	   epistemically	   proper	   assertion	  and	   knowledge	   will	   remain	   fixed.	   The	   way	   to	   ascertain	   whether	   the	  requirements	   at	  work	   in	   one	   case	  or	   another	   are	   genuinely	   epistemic	  requirements	   is	   by	   looking	   at	   the	   function	   that	   is	   plausibly	   being	  served.48	  An	   epistemic	   function	   will	   be	   associated	   with	   an	   epistemic	  norm.	  	  	   To	  see	  how	  this	  works,	  consider	  Williamson’s	  TRAIN	  case:	  	  
TRAIN:	  Suppose	  that	  I,	  knowing	  that	  it	  is	  urgent	  for	  you	  to	  get	  to	  your	  destination,	  shout	  “That	  is	  your	  train”	  upon	  seeing	  a	  train	  approach	  the	  station,	  although	  I	  don’t	  know	  that	  is	  the	  case;	  I	  merely	  believe	  there	  is	  some	   chance	   that	   is	   the	   case,	   and	   I	   think	   you	   should	   check	   it	   out.	  (Williamson	  (2000)).	  	  	  	   According	   to	   the	   present	   proposal,	   the	   assertion	   in	   TRAIN	   is	  epistemically	   defective,	   but	   all-­‐things-­‐considered	   proper,	   due	   to	  prudential	   considerations	  stepping	   in	  and	  requiring	  a	   lower	  degree	  of	  warrant	   (Override2).	   In	   view	   of	   the	   epistemic	   function	   of	   generating	  testimonial	   knowledge,	   this	   assertion	   is	   not	   permissible.	   However,	   in	  view	  of	  the	  prudential	   function	  of	  raising	  your	  chances	  at	  catching	  the	  train,	  the	  assertion	  in	  TRAIN	  is	  perfectly	  fine.	  Given	  that	  the	  prudential	  constraint	  overrides	  the	  epistemic	  constraint	   in	   this	  case	  (as	   in	  most),	  by	  lowering	  the	  degree	  of	  necessary	  warrant,	  the	  assertion	  is	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	  proper,	  which	  is	  what	  triggers	  our	  relevant	  intuitions.	  
                                                48	  At	  this	  point,	  the	  reader	  might	  worry	  that	  the	  functionalist	  account	  defended	  here,	  in	   virtue	  of	   being	   a	   variety	   of	   epistemic	   consequentialism,	   suffers	   from	   the	   classical	  problems	  associated	  with	  this	  view.	  Fortunately,	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case:	  in	  a	  nutshell,	  that	  is	  because	  while	  functionalism	  is,	  indeed,	  a	  variety	  of	  consequentialism,	  crucially,	  it	  is	  a	   rule	   consequentialism.	   The	   classical	   cases	   against	   consequentialism,	   however,	  arguably,	  only	  affect	  act	  consequentialism.	  For	  extensive	  discussion,	  see	  section	  #3.2.3	  below	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   Similarly,	   in	   ASPIRIN2,	   strictly	   epistemically	   speaking,	   if	   you	  have	   memorial	   knowledge	   that	   you	   have	   aspirin	   at	   home,	   you	   are	  permitted	  to	  assert.	  You	  are	  in	  a	  position	  to	  make	  an	  assertion	  that,	  in	  normal	   conditions,	   will	   fulfil	   its	   epistemic	   function	   of	   generating	  testimonial	  knowledge	  in	  your	  hearer.	  However,	  prudential	  constraints	  referring	  to	  the	  tragic	  consequences	  your	  assertion	  might	  have	  override	  the	   epistemic	   constraint,	   raise	   the	   necessary	   degree	   of	   warrant,	   and	  make	  the	  assertion	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	  improper.	  As	  such,	  again,	  it	  is	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	  propriety	   that	  varies	  with	  context,	  not	  epistemic	  propriety.49	  	  	  
3.2	  Objections	  and	  Replies	  	  Before	   I	   continue,	   in	  what	   follows,	   I	  would	   like	   to	   take	  a	  brief	   look	  at	  (and	  try	  to	  answer!)	  what	  I	  take	  to	  be	  the	  main	  objections	  that	  come	  to	  mind	  when	  presented	  with	  my	  account.	  I	  will	  try	  to	  do	  justice	  to	  three	  importantly	   different	   directions	   of	   possible	   discontent:	   contextualism	  and	   pragmatic	   encroachment,	   anti-­‐functionalism	   and	   truth-­‐centred	  functionalism.	  	  	  	  
3.2.1	  Objection	  #1:	  A	  Contextualist	  Rejoinder	  	  On	   the	   view	   defended	   here,	   the	   contextualist	   data	   is	   explained	   by	  normative	   overriding:	   while	   epistemically	   fine,	   it	   is	   prudentially	  impermissible	  for	  DeRose	  to	  assert	  ‘The	  bank	  will	  be	  open	  tomorrow’	  in	  the	   high	   stakes	   scenario.	   Again,	   this	   claim	   draws	   its	   plausibility	   from	  what	  I	  have	  dubbed	  Value	  Individuation	  of	  normative	  constraints:	  look	  at	   the	   goods	   associated	   with	   the	   norm!	   In	   the	   bank	   cases,	   of	   course,	  practical	  goods	  are	  at	  stake	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  variation	  in	  assertability;	  therefore,	  on	  the	  account	  defended	  here,	  unassertability	  is	  triggered	  by	  the	   prudential	   norm	   corresponding	   to	   the	   prudential	   function	   of	  assertion,	  overriding	  the	  epistemic	  function.	  	  	   Recall,	  however,	   that,	  according	   to	  DeRose,	  not	  only	  can	  he	  not	  assert	   ‘The	   bank	  will	   be	   open’	   or	   the	   corresponding	   ‘I	   know	   that	   the	  bank	  will	   be	  open’	   in	  high	   stakes	   cases,	   but	   it	   is	   even	   appropriate	   for	  him	   to	   deny	   knowledge	   to	   himself.	   Now,	   what	   does	   the	   functionalist	  picture	  have	  to	  say	  about	  this?	  	  
                                                49	  Note	  that	  it	  is	  not	  in	  my	  intention	  to	  suggest	  that	  practical	  concerns	  will	  always	  override	  epistemic	  ones	  (or	  aesthetic	  ones,	  for	  that	  matter).	  The	  claim	  made	  by	  this	  chapter	  (and	  needed	  here)	  is	  weaker	  than	  that:	  practical	  requirements	  will,	  on	  occasion,	  do	  so.	  I	  gather	  that	  this	  is	  a	  fairly	  plausible	  thought.	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   Two	   things:	   first,	   several	   people	   (e.g.	   Pritchard	   2005)	   have	  expressed	  serious	  doubts	  about	  the	  plausibility	  of	  the	  knowledge	  denial	  data.	  I	  tend	  to	  agree.	  Here	  is	  why:	  note	  that,	  if	  at	  all,	  it	  looks	  as	  though	  the	  natural	  way	  to	  deny	  knowledge	  to	  oneself	   in	  high	  stakes	  scenarios	  rather	  goes	  along	  the	   lines	  of	   ‘All	  right,	   I	  guess	  I	  don’t	  really	  know	  the	  bank	   will	   be	   open	   tomorrow!’,	   rather	   than	   the	   bare:	   ‘I	   don’t	   know	  that…’.	  But	   it	   is	   fairly	  plausible	   that	   the	  epistemic	  standing	  at	   stake	   in	  this	   assertion–	   i.e.	   ‘really	   knowing’	   –	   is	   but	   a	   different	   epistemic	  standing	   than	   knowledge	   –	   plausibly	   something	   stronger,	   closer	   to	  certainty.	   To	   see	   this,	   compare,	   for	   instance,	   with	   ‘liking	   John’	   and	  ‘really	  liking	  (in	  the	  sense	  of	  having	  a	  crash	  on)	  John’.	  It	  looks	  as	  though	  ‘really	   liking’	   is	   but	   a	   different	   state	   than	   liking.	   It	   is,	   I	   submit,	   not	  completely	   implausible	   that	   the	   same	   is	   true	   for	   ‘really	   knowing’,	   in	  which	  case	  DeRose’s	  denial	  does	  little	  to	  prove	  the	  invariantist	  wrong.	  	  	   Second,	   even	   if	   we	   buy	   the	   knowledge	   denial	   data,	   they	   are	  hardly	  problematic	   for	   the	   functionalist.	  After	   all,	   recall	   that	  DeRose’s	  denial	   comes	  as	  a	   reply	   to	  his	  wife’s	  question:	   “Do	  you	  know	   that	   the	  bank	  will	  be	  open	  tomorrow?’.	  It	  looks	  as	  though,	  then,	  at	  that	  point	  in	  the	  conversation,	  DeRose	  is	  faced	  with	  a	  choice	  between	  (1)	  Attributing	  knowledge	   to	  himself	   –	  which	  would,	   plausibly,	   in	   the	   absence	  of	   any	  qualification,	   result	   in	   a	   quite	   risky	   course	   of	   action,	   (2)	   Saying	  something	   along	   the	   lines	   of:	   ‘I	   guess	   we	   should	   check,	   just	   to	   make	  sure!’	  or	  (3)	  Deny	  knowledge	  to	  himself	  in	  order	  to	  stay	  on	  the	  safe	  side.	  Of	   course,	   one	   of	   the	   latter	   two	   options	   will	   be	   the	   (prudentially!)	  preferable	  one.	  To	  my	  ear,	  the	  first	  is	  the	  most	  natural	  one.	  Whichever	  it	  is,	   however,	   it	  will	   not	  hurt	   the	   view	  defended	  here,	   since,	   again,	   it	   is	  fairly	   clear	   that	   prudential	   constraints	   are	   at	   work	   in	   the	   choice	   of	  speech	  act.	  	  	  
3.2.2.	  Objection	  #2:	  Shifty	  Data	  for	  Belief	  	  The	  account	  defended	  here	  explains	  the	  Shiftiness	  Intuition	  in	  terms	  of	  practical	  norms	  overriding	  the	  epistemic	  one;	  the	  thought	  is	  that,	  in	  the	  high	   stakes	   BANK	   CASE,	   DeRose	   cannot	   permissibly	   assert	   that	   he	  knows	   the	   bank	   will	   be	   open	   on	   Saturday	   due	   to	   prudential	  considerations:	   his	   assertion,	   for	   instance,	   might	   trigger	   a	   very	   risky	  course	   of	   action.	   It	   is,	   then,	   prudential	   permissibility,	   not	   epistemic	  permissibility	  that	  is	  at	  stake	  in	  the	  Shiftiness	  Intuition.	  	  	   What	   about	  belief,	   however?	  After	   all,	   one	   could	   think	   that	   the	  relevant	   shiftiness	   seems	   to	   also	   be	   present	   at	   this	   level.	   It	   looks	   as	  though,	   in	  high	  stakes,	   after	  his	  wife	   raises	   the	  possibility	  of	   the	  bank	  having	   changed	   its	   hours,	   DeRose	   is	   not	   warranted	   in	   holding	   an	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outright	  belief	   that	  he	  knows	   that	   the	  bank	  will	   be	  open	  on	  Saturday.	  Similarly	  for	  the	  generalized	  data	  -­‐	  an	  outright	  belief	  that	  the	  bank	  will	  be	   open	   also	   seems	   impermissible.	   	  What	   does	   the	   account	   defended	  here	  have	  to	  say	  about	  this?	  After	  all,	  while	  it	  is	  plausible	  that	  DeRose’s	  assertion	  might	  trigger	  a	  prudentially	  risky	  course	  of	  action,	  that	  seems	  less	  plausible	  about	  his	  belief.	  	  	   Two	   things	   about	   this:	   first,	   crucially,	   recall	   that	   this	   thesis	  rejects	   commonality	   for	   belief	   and	   assertion.	   Furthermore,	   Section	  #3.3.1	  below	  will	  make	  an	  attempt	  at	  a	  positive	  argument	  in	  support	  of	  a	   view	   that	   takes	   belief	   to	   be	   governed	   by	   a	   weaker	   norm	   than	  assertion.	  As	  such,	  strictly	  speaking,	  shifty	  data	  about	  belief	  do	  little	  to	  affect	  the	  story	  told	  here	  about	  assertion.	  	   That	  being	  said,	  however,	  is	  belief	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  governed	  by	  a	  shifty	  norm,	  this	  is	  fairly	  bad	  news	  for	  the	  invariantist	  picture	  defended	  here	  –	  insofar	  as	  we	  take	  belief	  to	  be	  justified	  if	  and	  only	  if	  permissible.	  Since	   I	   am	   very	   sympathetic	   to	   this	   thought,	   I	   will	   set	   the	   non-­‐commonality	  reply	  aside.	  	   Second,	  however,	  even	   if	  we	  abstract	   from	  non-­‐commonality,	   it	  is	  not	  clear	  to	  me	  that,	  insofar	  as	  the	  intuition	  of	  impropriety	  extends	  to	  belief,	   it	   is	  not	  prudential	  impropriety	  that	  is	  at	  stake	  in	  this	  case	  also.	  To	  see	  why,	  note	  that,	  as	  the	  case	   is	  built,	  plausibly,	  DeRose’s	  outright	  belief	  that	  the	  bank	  will	  be	  open	  on	  Saturday	  in	  BANK	  2	  is	  as	  likely	  to	  be	  conducive	   to	   risky	   behaviour	   as	   is	   his	   corresponding	   assertion.	  Furthermore,	  it	  looks	  as	  though	  one	  easy	  way	  to	  ascertain	  whether	  my	  account	   gets	   things	   right	   here	   –	   when	   it	   goes	   to	   both	   assertion	   and	  belief	  –	  is	  to	  try	  to	  build	  a	  case	  where	  asserting/believing	  the	  relevant	  proposition	   is	   not	   likely	   associated	   with	   any	   risky	   action.	   If	   the	  shiftiness	   intuition	   is	   preserved,	   this	   raises	   serious	  worries	   about	   the	  prudential	   nature	   of	   the	   permissibility	   at	   stake.	   Note,	   though,	   that	  building	  such	  cases	  will	  not	  be	  a	  trivial	  affair.	  One	  way	  to	  try	  and	  do	  this	  will	   be	   by	   removing	   practical	   stakes	   altogether	   from	   the	   picture,	   and	  relying	   on	   the	   mere	   tabling	   of	   error	   possibilities.	   It	   is	   not	   clear,	  however,	   that	   the	   Shiftiness	   Intuition	   survives	   this	   move.	   After	   all,	   I	  seem	  to	  be	  perfectly	  warranted	  in	  both	  my	  belief	  and	  the	  corresponding	  assertion	   I	  am	   just	  about	   to	  make	   that	   there	   is	  a	   computer	   in	   front	  of	  me,	  in	  spite	  of	  me	  in	  spite	  of,	  say,	  sceptical	  scenarios	  being	  tabled.	  But	  see	  Section	  #6.2.1	  below	  for	  more	  discussion	  on	  this	  matter.	  	   Alternatively,	   one	   can	   try	   to	   build	   a	   case	   where	   the	   subjects	  falsely	   believe	   high	   stakes	   are	   present,	   but,	   by	   stipulation,	   no	   risky	  action	   is	   likely	   to	   follow	   form	   DeRose’s	   assertion/belief.	   Say	   that,	  unbeknownst	  to	  DeRose,	  his	  rich	  grandmother	  deposited	  a	  large	  sum	  of	  money	  in	  his	  account	  as	  a	  present	  for	  his	  birthday,	  which	  will	  be	  more	  than	  enough	  to	  cover	  the	  check.	  Doesn’t	  the	  Shiftiness	  Intuition	  survive	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this	   alteration	  of	   the	   case?	   First,	   I	   am	  not	   sure	   it	   does,	   as	   a	  matter	   of	  fact.	  I	  can	  get	  myself	  to	  think	  both	  ways.	  Also,	  I	  think	  the	  intuition	  is	  not	  stable	  because	  it	  depends	  on	  how	  the	  case	  is	  spelled	  out.	  Surely	  not	  all	  cases	   in	  which	  subjects	  attach	   false	  stakes	   to	   the	  situation	  will	   trigger	  impermissibility	   for	   assertion/belief.	   After	   all,	   it	   does	   not	   look	   as	  though,	   if	   I	   loose	  my	  mind	  and	  start	  thinking	  that	   if	   I	  believe	  or	  assert	  that	  it	  will	  be	  raining	  tomorrow,	  three	  Martians	  are	  going	  to	  come	  and	  kidnap	  me	   from	  my	   office,	   my	   belief/assertion	   that	   it	   will	   be	   raining	  tomorrow	  is	  rendered	  impermissible.	  	  	  	   Second,	   more	   importantly,	   even	   if	   we	   find	   a	   way	   to	   build	   the	  cases	  such	  that	  the	  Shiftiness	  Intuition	  is	  preserved,	  the	  explanation	  in	  terms	   of	   prudential	   propriety	   is	   still	   not	   out	   of	   the	   picture.	   After	   all,	  many	  people	  in	  the	  literature	  think	  of	  the	  latter	  as	  a	  subjective	  affair.	  On	  a	  Bayesian	  picture,	  for	  instance,	  what	  matters	  for	  prudential	  propriety	  is	   not	   the	   actual	   state	   of	   the	   world,	   but	   the	   subjective	   probability	  assigned	  to	   the	  relevant	  outcome.	  As	  such,	   it	   is	  not	  clear	   that	  building	  such	  cases	  will	  do	  the	  intended	  job	  against	  my	  view	  to	  begin	  with.	  	  	  	  
3.2.3	  	  	  Objection	  #3:	  Consequentialist	  Fairies	  
	  Here	   is	   one	   legitimate	  worry	   about	   the	   account	   I’ve	   just	  put	   forth.	  By	  the	   looks	   of	   it,	   functionalism	   seems	   just	   another	   variety	   of	   epistemic	  consequentialism.	   After	   all,	   normativity	   is	   taken	   to	   drop	   out	   of	   the	  relevant	   functions,	   and	   we	   have	   already	   described	   functions	   as	  purposes.	   Isn’t	   this,	   however,	   going	   to	   expose	   the	   account	   to	   the	  classical	   objections	   against	   epistemic	   consequentialism?	   Fortunately,	  not.	  Or	  so	  I	  will	  argue.	  	   Here’s	  the	  recipe	  for	  the	  classical	  anti-­‐consequentialism	  line:	  you	  take	   an	   intuitively	   epistemic	   bad	   (say,	   a	   false,	   unjustified	   belief,	   or	   a	  false	  assertion)	  and	  stipulate	  that	  a	  great	  amount	  of	  epistemic	  goodness	  comes	   to	   attach	   to	   it	   on	   a	   particular	   occasion,	   usually	   virtue	   of	   some	  otherworldly	   intervention	  –	   say,	   the	  Consequentialist	   Fairy	  offers	   you	  one	  million	  pieces	  of	   interesting	  knowledge	   for	  holding	   the	  respective	  unjustified	   false	  belief	  or	  making	  the	  respective	   false	  assertion.	  Still,	   it	  does	   not	   look	   as	   though	   the	   false	   belief/assertion	   in	   question	   is	  epistemically	  permissible.	  	  	   Note,	   though,	   that	   ‘fairy	   cases’	   are	   only	   an	   issue	   for	   act	  consequentialism,	   i.e.	   the	   view	   that,	   roughly,	   asks	   us	   to	   maximize	  epistemic	   goodness	   on	   each	   occasion.	   The	   functionalist	   picture,	  however,	   is	  a	  rule	  consequentialist	  picture:	  according	  to	  this	  variety	  of	  consequentialism,	  the	  rightness	  or	  wrongness	  of	  a	  particular	  action	  is	  a	  function	  of	  the	  correctness	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  which	  it	  is	  an	  instance.	  In	  turn,	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the	  correctness	  of	  a	  rule	  is	  determined	  by	  the	  amount	  of	  good	  following	  it	  brings	  about.	  According	  to	  rule	  consequentialism,	  following	  rules	  that	  tend	  to	  lead	  to	  the	  greatest	  good	  will	  have	  better	  consequences	  overall	  than	  trying	  to	  maximize	  in	  all	   instances.	  For	  instance,	  according	  to	  the	  account	  defended	  here,	   knowledgeable	   assertions	   are	   good	   assertions	  in	  virtue	  of	  conforming	  to	  the	  knowledge	  norm,	  which	  is	  the	  norm	  that	  generates	  the	  most	  epistemic	  benefit	  overall:	  knowledgeable	  assertions	  most	  often	  generate	  testimonial	  knowledge	  in	  hearers.	  In	  virtue	  of	  this,	  ‘fairy	   cases’	   will	   not	   affect	   the	   functionalist	   story:	   contra	   act-­‐consequentialism,	   proper	   function	   –	   that	   is,	   norm	   compliance	   –	   need	  not	   imply	   function	   fulfilment	   –	   i.e.	   reaching	   the	   corresponding	  epistemic	  goal.	  What	  matters	  for	  norm	  compliance,	  however,	  is	  proper	  functioning,	   not	   function	   fulfilment.	   Good,	   properly	   functioning,	  knowledgeable	  assertions	   can	   fail	   to	   fulfil	   their	   function	  of	   generating	  testimonial	   knowledge	   –	   for	   instance,	   in	   cases	   where	   there	   are	  defeaters	   around.	   And	   the	   other	   way	   around:	   Stella,	   the	   creationist	  teacher,	   for	   instance,	   arguably	   generates	   knowledge	   in	   her	   students	  although	  she	  does	  not	  believe,	  therefore	  she	  does	  not	  know	  what	  she’s	  asserting	  herself.	  	  	   As	   such,	   to	   go	   back	   to	   the	   Consequentialist	   Fairy:	   even	   if	   she	  offers	  you	  all	  the	  epistemic	  benefit	  in	  the	  world,	  according	  to	  the	  norm	  defended	   here,	   you	   are	   still	   not	   epistemically	   allowed	   to	   assert	   non-­‐knowledgeably.	   Stella’s	   assertion,	   for	   instance,	   is	   still	   epistemically	  impermissible	   in	   spite	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   her	   assertion	   comes	   with	   nice	  epistemic	  goods.	  
	  
	  
3.2.4	  Objection	  #4:	  History	  	  How	   about	   if	   it	   turns	   out	   that	   we	   would	   have	   been	   better	   off	   as	   a	  species	   if	   the	   assertoric	   practice	   had	   never	   existed?	   Wouldn’t	   this	  threaten	   the	   very	   foundation	   of	   this	   proposal?	   After	   all,	   even	   if	  biological	  benefit	  is	  not	  taken	  to	  be	  essential	  to	  function	  acquisition,	  the	  entire	  story	  still	  rests	  on	  the	  claim	  that	  assertion	  acquired	  the	  function	  of	   generating	   knowledge	   in	   hearers	   in	   virtue	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   it	   did	   so	  back	   in	   the	  day,	  and	  this	  was	  beneficial	   for	  our	  survival.	  Furthermore,	  the	  main	  reason	  why	  we	  find	  it	  plausible	  that	  the	  practice	  would	  have	  disappeared	  had	  it	  not	  generated	  knowledge	  in	  hearers	  is	  because,	  as	  a	  matter	   of	   fact,	  we	   take	   it	   that	   the	   latter	   is	   beneficial	   for	   our	   survival,	  while,	  say,	  false	  beliefs	  are	  not.	  As	  such,	  it	  looks	  as	  though	  the	  account	  still	   lives	  and	  dies	  with	  the	  presence/absence	  of	  a	  history	  of	  biological	  benefit,	  to	  some	  extent.	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   Crucially,	  though,	  note	  that	  the	  biological	  benefit	  claim	  made	  and	  needed	   here	   is	   merely	   an	   actuality	   claim	   rather	   than	   a	   modal	   one.	  Again,	   the	   account	   defended	   here	   departs	   from	   models	   put	   forth	   by	  people	   like	  Peter	  Graham	  and	  Ruth	  Millikan	   in	   this	   important	  respect:	  epistemic	  normativity	  is	  not,	  in	  any	  way,	  taken	  to	  be	  modally	  dependent	  on	  biological	  benefit	  either	  being	  or	  ever	  having	  been	  present.	  Rather,	  what	   is	   essential	   in	   epistemic	   function	   acquisition,	   and	   therefore	  essential	  for	  epistemic	  normativity	  being	  in	  place,	  is	  a	  (short)	  history	  of	  
epistemic	  benefit:	  the	  trait/action	  etc.	  must	  have	  produced	  the	  relevant	  epistemic	   good	   before.	   The	   biological	   benefit	   associated	   with	   the	  epistemic	  one	  –	   that	   is,	   the	   fact	   that	  epistemic	  benefit	   is	  also	  good	   for	  survival	   -­‐	   is	   taken	  to	  be	  merely	  a	  happy	  coincidence	  pertaining	  to	  this	  world.	  As	  such,	   if	  we	  ever	  discover	   that,	  as	  a	  matter	  of	   fact,	  we	  would	  have	  been	  much	  better	  off	  if	  we	  have	  kept	  silent	  rather	  than	  engaging	  in	  all	  these	  language	  games,	  the	  view	  defended	  here	  will	  be	  unaffected.	  It	  would	   just	   follow	   that	   the	   hearers	   were	   wrong	   to	   suppose	   that	  extending	   their	   knowledge	   via	   testimony	   was	   good	   for	   them,	   and	  therefore	   they	  were	  wrong	   to	  not	  discontinue	   this	  practice.	   I	   find	   this	  result	  independently	  plausible.	  There	  are	  many	  practices	  humanity	  has	  kept	   alive	   for	   centuries	   from	   the	   mistaken	   belief	   that	   they	   were	  beneficial.	   This,	   however,	   does	   nothing	   to	   rob	   the	  traits/artefacts/actions	   involved	   in	   those	   practices	   of	   their	  corresponding	  functions,	  at	  the	  time.	  War	  is	  the	  clearest	  example	  I	  can	  think	  of.	  	  	  
3.2.5	  Objection	  #5:	  Constitutivity	  Light	  	  Say	  that	  this	  thesis	   is	  right,	  and	  knowledge	  is	  the	  norm	  of	  assertion	  in	  virtue	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  function	  of	  assertion	  is	  to	  generate	  knowledge	  in	   hearers.	   Now,	   one	   legitimate	   question	   that	   arises	   goes	   along	   the	  following	  lines:	  how	  is	  this	  rationale	  any	  better	  than	  the	  Williamsonian	  constitutivity	  line	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  contingency	  considerations?	  Are	  we	  supposed	  to	  believe	  that,	   if	   it	  so	  happened	  that	  assertion	  had	  served	  a	  different	  epistemic	  function,	  it	  would	  have	  been	  governed	  by	  a	  different	  epistemic	  norm?	  Or	  that	  this	  shift	  can	  happen	  at	  any	  point?	  Doesn’t	  the	  account	  defended	  here	  leave	  this	  open,	  and	  therefore	  make	  KNA	  into	  a	  mere	  historical	  contingency?	  Second,	  relatedly,	  what	  is	  the	  relation	  –	  if	  any	  -­‐	  between	  the	  nature	  of	  assertion	  and	  its	  normativity?	  What	  is	  the	  status	  of	   this	   functionalist	  norm	  that	   is	  being	  defended?	   Is	   it	  a	  merely	  conventional	   one,	   subject	   to	   the	   whims	   of	   societal	   evolution?	   This	  sounds	  less	  than	  plausible.	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   Recall	   that	   the	   etiological	   theory	   of	   function	   aims	   to	   offer	   a	  naturalistically	   friendly	  explanation	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  normativity.	  As	  such,	   the	   coming	   into	   being	   of	   the	   respective	   norms	   is	   hardly	   an	  accident:	  it	  is	  sourced	  in	  evolutionary	  considerations	  pertaining	  to	  what	  benefits	  the	  organism	  and	  what	  does	  not.	  	  	   Note,	  also,	   that	  what	  this	  amounts	  to	   is	  but	  a	  different	  sort	  of	  a	  constitutivity	  claim,	  conceived	  on	  a	  functionalist	  model,	  rather	  than	  on	  the	  model	  of	  games:	  due	  to	  being	  sourced	  in	  e-­‐functions,	  which,	  in	  turn,	  contribute	   to	   the	   explanation	   of	   why	   the	   trait/artefact/action	   in	  question	   continues	   to	   exist,	   the	   functionalist	   norms	   are	   constitutively	  associated	   with	   the	   corresponding	   trait/artefact/action:	   they	   are	  constitutively	   associated	   with	   its	   continuous	   existence.	   When	  functioning	   properly	   (i.e.	   beating)	   –	   whether	   in	   normal	   conditions	   or	  not	   –	   the	   heart	   will	   meet	   the	   norm	   constitutively	   associated	   with	   its	  continuous	  existence.	  Similarly,	  when	   functioning	  properly	  –	   i.e.	  being	  knowledgeable	   -­‐	  whether	   in	  normal	   conditions	  or	  not	  –	   assertion	  will	  meet	  the	  norm	  constitutively	  associated	  with	  generating	  knowledge	  in	  hearers	   and,	   correspondingly,	   with	   its	   continuous	   existence;	   it	   will	  work	  the	  way	  it	  is	  supposed	  to	  work,	  where	  the	  right	  way	  of	  working	  is	  constituted	  by	  generating	  knowledge	  in	  normal	  conditions.	  	  	   Now	   here	   is	   the	   worry:	   going	   domain-­‐specific	   for	   positive	  feedback	   seems,	   at	   first	   glance,	   to	   rob	   e-­‐functional	   accounts	   of	   their	  explanation	  of	   the	   continued	   existence	  of	   a	   trait.	   After	   all,	   if	   asserting	  knowledgeably	  need	  not	  benefit	  us	  biologically	  in	  order	  for	  the	  relevant	  speech	  act	  to	  have	  the	  corresponding	  function,	  nothing	  seems	  to	  be	  left	  to	  explain	  the	  continued	  existence	  of	  the	  trait	  in	  question.	  	  	   Notice,	   however,	   that	   etiological	   theories	   of	   functions	   are	  intended	   to	   be	   real-­‐nature	   theories	   (Millikan	   1984).	   And,	   in	   fact,	  plausibly	  enough,	  knowledgeable	  assertions	  are,	  most	  likely,	  beneficial	  for	   our	   survival.	   So	   the	   positive	   biological	   feedback	   that	   is,	   in	   fact,	   at	  play,	   does	   explain	   the	   continued	   existence	   of	   the	   relevant	   practice.	   It	  explains	  why	  the	  epistemic	  functions	  and	  the	  corresponding	  epistemic	  norms	   are	   there;	   because	   their	   being	   in	   place	   benefits	   us.	   But	   notice	  that	  this	  is	  all	  we	  wanted	  to	  begin	  with:	  a	  naturalistic	  explanation	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  such	  oddities	  as	  norms	  and	  purposes.	  As	  such,	  even	  though	  biological	  benefit	  does	  not	   affect	   the	   content	  of	   the	   relevant	  norms,	   it	  does	   nicely	   explain	   how	   and	   why	   the	   purposes	   and	   the	   norms	  associated	  with	  them	  arose	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	   Finally,	   note	   another	   important	   advantage	   of	   the	   ‘light’	  constitutivity	  claim	  defended	  here:	  it	  also	  vindicates	  the	  Williamsonian	  intuition	   that,	   in	   an	   important	  way,	   assertion	   lives	   and	   perishes	  with	  KNA.	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3.2.6	  Objection	  #6:	  How	  about	  truth?	  
	  
Contra	   the	   account	   defended	   in	   this	   thesis,	   Ruth	  Millikan	   (1984)	   and	  Peter	   Graham	   (2010)	   take	   the	   function	   of	   assertion	   to	   be	   generating	  true	   belief	   rather	   than	   knowledge	   in	   one’s	   audience.	   If	   they	   are	   right,	  one	  could	  wonder,	  would	  it	  not	  be	  reasonable	  to	  suppose	  that	  assertion	  is	  governed	  by	  a	  corresponding	  truth	  norm?	  	   A	   few	   things	   about	   this:	   first	   of	   all,	   I	   take	   it	   to	   be	   fairly	  implausible	  that	  the	  function	  of	  assertion	  is	  generating	  mere	  true	  belief	  rather	  than	  knowledge.	  Here	  is	  why:	  recall	  that	  the	  etiological	  account	  of	  functions	  is	  a	  historical	  account.	  The	  thought	  is	  that	  a	  particular	  trait	  generated	   some	   benefit	   and	   that’s	   how	   it	   acquired	   its	   function.	  However,	  mere	   true	   belief	   is	   a	   fairly	   rare	   good,	   while	   knowledge	   is	  readily	  available.	  Again,	  all	  I	  have	  to	  do	  in	  order	  to	  come	  to	  know	  that	  there’s	   a	   table	   in	   front	   of	   me	   is	   have	   a	   look.	   For	   me	   to	   get	   a	   non-­‐knowledgeable	   true	   belief,	   however,	   the	   world	   needs	   to	   fail	   to	  cooperate	  somehow	  (like	  in	  Gettier	  cases,	  for	  instance),	  or	  else	  I	  need	  to	  radically	  change	  my	  epistemic	  behaviour	  (say,	  start	   forming	  beliefs	  on	  coin	  tosses).	  Since	  it	   is	   less	  than	  plausible,	  historically,	  that	  any	  of	  this	  was	   the	   case	   when	   assertion	   acquired	   its	   function,	   we	   can	   safely	  assume	  that	  the	  epistemic	  benefit	  generated	  by	  assertion	  at	  the	  time	  of	  function	  acquisition	  was	  knowledge.	  	  	   Now,	  of	  course,	  Millikan	  and	  Graham	  could	  argue,	  the	  function	  at	  stake	   need	   not	   be	  mere	   true	   belief.	   After	   all,	   true	   belief	   is	   implied	   by	  knowledge.	   Take	   the	   heart:	   it	   pumps	   blood	   and,	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   it	  generates	  a	  beating	  sound.	  Plausibly,	  it	  always	  has.	  However,	  we	  would	  not	   want	   to	   say	   that	   the	   function	   of	   the	   heart	   is	   to	   pump	   blood	   and	  generate	   a	   beating	   sound,	   rather	   than	   just	   to	   pump	  blood.	  Why,	   then,	  think	   that	   the	   function	   of	   assertion	   is	   generating	   knowledgeable	   true	  belief	  rather	  than	  just	  true	  belief?	  	  	   Furthermore,	  the	  champion	  of	  the	  truth	  account	  could	  argue,	  on	  the	  etiological	  account,	  one	  easy	  way	  to	  ascertain	  whether	  a	  trait	  T	  has	  a	   function	   F	   is	   by	   checking	   whether	   doing	   F	   contributes	   to	   the	  explanation	  of	  why	  tokens	  of	  T	  continue	  to	  exist.	  The	  fact	  that	  it	  pumps	  blood	   in	  our	  circulatory	  system	  contributes	   to	   the	  explanation	  of	  why	  hearts	  continue	  to	  exist:	  if	  they	  stopped	  doing	  it,	  plausibly,	  they	  would	  cease	  to	  exist.50	  The	  fact	  that	  it	  produces	  a	  beating	  sound	  fails	  to	  satisfy	  the	   relevant	   counterfactual.	   Generating	   true	   belief	   easily	   meets	   this	  condition:	   plausibly,	   even	   if	   assertions	   stopped	   generating	   knowledge	  in	  hearers	  and	  only	  produced	  true	  belief,	  we	  would	  not	  discontinue	  the	  
                                                50	  But	  see	  Buller	  (1998)	  for	  an	  argument	  to	  the	  contrary.	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practice.	   If	   that	   is	   the	   case,	   however,	   why	   think	   that	   the	   relevant	  function	  is	  knowledge	  rather	  than	  true	  belief?	  	   Several	  people	  in	  the	  literature	  have	  adduced	  reasons	  to	  believe	  the	  function	  at	  stake	  is,	   indeed,	  knowledge	  rather	  any	  lesser	  epistemic	  standing.	   Turri	   (In	   Press),	   for	   instance,	   puts	   forth	   experimental	  philosophy	   results	   suggesting	   that	   folk	   intuition	   designates	  transmitting	   knowledge	   as	   the	   	   “main	   point”	   of	   asserting.	   Chris	   Kelp	  (Forthcoming)	  argues	  for	  the	  weaker	  claim	  that	  generating	  knowledge	  in	  hearers	   is,	  at	   least,	  one	   epistemic	   function	  of	  assertion;	   it	   is	  easy	   to	  see,	   however,	   that,	   since	   knowledge	   is	   a	   stronger	   epistemic	   standing	  than	   truth,	   arguing	   from	   the	   claim	   that	   generating	   knowledge	   is	   one	  epistemic	   function	   of	   assertion	   to	   the	   stronger,	   contrastive	   claim	   that	  the	  relevant	  function	  is	  generating	  knowledge	  rather	  than	  truth	  will	  be	  fairly	  trivial.	  After	  all,	  knowledge	  implies	  truth;	  if	  pumping	  blood	  in	  our	  circulatory	  system	  is	  one	  biological	  function	  of	  the	  heart,	  it	  will	  be	  fairy	  implausible	   to	   hold	   that,	   alongside	   this	   particular	   function,	   the	   heart	  also	  has	  the	  function	  of	  pumping.	  	  	   Rather	  than	  rehearsing	  these	  arguments,	  however,	  what	  I	  will	  do	  next	  is	  try	  to	  offer	  further	  considerations	  that	  seem	  to	  speak	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  knowledge	  account	  when	  considered	  against	  the	  competing	  truth	  account.51	  	  	   First,	   about	   the	   point	   concerning	   contribution	   to	   continuous	  existence:	   it	   is	   not	   clear	   to	  me	   that,	   in	   the	   scenario	   described	   above,	  where	  assertions	  would	  only	  generate	  true	  beliefs,	  we	  would	  not,	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  discontinue	  the	  practice.	  Let	  us	  try	  and	  add	  details	  to	  the	  envisaged	   scenario:	   first,	   note	   that	   what	   the	   defender	   of	   the	   truth	  account	  needs,	  this	  time	  around,	  for	  her	  argument	  to	  go	  through,	  is	  for	  
mere	   true	   belief	   generation	   to	   be	   sufficient	   for	   keeping	   the	   practice	  alive.	  For	  if	  she	  wants	  to	  make	  use	  of,	  say,	  Gettiered	  belief,	  the	  suspicion	  would	  be	   that	  what	   is	   doing	   the	   trick	   in	  preventing	   the	  practice	   from	  being	  discontinued	  is	  truth	  plus	  the	  corresponding	  warrant,	  rather	  than	  truth	  alone.	  	  	   However,	   a	  world	   of	  mere	   true	   believers	   involved	   in	   asserting	  things	   to	   each	   other	   is	   not	   very	   easily	   conceivable.	   Note	   that,	   what	  would,	  presumably,	  have	  to	  be	  the	  case,	  would	  be	  something	  along	  the	  following	   lines:	   the	  members	  of	   this	  population	  would	   form	  beliefs	  on	  
                                                51	  The	  argument	  to	  follow	  does	  not	  address	  the	  possibility	  of	  any	  epistemic	  standing	  that	   falls	   short	   of	   both	  knowledge	   and	   truth	  being	   the	   function	  of	   assertion.	  That	   is	  because	  I	  take	  it	  to	  be	  extremely	  plausible	  that	  if	  assertion	  would	  systematically	  fail	  to	  generate	   true	  beliefs	   in	  hearers,	   the	  practice	  would	  be	  discontinued.	  Note,	  however,	  that	   nothing	   in	   what	   follows	   excludes	   the	   possibility	   of	   the	   relevant	   function	   to	   be	  generating	   justified	   true	   beliefs	   (JTB)	   rather	   than	   knowledge.	   That	   being	   said,	   see	  Chapter	   #4	   for	   arguments	   against	   epistemic	   standings	   that	   fall	   short	   of	   knowledge	  being	  the	  ones	  featured	  in	  the	  norm	  under	  discussion.	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coin	   tosses,	   wishful	   thinking	   and	   other	   such	   epistemically	   barren	  methods,	   they	  would	  all	  happen	  to	  be	  true,	   they	  would	  assert	   them	  to	  each	  other	  and	  they	  would	  all	  respond	  with	  belief	  to	  the	  corresponding	  assertions.	  Note,	  though,	  that	  what	  also	  needs	  to	  be	  the	  case	  is	  that	  the	  members	   of	   this	   population	   have	   no	   clue	   that	   the	   relevant	   assertions	  happen	  to	  be	  true	  –	  that	  is,	  that	  their	  peers	  always	  luckily	  hit	  the	  truth.	  Otherwise,	   the	   generated	   beliefs	   would	   fail	   to	   amount	   to	   mere	   true	  beliefs,	   since	   the	   believer	   will	   have	   some	   evidence	   concerning	   some	  good	   features	   of	   the	   speaker	   as	   epistemic	   agent.	   This	   assumption,	   in	  itself,	  is	  hard	  to	  square	  with	  our	  everyday	  epistemic	  practices;	  after	  all,	  each	   and	   every	   member	   of	   this	   population	   will	   see	   her	   peers	  successfully	   walking	   the	   streets,	   avoiding	   obstacles,	   going	   to	   work,	  doing	   grocery	   shopping	   etc.	   All	   this	  will	   suggest	   that	   these	   people	   do	  form	  some	  true	  beliefs,	  and	  thus	  add	  warrant	  to	  the	  beliefs	  generated	  in	  their	  hearers.	  	  	   Also,	   this	   story	   gives	   rise	   to	   two	   possible	   scenarios:	   either	   the	  receivers	   of	   testimony	   are	   aware	   that	   the	   testifiers	   are	   engaged	   in	  weird	   epistemic	   practices,	   or	   they	   are	   not.	   If	   they	   are	   aware,	   I	   find	   it	  empirically	   fairly	   implausible	   that,	   under	   these	   circumstances,	   the	  practice	  of	  assertion	  will	  be	  maintained,	  since	  this	  piece	  of	  information	  is	   likely	   to	   act	   as	   a	   very	   serious	   defeater	   for	   believing	   the	   asserted	  content.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  a	  scenario	  where	  each	  and	  every	  member	  of	  this	   population	   forms	   beliefs	   on	   coin	   tosses	   but	   has	   no	   clue	   that	  everyone	  else	  does	  the	  same	  is	  fairly	  implausible.	  	  	   Last	  but	  not	   least,	   I	  will	  briefly	   turn	   to	   the	  point	   related	   to	   the	  description	   of	   the	   function.	   Note,	   that	   what	   the	   case	   of	   the	   heart	  suggests	   is	   that	   function	   ascriptions	   are	   value	   loaded:	   that	   is,	   the	  description	   of	   the	   function	   corresponds	   to	   the	   (most)	   valuable	  contribution	  of	  the	  respective	  trait	  to	  the	  relevant	  system.	  The	  function	  is	  pumping	  blood	   in	   the	   circulatory	   system	  –	  not	   just	  pumping	  blood,	  since	   pumping	   it	   anywhere	   else	   would	   fail	   to	   be	   valuable	   for	   the	  organism;	   also,	   not	   just	   pumping	   something	   in	   the	   circulatory	   system,	  since	  pumping	  orange	  juice	  would	  also	  fail	  to	  do	  the	  work.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  pumping	  blood	  and	  making	  a	  beating	  sound	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  in	  any	  way	  more	  valuable	  to	  the	  organism	  than	  merely	  pumping	  blood.	  	   Now,	   the	  way	   in	  which	  knowledge	   is	  more	   valuable	   than	  mere	  true	  belief	  (or	  any	  epistemic	  standing	  that	  falls	  short	  of	  knowledge,	  for	  that	  matter)	  has	  been	  a	  fairly	  hot	  topic	  of	  debate	  in	  the	  last	  years	  (see,	  e.g.	  (Pritchard	  2010)).	  One	  thing	  is,	  however,	  assumed	  by	  most52	  actors	  in	  the	  debate:	  knowledge	  is,	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  more	  valuable	  than	  true	  belief;	   the	  challenge	   is	   to	  explain	  how,	  not	   to	  argue	  that	   it	   is.	   If	   that	   is	  
                                                52	  But	  see	  Jonathan	  Kvanvig	  (2003)	  and	  Pritchard	  (2010)	  for	  two	  notable	  exceptions.	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the	  case,	  however,	  it	  looks	  as	  though,	  similarly	  to	  the	  case	  of	  the	  heart,	  value	  considerations	  give	  us	  reason	  to	  describe	  the	  function	  at	  stake	  as	  being	  knowledge	  rather	  than	  true	  belief.	  	   Last	   but	   not	   least,	   note	   one	   more	   thing:	   if	   it	   turns	   out	   that	  Millikan	   and	   Graham	   are	   right,	   after	   all,	   and	   the	   proper	   function	   of	  assertion	  is	  generating	  true	  belief,	  it	  is	  still	  arguable	  that	  the	  norm	  that	  drops	  out	  of	  this	  functional	  schema	  is	  a	  knowledge	  norm.	  Here	  is	  how:	  recall	  that	  proper	  functioning	  is	  normal	  functioning,	   i.e.,	   functioning	  in	  the	   way	   the	   trait	   did	   back	   in	   the	   day	   when	   it	   acquired	   its	   function.	  Plausibly,	  again,	  given	  considerations	  pertaining	  to	  ready	  availability,	  if	  back	   in	   the	   day,	   assertion	   performed	   its	   function	   of	   generating	   true	  belief	  by	  being	  knowledgeable.	  	  	  
3.3	  Normative	  Relations	  
	  We	  have	  seen	  that,	  on	  the	  fairly	  plausible	  assumption	  that	  the	  function	  of	  assertion	  is	  to	  generate	  testimonial	  knowledge,	  we	  get	  a	  knowledge	  norm	   of	   assertion:	   assertion	   needs	   be	   knowledgeable	   in	   order	   to	  reliably	   fulfil	   its	   function.	  Recall,	   now,	   that	   in	   the	  previous	   section	  we	  have	   looked	   at	   several	   alternative	   attempts	   to	   provide	   a	   rationale	   for	  KNA,	  and	  found	  them	  wanting.	  That	  is,	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  normative	  inheritance	   thesis	   from	  belief	   and/or	   action	   to	   assertion	   is	   in	   need	  of	  further	  support.	  	  	   Now,	  here	  are	  two	  interesting	  questions	  that	  arise	  at	  this	  point.	  First,	  where	  does	  the	   functionalist	  picture	  put	   forth	  above	   leave	  belief	  and	   action?	   After	   all,	   there	   is,	   intuitively,	   a	   clear	   sense	   in	   which	  assertion,	   action	   and	   belief	   seem	   to	   be	   intimately	   connected	   by	   their	  very	   nature,	   so	   any	   normative	   framework	   that	   stays	   silent	   on	   these	  issues	  seems	  less	  than	  satisfactory.	  	  	   Second,	  relatedly,	  can	  we	  hope	  to	  get	  a	  nicely	  unified	  picture	  for	  all	  three?	  This	  next	  section	  deals	  with	  just	  these	  issues.	  It	  is	  argued	  that,	  one	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  prospects	  of	  a	  unified	  picture	  look	  dim,	  if	  what	  is	  meant	  by	  unification	   is	  normative	  commonality:	   	   if	   this	   thesis	   is	   right,	  the	   functionalist	  story	  delivers	  non-­‐commonality	  high	  and	   low.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  however,	  the	  picture	  is	  nicely	  unified	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  all	  the	  normative	   claims	   put	   forth	   drop	   out	   of	   the	   same	   functionalist	  machinery.	  
	  
	  
3.3.1	  Assertion	  and	  Belief	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In	  the	  previous	  section,	  we	  have	  seen	  that,	  if	  we	  take	  the	  main	  telos	  of	  our	   epistemic	   activities	   to	   be	   knowledge,	   what	   follows	   for	   assertion	  from	   a	   functionalist	   picture	   is	   a	   knowledge	   norm.	   Let	   us	   now	   look	   at	  what	  is	  the	  case	  with	  belief.	  Note	  that,	  as	  opposed	  to	  assertion,	  on	  our	  knowledge-­‐centric	  assumption,	  the	  function	  of	  belief	  is	  not	  transmitting	  knowledge;	   belief	   itself	   is	   a	   device	   that	   serves	   for	   accurately	  representing	   the	   world.	   One	   way	   for	   belief	   to	   do	   this	   is	   by	   being	  knowledgeable;	  on	  our	  knowledge-­‐centric	  assumption,	  then,	  belief	  aims	  at	   being	   knowledgeable,	   this	   is	   its	   main	   epistemic	   function.	   Note,	  though,	   that	   if	   that	   is	   the	   case,	   that	   is,	   if	   knowledge	   is	   the	   relevant	  function,	  there	  are	  good	  reasons	  to	  doubt	  that	  the	  corresponding	  norm	  will	  be	  a	  knowledge	  norm.	  	  	   First,	   note	   that,	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   normativity	   at	   large,	   norms	  tend	  to	  not	  share	  content	  with	  the	  goal	  they	  observe.	  To	  see	  this,	  think	  of	  other	  norms	  we	  are	  familiar	  with.	  Take	  traffic	  norms:	  plausibly,	  they	  are	  meant	  to	  promote	  the	  aim	  of	  producing	  safe	  traffic.	  Now,	  note	  that	  norms	  meant	   to	  make	   it	   likely	   that	   the	   goal	   of	   safe	   traffic	   is	   reached	  have	   informative	   content,	   i.e.	   content	   that	   tells	   us	   how	   to	   go	   about	  reaching	   the	  goal	   in	   informative	  ways:	   ‘Drive	  at	  most	  50	  km/h	  within	  city	  bounds!’,	  ‘Stop	  at	  the	  red	  light!’	  etc.	  Similarly,	  take	  social	  norms;	  say	  you	  want	  to	  become	  a	  biologist;	  again,	  there	  are	  going	  to	  be	  norms	  that	  inform	  you	  how	  to	  go	  about	  it	  in	  order	  to	  make	  it	  very	  likely	  that	  you	  do	  become	   a	   biologist:	   ‘Go	   to	   biology	   school!’,	   ‘Study	   hard!’	   Etc.	   Or	   take	  norms	  of	  chemistry:	  say	  you	  want	  to	  produce	  an	  antibiotic.	  The	  norms	  associated	  with	  this	  goal	  are	  going	  to	  tell	  you	  what	   ingredients	   to	  mix	  and	   under	   what	   conditions	   to	   mix	   them	   in	   order	   to	   produce	   an	  antibiotic.	   It	  would	   be	   less	   than	   informative	   if	   all	   these	   norms	  would	  share	  content	  with	  the	  goal;	  for	  instance,	  if	  the	  norm	  serving	  the	  goal	  of	  your	   becoming	   a	   biologist	  would	  merely	   say	   ‘Become	   a	   biologist!’,	   or	  the	  norms	  regulating	  antibiotics	  production	  would	  merely	  say	  ‘Produce	  antibiotics!’.	   Similarly,	   it	   would	   be	   less	   than	   informative	   if	   the	   only	  driving	  norm	  we	  would	  have	  to	  guide	  us	  towards	  our	  goal	  of	  safe	  traffic	  would	  be	  ‘Drive	  safely!’.53	  	   Now,	  unless	  we	  have	  good	  reason	  to	  think	  epistemic	  normativity	  is	   special	   in	   this	   respect,	  we	  should	  expect	   to	  get	  a	   similar	  picture	   for	  belief:	   the	  norms	  should	  not	  share	  content	  with	   the	  goal.	  They	  should	  be	  such	  that	  they	  inform	  us	  how	  to	  go	  about	  belief	  formation	  in	  order	  to	  make	  it	  likely	  that	  you	  end	  up	  with	  knowledgeable	  beliefs.	  A	  norm	  that	  
                                                53	  That	  being	  said,	  see	  Simion,	  Kelp	  and	  Ghijsen	  (Forthcoming)	  for	  an	  account	  that	  distinguishes	  between	  the	  evaluative	  norm	  governing	  belief	  (identical	  in	  content	  with	  the	  goal	  thereof,	  stating	  conditions	  for	  what	  it	  is	  for	  a	  belief	  to	  be	  a	  good	  belief)	  and	  a	  prescriptive	  norm	  of	  belief	  (stating	  conditions	  for	  reliably	  reaching	  the	  corresponding	  goal).	  Crucially,	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  the	  norm	  that	  is	  relevant	  for	  epistemic	  justification	  is	  the	  latter.	  
	   67	  
tells	  us	  to	  only	  believe	  what	  we	  know	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  guide	  us	  much	  with	   regard	   to	   how	   to	   go	   about	   reaching	   our	   goal	   of	   producing	  knowledgeable	  beliefs.	  	  	   And,	  indeed,	  the	  functionalist	  picture	  vindicates	  these	  intuitions.	  Crucially,	   again,	   function	   fulfilment	   and	   proper	   functioning	   can	   come	  apart:	   my	   non-­‐beating	   heart	   can	   pump	   blood	   via,	   say,	   some	   weird	  magnetic	   field,	   but	   it	   will	   not	   count	   as	   functioning	   properly.	   Also,	  function	   fulfilment	   is	   only	   likely	   to	   occur	   given	   proper	   functioning	   in	  
normal	  conditions,	   i.e.	   conditions	  of	   function	  acquisition.	  My	  heart	   can	  be	  a	  perfectly	  properly	  functioning	  heart;	  if	  you	  take	  it	  out	  of	  my	  chest	  and	   place	   it	   in	   vat	   with	   nutrients,	   however,	   it	   will	   fail	   to	   fulfil	   its	  function.	   If	   knowledge	   is	   both	   the	   function	   and	   the	   norm	   of	   belief,	  however,	   properly	   functioning	  will	   entail	   function	   fulfilment,	   and	   vice	  versa;	   this,	   to	   say	   the	   least,	   paints	   a	   weird	   functionalist	   picture	   for	  belief.54	  	   If	  that	  is	  the	  case,	  however,	  it	  looks	  as	  though	  what	  we	  get	  out	  of	  the	   normative	   picture	   at	   work	   is	   a	   milder	   norm	   for	   belief	   than	   for	  assertion.	   That	   is	   because,	   while	   in	   the	   case	   of	   assertion,	   the	   reliable	  way	   to	   fulfil	   its	   epistemic	   function	   is	   by	   being	   knowledgeable,	   in	   the	  case	   of	   belief	   the	   function	   itself	   is	   knowledge.	   As	   such,	   the	   norm	   for	  belief	   will	   just	   stipulate	   to	   follow	   the	   procedure	   for	   belief	   formation	  that	   reliably	   gets	   you	   to	   have	   knowledgeable	   beliefs.	   Here	   is,	   just	   for	  illustration,	   one	   account	   that	   will	   nicely	   fit	   the	   bill,	   which	   I	   defend	  elsewhere:	  	  
Knowledge-­‐First	   Functionalism:	   A	   belief	   that	   p	   is	   epistemically	  permissible/justified	  iff	  formed	  via	  cognitive	  processes	  that	  have	  the	  e-­‐function	   of	   generating	   knowledge	   ((Simion,	   Kelp	   and	   Ghijsen	  Forthcoming),	  (Simion	  In	  Progress)).	  	  	  	   Many	   extant	   broadly	   reliabilist	   norms	   will	   likely	   fit	   the	   bill,	  though:	  we	  need	  not	   take	   a	   stance	  here.	  What	   is	   important	   to	  note	   is	  that,	   insofar	   as	   the	  aim	  of	  belief	   is	   knowledge,	   the	  norm	  will	  not	  be	  a	  knowledge	  norm,	   it	  will	  differ	   in	  content.	   If	   that	   is	   the	  case,	  and	   if	   the	  story	   told	   by	   this	   paper	   for	   the	   norm	   of	   assertion	   also	   goes	   through,	  belief	  and	  assertion	  are	  governed	  by	  distinct	  epistemic	  norms	  in	  virtue	  of	   serving	   different	   epistemic	   functions.	   Assertion	   aims	   to	   transmit	  knowledge,	   therefore	   it	   needs	   to	   be	   knowledgeable	   to	   begin	   with	   in	  order	   to	   achieve	   this.	   Belief	   aims	   to	   be	   knowledgeable;	   as	   such,	   the	  norm	   governing	   it	   is	   going	   to	   be	   milder;	   it	   is	   going	   to	   indicate	   the	  proper	  procedure	  to	  reach	  this	  aim	  reliably.	  
                                                
54 See fn. #52. 
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3.3.2	  Assertion	  and	  Action	  
	  One	   central	   debate	   in	   recent	   literature	   on	   epistemic	   normativity	  concerns	   the	   epistemic	   norm	   for	   action.	   Several	   people	   think	   that,	  where	   one’s	   choice	   is	   p-­‐dependent,	   it	   is	   appropriate	   to	   treat	   the	  proposition	   that	  p	  as	   a	   reason	   for	   acting	  only	   if	   you	  know	   that	  p	   (e.g.	  Hawthorne	  and	  Stanley	  (2008),	  Williamson	  (2000)).	  The	  most	  notable	  competing	  account	  puts	  forth	  a	  Bayesian	  expected	  utility	  maximization	  norm,	   according	   to	   which	   it	   is	   rational	   to	   choose	   an	   act	   only	   if	   it	  maximizes	  expected	  utility	  with	  respect	  to	  one’s	  credences	  and	  utilities	  (e.g.	  Douven	  (2008)).55	  	  	   This	   section	   argues	   that	   the	   debate	   is	   afflicted	   by	   a	   category	  mistake:	  strictly	  speaking,	  there	  is	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  an	  epistemic	  norm	  for	  action.	  Let	  us,	  on	  a	  first	  approximation,	  formulate	  the	  norm	  we	  are	  talking	  about	  as	  follows:	  	  
The	   X	   Norm	   for	   Action	   (XNA):	   One	   is	   in	   a	   good	   enough	   epistemic	  position	  to	  act	  on	  p	  only	  if	  p	  has	  X.	  	  	   Now,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  there	  is	  no	  consensus	  in	  the	  literature	  as	  to	  what	  property	  X	   is	   supposed	   to	  stand	   for,	  whether	   it	   is	  knowledge,	  expected	  utility	  maximization	  or	  what	  have	  you.	  However,	  there	  is	  one	  thing	  many	  people	  involved	  in	  the	  debate	  seem	  to	  agree	  on:56	  given	  that	  
                                                55	  For	  an	  overview	  of	   the	  debate,	  see	  Benton	  (2014).	  For	  recent	  work,	  see	  Littlejohn	  and	  Turri	  (eds.)	  (2014).	  56	  By	   either	   explicitly	   endorsing	   the	   fact	   that	   XNA	   and	   its	   various	   incarnations	   are	  epistemic	   norms	   (for	   an	   overview,	   see	   e.g.	   Benton	   (2014)),	   or	   by	   not	   denying	   this	  extremely	  popular	  (and	  notable)	  assumption	  (e.g.	  Douven	  (2008)).	  	  	  	   Crucially,	   in	   personal	   communication,	   Tim	   Williamson	   explicitly	   denied	  defending	   an	   epistemic	   norm	   for	   action.	   According	   to	   him,	   the	   knowledge	   norm	  governing	  action	   is	  not	  so	  much	  of	  a	  particular	   type	  or	  another,	  as	   it	  pertains	   to	   the	  well	   functioning	   of	   action	   as	   such:	   an	   action	   based	   on	   less	   than	   knowledge	   is,	  according	  to	  Williamson,	  in	  a	  crucial	  way,	  malfunctional.	  To	  help	  with	  making	  sense	  of	  this,	   Williamson	   gave	   the	   example	   of	   walking:	   according	   to	   him,	   one	   can	   easily	  imagine	  scenarios	  where	   limping	   is	  prudentially	  good	  –	  say	   that	   it	   saves	  your	   life	   in	  some	  weird	  way	   -­‐	  epistemically	  good	  –	   if	  you	  get	  a	  million	  knowledgeable	  beliefs	   in	  return	  for	  limping	  -­‐	   ,	  morally	  good	  –	  if	  your	  limping	  saves	  the	  life	  of	  your	  neighbor	  –	  and	  so	  on;	  however,	  no	  matter	  what,	  limping	  is	  still	  bad,	  that	  is,	  malfunctional	  walking.	  	  	   Two	  things	  about	  this:	  first,	  note	  that	  the	  value	  theoretic	  assumption	  behind	  Williamson’s	   normative	   type	   attributions	   above	   is	   an	   act	   consequentialist	   one;	   on	  such	  a	  view,	  something	  is	  epistemically/prudentially/morally	  etc.	  permissible	  insofar	  as	   it	   maximizes	   the	   epistemic/prudential/moral	   good	   on	   the	   particular	   occasion	   at	  stake.	   Notably,	   though,	   act	   consequentialism	   is	   a	   fairly	   contested	   view	   (see	   section	  3.3.6	  above).	  	   Second,	   even	   if	   we	   grant	   Williamson	   that	   non-­‐knowledgeable	   action	   is	  malfunctional,	   it	   still	   does	   not	   follow	   that	   he	   is	   off	   the	   hook	   when	   it	   comes	   to	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we	  are	  concerned	  with	  how	  good	  one’s	  epistemic	  position	  needs	  to	  be	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  p	  in	  order	  to	  make	  acting	  on	  p	  permissible,	  XNA	  is	  an	  epistemic	  
norm.	   Therefore,	   all	   sides	   of	   the	   debate	   seem	   to	   stand	   behind	   the	  content	  individuation	  thesis	  (CIT):	  If	  a	  norm	  N	  determines	  the	  amount	  of	  epistemic	  support	  needed	   for	  proper	  action,	   then	  N	   is	  an	  epistemic	  norm.	  	  	   Now,	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  Chapter	  #1	  of	  this	  thesis	  that	  CIT	  is	  false;	  hence,	   there	   is	   little	   reason	   to	  believe	   that	  XNA	  captures	  an	  epistemic	  norm.	  On	  top	  of	  this,	  this	  section	  purports	  to	  argue	  that	  XNA	  is	  actually	  not	  an	  epistemic	  norm,	  but	  a	  prudential	  norm	  with	  epistemic	  content.	  	   To	  see	  this,	  recall	  Value	  Individuation:	  prudential	  norms	  will	  be	  associated	   with	   prudential	   goods,	   moral	   norms	   with	   moral	   goods,	  epistemic	  norms	  with	  epistemic	  goods	  etc.	  If	  that	  is	  the	  case,	  however,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  why	  action	   in	  general	  would	  be	  governed	  by	  an	  epistemic	  norm	  to	  begin	  with.	  	  	   When	  does	  it	  make	  sense	  to	  regulate	  something	  X	  by	  a	  norm	  of	  type	   Y,	   such	   as	   a	   prudential,	   moral	   or	   epistemic	   norm?	   The	  overwhelmingly	   plausible	   answer	   is:	   when	   X	   has	   attaining	   Y	   as	   a	  characteristic	   aim.	   Consider	   antibiotics;	   the	   characteristic	   goal	  associated	  with	  producing	  them	  is	  curing	  bacterial	   infections.	  As	  such,	  norms	  governing	  this	  activity	  will	  plausibly	  be	  there	  to	  insure	  that	  they	  reliably	  do	  so.57	  	  	   Conversely,	  when	  X	  does	  not	  have	  Y	  as	  a	  characteristic	  aim,	  there	  is	  little	  reason	  to	  regulate	  X	  by	  a	  norm	  of	  type	  Y.	  Producing	  antibiotics	  will	  most	  likely	  not	  be	  governed	  by,	  say,	  aesthetic	  norms,	  given	  that	  the	  characteristic	   aim	   associated	   with	   antibiotics	   is	   not	   to	   aesthetically	  please	  the	  consumer;	  antibiotics	  can	  be	  proper	  antibiotics	  even	  if	  they	  are	  not	  particularly	  pretty.	  	   Notice	  that	  most	  actions	  are	  not	  characteristically	  aimed	  at	  any	  epistemic	  goals;	  my	  eating	  breakfast,	  running	  in	  the	  park,	  brushing	  my	  teeth,	  buying	  chocolate,	  helping	  my	  old	  neighbour	  cross	   the	  street	  are	  
                                                                                                                       committing	  to	  one	  type	  of	  norm	  or	  another.	  To	  see	  why,	  note	  that	  functions	  are	  typed;	  therefore,	   so	   is	   malfunctioning.	   Something	   can	   be	   epistemically	   malfunctional,	  prudentially	  malfunctional	  and	  so	  on.	  Of	  course,	  for	  many	  traits,	  actions	  and	  artifacts,	  there	   will	   be	   such	   a	   thing	   as	   a	   central	   function	   associated	   with	   them.	   Failure	   to	  function	  properly	  in	  view	  of	  fulfiling	  this	  central	  function	  will	  often	  be	  referred	  to	  as	  merely	  malfunctioning.	  However,	  this	  still	  refers	  to	  the	  failure	  of	  properly	  functioning	  in	  view	  of	   fulfilling	  a	   function	  of	  a	  particular	   type	  –	  which	  happens	  to	  be	  the	  central	  function	   associated	   with	   the	   artifact,	   trait	   or	   action	   in	   question.	   Take	   hearts,	   for	  instance:	   it	   seems	  proper	   to	   say	   that	   a	  non-­‐beating	  heart	   s	  malfunctional.	  What	   this	  amounts	   to,	  however,	   is	  saying	   that	   it	   fails	   to	  properly	   function	   towards	   fulfilling	   its	  main	  function,	  which	  is	  the	  biological	  function	  of	  pumping	  blood.	  	  57	  Note	  that	  the	  argument	  made	  here	  explicitly	  assumes	  a	  consequentialist	  reading	  of	  VIT.	  The	  reasons	  for	  this	  merely	  pertain	  to	  user-­‐friendliness	  and	  space	  considerations.	  The	   argument,	   however,	   can	   be	   easily	   reconstructed	   on	   a	   deontological,	   Fitting	  Attitude	  reading	  thereof.	  For	  a	  rough	  idea	  of	  how	  this	  would	  go,	  see	  Section	  #	  6.2.	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cases	   in	   point.	   Most	   of	   them	   are	   aimed	   at	   prudential	   goals,	   such	   as	  maximizing	   expected	   practical	   utility,	   some	   of	   them	   at	   moral	   goals,	  maybe	   a	   few	   at	   aesthetic	   goals.	   In	   the	   absence	   of	   any	   characteristic	  epistemic	   aim	   associated	   with	   them,	   though,	   there	   is	   little	   reason	   to	  think	  that	  these	  actions	  will	  be	  governed	  by	  an	  epistemic	  norm.	  	  	   Consider,	   in	   contrast,	   asserting,	   perceiving,	   reporting,	   judging,	  learning,	   reading,	   applying	   to	   the	   university	   etc.	   These	   actions	   are	   all	  characteristically	  aimed	  at	  delivering	  epistemic	  goods.	  As	  such,	  it	  makes	  sense	  for	  them	  to	  be	  governed	  by	  epistemic	  norms.	  	  	   Thus,	  having	  an	  epistemic	  norm	  for	  action	  makes	  perfect	  sense	  when	   it	   comes	   to	   actions	   characteristically	   associated	   with	   epistemic	  goals,	  like	  assertion.	  It	  makes	  sense	  to	  ask	  what	  property	  exactly	  one’s	  assertion	  must	  enjoy	  for	  it	  to	  be	  epistemically	  proper;	  that	  is,	  properly	  equipped	   to	   reach	   its	   epistemic	   goal.	   However,	   just	   as	   in	   the	   case	   of	  producing	   antibiotics,	   there	   is	   no	   reason	   to	   think	   that	   my	   buying	  chocolate	  will	  be	  governed	  by	  an	  epistemic	  norm,	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  not	  characteristically	  aimed	  at	  delivering	  epistemic	  goods.	  Assertion	  is	   not	   governed	   by	   an	   epistemic	   norm	   in	   virtue	   of	   its	   being	   a	   type	   of	  action,	  but	  due	  to	  its	  characteristic	  epistemic	  function.	  	   In	  the	  light	  of	  these	  results,	  it	  looks	  as	  if	  the	  question	  concerning	  what	  one’s	  epistemic	  relation	  to	  p	  has	  to	  be	  in	  order	  to	  render	  acting	  on	  p	  permissible	  should	  be	  framed	  as	  concerning	  a	  type	  of	  normativity	  that	  plausibly	   governs	   all	   types	   of	   action.	   Uncontroversially,	   I	   guess,	   the	  most	  obvious	   candidate	   is	  prudential	  normativity.	   	  Thus,	  what	  we	  are	  asking	  is	  what	  one’s	  epistemic	  relation	  to	  p	  has	  to	  be	  in	  order	  to	  render	  acting	  on	  p	  prudentially	  permissible.58	  	  	  	  
3.4	  Conclusion	  	  This	  chapter	  put	   forth	  a	   function-­‐first	   classical	   invariantist	  knowledge	  account	   of	   assertion.	  According	   to	   the	   view	  defended	  here,	   assertions	  are	  epistemically	  permissible	  if	  and	  only	  if	  knowledgeable	  in	  virtue	  of:	  (1)	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  main	  epistemic	  function	  of	  assertion	  is	  to	  generate	  knowledge	   in	   hearers	   and	   (2)	   knowledge	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	   asserter	  being	  both	  necessary	  and	  sufficient	  for	  fulfilling	  this	  function.	  	  	   I	  have	  also	  hinted	  towards	  what	  the	  functionalist	  framework	  has	  to	   say	   about	   the	   relationship	   between	   assertion	   and	   its	   normative	  neighbours,	  belief	  and	  action.	  According	  to	  the	  view	  defended	  here,	  the	  
                                                58 	  Crucially,	   nothing	   here	   excludes	   there	   being	   an	   epistemic	   norm	   for	   practical	  reasoning.	  After	  all,	  practical	  reasoning	  does	  serve	  (at	  least)	  the	  epistemic	  function	  of	  generating	   knowledge	   of	   the	   conclusion.	   For	   more	   on	   this,	   see	   (Simion,	   Under	  Review).	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normative	   commonality	   assumption	   for	   the	   three	   is	   false:	   knowledge	  governs	  assertion,	  the	  norm	  of	  belief	   is	  a	  weaker,	  reliabilist	  norm,	  and	  there	  is	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  an	  epistemic	  norm	  for	  action.	  	   Last	  but	  not	   least,	   I	  put	   forth	  a	   functionalist,	   light	  constitutivity	  claim,	   which	   stays	   clear	   of	   the	   difficulties	   encountered	   by	   its	  Williamsonian	  counterpart.	  	   In	  what	   follows,	   I	  defend	  both	  the	  necessity	  and	  the	  sufficiency	  direction	  of	  the	  norm	  proposed	  against	  the	  putative	  counterexamples	  in	  the	  literature.	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Chapter	  IV.	  
The	  Necessity	  Claim	  	  In	   recent	   literature,	   the	   necessity	   claim	   involved	   in	   KNA	   (henceforth,	  KNA-­‐Nec)	   is	   taken	  by	  many	   to	  be	   too	  strong	  a	   requirement.	  The	  most	  prominent	  competing	  account	  on	  the	  market59	  imposes	  a	  weaker	  norm	  on	   assertion,	   and	   has	   been	  most	   notably	   defended,	   among	   others,	   by	  Igor	  Douven	  (2006)	  and	  Jennifer	  Lackey	  (2008).	  Roughly,	  the	  thought	  is	  that	   one	   should	   only	   assert	   p	   if	   p	   is	   rationally	   credible	   to	   one	  (henceforth,	  RCNA),	  where	  the	  epistemic	  status	  at	  stake	   is	  taken	  to	  be	  equivalent	  to	  knowledge-­‐level	  justification	  –	  that	  is,	  whatever	  turns	  un-­‐Gettiered	  true	  belief	  into	  knowledge.	  	  	   Defenders	  of	  RCNA	  argue	  for	  their	  preferred	  view	  from	  different	  directions;	   thus,	   I	   will	   discuss	   them	   in	   turn.	   Douven	   (2006,	   2009)	  argues	  that	  theoretical	  considerations,	  such	  as	  a	  priori	  simplicity,	  speak	  in	  favour	  of	  RCNA;	  furthermore,	  he	  thinks	  the	  weaker	  norm	  will	  also	  do	  just	   as	   fine	   in	   accommodating	   the	   linguistic	   data	   generally	   taken	   to	  support	  KNA-­‐Nec.	  According	   to	   Jennifer	   Lackey,	  KNA-­‐Nec,	   as	   opposed	  to	  RCNA,	  has	  a	  hard	  time	  explaining	  cases	  in	  which	  assertions	  on	  some	  lesser	  epistemic	  standings	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  render	  the	  speakers	  subject	  to	  criticism.	  All	  in	  all,	  RCNA	  is	  taken	  to	  score	  better.	  	  	   This	  chapter’s	  main	  ambition	  is	  to	  tip	  the	  balance	  back	  in	  favour	  of	  KNA-­‐Nec.	  To	  this	  effect,	  I	  will	  first	  argue	  that	  Douven’s	  argument	  for	  the	  a	  priori	  simplicity	  of	  RCNA	  does	  not	  go	  through.	  Furthermore,	  I	  will	  show	   that	   KNA	   scores	   better	   on	   the	   second	   front	   –	   that	   is,	  accommodating	  linguistic	  data.	  Finally,	  I	  will	  provide	  a	  unified	  defence	  of	  KNA-­‐Nec	  against	  Lackey’s	  cases,	  sourced	  in	  the	  normativity	  of	  action	  in	  general,	  so	  as	  to	  avoid	  charges	  with	  ad	  hoc-­‐ness.	  	  	  	  
4.1	  A	  Priori	  Simplicity	  	  
	  According	   to	   Douven,	   while	   both	   KNA-­‐Nec	   and	   RCNA	   do	   an	   equally	  good	  job	  in	  explaining	  the	  empirical	  data,	  RCNA	  is	  to	  be	  preferred	  due	  to	  considerations	  pertaining	  to	  a	  priori	  simplicity	  (2006,	  451).	  That	  is,	  
                                                59	  The	   truth	   norm	   of	   assertion,	   according	   to	   which	   one’s	   assertion	   is	   epistemically	  permissible	  only	  if	  true,	  is	  the	  other	  main	  competitor	  on	  the	  market.	  I	  do	  not	  engage	  with	  this	  account,	  mainly	  because	  I	  am	  convinced	  by	  the	  extant	  case	  against	  it	   in	  the	  literature.	   See	   (Williamson	   2000)	   for	   reasons	   to	   thing	   truth	   is	   not	   the	   norm	   and	  Weiner	   (2005)	   for	   a	   rejoinder	  on	  behalf	   of	   the	   truth	  account.	   Furthermore,	   some	  of	  the	   arguments	   in	   support	   of	   the	   necessity	   claim	   involved	   in	   KNA	   presented	   in	   this	  chapter	  will	  work	  equally	  well	  to	  mount	  a	  defense	  against	  a	  truth	  norm,	  or	  any	  weaker	  norm,	   for	   that	  matter.	   (But	  see	   the	  previous	  chapter	   	   (section	  #3.2.2)	   for	   reasons	   to	  believe	  a	  truth	  norm	  cannot	  be	  associated	  with	  the	  epistemic	  function	  of	  assertion.)	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Douven	   argues,	   RCNA	   is	   but	   an	   extension	   of	  what	   he	   dubs	   ‘the	   zeroth	  law	  of	  rationality’:	  	   	  
LR:	  Only	  φ	  if	  it	  is	  rational	  for	  you	  to	  φ.	  	  From	   this,	   Douven	   derives	   the	   corresponding	   principle	   for	   assertion	  (henceforth	  LRA):	  	  
LRA:	  Only	  assert	  p	  if	  it	  is	  rational	  for	  you	  to	  assert	  p.	  	  	   Furthermore,	  Douven	  goes	  along	  with	  Jonathan	  Adler	  (2002)	  in	  supporting	   the	  belief-­‐assertion	  parallel.	   In	   the	   light	  of	   this,	  and	  by	   the	  plausible	  assumption	  that	  if	  it	  is	  rational	  for	  one	  to	  assert	  that	  p,	  then	  it	  is	  rational	  for	  one	  to	  assert	  p	  to	  oneself,	  he	  derives:	  	  
RCNA:	  Only	  assert	  p	  if	  it	  is	  rational	  for	  you	  to	  believe	  p,	  	  	  	   As	   such,	   Douven	   argues,	   we	   are	   faced	   with	   the	   following	  situation:	   RCNA	   seems	   to	   be	   a	   mere	   extension	   to	   a	   fundamental	  principle	   of	   rationality,	   to	   wit,	   LR	   –	   to	   which,	   he	   argues,	   we	   are	  committed	  anyway	  (2006:	  456).	  Furthermore,	  the	  extension	  is	  obtained	  by	  an	  application	  of	  a	  principle	  that	  is	  equally	  endorsed	  by	  Williamson	  (2000)	  –	  that	  is,	  the	  belief-­‐assertion	  parallel.	  	  	   Say	  that	  it	  turns	  out	  that	  RCNA	  deals	  with	  the	  linguistic	  data	  as	  well	  as	  KNA	  does.	   If	   that	   is	   the	  case,	   in	  absence	  of	   similar	  support	   for	  KNA	   –	   that	   is,	   support	   coming	   from	   things	   that	   we	   endorse	   on	  independent	   grounds	   –	   RCNA	   will	   just	   provide	   an	   a	   priori	   simpler	  explanation	   of	   the	   data,	   and	   will	   thus	   turn	   out	   to	   be	   the	   preferable	  account.	  	  	   Now,	  we	  have	  already	  seen	  that	  there	  is	  strong	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  belief-­‐assertion	  parallel	  fails	  to	  provide	  the	  normative	  goods	  it	  is	  taken	  to	  carry.	  Let	  us,	  though,	  leave	  this	  aside,	  and	  take	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  Douven’s	  LR.	  Recall	   that	  what	  we	  are	   interested	   in	   is	   the	  epistemic	  norm	  governing	  assertion.	  As	  such,	  Douven	  (2012,	  293)	  points	  out	  that	  the	   rationality	   at	   stake	   is	   going	   to	  be	   epistemic	   rationality,	   concerned	  with	   the	   purpose	   of	   maximizing	   epistemic	   utility.	   As	   such,	   on	   a	   first	  approximation,	  we	  can	  restate	  the	  principle	  as	  follows:	  	  
LR*:	  You	  must	  (epistemically):	  φ	  only	   if	   it	   is	  epistemically	  rational	   for	  you	  to	  φ.	  	  Further	  on,	  for	  the	  particular	  case	  of	  assertion,	  we	  get:	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LRA*:	   You	   must	   (epistemically):	   assert	   p	   only	   if	   it	   is	   epistemically	  rational	  for	  you	  to	  assert	  p.	  	  By	  the	  belief-­‐assertion	  parallel,	  we	  get:	  	  
RCNA*:	   You	   must	   (epistemically):	   assert	   p	   only	   if	   it	   is	   epistemically	  rational	  for	  you	  to	  believe	  p.	  	  	   However,	   there	   are	   two	  major	   problems	  with	   this	  move.	   First,	  (Kelp	   and	   Simion	   2016)	   identifies	   cases	   in	   which	   it	   looks	   as	   if	   it	   is	  epistemically	  rational	  for	  me	  to	  assert	  p	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  I	  have	  no	   justification	   whatsoever	   to	   believe	   p.	   If	   that	   is	   the	   case,	   there	   is	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  either	  the	  epistemic	  status	  at	  stake	  in	  RCNA	  is	  not	  knowledge-­‐level	   justification,	   or	   the	   belief-­‐assertion	   parallel	   does	   not	  hold.	  Here	  is	  one	  relevant	  case:	  	   Consider	  a	  case	   in	  which	   I	  am	  offered	  a	  million	  true	  beliefs	  for	  asserting	  that	  two	  plus	  two	  equals	  five.	  Given,	  as	  Douven	  (2008)	  himself	  accepts,	  that	  attaining	  a	  large	  body	  of	  beliefs	  with	  a	  favourable	  truth	  to	  falsity	  ratio	  is	  our	  epistemic	  goal,	  it	  would	  seem	  highly	  epistemically	   rational	   for	  me	   to	  make	  this	  assertion.	  After	  all,	   I	  will	  make	  great	  progress	   towards	  attaining	  my	  epistemic	   goal.	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   [...]	   I	   do	  not	  have	   justification	   for	   believing	   what	   I	   assert	   (Kelp	   and	  Simion	  2016,	  87).	  	  	   	  	   Of	   course,	   arguably,	   this	   argument,	   at	   least	   in	   its	  present	   form,	  only	   goes	   through	   on	   an	   act	   consequentialist	   value	   theoretic	  assumption.	  Notice,	  though,	  that	  this	  assumption	  would	  create	  a	  similar	  problem	   for	   any	   norm	   of	   assertion,	   including	   KNA;	   after	   all,	   we	   can	  always	   bring	   cases	   in	  which	   on	   a	   particular	   occasion	   one	   gains	  more	  epistemically	  by	  breaking	  the	  norm.	  This	  problem	  parallels	  the	  classical	  ‘scapegoat’	  objection	  to	  act	  utilitarianism	  in	  ethics.	  	  	   That	   is	   not	   to	   say,	   however,	   that,	   as	   things	   stand,	   the	   above	  argument	  does	  not	  go	  through.	  After	  all,	  Douven	  does	  commit	  himself	  to	  a	   combination	  of	  RCNA	  and	  epistemic	  act	   consequentialism	   in	   several	  places	   (e.g.	   Douven	   and	   Kelp	   (2012)),	   so	   it	   looks	   as	   if	   it	   is	   on	   his	  shoulders	  to	  refine	  his	  view	  in	  order	  to	  escape	  these	  worries.	  	  	   Furthermore,	   what	   I	   will	   argue	   next	   is	   that,	   even	   if	   we	   leave	  consequentialist	   worries	   aside,	   Douven’s	   argument	   still	   fails	   to	   go	  through.	  That	  is,	  in	  what	  follows,	  I	  will	  point	  towards	  a	  missing	  link	  in	  Douven’s	   argument	  which	   renders	   it	   incapable	  of	  offering	   support	   for	  his	  favourite	  account	  of	  assertion	  over	  competing	  accounts.	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Let	  us	  first	  grant	  Douven,	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  the	  argument,	  that	  his	  derivation	   of	   RCNA*	   is	   fine.	   Recall,	   however,	   that	   Douven	   also	   wants	  rational	  credibility	  to	  stand	  for	  knowledge-­‐level	  justification.	  Therefore,	  the	  claim	  Douven	  is	  making	  is	  actually	  stronger	  than	  RCNA*:	  	  
RCNA**:	  You	  must	  (epistemically):	  assert	  p	  only	  if	  you	  have	  knowledge-­‐level	  justification	  to	  believe	  p.	  	  As	  such,	  the	  argument	  seems	  to	  go	  along	  the	  following	  lines:	  	  	  (1)	   You	  must	   (epistemically):	   only	  φ	   if	   it	   is	   epistemically	   rational	   for	  you	  to	  φ.	  (2)	  You	  must	  (epistemically):	  assert	  p	  only	  if	  it	  is	  epistemically	  rational	  for	  you	  to	  assert	  p	  (from	  (1)).	  (3)	  Belief	  is	  assertion	  to	  oneself.	  (4)	   If	   it	   is	   epistemically	   rational	   for	   one	   to	   assert	   that	   p,	   then	   it	   is	  epistemically	  rational	  for	  one	  to	  assert	  p	  to	  oneself.	  (5)	  You	  must	  (epistemically):	  assert	  p	  only	  if	  it	  is	  epistemically	  rational	  for	  you	  to	  believe	  p	  (from	  (2),	  (3)	  and	  (4)).	  (6)	  You	  must	  (epistemically):	  assert	  p	  only	  if	  you	  have	  knowledge-­‐level	  justification	  to	  believe	  p.	  (from	  (5))	  	  	   It	  becomes	  clear	  then	  that	  Douven	  misses	  an	  argument	  from	  (5)	  to	   (6);	   that	   is,	   an	   argument	   to	   establish	   the	   equivalence	   between	  rational	  credibility	  and	  knowledge-­‐level	  justification.	  	  	   Note,	   though,	   that	  when	   first	   presented,	   the	   argument	  was	  not	  supposed	   to	   establish	  more	   than	   (5).	   That	   is	   because	   Douven	   (2006)	  does	   not	   take	   much	   of	   a	   stance	   with	   regard	   to	   what	   the	   notion	   of	  rational	   credibility	   in	   RCNA	   is	   supposed	   to	   stand	   for.	   Douven	   (2006,	  459)	   does,	   though,	   gesture	   in	   the	   direction	   of	   Keith	   Lehrer’s	   (1990)	  coherentist	  theory	  of	  justification,	  and	  in	  later	  personal	  communication	  with	   several	   authors	   he	   acknowledges	   that	   he	   has	   knowledge-­‐level	  justification	  in	  mind	  (see	  e.g.	  Kelp	  and	  Simion	  (2016)	  for	  discussion).	  In	  contrast,	   Lackey	   (2008,	   128)	   explicitly	   states	   that	   knowledge-­‐level	  justification	  is	  the	  epistemic	  status	  at	  stake.	  	  	   However,	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  day,	  this	  does	  not	  help	  Douven	  much.	  Here	   is	  why:	   even	   if	  Douven	  were	   to	   not	   stand	   behind	   any	   particular	  account	   of	   rational	   credibility,	   his	   argument	   would	   end	   up	   equally	  supporting	   whatever	   norm	   of	   assertion	   that	   also	   comes	   with	   a	   well-­‐defended	  norm	  for	  rational	  belief,	  including	  KNA.	  Inasmuch	  as	  rational	  credibility	   is	   supposed	   to	   stand	   for	  knowledge-­‐level	   justification,	  both	  the	   KNA	   and	   RCNA	   defender	   need	   a	   further	   argument	   for	   their	  preferred	  account	  of	  normativity	  of	  belief	  in	  order	  to	  get	  support	  from	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Douven’s	   ‘zeroth	   law	  of	   rationality’.	   If	   that	   is	   the	   case,	   as	   things	   stand,	  Douven’s	  argument	  offers	  as	  much	  support	  for	  KNA	  as	  to	  RCNA.	  To	  see	  this,	   let	  us	  have	  a	   look	  at	   the	  epistemic	  extensions	  of	  Douven’s	  LR	   for	  belief:	  	  
LRB*:	   You	   must	   (epistemically):	   believe	   p	   only	   if	   it	   is	   epistemically	  rational	  for	  you	  to	  believe	  p.	  	  Given	   that	   Douven	  wants	   rational	   credibility	   to	   stand	   for	   knowledge-­‐level	  justification,	  we	  get:	  	  
LRB**:	  You	  must	  (epistemically):	  believe	  p	  only	  if	  you	  have	  knowledge-­‐level	  justification	  for	  p.	  	  	   Both	   of	   these	   principles	   state	   epistemic	   norms	   for	   belief.	  However,	   only	   the	   first	   is	   a	   direct	   instance	   of	   LR*.	   The	   second	  presupposes	  that	  it	   is	  epistemically	  rational	  for	  you	  to	  believe	  p	  if	  and	  only	  if	  you	  have	  knowledge-­‐level	  justification	  for	  p.	  	   However,	  why	  should	  we	  accept	  without	   further	  argument	  that	  epistemically	   rational	   credibility	   is	   knowledge-­‐level	   justification	   and	  not	  some	  other	  epistemic	  standard?	  Many	  people	  in	  the	  literature	  argue	  for	   different	   epistemic	   norms	   for	   belief:	   truth	   and	   knowledge	   are	   the	  most	   common	   counter-­‐candidates.60	  Williamson	   himself,	   for	   instance,	  takes	   it	   that	   the	   epistemic	  norm	   for	  belief	   is	   knowledge	  –	   that	   is,	   one	  should	  only	  believe	  p	  if	  one	  knows	  p.	  	  	   As	  such,	   for	  Williamson,	   it	  will	  only	  be	  epistemically	  rational	  to	  believe	   p	   if	   one	   knows	   that	   p.61	  Therefore,	   Williamson’s	   position	   is	  perfectly	  compatible	  with	  RCNA*:	  one	  must,	  indeed,	  only	  assert	  p	  if	  p	  is	  rationally	  credible	   to	  one,	  where	  p	   is	   rationally	  credible	   to	  one	  only	   if	  one	  knows	  that	  p.	  Therefore,	  one	  should	  only	  assert	  p	   if	  one	  knows	  p.	  Thus,	   insofar	   as	   we	   are	   missing	   an	   argument	   for	   a	   knowledge-­‐level	  justification	  norm	  for	  epistemically	  rational	  belief,	  Douven’s	  derivation	  fails	  to	  offer	  support	  for	  his	  preferred	  norm	  over	  KNA.	  	   To	  sum	  up:	  we	  have	  seen	  that,	  against	  Douven’s	  argument	   fails	  to	   favour	   RCNA	   over	   KNA.	   By	   the	   same	   token,	   Douven’s	   attempt	   to	  provide	   independent	   theoretical	   support	   for	   RCNA	   fails.	   If	   that	   is	   the	  case,	  all	  we	  are	  left	  with	  for	  our	  scoreboard	  are	  empirical	  data.	  This	  still	  does	  not	  mean	  much	  for	  KNA,	  though;	  after	  all,	  if	  the	  RCNA	  supporters	  are	  right,	  and	  both	  norms	  deal	  equally	  well	  with	  these	  data,	  there	  is	  still	  
                                                60	  See	  Gibbons	  (2013)	  for	  discussion.	  61	  While	   Williamson	   (2000)	   is	   unclear	   on	   whether	   rational	   belief	   is	   governed	   by	   a	  knowledge	   norm,	   in	  more	   recent	  work	   he	   openly	   stands	   behind	   this	   claim	   (e.g.	   his	  2013	  exchange	  with	  Comesana	  and	  Cohen).	  
	   77	  
an	  argument	  to	  be	  made	  that	  one	  should	  go	  for	  RCNA	  on	  grounds	  of	  less	  demandingness.	  	   Thus,	   let	   us	   have	   a	   look	   at	   how	   the	   two	   fare	  when	   it	   comes	   to	  empirical	  adequacy.	  	  	  
4.2	  Linguistic	  Data	  	  KNA	  is	  notably	  strongly	  supported	  by	  linguistic	  data	  concerning:	  1)	  The	  intuitive	   impropriety	   of	   asserting	   ‘My	   ticket	   lost’	   before	   knowing	   the	  results	   of	   the	   lottery	   draw;	   according	   to	   the	   vast	   majority	   of	   the	  literature,	  lottery	  propositions	  are	  not	  knowable	  and	  therefore,	  by	  KNA,	  unassertable.	   2)	   The	   fact	   that	   assertions	   can	   be	   challenged	   by	   the	  question	   ‘How	   do	   you	   know	   that	   p?’;	   if	   knowledge	   is	   the	   norm	   of	  assertion,	   it	  makes	  sense	   that	   the	  hearer	  expects	   the	  speaker	   to	  know	  what	   he	   asserted.	   3)	   The	   paradoxical	   soundingness	   of	   Moorean	  statements	  of	  the	  form	  ‘p	  but	  I	  don’t	  know	  that	  p’	  (see	  below).	  	  	   Now,	  defenders	  of	  RCNA	  would	  have	  it	  that	  their	  favourite	  norm	  does	  not	  fall	  far	  behind	  in	  these	  respects.	  Douven	  (2006,	  2009)	  argues	  that,	   in	   terms	   of	   empirical	   adequacy,	   RCNA	   does	   as	   well	   as	   KNA	   in	  explaining	  all	  of	  the	  above.	  Here	  is	  how:	  by	  Douven’s	  lights,	  the	  intuitive	  unassertability	  of	   lottery	  propositions	   is	   triggered	  by	   the	   fact	   that	  not	  only	   are	   they	   not	   knowable,	   but,	   in	   accordance	  with	   the	  most	   recent	  solutions	  to	  the	  Lottery	  Paradox62,	  they	  are	  not	  even	  rationally	  credible	  to	   one.	   Therefore,	   they	   are	   also	   unassertable	   by	   RCNA	   (2006,	   459).	  	   When	  it	  comes	  to	  explaining	  the	  ‘How	  do	  you	  know?‘	  challenge,	  Douven	   argues	   that,	   even	   if	   KNA	   is	   false,	   due	   to	   the	   mostly	   friendly	  epistemic	  environment	  we	   inhabit,	  we	   typically	  know	  what	  we	  assert;	  as	   such,	   it	   makes	   sense	   that	   hearers	   would	   assume	   it	   to	   be	   the	   case	  (2006,	  469).63	  	   This	  chapter	  will	  not	   take	   issue	  with	  Douven’s	  case	   in	  either	  of	  these	  two	  respects;	  that	   is	  mostly	  because	  I	  agree	  with	  Douven	  on	  the	  former	  and	  I	  find	  the	  latter	  fairly	  plausible.	  What	  I	  will,	  though,	  discuss	  in	  more	  detail	  is	  the	  RCNA	  explanation	  of	  the	  paradoxical	  soundingness	  of	  Moorean	  statements.	  I	  will	  argue	  below	  that	  not	  only	  does	  RCNA	  not	  fare	  as	  well	  as	  KNA	  in	  this	  respect,	  but	  that	  it	  does	  not	  even	  come	  close	  to	  giving	  a	  satisfactory	  account.	  
	   Note,	  first,	  that	  it	  is	  widely	  acknowledged	  that	  KNA	  offers	  a	  very	  straightforward	  explanation	  of	  why	  sentences	  such	  as	  ‘It	  is	  Wednesday	  
                                                62	  See	  Douven	  (2006)	  section	  (2)	   for	  a	  brief	  overview.	  For	  more	  support,	   see	   (Smith	  2016).	  63	  Douven	  does	  acknowledge	  that	  the	  RCNA	  explanation	  falls	  short	  of	  the	  simplicity	  of	  that	  of	  KNA	  here.	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but	  I	  don’t	  know	  that	  it	  is	  Wednesday’	  and	  ‘It	  is	  Wednesday	  but	  I	  don’t	  believe	   that	   it	   is	  Wednesday’	   sound	  paradoxical	   to	  us.	   If	  knowledge	   is	  the	   norm	   of	   assertion,	   on	   the	   plausible	   assumption	   that	   knowledge	  distributes	   across	   conjunctions,	   one	   is	   in	   a	   good	   enough	   epistemic	  position	   to	   assert	   ‘p	   but	   I	   don’t	   know	   that	   p’	   only	   if	   one	   knows	   both	  conjuncts.	   However,	   since	   knowledge	   is	   factive,	   one	   only	   knows	   the	  second	   conjunct	   if	   it	   is	   true	   that	   one	   does	   not	   know	   that	   p.	   But	   that	  contradicts	   knowing	   the	   first	   conjunct.	   Thus,	   according	   to	   KNA,	   one	  cannot	  meet	  the	  conditions	  for	  making	  a	  proper	  assertion	  of	  the	  form	  ‘p	  but	  I	  don’t	  know	  that	  p’	  (Williamson	  2000,	  253).	  Furthermore,	  if	  KNA	  is	  true,	   it	   is	  plausible	   that	  when	  the	  speaker	  asserts	   that	  p,	   the	  hearer	   is	  led	  to	  believe	  that	  she	  knows	  that	  p;64	  therefore,	  when	  one	  asserts	  the	  second	  conjunct	  of	  a	  Moorean	  statement,	  one	  denies	  what	  one	  has	   led	  one’s	   hearer	   to	   believe	   by	   asserting	   the	   first	   conjunct	   (Moore	   1962,	  277).	  Thus,	  KNA	  explains	  why	  the	  conjunction	  ‘p	  but	  I	  don’t	  know	  that	  p’	  is	  not	  only	  unassertable,	  but	  it	  also	  sounds	  paradoxical.	  	   It	   is	   easy	   to	   see	   that,	   by	   similar	   reasoning,	   KNA	   scores	   equally	  well	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  Moorean	  statements	  with	  belief.	  If,	  by	  KNA,	  one	  is	  supposed	  to	  know	  both	  conjuncts	  of	  the	  Moorean	  statement,	  given	  that	  knowledge	  implies	  belief,	  it	  follows	  that	  one	  has	  to	  1)	  believe	  that	  p	  and	  2)	   know	   that	   one	   does	   not	   believe	   that	   p.	   Given,	   again,	   factivity	   of	  knowledge,	   one	   needs	   to	   1)	   believe	   that	   p	   and	   2)	   not	   believe	   that	   p.	  Thus,	   the	   conditions	   for	   proper	   assertability	   of	  Moorean	   propositions	  with	   belief	   cannot	   be	  met	   and,	   again,	   on	   similar	   grounds	   as	   above,	   it	  makes	  sense	  that	  such	  statements	  sound	  paradoxical	  to	  the	  hearer.	  	   At	  a	  first	  glance,	  RCNA	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  able	  to	  give	  as	  good	  an	  explanation	  of	  the	  phenomenon,	  given	  that	  rational	  credibility	  is	  not	  factive.	   In	   his	   2006	   paper,	   Douven	   himself	   acknowledges	   the	  superiority	  of	  KNA	  on	  this	   front;	   thus,	  he	  argues	  that,	  while	  RCNA	  can	  also	  make	  sense	  of	  why	  Moorean	  statements	  come	  with	  a	  paradoxical	  flavour,	   KNA	   scores	   better	   in	   terms	   of	   simplicity.	   Douven’s	   early	  explanation	   goes,	   roughly,	   along	   the	   following	   lines:	   first	   of	   all,	   notice	  that	  the	  champion	  of	  RCNA	  need	  not	  hold	  that	  Moorean	  statements	  are	  not	  assertable.	  All	  she	  needs	  is	  a	  good	  explanation	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  sound	  paradoxical.	  Now,	  it	  is	  a	  fact	  that	  we	  do	  not	  encounter	  Moorean	  
                                                64	  In	  what	  sense	  does	  asserting	  p	  lead	  the	  hearer	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  asserter	  knows	  p?	  The	  received	  view	   is	   that	   it	   is	  a	  matter	  of	   ‘presenting	  oneself’	  as	  knowing;	  however,	  people	   do	   not	   usually	   go	   to	   much	   into	   detail	   about	   this.	   One	   thing:	   if	   it	   is	   an	  implicature	   that	   is	   at	   stake	   here,	   it	   will	   probably	   not	   be	   a	   mere	   conversational	  implicature,	  since	  it	  is	  clearly	  not	  cancellable.	  Most	  likely,	  what	  we	  are	  dealing	  with	  is	  a	   conventional	   implicature	   (non-­‐cancellable);	   for	  more	  on	   this	   distinction,	   see	  Grice	  (1989,	  25-­‐39).	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statements	  every	  day.	   If	   that	   is	   the	  case,	   it	  also	  makes	  sense	   that	   they	  sound	  odd	  to	  us,	  due	  to	  lack	  of	  exposure.	  Why	  is	  it,	  though,	  that	  we	  do	  not	   hear	   Moorean	   statements	   every	   day?	  Well,	   according	   to	   Douven,	  although	  KNA	   is	   strictly	   speaking	   false,	   it	   is	   the	   case	   that	  we	   typically	  know	   what	   we	   assert.	   That	   is,	   in	   normal,	   friendly	   environmental	  conditions,	   if	   p	   is	   rationally	   credible	   to	  me,	   I	   also	   know	   that	   p.	   Given	  this,	   Moorean	   sentences	   are	   extremely	   rarely	   uttered,	   therefore	  extremely	   rarely	   heard,	   which	   explains	   their	   odd-­‐soundingness.	   As	  such,	   according	   to	   Douven,	   although	   RCNA	   does	   not	   offer	   an	   equally	  straightforward	   explanation	   as	   KNA	   for	   the	   oddity	   of	   Moorean	  statements,	   it	   is	  able	   to	  accommodate	  the	  data	   in	  a	  perfectly	  plausible	  way	  (2006,	  474).	  	   In	   later	  work,	   though,	   Douven	   (2009)	   comes	   back	   to	   the	   issue	  and	   concedes	   that	   his	   early	   explanation	   of	   the	   odd-­‐soundingness	   of	  Mooreean	  sentences	  remains	  unsatisfactory;	  after	  all,	  many	  expressions	  we	  do	  not	  often	  encounter	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  share	  the	  odd-­‐soundingness	  of	  Moorean	   statements.	   Consider,	   for	   instance,	   ‘John	   seeks	   a	   unicorn’;	  surely	  we	  do	  not	  hear	   this	   every	  day.	   Still,	   it	   seems	  clear	  enough	   that	  whatever	  is	  happening	  when	  one	  hears	  a	  Moorean	  sentence	  pertains	  to	  a	  completely	  different	  category	  of	  oddness	  than	  that	  of	  other	  sentences	  to	  which	  we	  have	  little	  exposure	  (2009,	  363).	  	  	   However,	   Douven	   (2009)	   argues	   that,	   on	   the	   bright	   side,	   on	  more	   careful	   examination,	   RCNA	   is	   able	   to	   do	   as	   good	   a	   job	   as	   the	  knowledge	  norm	  in	  accommodating	  the	  odd-­‐soundingness	  of	  Moorean	  statements.	   That	   is	   because,	   according	   to	   him,	   not	   only	   are	   the	   latter	  statements	  not	  knowable,	  but,	  on	  a	  Bayesian	  analysis,	  they	  are	  also	  not	  rationally	  credible,	  and,	  therefore,	  unassertable.	  Roughly,	  the	  argument	  goes	   as	   follows:	   first,	   Douven	   assumes	   that	   one	   plausible	   and	   fairly	  weak	   requirement	   on	   rational	   credibility	   is	   that	   a	   person	   believes	   p	  rationally	  only	   if	   it	   does	  not	   readily	   follow	   strictly	  on	   the	  basis	   of	   the	  assumption	   of	   her	   rationally	   believing	   p	   plus	   some	   fairly	  uncontroversial	  doxastic	  principles65	  that	  her	  degrees	  of	  belief	  are	  not	  probabilities.	   Second,	   Douven	   proves	   that,	   if	   one	   assumes,	   towards	   a	  
reductio,	  that	  one	  rationally	  believes	  Moorean	  sentences,	  it	  does	  follow	  that	  one’s	  degrees	  of	  belief	  are	  not	  probabilities.	  Thus,	  Douven	  argues,	  Moorean	   sentences	   are	   not	   rationally	   credible	   and	   therefore	   not	  assertable.	  	   Even	   if	   we	   accept	   Douven’s	   unassertability	   diagnosis,	   though,	  there	  are	  still	  two	  major	  problems	  for	  his	  account.	  First,	  even	  if	  RCNA	  is	  
                                                65	  (1)	   if	   you	   rationally	   believe	   p	   and	   q	   you	   also	   rationally	   believe	   p;	   (2)	   rationally	  believing	  that	  p	  requires	  that	  your	  degree	  of	  belief	  that	  p	  exceeds	  your	  degree	  of	  belief	  that	  non	  p,	  and	  (3)	  if	  you	  rationally	  believe	  some	  p,	  then	  your	  degree	  of	  belief	  that	  you	  believe	  p	  is	  at	  least	  as	  great	  as	  your	  degree	  of	  belief	  that	  you	  don’t	  believe	  p.	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the	   norm	   of	   assertion,	   it	   is	   not	   immediately	   clear	   that	   laymen	  would	  immediately	   ‘feel’	  that	  Moorean	  statements	  are	  unassertable	  by	  RCNA.	  After	   all,	   by	   Douven’s	   own	   lights,	   Moorean	   statements	   are,	   at	   first	  glance,	   rationally	   credible	   to	   one	   –	   Douven	   himself	   granted	   their	  assertability	  by	  RCNA	  in	  his	  2006.	  Furthermore,	  proving	  that	  Moorean	  statements	  are	  not	  rationally	  credible,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  required	  quite	  some	  amount	  of	  work:	   ”it	   is	  not	   immediately	   clear	   that	   it	   could	  never	  happen	  that,	  for	  some	  φ,	  φ	  is	  rationally	  credible	  to	  a	  person	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  it	  is	  rationally	  credible	  to	  this	  person	  that	  she	  does	  not	  know	  φ”	   (2009,	  363).	  But	   if	   it	   is	  not	   immediately	   clear	   to	  philosophers	   that	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  how	  can	  it	  be	  that	  it	   is	  as	  clear	  to	  laymen	  as	  to	  trigger	  such	  feeling	  of	  paradox?	  	  	   Second,	   crucially,	   even	   if	   we	   put	   this	   problem	   aside,	   mere	  unassertability	  will	  not	  suffice	  for	  doing	  the	  intended	  work	  here.	  Recall	  that	   the	  KNA	  explanation	  of	   the	  paradoxical	  soundingness	  of	  Moorean	  statements	   had	   two	   essential	   components:	   first,	   there	   was	   the	  unassertability;	  second,	  the	  heard	  contradiction	  triggered	  by	  it.	  Notice,	  also,	   that	   the	   former	  without	   the	   latter	  would	   do	   quite	   a	   poor	   job	   in	  what	   empirical	   adequacy	   is	   concerned.	   After	   all,	   there	   are	   many	  sentences	   for	   which	   one	   cannot	   ever	   meet	   the	   conditions	   for	  assertability	  imposed	  by	  KNA;	  take,	  for	  instance,	  necessary	  falsehoods.	  By	  KNA,	  and	  given	  factivity	  of	  knowledge,	   ‘2+2=5’	   is	  unassertable,	  due	  to	   it	  being	  necessarily	   false	  and,	   therefore,	  unknowable.	  However,	   just	  like	  in	  the	  case	  of	  ‘John	  seeks	  a	  unicorn’,	  the	  oddity	  involved	  in	  hearing	  someone	   assert	   ‘2+2=5’,	   if	   any,	   is	   definitely	   of	   a	   completely	   different	  sort	   than	   the	   paradoxical	   soundingness	   of	   Moorean	   statements.	   As	  such,	  it	  looks	  as	  if	  what	  completes	  the	  work	  for	  empirical	  adequacy	  for	  KNA’s	  explanation	  of	   the	   latter	   is	   the	  heard	  contradiction	  triggered	  by	  what	  the	  hearer	   is	   led	  to	  believe	  by	  the	  assertion	  of	   the	  first	  conjunct,	  together	  with	  the	  assertion	  of	  the	  second.	  	  	   We	   have	   seen	   that,	   according	   to	   Douven,	   Moorean	   statements	  are	   not	   rationally	   credible	   to	   one,	   and,	   therefore,	   by	   RCNA,	   not	  assertable.	  Now,	  similarly	  to	  the	  case	  of	  KNA,	  this	  result,	  on	  its	  own,	  will	  not	   do	   the	   intended	   work	   in	   accounting	   for	   the	   paradoxical	  soundingness	   at	   stake.	   To	   see	   this,	   consider	   the	   case	   of	   lottery	  propositions;	   we	   have	   seen	   that	   according	   to	   Douven,	   they	   are	   not	  rationally	   credible,	   and	   therefore,	   by	   RCNA,	   not	   assertable.	   However,	  again,	   if	   I	   assert	   ‘My	   ticket	   did	   not	   win’	   in	   absence	   of	   any	   inside	  information	   about	   the	   draw,	   although	   I	   am	   criticisable	   for	  making	   an	  improper	   assertion,	   there	   is	   not	   much	   feeling	   of	   oddity	   there	   to	   be	  experienced	   by	   the	   hearer.	   Again,	   while	   merely	   unassertable	  propositions	  do	  trigger	  a	  feeling	  of	  impropriety,	  this	  still	  does	  not	  come	  close	   to	   the	   paradoxical	   soundingness	   of	  Moorean	   statements.	   To	   see	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this,	  consider,	  in	  contrast:	  ‘My	  ticket	  did	  not	  win	  but	  I	  don’t	  believe	  my	  ticket	  did	  not	  win’.	  	   If	  that	  is	  the	  case,	  Douven	  needs	  more	  for	  his	  argument	  to	  work.	  What	   needs	   to	   be	   the	   case	   is	   not	   only	   that	   Moorean	   statements	   are	  unassertable	   by	   RCNA,	   but	   also	   that	   this	   triggers	   their	   paradoxical	  soundingness.	   Recall	   the	   KNA	   explanation	   of	   the	   latter:	   knowledge	   is	  the	  norm	  of	  assertion,	  therefore	  when	  one	  asserts	  that	  p	  one	  leads	  one’s	  hearer	   to	  believe	   that	   one	  knows	   that	  p,	  which	   is	   contradicted	  by	   the	  second	   conjunct;	   therefore,	   the	   heard	   contradiction.	   Let	   us	   try	   to	  construct	   an	  RCNA	  account	   along	   similar	   lines:	  when	   I	   assert	   that	   p	   I	  lead	   my	   hearer	   to	   believe	   that	   p	   is	   rationally	   credible	   to	   me.	   Notice,	  however,	  this	  does	  not	  contradict	  the	  second	  conjunct	  in	  any	  of	  the	  two	  Moorean	  schemas	  that	  we	  have	  been	  looking	  at.	  Take,	  for	  instance,	  the	  case	  of	   someone	  who	   is	   (irrationally)	  afraid	  of	   flying	  and	  consider	  his	  relationship	   to	   the	  proposition	   ‘Flying	   is	   the	   least	   dangerous	  mode	  of	  transportation’.	   Even	   if	   the	   corresponding	  Moorean	   sentences	   are	  not	  rationally	   credible	   to	   her,	   it	   is	   certainly	   not	   contradictory	   for	   that	  person	  to	  say	  that	  p	  is	  rationally	  credible	  to	  her	  but	  she	  doesn’t	  know	  or	  believe	  it.	  As	  such,	  it	  looks	  as	  if	  Douven	  is	  still	  missing	  an	  explanation	  of	  the	  paradoxical	  soundingness	  of	  Moorean	  sentences.	  	  	  	  
4.3	  The	  ‘Blameless	  Asserter’	  Objection	  	  Norms	  govern	  actions	   in	   all	  walks	  of	   life.	   For	  better	  or	  worse,	  we	  are	  capable	   of	   violating	   these	   norms	   and	   do	   so	   frequently.	   When	   we	   do	  break	   the	   rules,	  we	   are	   criticisable	   for	   breaking	   them.	   Sometimes,	  we	  are	  even	  deserving	  of	  blame.	  However,	  the	  latter	  is	  not	  always	  the	  case.	  Often	   enough	   we	   violate	   rules	   and	   still	   walk	   free	   of	   blame.	   The	  compulsive	   and	   small	   children	   are	   paradigm	   cases	   of	   blameless	  violators	  of	  norms.	  	  	   While	   it	   is	   widely	   accepted	   that	   norms	   can	   be	   violated	  blamelessly,	   and	   while	   there	   is	   a	   pretty	   reasonable	   understanding	   of	  when	  this	  happens	  implicit	  in	  the	  literature,	  there	  are	  few	  if	  any	  explicit	  accounts.66	  This	  chapter	  supplies	  this	   lack.	   Its	  ambition	  is	  to	  develop	  a	  normative	  framework	  for	  action	  in	  general	  including	  detailed	  accounts	  of	  criticisability,	  blamelessness	  and	  blameworthiness.	  	  
                                                66	  Recent	   literature	   in	   epistemology	  witnesses	   some	   interest	   in	   this	   issue	   and	   some	  steps	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  a	  worked	  out	  account	  are	  being	  taken	  as	  we	  speak.	  Notably,	  (Timothy	  Williamson	   forthcoming)	   and	   (Clayton	   Littlejohn	   forthcoming),	   both	   offer	  conditions	  for	  blamelessness.	  However,	  their	  conditions	  are	  at	  best	  sufficient.	  Neither	  offers	   a	   fully-­‐fledged	  normative	   framework	  of	   the	  kind	  offered	  here,	  which	   includes	  both	  necessary	  and	  sufficient	   conditions	   for	  blamelessness	   relative	   to	  a	   single	  norm	  and	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	  blamelessness.	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   Assertion	  is	  an	  action.	  As	  such,	  the	  aim	  of	  this	  section	  is	  to	  apply	  the	  normative	  framework	  to	  the	  case	  of	  assertion.	  It	  will	  be	  argued	  that	  this	   allows	   its	   champions	   to	   defuse	   a	   prominent	   line	   of	   objection	  against	  KNA-­‐Nec,	  most	  notably	  championed	  by	   Jennifer	  Lackey,	  which	  ventures	   to	   show	   that	   the	   knowledge	   requirement	   on	   permissible	  assertion	  is	  too	  strong.	  	  	  	  
4.3.1	  The	  Cases	  	  In	   order	   to	   achieve	   this,	   foes	   of	   KNA-­‐Nec	   adduce	   cases	   in	   which	   a	  speaker	   is	   said	   to	   make	   a	   permissible	   assertion,	   whilst	   not	   knowing	  what	  they	  assert.	  Crucially,	  evidence	  that	  the	  assertion	  is	  permissible	  is	  supposed	   to	   reside	   in	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   relevant	   speakers	   are	   not	  deserving	  of	  criticism	  or	  alternatively	  that	  they	  are	  blameless.	  Here	  are	  some	  characteristic	  statements	  of	  the	  argumentative	  strategy:	  	   I	  shall	  show	  that	  there	  are	  cases	  in	  which	  a	  speaker	  asserts	  that	  p	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  knowing	  that	  p	  without	  being	  subject	  to	   criticism	   in	   any	   relevant	   sense,	   thereby	   showing	   that	  knowledge	  cannot	  be	  what	   is	  required	   for	  proper	  assertion	  (Lackey	  2007,	  595).	  	  	  [I]f	   breaching	   a	   rule	   makes	   one	   blameworthy,	   which	  typically	   it	   does,	   then,	   [in	   the	   relevant	   cases],	   on	   the	  knowledge	   account,	   the	   asserter	   comes	   out	   as	   being	  blameworthy,	  contrary	  to	  intuition	  (Douven	  2006,	  477).	  	  The	  classical	  cases	  that	  foes	  of	  KNA-­‐Nec	  have	  adduced	  against	  KNA-­‐Nec	  are	   cases	   in	   which	   speakers	   assert	   (i)	   justified	   false	   beliefs	   and	   (ii)	  Gettiered	   beliefs	   as	  well	   as	   (iii)	   cases	   of	   selfless	   assertion.	   By	  way	   of	  illustration,	  consider	  the	  following	  examples:	  	  1.	  Assertion	  on	  justified	  false	  belief	  	  
FAKE	  SNOW.	  [I]t	  is	  winter,	  and	  it	  looks	  exactly	  as	  it	  would	  if	  there	  were	  snow	  outside,	  but	  in	  fact	  that	  white	  stuff	  is	  not	  snow	  but	  foam	  put	  there	  by	  a	  film	  crew	  of	  whose	  existence	  I	  have	  no	  idea	  …	  [I]	  assert	  that	  there	  is	  snow	  outside	  (Williamson	  2000).	  	  2.	  Assertion	  on	  Gettiered	  belief	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FAKE	  BARNS.	   [S]uppose	  that	  Wendy	  correctly	  sees	  the	  only	  real	  barn	  that,	   unbeknownst	   to	   her,	   is	   completely	   surrounded	   by	   barn	   facades	  and	  asserts	  to	  me	  ‘There	  was	  a	  barn	  in	  the	  field	  we	  just	  passed’	  on	  this	  basis	  (Lackey	  2008).	  	  	  3.	  Selfless	  assertions	  	  
CREATIONIST	   TEACHER.	   Stella	   is	   a	   devoutly	   Christian	   fourth-­‐grade	  teacher	  […]	  Part	  of	  this	  faith	  includes	  a	  belief	  in	  the	  truth	  of	  creationism	  and,	   accordingly,	   a	  belief	   in	   the	   falsity	  of	   evolutionary	   theory.	  Despite	  this,	   Stella	   fully	   recognizes	   that	   there	   is	   an	   overwhelming	   amount	   of	  scientific	   evidence	   against	   both	   of	   these	   beliefs	   […]	   [S]he	   regards	   her	  duty	  as	  a	  teacher	  to	  include	  presenting	  material	  that	  is	  best	  supported	  by	   the	   available	   evidence,	   which	   clearly	   includes	   the	   truth	   of	  evolutionary	   theory.	   As	   a	   result,	   while	   presenting	   her	   biology	   lesson	  today,	  Stella	  asserts	  to	  her	  students,	  ‘Modern	  day	  Homo	  sapiens	  evolved	  from	  Homo	  erectus,’	  though	  she	  herself	  neither	  believes	  nor	  knows	  this	  proposition	  (Lackey	  2007).	  	  	  	   In	   all	   of	   these	   cases,	   the	   agents	   are	   said	   not	   to	   be	   subject	   to	  criticism	   or	   not	   to	   be	   blameworthy.	   Since	   they	   violate	   KNA-­‐Nec,	   it	  would	   seem	   that	   KNA-­‐Nec	   makes	   incorrect	   predictions	   about	   these	  cases.	  Hence	  KNA-­‐Nec	  is	  in	  trouble.	  	  	   Champions	   of	   KNA-­‐Nec	   often	   argue	   that	   speakers	   who	   assert	  justified	   false	   beliefs	   and	   Gettiered	   beliefs	   violate	   KNA-­‐Nec	   but	   do	   so	  
blamelessly.	   In	   particular,	   they	   point	   out	   that	   1.	   In	   cases	   of	   selfless	  assertion,	  plausibly,	   the	  teacher	  is	  not	  speaking	  for	  herself,	  but	  for	  the	  community	  of	  educators	  (Turri	  2015),	  which	  explains	  the	  felt	  propriety	  of	   her	   assertion,	   and	   that	   2.	   when	   in	   doing	   something	   one	   breaks	   a	  norm	   because	   one	   reasonably	   believes	   that	   what	   one	   does	   is	  permissible,	  then	  one	  is	  blameless.	  Since	  this	  is	  the	  case	  with	  agents	  in	  cases	   like	   FAKE	   SNOW	  and	   FAKE	  BARNS,	   these	   agents	   are	   blameless.	  These	  speakers	  assert	  what	  they	  assert	  because	  they	  reasonably	  believe	  that	   they	   know	   what	   they	   assert	   and,	   in	   consequence,	   that	   they	   are	  permitted	  to	  assert	  as	  they	  do.	  If	  so,	  it	  is	  reasonable	  for	  them	  to	  believe	  that	   they	   satisfy	   KNA-­‐Nec.	   As	   a	   result,	   they	   are	   blameless	   when	  asserting	  as	  they	  do.	  	  	   However,	   there	   are	   problems	  with	   both	   these	   accounts.	   Let	   us	  start	  with	  the	  latter.	  It	  may	  be	  that	  there	  are	  unsophisticated	  speakers	  who	  do	  not	  even	  have	  the	  concept	  of	  knowledge.67	  They,	  too,	  may	  be	  in	  cases	   in	   which	   they	   assert	   justified	   false	   beliefs	   or	   Gettiered	   beliefs.	  
                                                
67 See Section #6.3 for related discussion. 
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Since	   they	   do	   not	   have	   the	   concept	   of	   knowledge,	   they	   are	   not	   in	   a	  position	   to	  host	   reasonable	  beliefs	   about	  knowledge	   in	   the	   first	  place.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  envisaged	  explanation	  of	  why	  agents	  in	  cases	  like	  FAKE	  SNOW	   and	   FAKE	   BARNS	   are	   blameless	   will	   not	   work	   here	   (Gerken	  2011).	  	  	   Regarding	   SELFLESS	  ASSERTION	   cases,	   Jennifer	   Lackey	   (2007)	  rightly	  points	  out	  that	  it	  is	  fairly	  easy	  to	  redescribe	  the	  case	  such	  that	  no	  social	  role	  is	  at	  stake	  anymore;	  say,	  for	  instance,	  that	  Stella	  is	  speaking	  to	  a	  friend	  when	  making	  the	  same	  assertion.	  	   At	   a	   more	   general	   level,	   foes	   of	   KNA-­‐Nec	   worry	   that	   the	  blamelesness	   response	   is	   ad	  hoc.	  Here	   is	  one	  very	   clear	  expression	  of	  this	  worry:	  	   [A]	  general	  worry	  with	  excuse	  manoeuvres	  is	  that	  they	  form	  very	  generic	  ways	  of	   immunizing	  proposed	  norms.	  Without	  a	   principled	   account	   of	   when	   an	   agent	   is	   excused,	   every	  counterexample	   to	   a	   norm	   may	   be	   rebutted	   by	   upholding	  that	   the	   agent	   is	   excused	   from	   violating	   the	   norm.	   As	   we	  have	  seen,	  the	  proponents	  of	  [KNA-­‐Nec]	  have	  yet	  to	  provide	  a	   viable	   principled	   account	   of	   excusability	   (Gerken	   2011,	  544).	  	  	  Now,	   what	   I	   will	   do	   in	   the	   next	   section	   is	   offer	   exactly	   what	   Gerken	  claims	   champions	   of	   KNA-­‐Nec	   are	   missing:	   a	   perfectly	   general	  normative	  framework	  that	  vindicates	  the	  so-­‐called	  ‘excuse	  manoeuvre’.	  	  	  	  
4.3.2	  Criticism	  and	  Blame:	  A	  Full	  Normative	  Framework	  	  It	  is	  widely	  acknowledged	  in	  the	  literature	  that	  a	  permissible	  action	  is	  a	  blameless	  action.	  This	  applies	  at	  the	  level	  of	  specific	  norms	  such	  as	  the	  rule	   of	   Uno	   requiring	   players	   to	   call	   Uno	   when	   playing	   their	  penultimate	   card.	   If	   you	   do	   call	   Uno	   when	   playing	   your	   penultimate	  card,	  your	  action	   is	  permissible	  by	  this	  norm	  and	  so	  blameless	  relative	  
to	  this	  norm.	  	  	   Consider	  next	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  a	  particular	  norm	  is	  violated.	  Say,	  you	  played	  your	  penultimate	  card	  without	  calling	  Uno.	  You	  violated	  a	   rule	   of	   Uno.	   If	   so,	   you	   can,	   of	   course,	   be	   prima	   facie	   legitimately	  criticised	   for	   violating	   this	   norm.	   In	   the	  Uno	   case,	  we	  may	  do	   this	   for	  instance	  by	  saying:	  “You	  didn’t	  call	  Uno!”	  Even	   so,	   it	   may	   be	   that	   you	   violate	   a	   norm	   and	   yet	   you	   are	  blameless	  for	  so	  doing.	  If	  so,	  you	  are	  also,	  of	  course,	  blameless	  relative	  to	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this	   norm.	   More	   specifically,	   there	   are	   three	   ways	   in	   which	   this	   may	  happen.	  	   One	  way	   of	   blamelessly	   violating	   a	   particular	   norm	   is	   through	  overriding.68	  This	  happens	  when	  the	  requirements	  of	  the	  norm	  you	  are	  violating	   are	   in	   conflict	   with	   the	   requirements	   of	   another	   norm	   that	  takes	  precedence	  in	  the	  situation.	  For	  instance,	  suppose	  you	  are	  playing	  a	  game	  of	  Uno	  and	  are	   required	  by	   the	  rules	  of	  Uno	   to	  call	  Uno	  when	  playing	   your	   next	   card.	   Suppose,	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   someone	   will	   kill	  your	  neighbour	  if	  you	  do	  so.	  What	  the	  rules	  of	  Uno	  require	  of	  you	  is	  in	  conflict	  with	  the	  requirements	  of	  moral	  norms,	  which	  take	  precedence	  here.	   In	   other	   words,	   moral	   norms	   override	   the	   rules	   of	   Uno.	   When,	  because	   of	   this,	   you	   go	   on	   to	   violate	   the	   rules	   of	   Uno,	   you	   do	   so	  blamelessly.	  	  	   The	  second	  way	  of	  blamelessly	  violating	  a	  norm	  is	  by	  violating	  it	  because69	  your	  action	  is	  not	  under	  your	  control.	  Suppose,	   for	   instance,	  that	   you	   have	   been	   brainwashed	   by	   your	   guru	   not	   to	   call	   Uno	   when	  playing	  your	  penultimate	  card.	  Here	  you	  violate	  the	  rule	  but	  are	  clearly	  blameless	  for	  doing	  so.	  	   Finally,	  the	  third	  way	  manifests	  itself	  in	  situations	  in	  which	  you	  violate	   a	   norm	   because	   you	   are	   unaware	   that	   this	   is	   what	   you	   are	  doing.70	  Suppose,	   for	   instance,	   that	   you	   are	   unaware	   that	   the	   rules	   of	  Uno	  require	  you	  to	  call	  Uno	  when	  playing	  your	  penultimate	  card.	  As	  a	  result,	  you	  do	  not	  do	  so.	  In	  this	  case	  you	  violate	  a	  rule	  of	  Uno.	  Again,	  you	  are	  blameless	  for	  doing	  so.	  Ignorance	  excuses	  also.	  	  	   With	   regard	   to	   the	   second	   and	   the	   third	   way	   of	   blamelessly	  violating	  a	  norm,	  some	  qualifications	  are	  needed.	  To	  see	  why,	  suppose	  that	   you	   knew	   that	   you	  would	   undergo	   brainwashing	  were	   you	   to	   go	  back	  to	  your	  guru.	  You	  had	  also	  promised	  not	  to	  go	  back.	  However,	  you	  went	  anyway.	  The	  impermissible	  act	  you	  are	  made	  to	  perform	  may	  be	  out	   of	   your	   control.	   Even	   so,	   you	   are	   blameworthy	   (see	   below)	   for	  another	  act,	  going	  back	  to	  your	  guru,	  of	  which	  the	  impermissible	  act	  is	  a	  consequence.	  As	  a	  result,	  you	  are	  not	  blameless	  for	  violating	  the	  rule	  of	  Uno.	  Strictly	  speaking,	  then,	  lack	  of	  control	  excuses	  only	  when	  it	  is	  itself	  blameless.	  	   Similarly,	   suppose	   that,	   in	   our	   toy	   case,	   you	   had	   promised	   to	  read	   up	   on	   the	   rules	   of	   Uno	   before	   playing	   but	   did	   not	   do	   so.	   In	   this	  case,	   you	   are	   unaware	   of	   the	   relevant	   rule	   of	   Uno.	   Even	   so,	   you	   are	  blameworthy	  for	  another	  act	  (in	  this	  case	  an	  omission),	  your	  failure	  to	  
                                                68	  For	  a	  detailed	  account	  see,	  e.g.,	  (Chisholm	  1964).	  	  69	  ‘Because’	  here	  is	  crucial	  to	  blamelessness.	  See	  (Frankfurt	  1969).	  	  70	  See	  for	  example	  (Ishtiyaque	  Haji	  1998)	  and	  (Michael	  Zimmerman,	  1997).	  However,	  that	   ignorance	   excuses	   was	   already	   recognised	   by	   Aristotle	   in	   the	   Nichomachean	  Ethics.	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read	   up	   on	   the	   rules	   of	   Uno,	   of	   which	   your	   failure	   to	   call	   Uno	   is	   a	  consequence.	   As	   a	   result	   you	   are	   not	   blameless	   for	   not	   calling	   Uno.	  Strictly	   speaking,	   then,	   ignorance	   excuses	   only	   when	   it	   is	   itself	  blameless	  (Zimmerman	  1997).	  	   In	   sum,	   then,	   here	   is	   this	   chapter’s	   proposal	   for	   an	   account	   of	  blamelessness	  with	  respect	  to	  specific	  norms:	  	  
Norm-­‐Specific	   Criticisability.	   An	   agent	   is	   prima	   facie	   legitimately	  criticisable	  relative	  to	  a	  specific	  norm	  N	  for	  ϕ-­‐ing	  iff	  ϕ-­‐ing	  violates	  N	  	  
Norm-­‐Specific	   Blamelessness.	   An	   agent	   is	   blameless	   relative	   to	   a	  specific	  norm	  N	  for	  ϕ-­‐ing	  iff:	  (1)	  	   ϕ-­‐ing	  is	  permissible	  by	  N	  or	  	  (2)	   ϕ-­‐ing	  violates	  N	  but	  the	  agent	  ϕs	  	  (2.a)	  	   in	  order	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  requirements	  of	  a	  (non-­‐overridden)	  overriding	  norm	  or	  	  (2.b)	  	   because	  this	  is	  blamelessly	  out	  of	  her	  control	  or	  	  (2.c)	  	   because	  the	  agent	  is	  blamelessly	  ignorant	  that	  ϕ-­‐ing	  violates	  N.	  	  On	  this	  account,	  an	  action	  can	  be	  criticisable	  relative	  to	  a	  specific	  norm	  and,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  blameless	  relative	  to	  that	  very	  same	  norm.	  While	  this	  may	  look	  odd	  at	   first	  sight,	  on	  reflection,	   it	   is	  entirely	  as	   it	  should	  be.	  Actions	  are	  often	  performed	   in	   the	  public	   sphere	  and,	  as	  such,	  are	  observable	   by	   others,	   who	   may	   pick	   up	   the	   forms	   of	   behaviour	  exhibited.	   When	   you	   fail	   to	   call	   Uno	   when	   playing	   your	   penultimate	  card	   and	   so	   violate	   a	   rule	   of	   the	   game,	   this	   may	   be	   observed	   by	  someone	   else	   who	  will	   pick	   up	   your	   behaviour	   and,	   as	   a	   result,	   may	  violate	   the	  rule	   in	   the	   future,	   too.	  By	  allowing	   for	  criticisms	  of	  actions	  that	   violate	   specific	   norms	  we	   can	  work	   against	   the	   spread	   of	   norm-­‐violating	  forms	  of	  behaviour.	  Since	  this	  is	  a	  good	  thing,	   it	  makes	  sense	  for	  us	  to	  allow	  for	  such	  criticisms.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  we	  may	  also	  want	  to	  grant	  that	  a	  norm	  has	  been	  broken	  blamelessly	  by	  the	  agent.	  We	  do	  not	  want	   to	  hold	   the	  norm	  violation	   against	   her:	   she	  was	  blamelessly	  ignorant,	  things	  were	  blamelessly	  out	  of	  control	  and	  so	  on.	  If	  so,	  there	  is	  excellent	  reason	  for	  us	  to	  allow	  criticisability	  relative	  to	  a	  specific	  norm	  and	  blamelessness	  relative	  to	  the	  very	  same	  norm	  to	  coexist.71	  	   Thus	  far	  we	  have	  looked	  at	  the	  blamelessness	  of	  an	  action	  with	  respect	   to	   specific	   norms.	   However,	   it	   is	   common	   to	   distinguish	  between	  assessments	  of	  actions	  with	  respect	  to	  specific	  norms	  and	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	   assessments	   of	   actions.	   All-­‐things-­‐considered	  
                                                71	  This	  is	  also	  why	  Norm-­‐Specific	  Criticisability	  and	  Norm-­‐Specific	  Blamelessness	  need	  be	  kept	  apart.	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assessments	  take	  into	  account	  the	  entire	  normative	  profile	  of	  an	  action	  and	   assesses	   whether	   the	   action	   was	   permissible,	   required,	   or	  forbidden	   in	  view	  of	   its	  entire	  normative	  profile.	  Unsurprisingly,	   then,	  just	  as	  an	  action	  can	  be	  blameless	  relative	  to	  a	  specific	  norm,	  it	  can	  also	  be	   all-­‐things-­‐considered	   blameless.	   For	   that	   reason,	   let	   us	   extend	   the	  above	  account	  to	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	  blamelessness.	   	  	   An	   action	   is	   all-­‐things-­‐considered	   blameless	   if	   it	   is	   all-­‐things-­‐considered	  permissible.	  There	  are,	   in	  turn,	  two	  ways	  in	  which	  this	  can	  happen.	  	  	   First,	   an	   action	   is	   all-­‐things-­‐considered	   permissible	   if	   it	   is	  permissible	   by	   all	   the	   specific	   norms	   that	   apply	   to	   it	   (henceforth	   also	  
fully	   permissible	   for	   short).	   Suppose	   you	   call	   Uno	   when	   playing	   your	  penultimate	   card	   and	   thus	   comply	  with	   the	   rules	   of	   Uno.	   Suppose,	   in	  addition,	  you	  do	  not	  thereby	  violate	  any	  practical	  and	  moral	  norms	  and	  that	   no	   other	   norms	   apply	   to	   your	   act.	   Then	   your	   calling	   Uno	   is	   all-­‐things-­‐considered	  permissible.	  	   Second,	   an	   action	   is	   all-­‐things	   considered	   permissible	   if	   it	   is	  permissible	  by	  all	   (non-­‐overridden)	  overriding	  norms	   that	  apply	   to	   it.	  Suppose	  you	  do	  not	  call	  Uno	  when	  playing	  your	  penultimate	  card	  and	  thus	  violate	  a	  rule	  of	  Uno.	  Suppose,	   in	  addition,	  you	  violate	  a	  practical	  norm	  in	  so	  doing:	  you	  will	  be	  punished	  and	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  win.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  your	  neighbour	  will	  die	  if	  you	  call	  Uno	  and	  so	  calling	  Uno	  is	  prohibited	   by	   moral	   norms.	   Suppose	   there	   are	   no	   further	   norms	  applying	   to	  your	  action.	   In	  order	   to	  save	  your	  neighbour’s	   life,	  you	  do	  not	   call	   Uno.	   In	   this	   case,	   your	   action	   is	   all-­‐things-­‐considered	  permissible.	   The	   moral	   norms	   override	   the	   norms	   of	   Uno	   and	   the	  practical	   norms	   (without	   being	   themselves	   overridden	   by	   further	  norms)	  and	  your	  not	  calling	  Uno	  is	  permissible	  by	  the	  moral	  norms.	  	  	   To	   repeat,	   what	  we	   have	   seen	   now	   are	   two	  ways	   in	  which	   an	  action	   can	   be	   all-­‐things-­‐considered	   blameless	   in	   virtue	   of	   being	   all-­‐things-­‐considered	   permissible.	   That	   said,	   even	   an	   action	   that	   is	   all-­‐things-­‐considered	   impermissible	   can	   be	   all-­‐things-­‐considered	  blameless.	  	  	   Here	   is	   one	   plausible	   thought:	   an	   all-­‐things-­‐considered	  impermissible	  action	   is	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	  blameless	   if	   the	  action	   is	  blameless	   relative	   to	   all	   specific	   norms	   that	   apply	   to	   it.	   Suppose	   that	  you	   play	   your	   penultimate	   card	  without	   calling	   Uno.	   However,	   this	   is	  because	  you	  are	  blamelessly	  unaware	   that	   there	   is	  a	   rule	   requiring	   to	  you	   call	   Uno	  when	   playing	   your	   penultimate	   card.	   Suppose	   that	   your	  action	   is	  permissible	  by	  moral	  and	  practical	  norms	  and	   that	   there	  are	  no	   further	   norms	   applying	   to	   your	   action.	   In	   this	   case,	   you	   are	   all-­‐things-­‐considered	   blameless	   for	   not	   calling	   Uno.	   Since	   your	   act	   is	  permissible	   by	   moral	   and	   practical	   norms,	   it	   is	   blameless	   relative	   to	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these	   norms.	   Since	   you	   do	   not	   call	   Uno	   because	   you	   are	   blamelessly	  unaware	  that	  there	  is	  a	  rule	  requiring	  you	  to	  do	  so,	  you	  are	  blameless	  relative	   to	   this	   rule.	   Since	   these	   are	   all	   the	   rules	   that	   apply	   to	   your	  action	  in	  this	  case,	  your	  action	  is	  blameless	  relative	  to	  all	  specific	  norms	  that	  apply	  to	  it.	  So,	  it	  is	  all-­‐thing-­‐considered	  blameless.	  	  	   Finally,	   an	   agent	   is	   blameworthy	   if	   and	   only	   if	   she	   is	   not	   all-­‐things-­‐considered	  blameless.	  	  	   In	  sum,	  here	  is	  the	  proposal:	  	  
All-­‐Things-­‐Considered	   Blamelessness.	   An	   agent	   is	   all-­‐things-­‐considered	  blameless	  for	  ϕ-­‐ing	  iff:	  (1)	  	   ϕ-­‐ing	   is	   all-­‐things-­‐considered	   permissible	   (that	   is,	   either	   fully	  permissible	   or	   permissible	   by	   all	   (non-­‐overridden)	   overriding	   norms	  that	  apply	  to	  it)	  or	  (2)	  	   ϕ-­‐ing	   is	   all-­‐things-­‐considered	   impermissible	   but	   the	   agent’s	  ϕ-­‐ing	  is	  blameless	  relative	  to	  all	  specific	  norms	  that	  apply	  to	  it.	  	  
All-­‐Things-­‐Considered	  Criticisability/Blameworthiness.	  An	  agent	  is	  blameworthy	  for	  ϕ-­‐ing	  iff	  she	  is	  not	  all-­‐things	  considered	  blameless	  for	  
ϕ-­‐ing.	  	  	  It	   may	   be	   worth	   noting	   that,	   according	   to	   this	   account,	   criticisability	  occurs	   at	   the	   level	  of	   assessments	  by	   specific	  norms.	   In	   this	  way,	   it	   is	  fine-­‐grained,	  as	  it	  were.	  In	  contrast,	  blameworthiness	  occurs	  at	  the	  level	  of	   all-­‐things-­‐considered	   assessments	   and	   so	   is	   coarse-­‐grained.	  Blamelessness	  can	  occur	  at	  both	  levels.	  	  
	   This	   completes	   the	   proposed	   normative	   framework	   for	  criticisability,	   blamelessness,	   and	   blameworthiness.	   Crucially,	   this	   is	   a	  perfectly	   general	   framework,	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   it	   applies	   to	   action	   in	  general.	   That	   said,	   in	  what	   follows,	   I	  will	   apply	   the	   framework	   to	   the	  speech	  act	  of	  assertion.	   If	   the	  framework	  predicts	  that	  the	  speakers	   in	  the	   putative	   counterexamples	   to	   KNA-­‐Nec	   (as	   well	   as	   their	  unsophisticated	   counterparts)	   are	   indeed	   blameless,	   the	   ad	   hoc-­‐ness	  worry	   can	   be	   laid	   to	   rest.	   The	   blamelessness	   response	  will	   clearly	   be	  available	  to	  champions	  of	  KNA-­‐Nec.	  	   Let	   us	   see	   whether	   we	   get	   the	   desired	   results.	   First,	   Norm-­‐Specific	   Blamelessness	   entails	   that	   an	   agent	   is	   blameless	   relative	   to	   a	  specific	  norm	  N	   for	  ϕ-­‐ing	   if	  ϕ-­‐ing	  violates	  N	  but	   the	  agent	  ϕs	  because	  the	   agent	   is	   blamelessly	   ignorant	   that	   ϕ-­‐ing	   violates	   N.	   There	   are	   a	  number	  of	  ways	   in	  which	  one	  can	  be	  blameless	   for	  violating	  a	  specific	  norm	  in	  virtue	  of	  being	  blamelessly	   ignorant	  that	  one	   is	  doing	  so.	  One	  such	  way	   is	   if	   one	  does	  what	  one	  does	  because	  of	   a	   reasonable	  belief	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that	  what	  one	   is	  doing	   is	  permissible.	   If	  one	  believes	   that	  what	  one	   is	  doing	   is	  permissible,	   then	  one	  does	  not	  believe	   that	  one	   is	   violating	  a	  norm.	   If	   so,	   one	   is	   ignorant	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   one	   is	   violating	   a	  norm.	   If	  one’s	   belief	   is	   reasonable,	   then	   one’s	   ignorance	   is	   blameless.	   (2.c)	   is	  satisfied.	   And,	   of	   course,	   this	   is	   exactly	   what	   champions	   of	   KNA-­‐NEC	  have	   claimed	   is	   going	  on	   in	   cases	   like	  FAKE	  SNOW	  and	  FAKE	  BARNS.	  The	   speakers	   assert	   out	   of	   a	   reasonable	   belief	   that	   they	   know	  and	   so	  that	   asserting	   is	   permissible.	   This	   means	   that	   they	   are	   blamelessly	  ignorant	  for	  their	  assertions.	  	  	   While	   acting	   out	   of	   a	   reasonable	   belief	   that	   what	   one	   does	   is	  permissible	  is	  one	  route	  to	  blameless	  ignorance,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  only	  route.	  Others	  are	  available	   as	  well.	  To	   see	   this,	   recall	   our	  Uno	   case	   in	  which	  you	   are	   just	   blamelessly	   unaware	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   there	   is	   a	   rule	  requiring	  you	   to	   call	  Uno	  when	  playing	  your	  penultimate	  card.	   In	   this	  case	  you	  may	  have	  no	  belief	  either	  way	  on	  whether	  you	  are	  complying	  with	   the	   rules	   of	   Uno.72	  So	   it	   is	   not	   as	   if	   you	   play	   in	   the	  way	   you	   do	  because	   of	   a	   reasonable	   belief	   that	   this	   is	   permissible.	   Rather,	   you	  blamelessly	   have	   no	   belief	   on	   the	   relevant	   rule	   of	   Uno	   whatsoever.	  Thus,	   according	   to	   the	   above	   framework,	   another	   way	   to	   blameless	  ignorance	  is	  via	  a	  blameless	  lack	  of	  belief	  concerning	  the	  relevant	  rules.	  And	   this	   is	   of	   course	   exactly	   what	   we	   find	   with	   cognitively	  unsophisticated	   agents,	   such	   as	   agents	   who	   do	   not	   even	   have	   the	  concept	  of	  knowledge	  to	  begin	  with.	  Any	  such	  agent	  is	  incapable	  of	  even	  representing	   KNA-­‐NEC.	   If	   they	   are	   blameless	   for	   not	   having	   this	  concept,	  as	  they	  typically	  will	  be,	  they,	  too,	  will	  satisfy	  (2.c)	  and	  so	  come	  out	  blameless	  for	  violating	  KNA-­‐NEC.	  	  	   Let	   us	   now	   turn	   to	   Stella,	   the	   selfless	   asserter.	   I	   agree	   with	  Lackey	   that	   the	   social	   role	   is	   not	   essential	   to	   these	   cases.	   It	   is	   the	  prudential	  constraint,	  no	  matter	  its	  source	  (i.e.,	  dictated	  by	  a	  particular	  social	  role	  or	  not),	  that	  does	  the	  trick:	  in	  virtue	  of	  it,	  Stella	  is	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	  blameless	  for	  her	  assertion.	  Recall	  that	  in	  line	  with	  action	  in	  general,	  an	  agent	  is	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	  blameless	  for	  ϕ-­‐ing	  if	  ϕ-­‐ing	  is	  permissible	  by	  all	   (non-­‐overridden)	  overriding	  norms	   that	  apply	   to	   it.	  Plausibly	   enough,	   given	   the	   usual	   norms	   governing	   the	   activity	   of	  teaching	   –	   that	   is,	   “presenting	   students	   with	   material	   that	   is	   best	  supported	  by	  the	  available	  evidence”	  (Lackey	  2007,	  548)	  –	  Stella	  is	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	   blameless,	   as	   more	   stringent	   requirements	   are	  overriding	  the	  epistemic	  norm	  governing	  her	  assertion.	  This,	  however,	  in	  no	  way	  implies	  that	  her	  assertion	  is	  proper	  according	  to	  the	  latter.	  To	  see	   this,	   imagine	   how	   Stella’s	   KNA-­‐Nec-­‐proper	   assertion	   would	   have	  
                                                72	  If	  this	  is	  not	  immediately	  obvious,	  note	  that	  you	  may	  know	  that	  you	  have	  not	  been	  filled	  in	  on	  all	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  game	  yet	  and	  are	  taught	  various	  rules	  as	  you	  go	  along.	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looked	   like:	   ‘I	   don’t	   know	   how	   our	   species	   came	   into	   being.	  Evolutionary	   theory	   says	   that	   Homo	   sapiens	   evolved	   from	   Homo	  erectus,	  but	  I	  don’t	  believe	  that’s	  true.	  I	  believe	  that	  men	  were	  created	  by	  God,	  but	  I	  have	  no	  scientific	  evidence	  that	  this	  is	  so.’	  Would	  we	  really	  want	   this	   to	   be	   what	   our	   children	   get	   from	   their	   biology	   course?	  Certainly	  not.	  Prudentially,	  Stella’s	  assertion	  is	  surely	  impermissible.	  In	  fact,	  I	  trust	  that	  Stella	  would	  soon	  lose	  her	  job	  if	  she	  were	  to	  keep	  this	  kind	  of	  assertions	  coming.	  In	  contrast,	  let	  us	  change	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  audience:	   imagine	   that	   Stella	   would	   make	   the	   KNA-­‐Nec-­‐proper	  assertion	  in	  a	  conversation	  with	  her	  mother.	  Surely,	  we	  will	  no	   longer	  think	  she	  deserves	  criticism	  in	  this	  case.	  	   What	   comes	   to	   light,	   then,	   is	   that	   the	   envisaged	   response	   by	  champions	  of	  KNA-­‐Nec	  is	  borne	  out	  by	  the	  normative	  framework	  from	  the	  previous	   section.	  Moreover,	   the	   framework	   also	  delivers	   the	   right	  results	   for	  Gerken’s	   cases	  of	   assertions	  by	   cognitively	  unsophisticated	  agents.	  As	  a	  result,	  not	  only	  is	  the	  blamelessness	  response	  available	  to	  them,	  the	  worry	  of	  ad	  hoc-­‐ness	  is	  addressed	  too.	  	  	  	  
4.3.3	  Taking	  Back	  	  In	   reply	   to	   responses	   featuring	  blamelessness	  breach	  of	   the	  norm	  put	  forth	  by	  KNA-­‐Nec	  champions,	  Jonathan	  Kvanvig	  (2009)	  argues	  that	  the	  subjects	   don’t	   need	   excuses	   for	   their	   acts,	   as	   they	   have	   done	   nothing	  wrong	   to	   begin	  with.	   To	   support	   this	   claim,	   he	  distinguishes	   between	  two	  ways	  of	  taking	  back	  an	  assertion:	  	  “in	  some	  cases	  of	  correction,	  we	  take	  back	  the	  content	  of	  our	  speech	  act,	  and	  in	  other	  cases	  we	  apologize	  for,	  and	  regret,	  the	  very	  act	  itself”.	  For	  example,	  if	  we	  assert	  p	  and	  then	  are	  shown	  that	  p	  is	  false,	  we	  take	  back	  the	  content	  of	  our	  speech	  act,	  but	  we	  needn't	  apologize	  for	  or	  regret	  the	  very	  act	  itself.	  “In	  fact,	  were	  [we]	  to	   apologize,	   the	  natural	   response	  would	  be	  dismissive:	  Give	   it	   a	   rest,	  nobody's	   always	   right..."	   According	   to	   Kvanvig,	   the	   same	   distinction	  plays	  out	  with	  Gettiered	  assertions	  too.	  Thus,	  presumably,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Wendy	   above,	   if	   after	   she	   asserts	   “There’s	   a	   barn	   in	   the	   field”,	   and	   I	  point	   out	   to	   her	   that	   she	   can’t	   possibly	   know	   that,	   as	  we	   are	   in	   Fake	  Barn	  County,	  she	  would	   just	   take	  back	  what	   she	  said,	  not	   to	  apologize	  for	  having	  said	  it.	  	  	   Kvanvig	   argues	   that	   things	   are	   different	   when	   you	   don’t	   have	  justification	   for	  what	  you	  say,	  even	   if,	  by	  some	  bizarre	   twist,	  you	   turn	  out	  to	  be	  right.	  In	  support	  of	  this,	  he	  offers	  the	  case	  of	  Billy	  Bob,	  a	  Texas	  Democrat,	  who,	  based	  on	  a	  headline	  on	  a	   tabloid,	  asserts	   to	  his	   friend	  Sue:	  “George	  Bush	  is	  a	  communist!”	  When	  Sue	  points	  out	  to	  him	  that	  he	  should	  not	  trust	  tabloids,	  Billy	  Bob	  apologizes:	  “You're	  right,	  I	  shouldn't	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have	  believed	  that	  paper	  and	  I	  shouldn't	  have	  said	  what	  I	  did.	  I	  take	  it	  back."	  	   According	   to	   Kvanvig,	   in	   this	   situation,	   apologizing	   and	   taking	  back	  the	  speech	  act	  itself	  is	  the	  right	  thing	  to	  do.	  He	  argues	  that	  norms	  of	  assertion	  are	  norms	  governing	  a	  certain	  type	  of	  human	  activity,	  and	  thus	  relate	  to	  the	  speech	  act	  itself	  rather	  than	  the	  content	  of	  such	  an	  act.	  As	  such,	  only	  when	  the	  speech	  act	  itself	  is	  at	  fault,	  do	  we	  have	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  some	  norm	  of	  assertion	  is	  broken;	  when	  only	  the	  content	  of	  the	  assertion	  needs	  to	  be	  taken	  back,	  the	  assertion	  itself	   is	  not	  at	  fault	  (Kvanvig	  2009,	  148).	  	  	   Here	   is,	   however,	   some	   reason	   to	   doubt	   that	   Kvanvig’s	  distinction	  works;	  speech	  act	  literature73	  notably	  distinguishes	  between	  the	   content	   of	   a	   speech	   act	   and	   the	   illocutionary	   force	   by	   which	   the	  content	  is	  being	  put	  forward.	  One	  can	  perform	  various	  speech	  acts	  upon	  p:	  one	  can	  ask	  whether	  p,	  promise	  that	  p,	  threaten	  that	  p	  etc.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  assertion,	  by	  uttering	  p	  the	  speaker	  presents	  p	  as	  true.	  	   Given	  this,	  a	  proposition	  is	  itself	  communicatively	  inert;	  that	  is	  to	  say	   that	   to	   actually	   perform	   a	   speech	   act,	   one	   has	   to	   put	   forth	   a	  proposition	   with	   an	   illocutionary	   force,	   such	   as	   assertion,	   promise,	  command,	  etc.	  	  	   But	   if	   the	   propositional	   content	   is	   inert	   in	   isolation,	   it	   is	   less	  clear	  how	  Kvanvig	  envisages	  one	  being	  able	  to	  take	  it	  back	  in	  isolation.	  To	  see	  this,	  notice	  that	  assertion,	  as	  opposed	  to	  other	  types	  of	  actions	  –	  say,	  having	  vacationed	  in	  Hawaii	  –	  can	  be	  ‘taken	  back’.	  Not	  in	  the	  sense	  that	   one	   can	   change	   the	   past	   as	   to	   not	   have	   had	   asserted	   in	   the	   first	  place,	   of	   course.	   Rather,	   taking	   back	   an	   assertion	   that	   p	   refers	   to	   no	  longer	   standing	   behind	   the	   commitments	   implied	   by	   having	   asserted	  that	   p.	   Now,	   p	   itself,	   in	   isolation,	   does	   not	   imply	   any	   commitments	  whatsoever.	  That	  is,	  depending	  on	  which	  illocutionary	  force	  we	  will	  act	  upon	  it	  with,	  different	  commitments	  will	  follow.	  If	  I	  promise	  that	  p,	  for	  instance,	  I	  commit	  myself	  to	  a	  future	  course	  of	  action;	  if	  I	  assert	  that	  p,	  I	  commit	  myself	  to,	  at	  least,	  it	  being	  the	  case	  that	  p.	  	   If	   that	   is	   the	   case,	   it	   becomes	   clear	   that	   in	   order	   to	   take	   an	  assertion	  back,	  that	  is,	  to	  be	  released	  from	  the	  commitments	  implied	  by	  it,	  it	  has	  to	  be	  the	  case	  that	  I	  take	  back	  everything,	  force	  and	  content.	  I	  cannot	   only	   take	   back	   the	   content	   p,	   because	   p	   in	   isolation	   does	   not	  commit	   me	   to	   anything,	   inasmuch	   as	   I	   do	   not	   present	   it	   as	   true,	   or	  command	  p,	  or	  promise	  p,	  etc.	  Also,	  I	  cannot	  only	  take	  the	  action	  back	  either,	   because	   presenting	   nothing	   as	   true,	   or	   promising	   nothing	   also	  fails	  to	  imply	  any	  commitments	  on	  my	  part.	  	  
                                                73See,	  e.g.	  (Green	  2015).	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   So	  the	  only	  way	  in	  which	  one	  can	  take	  an	  assertion	  back	  is	  by	  not	  standing	   behind	   the	   commitments	   implied	   by	   the	   whole	   compound:	  having	  presented	  p	  as	  true.	  	   Something	  is,	  indeed,	  different	  between	  the	  two	  cases	  presented	  by	  Kvanvig,	  though.	  Recall	  that,	  according	  to	  the	  normative	  framework	  put	   forth	   above,	   an	   agent	   needs	   be	   blamelessly	   ignorant	   that	   ϕ-­‐ing	  violates	  N.	  The	  speakers	  in	  FAKE	  SNOW	  and	  FAKE	  BARNS,	  asserting	  on	  justified	  belief,	  are	  epistemically	  blameless,	  both	  directly	  and	  indirectly.	  They	  both	  assert	  from	  what	  they	  mistakenly	  take	  to	  be	  knowledge,	  and	  they	  seem	  to	  have	  conformed	   to	   their	  epistemic	  duties	   in	   forming	   the	  respective	   beliefs.	   After	   all,	   perception	   is	   a	   pretty	   reliable	   way	   to	   go	  about	   forming	   beliefs.	   In	   contrast,	   notice	   that	   Billy	   Bob’s	   belief	  formation	   process,	   as	   Sue	   rightly	   points	   out,	   does	   not	   stand	   very	   tall	  when	   it	   comes	   to	   reliability.	   So,	   indeed,	   Billy	   Bob	   is	   indirectly	  blameworthy,	   as	   he	   failed	   to	   conform	   to	   his	   epistemic	   duties	   before	  proceeding,	  which	  led	  to	  him	  being	  in	  breach	  of	  the	  norm.	  	   However,	   the	  KNA-­‐Nec	  objector	  might	   still	  maintain	   that	   that’s	  not	   all	   there	   is	   to	   it;	   that	   is,	   that	   all	   this	   does	   not	   go	   all	   the	   way	   in	  showing	   that	   the	   phenomenon	   of	   taking	   back	   one’s	   speech	   act	   when	  finding	  out	  one	  has	  been	  mistaken	  or	  Gettiered	  supports	  KNA-­‐Nec.	  The	  thought	  would	  go	  along	  the	  following	  lines:	  there	  seems	  to	  still	  be	  sense	  to	  the	  thought	  that	  some	  of	  the	  acts	  we	  take	  back	  were	  perfectly	  proper.	  Imagine	   I	   promise	   to	   come	   to	   your	   party.	   Plausibly	   enough,	   there’s	  some	  norm	  of	  promising	  to	  the	  effect	   that	  you	  should	  only	  promise	  to	  do	  something	  you	  have	  good	  reason	  to	  think	  you	  will	  be	  able	  to	  do.	  Now	  say	  I	  can’t	  come	  to	  your	  party,	  because	  of	  an	  entirely	  unforeseen	  event.	  It	  makes	   sense	   to	   say	   that,	   even	   though	   I	   ask	   to	  be	   released	   from	   the	  commitment	   to	   come,	   my	   original	   act	   of	   promising	   was	   perfectly	  proper.	   I	   need	   not	   apologise	   for	   having	   promised,	   or	   regret	   having	  promised.	  Why?	  Because	  I	  didn’t	  do	  anything	  wrong.	  Why	  can’t	  we	  say	  something	  parallel	  about	  assertion?	  When	  it	  turns	  out	  I	  was	  Gettiered,	  I	  ‘take	  back’	  my	  assertion	  (act	  and	  content),	  but	  I	  need	  not	  apologise	  for	  having	  asserted,	  or	   feel	  any	  regret.	  Why?	  Because	  I	  didn’t	  do	  anything	  wrong.	  	   Notice,	  though,	  that	  all	   it	   is	  claimed	  here	  is	  that	  the	  taking	  back	  of	   speech	  acts	   is	   sufficient	   for	  asking	   to	  be	  released	   from	  the	  relevant	  commitments,	  not	  that	  it	  is	  necessary.	  That	  is,	  it	  is	  perfectly	  compatible	  with	   the	   claim	  made	  here	   that	   there	  will	   be	   instances	  of	   commitment	  release	  demand	  that	  do	  not	  amount	  to	  taking	  back	  the	  relevant	  speech	  act.	  What	  I	  will	  try	  to	  briefly	  argue	  next	  is	  that	  this	  is	  what	  is	  going	  on	  in	  the	  case	  above.	  	   Note	  there	  is	  a	  clear	  disanalogy	  between	  the	  party	  case	  and	  the	  Gettiered	   assertion	   case.	   That	   is,	   by	   stipulation,	   in	   the	   party	   case	  my	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reason	  for	  promising	  to	  come,	  while	  still	  standing,	  gets	  overridden74	  by	  unforeseen,	  more	  pressing	  considerations;	  in	  contrast,	  Wendy’s	  reason	  to	  assert	  in	  the	  first	  place	  gets	  undercut	  by	  the	  information	  that	  she	  is	  in	  Fake	  Barn	  County.	  	  	   To	  see	  how	  this	  makes	  a	  difference,	  consider	  another	  speech	  act,	  that	   of	   agreeing	   to	  marry	   someone.	   If	   I	   agree	   to	  marry	   you	   because	   I	  think	  you	  love	  me,	  and	  it	  turns	  out	  you	  don’t,	  I	  will	  most	  likely	  take	  my	  speech	  act	  back	  and	  thereby	  ask	  to	  be	  released	  from	  my	  commitment.	  In	  contrast,	   if	  after	  twenty	  happy	  years	  of	  marriage	  we	  are	  not	  getting	  along	   very	   well	   anymore,	   and	   I	   ask	   for	   a	   divorce,	   I	   am	   asking	   to	   be	  released	   from	  my	   commitments	   without	   taking	   my	   initial	   speech	   act	  back;	  surely,	   if	  we	  had	  a	  perfectly	   fine	  marriage	   for	   twenty	  years,	   it	   is	  hardly	  appropriate	  or	  necessary	  for	  me	  to	  take	  back	  my	  having	  agreed	  to	  marry	  you	  to	  begin	  with,	  rather	  than	  merely	  ask	  to	  be	  released	  from	  my	  commitments	  now.	  	   Returning	   to	   the	   assertion/party	   cases,	   say	   my	   reason	   to	  promise	  to	  come	  to	  the	  party	  was	  a	  known	  fact:	  I	  knew	  that	  my	  partner	  wanted	  to	  go.	   	  Say	  that	  later	  on,	  however,	  something	  unforeseen	  came	  up	  at	  my	  office,	  and	  it	  turns	  out	  I	  have	  to	  work	  late	  and	  finish	  a	  project	  that	  evening.	  As	  such,	  while	  my	  initial	  reason	  is	  still	  in	  good	  standing,	  it	  has	  just	  been	  overridden	  by	  more	  pressing	  considerations.	  It	  looks	  as	  if,	  in	  this	  case,	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  for	  me	  to	  take	  back	  my	  initial	  speech	  act,	  rather	   than	   merely	   demand	   to	   be	   released	   from	   the	   commitment	  implied	  by	  it.	  That	  is,	  it	  would	  sound	  inappropriate	  if	  I	  were	  to	  tell	  you	  something	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  ‘I	  take	  it	  back,	  I	  should	  not	  have	  promised	  to	  come	  when	  I	  did’.	  Rather,	  merely	  letting	  you	  know	  that	  I	  will	  not	  be	  coming	   after	   all,	   due	   to	   unforeseen	   events,	   seems	  more	   suited	   to	   the	  situation.	  	  	   In	  contrast,	   in	   the	  Gettier	  case,	  when	  I	  point	  out	   to	  Wendy	  that	  there	  is	  no	  way	  in	  which	  she	  can	  know	  that	  there	  is	  a	  barn	  over	  there,	  since	   we	   are	   in	   Fake	   Barn	   County,	   her	   initial	   reason	   to	   believe	   the	  asserted	   proposition	   gets	   undercut,	   which	   makes	   taking	   back	   the	  speech	  act	  the	  appropriate	  move.	  To	  see	  this,	  here	  is	  how	  an	  assertion	  case	   analogous	   to	   the	   party	   case	  would	   look	   like:	   I	   know	   there	   is	   an	  opening	  in	  my	  department,	  therefore	  I	  tell	  you:	  ‘There	  is	  an	  opening	  in	  my	  department.’	  	  I	  therefore	  commit	  myself	  to	  this	  being	  the	  case.	  Now	  say	   that	   the	   very	   next	   day	   the	   position	   gets	   filled.	   Plausibly	   enough,	  when	  I	   tell	  you	  that	   there	   is	  no	  opening	   in	  my	  department	  anymore,	   I	  
                                                74	  Again,	   I	   am	   not	   claiming	   that	   overriding	   is	   necessary	   for	   cases	   of	   commitment	  release	  demand	  without	  taking	  back	  the	  initial	  speech	  act;	  in	  general,	  it	  is	  beyond	  the	  ambition	  of	  this	  section	  to	  give	  a	  full	  account	  thereof.	  Rather,	   the	  thought	   is	  more	  to	  argue	   that	   KNA,	   through	   the	   normative	   picture	   put	   forth	   by	   this	   paper,	   can	  accommodate	  the	  target	  phenomena.	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am	  not	  taking	  my	  initial	  assertion	  back	  –	  there	  was	  nothing	  wrong	  with	  it	   –	   but	   rather	   I	   am	  merely	   releasing	  myself	   from	   the	   commitment	   to	  there	   being	   an	   opening	   in	   my	   department,	   since	   that	   is	   not	   the	   case	  anymore.	  	  	  	  
4.3.4	  A	  Posteriori	  Simplicity	  	  Let	   us	   take	   stock:	  we	   have	   seen	   that,	   against	  Douven,	   RCNA	  does	   not	  immediately	   follow	   from	   principles	   that	   we	   are	   committed	   to	   on	  independent	  a	  priori	  grounds.	  As	  it	  turns	  out,	  for	  all	  Douven	  has	  proven,	  both	   the	   KNA	   and	   RCNA	   defender	   need	   a	   further	   argument	   for	   their	  preferred	  account	  of	  normativity	  of	  belief	  in	  order	  to	  get	  support	  from	  Douven’s	  ‘zeroth	  law	  of	  rationality’.	  So	  no	  advantage	  here	  on	  either	  side.	  	  	   Further	   on,	   I	   have	   conceded	   that	   RCNA	   does	   a	   fair	   job	   in	  accounting	   for	   the	   unassertability	   of	   lottery	   propositions	   and	   for	   the	  practice	   of	   challenging	   assertions	   by	   means	   of	   ‘How	   do	   you	   know?’	  questions.	   However,	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   Moorean	   statements,	   I	   have	  argued	   that,	   even	   if	   we	   accept	   Douven’s	   argument	   for	   their	  unassertability,	   RCNA	   still	   fails	   to	   account	   for	   their	   paradoxical	  soundingness.	  So	  there’s	  a	  big	  advantage	  on	  KNA’s	  part	  on	  this	  front.	  	   Last	  but	  not	   least,	   I	  have	  also	  offered	  a	  unified	  defence	  of	  KNA	  against	   ‘blameless	   speakers’	   objections,	   by	   putting	   forth	   a	   framework	  for	  the	  normativity	  of	  assertion	  in	  line	  with	  the	  normativity	  of	  action	  in	  general,	  so	  as	  to	  escape	  charges	  with	  ad	  hoc-­‐ness.	  	  	   Now,	   the	   RCNA	   defender	   might	   still	   want	   to	   argue	   that	   her	  preferred	   account	   offers	   a	   simpler	   explanation	   of	   the	   cases	   put	   forth.	  Douven	   gives	   it	   a	   go.	   He	   argues	   that	   it	   seems	   simpler,	   and	   thus	  methodologically	   preferable,	   to	   explain	   our	   intuitions	   about	   false	   but	  reasonable	  assertions	  without	  having	  to	  appeal	  to	  an	  extra	  story	  about	  how	  one	  can	  breach	  rules	  blamelessly	  (2006:	  478).	  	   As	  much	  as	  one	  might	  value	  simplicity,	  however,	  the	  illustrations	  in	   the	  previous	  sections	  stand	  as	  pretty	  solid	  proof	   to	   the	   fact	   that,	   in	  this	   case,	   it	   might	   get	   us	   in	   trouble	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   empirical	  adequacy.	   Unless	   Douven	   provides	   us	   with	   a	   principled	   explanation	  regarding	   how	   assertion	   differs	   from	   other	   actions,	   simplicity	   would	  lead	  us	  to	  conclude	  that	  traffic	  norms	  are	  not,	  in	  fact,	  governing	  driving,	  just	   because	   I’m	   blameless	   for	   violating	   them	   due	   to	   my	   broken	  speedometer.	   Similarly,	   the	   simpler	   explanation	   for	   my	   not	   being	  blameworthy	   for	  breaking	  my	  promise	   to	  Ted,	   that	   is,	   that	   there	   is	  no	  rule	  obliging	  me	  to	  keep	  my	  promises,	  would	  not	  do	  either.	  	  	   Here	  are	  two	  more	  reasons	  to	  resist	  this	  objection;	  first,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	   that	   the	   fact	   that	  KNA-­‐Nec	  needs	   to	   account	   for	   the	   relationship	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between	  propriety	  of	  action	  and	  blamelessness	  in	  order	  to	  explain	  the	  above	  cases	  speaks	  towards	  its	  lack	  of	  a	  posteriori	  simplicity.	  After	  all,	  recall	  that	  Douven	  himself	  tried	  to	  account	  for	  the	  a	  priori	  simplicity	  of	  RCNA	  by	  attempting	  to	  show	  that	  it	  follows	  from	  principles	  to	  which	  we	  are	  committed	  on	  independent	  grounds.	  Similarly,	  the	  defence	  put	  forth	  above	  follows	  from	  principles	  about	  the	  normativity	  of	  action	  to	  which	  we	   are	   committed	   on	   independent	   grounds.	   So,	   rather	   than	   speaking	  against	   KNA-­‐Nec,	   the	   fact	   that	   it	   is	   coheres	   with	   an	   account	   of	   the	  normativity	  of	  assertion	  that	   follows	  from	  the	  normativity	  of	  action	   in	  general	  seems	  to	  speak	  in	  its	  favour.	  	   Furthermore,	  one	  can	  easily	  imagine	  parallel	  cases	  against	  RCNA	  which	  will	   render	   the	   latter	   in	  need	  of	  a	   similar	   line	  of	  defence.	  Take,	  again,	   for	   instance,	  Williamson’s	   (2000)	  TRAIN	  case:	   shouting	   ‘That	   is	  your	  train!’	  upon	  seeing	  a	  train	  approach	  the	  station	  looks	  like	  the	  right	  thing	  to	  do,	  even	  though	  I	  do	  not	  know	  that	  it	  is	  your	  train,	  nor	  do	  I	  have	  knowledge-­‐level	   justification	   for	   believing	   it;	   I	   merely	   believe	   that	  there’s	  a	  fair	  chance	  that	  it	  is	  your	  train,	  and	  it’s	  prudentially	  better	  for	  you	   to	   check	   it	   out.	   This	   is	   a	   case	   in	   which	   the	   prudential	   norm	  overrides	  whatever	  the	  epistemic	  norm	  says	  and	  renders	  me	  blameless	  and	   my	   assertion	   all-­‐things-­‐considered	   proper.	   Also,	   even	   if	   my	  assertion	  is	  both	  in	  breach	  of	  RCNA	  and	  improper	  on	  all	  other	  grounds,	  I	  might	  still	  be	  blameless	  for	  it,	  if,	  for	  instance,	  the	  reason	  why	  I	  assert	  without	  having	  any	  justification	  whatsoever	  is	  because	  I	  have	  been	  hit	  over	   the	   head	   with	   a	   bat.	   	   In	   fact,	   Douven	   (2006,	   470)	   himself	  acknowledges	   that	   “we	   will	   need	   a	   story	   about	   breaching	   rules	  blamelessly	  anyway,	  regardless	  of	  what	  we	  are	  going	  to	  say	  is	  the	  rule	  of	   assertion”.	   Thus,	   it	   does	   not	   look	   like	   RCNA	   fares	   better	   in	  what	   a	  posteriori	  simplicity	  is	  concerned	  either.	  	  	  	  
4.4	  Conclusion	  	  This	   chapter	  has	   argued	   that	   the	  knowledge	  norm	  of	   assertion	   scores	  better	  than	  the	  main	  competing	  account	  on	  the	  market	  when	  it	  comes	  to	   both	   empirical	   adequacy	   and	   simplicity.	   To	   this	   aim,	   I	   have	   first	  shown	  that	   Igor	  Douven’s	  argument	   for	   the	  superiority	  of	   the	  rational	  credibility	   norm	   in	   terms	   of	   a	   priori	   simplicity	   does	   not	   go	   through.	  Further	  on,	   I	  have	  argued	   that	  RCNA,	  as	  opposed	   to	  KNA,	   is	  unable	   to	  explain	  the	  paradoxical	  flavour	  of	  Moorean	  statements.	  	  	   I	  have	  also	  put	  forth	  a	  framework	  for	  criticisability	  in	  the	  case	  of	  assertion	   as	   part	   of	   a	   fairly	   uncontroversial	   normative	   framework	   for	  action	   in	   general,	   and	   argued	   that	   it	   helps	   to	   defuse	   several	   notable	  objections	  to	  KNA.	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Chapter	  V	  
The	  Sufficiency	  Claim	  	  	  We	  have	  seen	  that	  much	  discussion	  has	  focused	  on	  the	  necessity	  claim	  involved	  in	  KNA.	  While	  not	  enjoying	  the	  same	  degree	  of	  popularity,	  the	  claim	   that	   knowledge	   is	   also	   sufficient	   for	   epistemically	   proper	  assertion	   (KNA-­‐Suff)	   has	   quite	   a	   few	   supporters	   too. 75 	  However,	  comparatively	   little	   discussion	   has	   focused	   on	   questioning	   KNA-­‐Suff.	  Most	   notably,	   Jessica	   Brown	   (2010)	   has	   argued	   that,	   in	   high	   stakes	  contexts,	  one	  needs	  to	  find	  oneself	  in	  a	  stronger	  epistemic	  position	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  p	   in	  order	   to	  properly	  assert	   that	  p	   (henceforth,	   the	  quantitative	  
objection).	   In	   recent	  work,	   Jennifer	   Lackey	   (2011,	   2013,	   2014)	   argues	  that	  that’s	  not	  all	  there	  is	  to	  it.	  That	  is,	  Lackey	  argues	  that	  it’s	  not	  only	  the	  quantity	  of	  epistemic	  support	  that	  might	  be	  at	  stake,	  but	  the	  quality	  too.	  	  More	  specifically,	  Lackey	  identifies	  cases	  in	  which	  it	  looks	  as	  if	  the	  
type	  of	  source	  of	  one’s	  knowledge	  that	  p	  might	  be	  defective	  in	  making	  it	  so	  that	  one	  can	  assert	  that	  p.	  Lackey	  argues	  that	  in	  some	  cases	  of	  expert	  testimony	   and	   testimony	   involving	   aesthetic	   judgements,	   isolated	  testimonial	  knowledge	  will	  not	  be	  enough	  to	  grant	  the	  speaker	  the	  right	  to	  assert	  (henceforth,	  the	  qualitative	  objection).	  	   This	   chapter	   argues	   that	   the	   case	   against	   KNA-­‐Suff	   rests	   on	  value-­‐theoretic	   inaccuracies.	   It	   is	  argued	   that	  1)	   the	   intuitive	  need	   for	  more	   than	   knowledge	   in	  Brown’s	   high-­‐stakes	   contexts	   does	  not	   come	  from	   the	   epistemic	   norm	   governing	   assertion,	   but	   from	   further	  (prudential,	  moral,	  etc.)	  norms	  stepping	   in	  and	  raising	   the	  bar,	  and	  2)	  Lackey’s	  purported	  quality-­‐driven	  case	  against	  KNA-­‐Suff	  boils	  down	  to	  a	  quantitative	  objection.	  As	  such,	   I	  will	  argue,	  Lackey	   fails	   to	  establish	  more	   than	   that	   some	   contexts	   require	   stronger	   epistemic	   support	   for	  assertion	   than	   others.	   If	   that	   is	   the	   case,	   Lackey’s	   argument	   will	   be	  vulnerable	  to	  the	  same	  objections	  as	  Brown’s.	  	  	  	  
5.1	  The	  Quantitative	  Case	  
	  Again,	   what	   we	   are	   interested	   in	   is	   the	   epistemic	   norm	   governing	  assertion;	   that	   is,	   we	   want	   to	   know,	   roughly,	   how	   much	   warrant	   is	  enough	  for	  an	  assertion	  that	  enjoys	  it	  to	  be	  epistemically	  proper.	  Let	  us	  then	  formulate	  the	  claim	  that	  knowledge	   is	  sufficient	   for	  epistemically	  proper	  assertion	  as	  follows:	  
                                                75E.g.	   Keith	   DeRose	   (2002),	   Simion	   (2015)	   and,	   more	   tentatively,	   John	   Hawthorne	  (2004).	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KNA-­‐Suff:	  One’s	   assertion	   that	  p	   is	   epistemically	  proper	   if	   one	  knows	  that	  p.	  	  	   At	  first	  glance,	  KNA-­‐Suff	  looks	  fairly	  promising.	  It	  looks	  as	  if	  it’s	  perfectly	  fine	  for	  me,	  for	  instance,	  to	  tell	  you	  that	  there’s	  a	  desk	  in	  front	  of	  me	  while	  I’m	  writing	  this	  paper;	  the	  reason	  why	  I	  can	  do	  that	  without	  rendering	  myself	  subject	  to	  criticism	  is	  because	  I	  know	  there’s	  a	  desk	  in	  front	   of	   me,	   via	   perception.	   If	   you	   were	   to	   question	   my	   assertion,	  appealing	  to	  my	  knowledge	  would	  adequately	  meet	  the	  challenge.	  	   According	   to	   Jessica	  Brown,	   however,	   knowledge	   is	   not	   always	  enough;	   that	   is,	   in	   high	   stakes	   scenarios,	   more	   epistemic	   support	   is	  needed	  for	  permissible	  assertion.	  Consider	  the	  following	  case:	  	  
AFFAIR:	   A	   husband	   is	   berating	   his	   friend	   for	   not	   telling	   him	   that	   his	  wife	  has	  been	  having	  an	  affair	  even	  though	  the	  friend	  has	  known	  of	  the	  affair	  for	  weeks.	  Husband:	  Why	  didn’t	  you	  say	  she	  was	  having	  an	  affair?	  You’ve	  known	  for	  weeks.	  Friend:	  Ok,	  I	  admit	  I	  knew,	  but	  it	  wouldn’t	  have	  been	  right	  for	  me	  to	  say	  anything	   before	   I	   was	   absolutely	   sure.	   I	   knew	   the	   damage	   it	   would	  cause	  to	  your	  marriage	  (Brown	  2010,	  555).	  	  	   Intuitively,	  we	  find	  Friend	  is	  right	  on	  this	  one;	  that	  is,	  he’s	  right	  to	   not	   have	   hastened	   into	   telling	   Husband	   about	   the	   affair	   before	   he	  was	  absolutely	  sure.	  One	  should	  definitely	  not	  rush	  into	  giving	  this	  kind	  of	   news.	   As	   such,	   Brown	   takes	   this	   case	   to	   show	   that,	   in	   high	   stakes	  situations,	   knowledge76	  is	   not	   enough;	   one	   needs	   to	   find	   oneself	   in	   a	  stronger	  epistemic	  position	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  p	   in	  order	  to	  properly	  assert	  that	  p.	   Furthermore,	   Brown	   takes	   the	   sufficiency	   claim	   of	   the	   epistemic	  norm	  we	  are	  talking	  about	  to	  come	  in	  the	  following	  formulation:	  	  
KNA-­‐Suff-­‐Brown	  (KNASB):	  One	  is	  in	  a	  good	  enough	  epistemic	  position	  to	  assert	  p	  if	  one	  knows	  that	  p	  (2010,	  550).	  	  Importantly,	  in	  the	  light	  of	  all	  this,	  Brown	  takes	  KNASB	  to	  be	  equivalent	  to	  our	  previous	  formulation	  of	  KNA-­‐Suff:	  
                                                76	  Note	  that	  Brown’s	  case,	  as	  it	  stands,	  is	  somehow	  under-­‐described;	  that	  is,	  it	  is	  not	  at	  all	  clear	  what	  could	  ground	  Friend’s	  belief	   in	  the	  affair	  such	  that	   it	  would	   intuitively	  amount	   to	   knowledge,	   but	   fall	   short	   of	   assertability.	   Seeing	   the	   couple	   in	   a	   fugitive	  embrace?	   Seems	   to	   fall	   short	   of	   being	   enough	   for	   knowledge.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   it	  looks	  as	  if	  anything	  more	  than	  that	  would	  come	  close	  to	  providing	  enough	  epistemic	  support	  for	  assertability.	  For	  my	  purposes	  here,	  however,	  I	  will	  take	  it	  that	  there	  is	  a	  way	  to	  fill	  out	  the	  case	  such	  that	  it	  ends	  up	  doing	  the	  intended	  work.	  
	   98	  
	   So,	   one	   might	   instead	   phrase	   the	   sufficiency	   claim	   as	   the	  claim	   that	   if	  one	  knows	  that	  p,	   then	  one	   is	   in	  a	  good	  enough	  
epistemic	   position	   to	   assert	   that	   p	   (emphasis	   added).	   This	  leaves	   it	   open	   that	   one’s	   assertion	   is	   incorrect	   on	   grounds	  other	   than	   epistemic	   ones,	   for	   instance,	   that	   it’s	   rude,	  imprudent	   or	   irrelevant	   etc.	   It	   merely	   claims	   that,	   if	   one	  
knows	  that	  p,	   then	  there	   is	  nothing	  epistemically	  wrong	  with	  
asserting	  that	  p	  (emphasis	  added)	  (2010,	  550).	  	  	  Thus,	  Brown	  stands	  behind	  the	  following	  equivalence	  thesis:	  	  
KNASB	  -­‐	  KNA-­‐Suff	  Equivalence	  Thesis	  (ET):	  One	  is	  in	  a	  good	  enough	  epistemic	  position	  to	  assert	  that	  p	  if	  and	  only	  if	  one’s	  assertion	  that	  p	  is	  epistemically	  proper.	  	  	   Further	   on,	   Brown	   finds	   KNASB	   to	   be	   false,	   as	   proven	   by	  AFFAIR;	   Friend	   does	   know	   that	   the	   wife	   is	   having	   an	   affair,	   but,	  intuitively,	  he	  is	  still	  not	  in	  a	  good	  enough	  epistemic	  position	  to	  assert	  it.	  If	  that	  is	  the	  case,	  naturally,	  in	  virtue	  of	  ET,	  she	  concludes	  KNA-­‐Suff	  is	  also	   false;	   knowledge	   is	   not	   always	   enough	   for	   epistemically	   proper	  assertion.	  	   I	   believe	   Brown	   is	   right	   to	   think	   that	   KNASB	   is	   false;	   the	  epistemic	  position	  a	  knowledgeable	  asserter	  finds	  himself	  in	  might	  not	  be,	  all-­‐things-­‐considered,	  good	  enough	  for	  asserting	  that	  p.	  However,	   I	  will	  also	  show	  that	  ET	  is	  false,	  which	  will	  render	  KNA-­‐Suff	  unaffected	  by	  Brown’s	   argument.	   Inasmuch	   as	   what	   we	   care	   about	   is	   epistemic	  propriety	  –	   that	   is,	  propriety	  by	   the	  epistemic	  norm	  –	   rather	   than	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	  propriety,	  for	  all	  Brown	  has	  shown,	  KNA-­‐Suff	  stands.	  	   Recall	   that,	   in	   Chapter	   #1,	   we	   have	   seen	   that	   content	  individuation	   (CIT)	   for	   epistemic	   norms	   fails:	   just	   because	   a	   norm	   N	  affects	  the	  amount	  of	  epistemic	  support	  needed	  for	  permissible	  φ-­‐ing,	  it	  need	   not	   follow	   that	   N	   is	   an	   epistemic	   norm.	   Given	   this,	   it	   looks	   as	  though	   it	   is	   on	   Brown’s	   shoulders	   to	   argue	   that	   the	   norm	   asking	   for	  stronger	  epistemic	  support	  in	  AFFAIR	  is	  not	  only	  a	  norm	  with	  epistemic	  content,	   but	   also	   an	   epistemic	   norm	   as	   such,	   associated	   with	   an	  epistemic	  goal,	  and	  concerned	  with	  epistemic	  propriety.	  By	  the	  looks	  of	  the	   case,	   one	   might	   find	   it	   more	   plausible	   that	   it	   is	   a	   prudential	  constraint	   that	  asks	   for	  a	  stronger	  epistemic	  support	  here,	  directed	  at	  the	  prudential	  goal	  of	  protecting	  Husband	  from	  unnecessary	  hardship,	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and	   thus	   concerned	   with	   prudential	   propriety77.	   Actually,	   the	   way	   in	  which	   the	   case	   is	   put	   forth	   suggests	   as	   much;	   recall	   Friend’s	   excuse:	  “Ok,	   I	   admit	   I	   knew,	   but	   it	   wouldn’t	   have	   been	   right	   for	   me	   to	   say	  anything	  before	  I	  was	  absolutely	  sure.	  I	  knew	  the	  damage	  it	  would	  cause	  
to	   your	   marriage	   (emphasis	   added)”	   (Brown	   2010,	   555).	   As	   Aidan	  McGlynn	  (2014)	  rightly	  points	  out,	  “[t]his	  builds	  into	  the	  case	  that	  one	  is	  worried	  about	  the	  effect	  one’s	  assertion	  would	  have	  on	  one’s	  friend’s	  marriage,	   which	   is	   surely	   a	   non-­‐epistemic	   factor”.	   Furthermore,	  McGlynn	   argues,	   “[…]	   if	   the	   impropriety	   that	   would	   be	   involved	   in	  asserting	  in	  this	  case	  would	  really	  be	  epistemic,	  rather	  than	  due	  to	  the	  presence	   of	   non-­‐epistemic	   factors,	   we	   would	   expect	   that	   a	   qualified	  assertion	  might	  be	  appropriate”.	  However,	  it	  looks	  as	  if	  hedging	  will	  not	  deliver	  propriety	  either.	  For	   instance,	   surely,	   given	   that	  Friend	  knows	  the	  wife	   is	   having	   an	   affair,	   he	   has	   enough	  warrant	   to	   be	   pretty	   sure	  that	  she	  might	  be	  having	  an	  affair.	  Still,	   it	  still	   looks	   like	  Friend	  would	  better	  abstain	  from	  asserting	  the	  latter	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  Husband	  also	  (2014,	   126).	   This	   also	   suggest	   that	   prudential	   considerations	   are,	   in	  fact,	  at	  play.	  	   In	   the	   light	   of	   all	   this,	   let	   us	   now	   move	   on	   to	   checking	   the	  plausibility	   of	  Brown’s	  Equivalence	  Thesis.	  Notice	   that,	   if	   CIT	   fails,	   ET	  turns	   out	   to	   be	   false	   too.	   One’s	   assertion	   that	   p	   can	   be	   epistemically	  proper	  without	  it	  being	  the	  case	  that	  one	  is	  in	  a	  (all-­‐things-­‐considered)	  good	  enough	  epistemic	  position	  to	  assert	  that	  p.	  This	  is	  going	  to	  be	  the	  case	  when	  the	  norm	  that	  dictates	  how	  much	  warrant	  is	  needed	  for	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	   proper	   assertion	   is	   not	   the	   epistemic	   norm,	   but	   a	  further	  norm	  –	  with	  epistemic	  content	  –	  stepping	  in	  and	  raising	  the	  bar,	  like	  in	  AFFAIR.	  	   Also,	   one	   can	   be	   in	   a	   (all-­‐things-­‐considered)	   good	   enough	  epistemic	  position	  to	  assert	   that	  p	  without	   it	  being	  the	  case	  that	  one’s	  assertion	   that	   p	   is	   epistemically	   proper.	   This	   is	   going	   to	   be	   the	   case	  when	  further	  norms	  step	  in,	  override	  the	  epistemic	  norm78,	  and	  set	  the	  
                                                77	  One	  way	  for	  Brown	  to	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  reaching	  an	  epistemic	  goal	  that	  more	   warrant	   is	   needed	   in	   this	   case	   could	   go	   along	   the	   following	   lines:	   Friend’s	  assertion	  is	  aimed	  at	  generating	  knowledge/true	  belief	  in	  his	  audience	  –	  in	  this	  case,	  Husband.	   If	   Friend	   were	   to	   assert	   ‘Your	   wife	   is	   having	   an	   affair’,	   Husband	   might	  plausibly	   ask	   ‘How	   do	   you	   know?’	   In	   this	   case,	   Husband	   might	   fail	   to	   believe	   the	  content	   of	   Friend’s	   assertion	   if	   the	   latter	   is	   not	   able	   to	   back	   his	   claims	   by	   serious	  epistemic	   support.	   If	   Friend	   fails	   to	   generate	   belief	   in	   his	   audience,	   he	   also	   thereby	  fails	   to	   generate	   knowledge,	   or	   true	   belief,	   for	   that	   matter,	   so	   he	   fails	   to	   reach	   his	  epistemic	   goal.	   See	   Section	   #6.2.3	   below	   for	   an	   argument	   aimed	   to	   show	   that	   this	  reply	  is	  bound	  to	  fail.	  	  	  78	  In	   this	   case,	   KNA-­‐Nec.	   Notice	   also	   that	   no	   one	   in	   the	   literature	   questions	   the	  prudential	   explanation	   in	   the	   TRAIN	   case.	   However,	   TRAIN	   is	   for	   KNA-­‐Nec	   what	  AFFAIR	  is	  for	  KNA-­‐Suff:	  a	  case	  in	  which	  the	  quantity	  of	  epistemic	  warrant	  needed	  for	  prudentially	   proper	   assertion	   is	   not	   the	   same	   as	   the	   one	   needed	   for	   epistemically	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threshold	  for	  (again,	  all-­‐things-­‐considered)	  good	  enough	  warrant	  lower	  than	   the	   epistemic	   norm.	   One	   example	   of	   this	   is,	   again,	   Williamson’s	  TRAIN	  case.	  	   To	   sum	   up:	   once	   we	   make	   the	   necessary	   distinction	   between	  epistemic	  norms	  and	  norms	  with	  epistemic	  content,	  Brown’s	  ET	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  false.	  If	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  her	  argument	  against	  KNASB	  in	  no	  way	  affects	  KNA-­‐Suff,	  which	  is	  the	  epistemic	  norm	  we	  were	  interested	  in	  to	  begin	  with.	  	   	  	  	  
5.2	  The	  Qualitative	  Case	  
	  We	  have	  seen	  that	  the	  quantitative	  case	  against	  KNA-­‐Suff	  did	  not	  stand	  up	  to	  close	  value-­‐theoretic	  scrutiny.	  That	   is,	  we	  have	  seen	  that	  further	  norms	  –	  like	  prudential	  and	  moral	  norms	  –	  can	  override	  the	  epistemic	  norm	  and	  raise	  the	  quantity	  of	  epistemic	  support	  needed	  for	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	  proper	  assertion.	  	  	   Jennifer	   Lackey	   (2011,	   2013,	   2014),	   however,	   argues	   that	   the	  quantity	  of	  epistemic	  support	  is	  not	  all	  there	  is	  to	  it.	  	  That	  is,	  according	  to	   Lackey,	   the	   type	   of	   epistemic	   support	   might	   be	   problematic	   for	  permissible	   assertion	   by	   knowledgeable	   speakers	   also;	   in	   some	  contexts,	   Lackey	   argues,	   mere	   isolated	   testimonial	   knowledge	   is	   not	  enough	  for	  permissible	  assertion.	  Consider	  the	  following	  case:	  	  	  
DOCTOR:	  Matilda	  is	  an	  oncologist	  at	  a	  teaching	  hospital	  […].	  One	  of	  her	  patients,	  Derek,	  […]	  has	  been	  experiencing	  intense	  abdominal	  pain	  […].	  After	  requesting	  an	  ultrasound	  and	  MRI,	  the	  results	  of	  the	  tests	  arrived	  on	   Matilda’s	   day	   off	   [and	   were]	   reviewed	   by	   Nancy,	   a	   competent	  medical	   student	   in	   oncology	   training	   at	   her	   hospital.	   […]	   Nancy	  communicated	   to	   Matilda	   simply	   that	   her	   diagnosis	   is	   pancreatic	  cancer,	  without	  offering	  any	  of	  the	  details	  of	  the	  test	  results	  […].	  Shortly	  thereafter,	  Matilda	   had	   her	   appointment	  with	   Derek,	  where	   she	   truly	  asserts	  to	  him	  purely	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  Nancy’s	  reliable	  testimony,	  “I	  am	  very	   sorry	   to	   tell	   you	   this,	   but	   you	   have	   pancreatic	   cancer”	   (Lackey	  2011,	  254).	  	  	   Matilda,	   Lackey	   argues,	   knows	   that	  Derek	  has	   cancer.	  After	   all,	  her	   belief	   is	   true,	   reliably	   produced	   and,	   furthermore,	   internally	   well	  grounded	  –	  Matilda	  has	  good	  reasons	  to	  trust	  Nancy’s	  assessment	  of	  the	  
                                                                                                                       proper	   assertion.	   It	   is,	   therefore,	   surprising	   that	   AFFAIR	   is	   seen	   as	   problematic	   for	  KNA-­‐Suff,	  while	  TRAIN	  is	  widely	  acknowledged	  to	  not	  put	  any	  pressure	  on	  KNA-­‐Nec.	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situation.	  As	  such,	  knowledge	  would	  be	  granted	  on	  any	  standard	  view	  of	  testimony	  (Lackey	  2013,	  36).	  	   In	   spite	   of	   this,	   though,	   intuitively,	   Matilda’s	   assertion	   is	  inappropriate.	  	  According	  to	  Lackey,	  this	  is	  due	  to	  the	  joint	  action	  of	  two	  factors:	  the	  purely	  testimonial	  source	  –	  what	  Lackey	  dubs	  second-­‐hand	  knowledge	  –	  and	  the	  isolated	  character	  of	  the	  piece	  of	  knowledge	  –	  the	  asserter	  knowing	  nothing	  other	  than	  p	  about	  the	  subject	  matter.	  	  	   Also,	   Lackey	   argues,	   just	   one	   of	   the	   two	   factors	   would	   not	   be	  enough	   to	   trigger	   the	   intuition;	   had	   Nancy	   given	   Matilda	   more	  information	  about	   the	   test	   results	   (non-­‐isolation),	  or	  had	  Matilda,	   say,	  seen	   the	   result	   of	   at	   least	   only	   one	   isolated	   test	   herself	   (not	   entirely	  second-­‐hand	  knowledge),	  her	  assertion	  would	  have	  been	  just	  fine.	  	   Now,	   crucially,	   recall	   that	   Lackey	   claims	   that	   the	   source	   of	   the	  felt	   inappropriateness	   of	   the	   assertion	   in	   DOCTOR	   is	   a	   qualitative,	  rather	  than	  a	  quantitative	  one.	  	  	   Notice,	  however,	   that	   it	   is	  not	  clear	  that	   isolation	  –	  that	   is,	  only	  possessing	  one	  item	  of	  knowledge	  about	  the	  subject	  matter	  –	  would	  not	  do	   the	   trick	   and	   render	   the	   assertion	   inappropriate	   itself.	   Telling	   a	  patient	  that	  he	  has	  cancer	  solely	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  one	  isolated	  test	  result	  looks	  a	  bit	  rushed.	  Surely,	  given	  the	  high	  stakes	  involved,	  we	  expect	  our	  doctors	  to	  have	  solid	  evidence	  before	  presenting	  us	  with	  such	  shocking	  news.	   Actually,	   the	   practice	   itself	   consists	   in	   not	   only	   seeing	   more	  results	  pointing	  in	  the	  same	  direction,	  but	  also	  having	  the	  tests	  redone	  at	  least	  once	  more	  for	  confirmation	  before	  informing	  the	  patient.	  But	  if	  that	   is	   the	   case,	   it	   looks	   as	   if	   it	   is	   quantity	   rather	   than	   quality	   of	  epistemic	  support	  at	  play	  here.	  	   Second,	   it	   is	   also	   less	   than	   clear	   that	  non-­‐isolated	   second-­‐hand	  knowledge	   would	   always	   be	   as	   proper	   of	   a	   source	   for	   assertion	   as	  Lackey	  would	   have	   it.79	  Of	   course,	   if	  Nancy	   spends	   quite	   a	   lot	   of	   time	  over	   the	   phone	   with	   Matilda	   and	   tells	   her	   everything	   about	   the	   test	  results	  in	  question,	  which	  would	  enable	  Matilda	  to	  draw	  her	  own	  expert	  conclusion	  about	   the	  case,	   it	  might	  seem	  fine	   for	  Matilda	   to	   tell	  Derek	  that	   he	   has	   cancer.	   However,	   it	   looks	   as	   if	   the	   propriety	   of	   Matilda’s	  assertion	  will	  be	  directly	  proportional	  to	  the	  amount	  of	  information	  she	  gets.	  Surely,	  if	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  Derek	  has	  cancer,	  due	  to	  time	  limitations,	  Nancy	  only	  gets	  to	  tell	  Matilda	  that	  the	  ultrasound	  shows	  a	  grey	   shadow	   on	   Derek’s	   pancreas,	   this	   will	   hardly	   enable	   Matilda	   to	  break	  the	  news	  to	  Derek.	  More	  seems	  to	  be	  needed.	  But,	  again,	  it	  looks	  as	   if	   the	   quantity	   of	   epistemic	   support	   is	   what	   does	   the	   trick,	   rather	  than	  its	  quality.	  
                                                79	  Lackey	   (2013,	   40)	   acknowledges	   that	   the	   purely	   testimonial	   source	   is	   enough	   to	  trigger	  unassertability.	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   And,	   last	   but	   not	   least,	   consider	  what	  would	   be	   the	   case	   if	   the	  source	   of	   Matilda’s	   isolated	   second-­‐hand	   knowledge	   would	   not	   be	  Nancy,	   but	   rather	  Matilda’s	   boss,	   Dr.	   Jones,	   the	   chief	   physician	   of	   the	  oncology	   ward.	   Surely,	   then,	   Matilda’s	   assertion	   would	   be	   perfectly	  warranted.	   	   But,	   again,	   this	   suggests	   that	   it	   is	   not	   the	   nature	   of	   the	  source	  –	  that	  is,	  its	  being	  isolated	  and	  second-­‐hand	  –	  that	  does	  the	  trick	  here,	   but	   its	   reliability.	   Dr.	   Jones	   is	   just	   a	   more	   reliable	   source	   than	  Nancy	  is.	  And	  while	  the	  testimony	  of	  both	  of	  them	  seems	  good	  enough	  for	  Matilda	  to	  gain	  knowledge,	  in	  the	  high-­‐stakes	  scenario	  we’re	  facing,	  Dr.	   Jones’s	   testimony	   would	   appropriately	   raise	   the	   quantity	   of	  epistemic	  support	  to	  what	  is	  required	  for	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	  proper	  assertion.	  	  	   In	   a	   similar	   line,	   it	   is	   also	   worth	   noticing	   that,	   in	   high	   stakes	  situations,	   it	   might	   be	   the	   case	   that	   even	   non-­‐isolated	   first-­‐hand	  knowledge	   would	   not	   be	   enough	   for	   assertion.	   That	   is,	   plausibly	  enough,	  telling	  Derek	  that	  he	  has	  cancer	  only	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  two	  blood	  test	  results,	  even	  if	  Matilda	  saw	  the	  results	  herself,	  would	  hardly	  make	  for	  a	  proper	  assertion,	  given	  the	  high	  stakes	  involved.80	  	  	   Consider,	  though,	  another	  type	  of	  case	  that,	  according	  to	  Lackey,	  sheds	  doubt	  on	  the	  sufficiency	  thesis:	  	  
FOOD:	  My	  neighbour	  Ken	   is	   a	   connoisseur	  of	   fine	  dining.	  As	  we	  were	  leaving	  Starbucks	  this	  afternoon,	  he	  told	  me	  that	  the	  food	  at	  a	  new	  local	  restaurant	   about	   which	   I	   was	   previously	   quite	   unfamiliar,	   Quince,	   is	  exquisite,	   though	   being	   in	   a	   hurry	   prevented	   him	   from	   offering	   any	  details	   or	   evidence	  on	  behalf	   of	   this	   claim.	  While	   talking	   to	  my	   friend	  Vivienne	   later	   in	   the	   day,	   she	   was	   fretting	   over	   where	   to	   take	   her	  boyfriend	  to	  dinner	   for	  Valentine’s	  Day.	   I	  promptly	  relieved	  her	  stress	  by	  truly	  asserting,	  “The	  food	  at	  Quince	  is	  exquisite”	  (Lackey	  2011,	  260).	  	  	   Again,	   Lackey	   argues	   that	  what	   explains	   the	   inappropriateness	  intuition	  for	  the	  assertion	  in	  this	  case	  is	  the	  joint	  action	  of	  isolation	  and	  second-­‐handedness.	  	   Lackey’s	   case	   affords	   a	   simple	  Gricean	  way	  out,	   though.	  Notice	  that	   there	  are	   three	  different	   things	  one	  might	  mean	  when	  making	  an	  assertion	  involving	  an	  aesthetic	  judgement.	  By	  uttering:	  	  ‘The	  food	  is	  exquisite	  at	  Quince’s’,	  
                                                80	  For	   a	   similar	   project	   but	   a	   quite	   different	   objection	   to	   Lackey’s	   expert	   testimony	  cases	   see	   Benton	   (2014).	   Although	   Benton’s	   case	   against	   Lackey	   goes	   along	   quite	  dissimilar	  lines	  to	  the	  one	  made	  by	  this	  paper,	  Benton	  too	  seems	  to	  be	  sympathetic	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  further	  norms	  stepping	  in	  due	  to	  the	  high-­‐stakes	  institutional	  contexts.	  See,	  for	   instance,	   footnote	  12,	  p.	  9.	   For	  Lackey’s	   reply	   to	  Benton’s	  objections,	   see	  Lackey	  (2014).	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  I	  might	  mean	  to	  say	  that	  I	  have	  tried	  it	  and	  I	  like	  it,	  or	  that	  it	  is	  generally	  considered	   good	   food	   (by	   experts,	   or	   most	   people,	   etc.),	   or	   both.	  However,	  the	  most	  common	  implicatures	  are	  the	  first	  and	  the	  third	  on	  the	  list.	  To	  see	  this,	  notice	  that	  if	  I	  want	  to	  say	  that	  experts	  consider	  it	  good	  but	   I	  don’t	   like	   it,	  or	   I	  haven’t	   tried	   it,	   I	  will	  not	  merely	  say	   ‘The	  food	  is	  good’,	  but	  qualify	  my	  statement	  accordingly.	  	   As	   such,	   it	   is	   easy	   to	   see	   how	   making	   assertions	   involving	  aesthetic	   judgements	   based	   on	   solely	   second-­‐hand	   knowledge	   is	   less	  than	  appropriate,	  unless,	  of	  course,	  I	  cancel	  the	  implicature	  and	  make	  it	  clear	   that	   it	   is	   according	   to	   experts,	   or	   most	   people,	   that	   the	   food	   is	  good,	  even	  though	  I	  haven’t	  tried	  it	  myself.	  	  One	   could,	   of	   course,	   argue	   that	   just	   because	   a	   Gricean	  explanation	   of	   the	   intuitive	   unassertability	   is	   available,	   that	   does	   not	  mean	  that	  KNA-­‐Suff	   is	  safe.	  Carter	  and	  Gordon	  (2011)	  choose	  this	   line	  of	   defence;	   they	   argue	   that,	   plausibly,	   in	   this	   case,	   the	  Gricean	  maxim	  has	  been	  broken	  due	  to	  epistemic	  shortcomings:	  	   A	  natural	  way	  for	  this	  to	  happen	  in	  everyday	  discourse	  will	  be	  when	  someone	  misleads	  someone	  else	  (thus	  violating	  the	  Gricean	   norm	   not	   to	  mislead)	   specifically	   by	   implying	   that	  they	   have	   greater	   epistemic	   warrant	   for	   their	   assertions	  than	  they	  actually	  do	  (Carter	  and	  Gordon	  2011,	  625).	  	  	  I	  agree	  with	  Carter	  and	  Gordon	  on	   this;	   I	   think	   that	   this	   is	  exactly	   the	  right	   diagnosis	  when	   it	   comes	   to	   the	   situation	   at	   hand.	  However,	   this	  fails	  to	  constitute	  a	  problem	  for	  KNA-­‐Suff,	  as	  the	  relevant	  broken	  norm	  is	  KNA-­‐Nec,81	  the	  corresponding	  necessity	  claim.	  After	  all,	  all	  I	  come	  to	  know	  by	  testimony	  in	  the	  above	  case	  is	  that	  my	  friend	  likes	  the	  food,	  or,	  at	  most,	  that	  it	  is	  considered	  good	  by	  experts	  in	  the	  field;	  this,	  of	  course,	  might	  increase	  the	  chances	  of	  my	  liking	  it	  too.	  But	  I	  surely	  do	  not,	  in	  any	  way,	   come	   to	   know	  that	   I	   like	   the	   food	  myself.82	  So	   the	   implicature	   to	  the	  effect	  that	  I	  like	  it	  will,	  of	  course,	  render	  my	  assertion	  improper,	  not	  because	   knowledge	   is	   not	   sufficient	   for	   assertion,	   but	   because	   it	   is	  necessary.83	  
                                                81	  Weaker	  norms	  are	  broken	  too:	  e.g.	  the	  speaker	  is	  not	  even	  justified	  in	  believing	  the	  implicature.	  82	  For	  further	  support	  for	  this	  claim,	  see	  McGlynn	  (2014,	  128).	  83	  For	   an	   argument	   against	   the	   claim	   that	   one	   has	   to	   know	   the	   conversational	  implicatures	   of	   one’s	   assertions,	   see	   Elisabeth	   Fricker	   (2012);	  while	   I	   find	   Fricker’s	  argument	   successful,	   I	   think	   that	   the	   case	   this	   paper	   is	  making	   is	   not	   affected	  by	   it.	  Roughly,	  Fricker	  takes	  it	  that	  we	  might	  not	  be	  able	  to	  hold	  the	  speaker	  responsible	  for	  lack	   of	   warrant	   for	   the	   generated	   conversational	   implicatures,	   because	   in	   many	  contexts	   it	   is	   not	   clear	   whether	   the	   hearer	   gets	   the	   implicature	   right.	   However,	  importantly,	   Fricker’s	   argument	   only	   targets	   (and,	   arguably,	   only	   goes	   through	   for)	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   What	  would	  help	  with	  the	  propriety	  of	  the	  assertion	  would	  be	  if	  the	   case	   stipulated	   that	  Ken	   and	   I	   share	   the	   exact	   same	   taste	   in	   food.	  The	  implicature	  thus	  generated	  would	  not	  be	  problematic	  anymore.	  But	  that,	   of	   course,	  would	   be	   due	   to	   the	   fact	   that,	   in	   these	   cases,	   I	  would	  come	  to	  know	  that	  I	  like	  the	  food	  myself.	  	  	   So,	   in	   sum,	   it	   seems	   that	   in	   order	   to	   turn	  my	   assertion	   into	   an	  appropriate	   one,	   we	   have	   to	   re-­‐describe	   the	   case	   so	   that	   I	   either	   1.	  know	   that	   I	   like	   the	   food	  myself,	   or	   2.	   cancel	   the	   implicature	   to	   this	  effect.	   But	   this	   goes	   to	   show	   that	   the	   underlying	   problem	   is	   not	   that	  knowledge	  is	  not	  sufficient	  for	  proper	  assertion,	  but	  simply	  that	  in	  the	  original	  case	  I	  assert	  to	  more	  than	  I	  actually	  know,	  and	  thereby	  I	  break	  KNA-­‐Nec.	  	  	  	  
5.3	  Objections	  and	  Replies	  	  
Objection	  1:	  Lackey	  considers	  a	  possible	  reply	  along	  Gricean	  lines,	  but	  she	   argues	   that	   it	   would	   not	   stand,	   as,	   by	   Grice’s	   own	   lights,	  implicatures	  are	  “not	  carried	  by	  what	  is	  said,	  but	  only	  by	  the	  saying	  of	  what	  is	  said,	  or	  by	  ‘putting	  it	  that	  way’”	  (Lackey	  2011,	  270).	  In	  contrast	  to	  this,	  in	  the	  discussed	  cases	  of	  aesthetic	  judgements,	  it	  looks	  as	  if	  the	  impropriety	   is	   linked	   to	   the	   content	   of	   the	   assertion	   rather	   than	   to	  uttering	  it	  in	  one	  context	  or	  another.	  	  
Reply.	   Grice	   (1989,	   25,	   37,	   39)	   distinguishes	   between	   three	   types	   of	  implicatures:	  1.	   Conversational	   implicatures	   (cancellable,	   and	   to	   which	   the	   quote	  above	  refers	  to):	  carried	  by	  uttering	  p	  in	  a	  specific	  context	  rather	  than	  by	  p	  itself,	  like	  in:	  	   ‘Are	  you	  going	  to	  Paul's	  party?’	  	   ‘I	  have	  to	  work.’	  (Implicature:	  I	  am	  not	  going	  to	  Paul’s	  party.)	  2.	  Conventional	  implicatures	  (non-­‐cancellable):	  carried	  by	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  sentence	  itself,	  like	  in:	  	   ‘He	   is	   an	  Englishman;	   he	   is,	   therefore,	   brave.’	   (Implicature:	  His	  being	  an	  Englishman	  implies	  that	  he	  is	  brave.)	  3.	  Generalized	   implicatures	  (cancellable):	  carried	  by	  the	  meaning	  with	  which	  the	  sentence	  is	  conventionally	  (usually)	  uttered:	  
                                                                                                                       mere	   conversational	   implicatures.	   The	   ones	   this	   paper	   is	   concerned	   with	   are	  
conventional	   conversational	   implicatures,	   that	   is,	  carried	  by	   the	  meaning	  with	  which	  the	  sentence	  is	  conventionally	  (usually)	  uttered	  (more	  about	  this	  below).	  Roughly	  put,	  it	   looks	   as	   if,	   if	   a	   sentence	   is	   conventionally	   uttered	   with	   a	   particular	   meaning,	   the	  hearer	   is	   in	   a	   better	   position	   to	   get	   the	   implicature	   right,	   and	   therefore	   in	   a	   better	  position	  to	  criticize	  the	  speaker	  for	  lack	  of	  warrant.	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   ‘Some	  athletes	  smoke.’	  (Implicature:	  Not	  all	  athletes	  smoke.)	  	   It	   is	   easy	   to	   see	   that	   assertions	   involving	   aesthetic	   judgements	  pertain	  to	  the	  third	  category.	  That	  is,	  the	  implicature	  is	  1.	  carried	  by	  the	  meaning	  conventionally	  associated	  with	  uttering	  a	  sentence	  of	  the	  type	  ‘X	  is	  good’,	  and	  2.	  cancellable.	  	  
Objection	  2:	  Lackey	  argues	  that	  one	  can	  easily	  imagine	  cases	  when	  the	  presumed	   implicature	   is	   not	   cancellable.	   To	   this	   effect,	   she	   illustrates	  with	  a	  case	  she	  dubs	  the	  ‘presumed	  witness’84	  scenario:85	  	  
RECOMMENDATION:	   Josie,	   who	   was	   asked	   to	   support	   a	   philosophy	  student	   applying	   to	   Ph.D.	   programs,	   wrote	   in	   her	   letter	   of	  recommendation	   for	   his	   applications,	   “Mitchell	   has	   very	   polished	  writing	  skills.”	  While	  Josie	  does	  indeed	  know	  this	  about	  the	  student,	  her	  knowledge	  is	  grounded	  purely	  in	  the	  isolated,	  reliable	  testimony	  of	  her	  trustworthy	  colleague.	  Josie	  herself	  has	  had	  Mitchell	  in	  class	  for	  only	  a	  few	  weeks,	  and	  has	  yet	  to	  see	  any	  of	  his	  writing	  (Lackey	  2011,	  264).	  	  
Reply:	   In	   the	   light	   of	   the	   discussion	   in	   the	   two	   previous	   sections,	   it	  might	  have	  become	  transparent	  already	  that	  RECOMMENDATION	  is	  but	  a	   combination	   of	   the	   above:	   an	   aesthetic	   judgement	   offered	   in	   an	  institutional	  context	  defined	  by	  particular	  stakes.	   In	  virtue	  of	  being	  an	  aesthetic	   judgement	   alone,	   the	   assertion	  will	   be	   inappropriate	   due	   to	  generating	   the	   false	   implicature	   that	   Josie	   likes	   the	   student’s	   writing	  style	   herself	   (and	   thus	   inappropriate	   due	   to	   being	   in	   breach	   of	   KNA-­‐Nec).	  Interestingly	  enough,	  though,	  what	  happens	  in	  this	  particular	  case	  of	   aesthetic	   judgement	   is	   that	   Josie	   cannot	   even	   properly	   cancel	   the	  implicature,	  due	   to	   the	   institutional	   requirements	   that	   specifically	   ask	  for	  Josie’s	  own	  aesthetic	  judgement	  on	  the	  matter.	  	   Notice,	  however,	  that	  this,	  again,	  fails	  to	  speak	  against	  KNA-­‐Suff.	  The	   institution	  of	  writing	  recommendation	   letters	   is	  so	  designed	  as	   to	  involve	   the	   writer’s	   aesthetic	   judgements,	   if	   any,	   because	   it	   is	   her	  
                                                84	  Notice	  the	  Gricean	  flavour	  here.	  85	  Lackey	   (2011,	   2013)	   brings	   two	   further	   cases	   in	   support	   of	   her	   view:	   a	   case	  involving	  someone’s	  second-­‐hand	  knowledge	  that	  a	  student	  cheated	  in	  an	  exam,	  and	  a	  case	  of	  moral	   testimony.	   In	  both	  cases,	  Lackey	   takes	   it	   that	   the	  subjects	   (i)	  have	   the	  relevant	   piece	   of	   knowledge	   from	   testimony,	   and	   (ii)	   still	   fail	   to	   be	   in	   a	   position	   to	  make	  epistemically	  proper	  assertions.	  	  Arguably	  though,	  both	  cases	  fall	  short	  of	  fully	  driving	  the	  point	  home;	  the	  former	  case	   fails	   to	   trigger	   a	   clear	   unassertability	   intuition,	   while	   the	   claim	   to	   knowledge	  acquisition	   in	   the	   latter	   case	   is	   disputed	   in	   the	   relevant	   literature;	   as	   such,	   for	   the	  purposes	  of	   this	  paper,	   I	  decided	  to	   focus	  on	  the	   less	  controversial	  cases.	  For	  a	  very	  convincing	   case	   against	   Lackey’s	   claim	   (ii)	   for	   the	   cheating	   student	   scenario,	   see	  McGlynn	  (2014,	  128).	  For	  problems	  with	  claim	  (i)	   for	   the	  moral	   testimony	  case,	   see	  Lackey’s	  (2013,	  33)	  overview	  of	  the	  relevant	  literature.	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reputation	  that’s	  at	  stake.	   Josie’s	  addressee	  wants	   to	  know	  what	   Josie,	  the	   author	   of	   the	   letter,	   thinks	   about	   the	   student’s	  writing	   style.	   Had	  Josie	  testified	  to	  something	  not	  involving	  an	  aesthetic	  judgement	  in	  her	  letter	   –	   say,	   the	   fact	   that	   Mitchell	   is	   a	   student	   representative	   the	  faculty’s	   committee	   for	   gender	   issues	   –	   isolated	   second-­‐hand	  knowledge	  would	  have	  been	  just	  fine.	  	   To	   see	   that	   non-­‐cancellability	   is	   due	   to	   institutional	   norms	  stepping	   in,	   rather	   than	   to	   the	   epistemic	   norm	   we	   are	   interested	   in,	  notice	   the	   difference	   with	   testifying	   in	   court.	   In	   these	   cases,	   even	  testimony	   based	   on	   second-­‐hand	   knowledge	   about	   non-­‐aesthetic	  matters	   of	   fact	  will	   be	   problematic	   –	   and,	   conversely,	   the	   implicature	  will	   be	   non-­‐cancellable	   –,	   due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   this	   is	   just	   how	   the	  institution	  is	  designed	  to	  work.	  	  	  
Objection	  3.	  Lackey	  considers	  a	  possible	  appeal	  to	  institutional	  norms	  stepping	   in	   (crediting	   it	   to	   Sandy	   Goldberg),	   but	   she	   argues	   that	  “assertions	   involving	   isolated	   second-­‐hand	   knowledge	   are	   not	  epistemically	  problematic	  because	  various	  institutions	  say	  that	  they	  are	  wrong;	   rather,	   the	   institutions	   say	   that	   they	   are	   wrong	   because	   such	  assertions	   are	   epistemically	   problematic”	   (Lackey	   2011,	   274).	   In	   line	  with	  Lackey,	  Carter	  and	  Gordon	  (2011)	  also	  argue	   that	   “	   ‘passing-­‐the-­‐buck’	  of	   criticism	   to	   the	  violation	  of	   some	  social	   role	  will	   only	   lead	   to	  having	  the	  buck	  passed	  right	  back	  to	  the	  epistemic	  shortcomings	  of	  the	  asserter	   who	   occupies	   such	   a	   role.	   This	   is	   because	   […]	   the	   relevant	  order	  of	  explanation	  is	  backwards”	  (2011,	  624).	  	  	  	  
Reply.	  Notice,	  first,	  that	  this	  paper	  does	  not	  explain	  the	  impropriety	  of	  the	   target	   assertions	   in	   terms	   of	   institutional	   norms,	   but	   the	   un-­‐cancellability	  of	  the	  generated	  implicature.	  	  	   That	   being	   said,	   I	   trust	   that	   Lackey	   is	   right	   on	   the	   order	   of	  explanation	   here.	   Notice,	   however,	   that	   this	   suggests	   a	   quantitative	  picture	   again.	   Plausibly	   enough,	   we	   designed	   the	   institutions	   in	   line	  with	   the	   stakes	   usually	   implied	   by	   their	   target	   concern.	   When	   the	  institution	   is	   in	   charge	   with	   informing	   you	   that	   you	   have	   cancer,	   its	  representatives	   should	   better	   be	   sure	   about	   it	   before	   proceeding.	  Journalism	  students	  are	  taught	  to	  corroborate	  information	  from	  at	  least	  three	   sources	  before	  publishing	   a	  piece	  of	   news,	   given	   the	   large-­‐scale	  impact	   it	   might	   have.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   writing	   recommendation	   letters,	  too,	   both	   the	   reputation	   of	   the	  writer	   and	   the	   student’s	   career	   are	   at	  stake.	  	   In	   contrast,	   isolated	   testimonial	   knowledge	   from	   an	   average	  source	   is	   surely	   pretty	   fine	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   assertion	   in	  many	   low	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stakes	  environments,	  like,	  say,	  companies	  providing	  cleaning	  services.	  I	  doubt	   that	   any	   such	   service	   provider	   would	   have	   to	   double	   check	  before	   telling	   me	   that	   my	   house	   has	   been	   cleaned,	   rather	   than	   just	  trusting	  the	  word	  of	  her	  employee.	  	  	   So	  it	  looks	  as	  if,	  again,	  we	  are	  just	  faced	  with	  a	  quantitative	  issue	  here;	  that	  is,	  the	  reliability	  of	  the	  source	  being	  in	  line	  with	  the	  stakes.	  If	  that	   is	   the	   case,	   if	   Lackey’s	   argument	   eventually	   boils	   down	   to	   a	  quantitative	  objection,	  her	  case	  is	  open	  to	  the	  same	  worries	  as	  Brown’s.	  	  	  	  
5.4	  Conclusion	  	  This	   chapter	   has	   argued	   that	   Brown’s	   quantitative	   worries	   regarding	  the	  amount	  of	  epistemic	  support	  needed	   for	  proper	  assertion	   in	  high-­‐stakes	  contexts	  need	  not	  concern	  the	  epistemic	  norm	  of	  assertion	  itself.	  	  	   I	   have	   also	   provided	   a	   quantitative	   explanation	   of	   Jennifer	  Lackey’s	  cases.	  Lackey	  thinks	  that	  isolated	  second-­‐hand	  knowledge	  will	  not	   always	   warrant	   assertion.	   I	   have	   argued	   that	   in	   her	   ‘expert	  testimony’	  cases,	  isolated	  second-­‐hand	  knowledge	  from	  a	  very	  reliable	  source	   warrants	   assertion,	   which	   suggests	   that	   what	   is	   at	   play	   is	  quantity	  (related	  to	  the	  high	  stakes	  of	  the	  featured	  context)	  rather	  than	  quality	   of	   support.	   I	   have	   then	   looked	   at	   Lackey’s	   cases	   involving	  aesthetic	   judgements	   and	   argued	   that	   they	   afford	   a	   straightforward	  Gricean	  explanation,	  and	  thus	  pose	  no	  problem	  for	  the	  sufficiency	  claim	  we	  are	  interested	  in.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




	  	  	  It’s	   time	   to	   take	   stock:	   this	   thesis	   has	   identified	   a	   widely	   assumed	  dilemma	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   accounting	   for	   the	   intuitive	   variability	   of	  proper	  assertion	  with	  practical	  stakes:	  it	  is	  commonly	  thought	  that	  one	  can	  either	  hold	  that	  knowledge	  is	  the	  norm	  of	  proper	  assertion	  and	  be	  a	  sensitivist	   about	   knowledge,	   or	   abandon	   KNA	   in	   favour	   of	   a	   context	  sensitive	   standard	   for	  proper	  assertability	   in	  order	   to	   remain	  under	  a	  Classical	   Invariantist	   umbrella	   (what	   I	   have	   dubbed	   the	   Shiftiness	  Dilemma).	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  Shiftiness	  Dilemma	  is	  a	  false	  dilemma,	  resting	   on	   an	   unmotivated	   normative	   assumption,	   i.e.	   the	   assumption	  that	  the	  felt	  variation	  in	  assertability	  with	  stakes	  is	  epistemic	  in	  nature	  (ESA).	   Further	   on,	   I	   have	   shown	   how,	   as	   soon	   as	   we	   give	   up	   this	  assumption,	   Classical	   Invariantism	   is	   perfectly	   compatible	   with	   KNA	  and	  put	  forth	  an	  independently	  motivated	  account	  that	  illustrates	  this.	  Furthermore,	   I	   have	   defended	   both	   the	   necessity	   and	   the	   sufficiency	  claim	  involved	  in	  KNA	  against	  the	  extant	  putative	  counterexamples.	  	  	   At	  this	  point,	  crucially,	  I	  still	  owe	  one	  thing	  to	  the	  reader:	  I	  need	  to	   provide	   reason	   to	   believe	   my	   account	   is	   preferable	   over	   counter	  candidate	   explanations	   of	   the	   contextualist	   data.	   After	   all,	   for	   all	   that	  has	  been	  said	  here,	  any	  empirically	  adequate	  alternative	  account,	  also	  enjoying	   some	  plausible	   independent	  motivation,	  will	   be	   just	   as	   good.	  This	  chapter	  attempts	  to	  rectify	  this	  situation;	  it	  argues	  that	  the	  account	  defended	  here	  deals	  better	  than	  the	  main	  competitors	  with	  the	  data	  at	  hand.	  	   In	   order	   to	   do	   that,	   I	   first	   have	   a	   very	   brief	   look	   at	   knowledge	  sensitivism	  and	  identify	  two	  ways	  in	  which	  Classical	  Invariantism	  is	  the	  preferable	   position	  when	   it	   comes	   to	   dealing	  with	   the	   normativity	   of	  assertion.	  	  	   Given	   that,	   and	   given	   that	   I	   take	   invariantism	   to	   have	   the	  advantage	  of	  being	  the	  default	  position	  anyway,	  I	  spend	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  chapter	   discussing	   competing	   classical	   invariantist	   views	   at	   length.	  First,	   I	   look	   at	   assertion	   sensitivism	   and	   argue	   that	   it	   conflicts	   with	  several	  fairly	  uncontroversial	  value	  theoretic	  assumptions;	  this,	  I	  argue,	  renders	  my	  account	  the	  preferable	  option	  on	  prior	  plausibility.	  	  	   Last	   but	   not	   least,	   I	   discuss	   the	   main	   classical	   invariantist	  knowledge	   norm-­‐friendly	   explanation	   of	   the	   contextualist	   data	  available	  on	  the	  market	  -­‐	  what	  I	  dub	  ‘the	  KK	  strategy.’	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6.1	  Knowledge	  Sensitivism	  	  
	  Recall	  that	  both	  Knowledge	  Sensitivism	  (SK)	  and	  Assertion	  Sensitivism	  (SA)	   aim	   to	   capture	   the	   Shiftiness	   Intuition,	   i.e.	   the	   intuitive	   stakes	  sensitivity	  of	  proper	  assertability.	  Both	  accounts	  take	  it,	  contra	  the	  view	  defended	   by	   this	   thesis,	   that	   the	   felt	   variation	   concerns	   epistemic	  propriety.	  Recall,	  also,	  that,	  for	  all	  that	  has	  been	  said	  so	  far	  in	  this	  thesis,	  the	  SK,	  SA	  and	  KNA	  explanations	  of	  the	  data	  are	  on	  a	  par.	  Now,	  if	  that	  is	  the	   case,	   bringing	   in	   theoretical	   considerations	   is	   the	  way	   forward	   in	  settling	  the	  issue.	  In	  what	  follows,	  I	  will	  try	  to	  do	  just	  that;	  I	  will	  point	  to	  some	   theoretical	   advantages	   that	   speak	   in	   favour	   of	   my	   view	   over	  sensitivism	  of	  both	  sorts.	  	   Let	   us	   begin	  with	  Knowledge	   Sensitivism.	  Recall	   that	   this	   view	  keeps	   the	   epistemic	   standard	   for	   proper	   assertion	   fixed	   –	   usually	  knowledge	   –	   and	   argues	   that	   the	   degree	   of	   warrant	   necessary	   for	  attributing/meeting	   it	   varies	   with	   practical	   context.	   Several	   positions	  defended	   in	   the	   literature	   belong	   here:	   contextualists	   claim	   that	  features	   of	   the	   attributor’s	   context	   affect	   the	   truth-­‐conditions	   of	  knowledge	   ascriptions	   (e.g.	   DeRose	   2002),	   while	   champions	   of	  pragmatic	  encroachment	  argue	  that	  having	  knowledge	  itself	  is	  affected	  by	  the	  subject’s	  practical	  situation	  (e.g.	  Hawthorne	  2004).	  	   According	  to	  champions	  of	  SK,	  due	  to	  change	  in	  practical	  context,	  as	   opposed	   to	   ASPIRIN	   1,	   in	   ASPIRIN	   2	   one	   fails	   to	   know	   the	   target	  proposition	  and,	  therefore,	  is	  not	  in	  a	  position	  to	  assert	  it.	  	  	   Now,	  crucially,	  note	  that	  according	  to	  contextualists	  themselves,	  invariantism	  is	  the	  default	  position;	  we	  need	  to	  be	  argued	  out	  of	  it:	  “we	  seem,	   if	   anything,	   to	   be	   ‘intuitive	   invariantists’”.	   According	   to	   Stewart	  Cohen	   (1999,	   78),	   for	   instance,	   “many	   resist	   [the	   contextualist]	   thesis	  —	  some	  fiercely.	  Moreover,	  those	  who	  do	  accept	  the	  thesis,	  generally	  do	  so	  only	  as	  a	  result	  of	  being	  convinced	  by	  philosophical	  reflection”.	  	   Considerable	   amounts	  of	   ink	  have	  been	   spilled	  on	  pointing	  out	  theoretical	   and	   empirical	   difficulties	   for	   both	   contextualism	   and	  pragmatic	  encroachment.86	  I	  will	  not	  rehearse	  these	  arguments	  here,	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  space.	  Also,	  I	  take	  it	  that,	  since	  the	  central	  concern	  of	  this	  thesis	   is	   with	   the	   normativity	   of	   assertion,	   out	   of	   the	   two	   sensitivist	  theories,	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  focus	  the	  discussion	  on	  the	  one	  that	  actually	  proposes	   a	   competing	   norm	   for	   this	   speech	   act,	   i.e.	   assertion	  sensitivism.	  	  	   What	  I	  will	  do,	  then,	  is	  only	  discuss	  two	  problems	  for	  knowledge	  sensitivism	  which	  speak	  in	  favour	  of	  combining	  a	  knowledge	  norm	  with	  
                                                86	  For	  a	  nice	  overview,	  see	  e.g.	  Rysiew	  (2016).	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a	  classical	  invariantist	  account	  in	  general,	  and,	  in	  particular,	  favour	  the	  account	  defended	  in	  this	  thesis.	  	  	  	  
6.1.1	  Two	  for	  Invariantism	  	  
1.	  The	   ‘Whose	  Stakes?	  Dilemma’:	  Recall	  that	  we	  have	  identified	  two	  positions	   under	   the	   knowledge	   sensitivist	   umbrella:	   contextualism	  about	   knowledge	   attributions	   and	   pragmatic	   encroachment.	   For	   the	  former,	   the	   relevant	   stakes	   are	   those	   of	   the	   attributor,	   while	   for	   the	  latter,	  the	  subject’s	  practical	  interest	  is	  what	  makes	  the	  difference.	  Now,	  as	   it	   so	   happens,	   the	   question	   regarding	   whose	   stakes	   matter	   will	  quickly	   lead	   SK	   into	   what	   I	   will	   call	   the	   ‘Whose	   Stakes?	   Dilemma’:	   if	  shiftiness	   depends	   on	   attributor’s	   stakes,	   the	   view	   notably	   divorces	  what	   it	   is	   to	  know	   from	  what	   it	   is	   to	  properly	  assert;	   (e.g.	  Hawthorne	  2004).	   That	   is	   because,	   while	   the	   relevant	   stakes	   for	   knowledge	  attribution	  will	  be	  those	  of	  the	  attributor,	  the	  relevant	  stakes	  for	  proper	  assertability	  will	  lie	  with	  the	  subject.	  	  	   To	   see	   why	   this	   is	   unfortunate,	   note	   that	   this	   puts	   the	  contextualist	   in	   the	  awkward	  position	   to	  have	   to	  accept	  statements	  of	  the	  form:	  ‘Louise	  knows	  that	  p.	  KNA	  is	  true	  and	  so	  if	  Louise	  knows	  that	  p,	   she	   may	   (epistemically)	   assert	   that	   p.	   However,	   Louise	   ought	  (epistemically)	  not	  assert	  that	  p’.	  	   On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  what	  matters	  are	  the	  stakes	  associated	  with	  the	  subject,	  SK	  fails	  to	  account	  for	  the	  independently	  plausible	  function	  of	   assertion	   of	   generating	   testimonial	   knowledge.	   After	   all,	   if	   the	   two	  parties,	   hearer	   and	   speaker,	   do	   not	   share	   stakes,	   knowledge	  transmission	  can	  fail.	  This	  will	  happen	  in	  cases	  where	  the	  stakes	  of	  the	  hearer	  are	  higher	  than	  those	  of	  the	  speaker.	  Whenever	  that	  is	  the	  case,	  the	  corresponding	  assertions,	  although	  epistemically	  proper,	  will	  fail	  to	  fulfil	   their	   epistemic	   function,	   in	   spite	   of	   the	   otherwise	   friendly	  environment.	  Furthermore,	  this	  difficulty	  also	  comes	  with	  an	  important	  theoretical	  burden	  on	  the	  shoulders	  of	  the	  SK	  defender:	  misfit	  with	  all	  extant	  accounts	  of	  testimonial	  knowledge,	  according	  to	  which	  whether	  knowledge	   gets	   generated	   by	   testimony	   is	   independent	   of	   pragmatic	  factors.87	  	  	   Now,	  one	  move	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  escaping	  the	  stakes	  dilemma	  that,	   at	   least	   at	   first	   glance,	   looks	   fairly	  promising,	   is	   the	  more	   recent	  contextualist	   suggestion	   that	   it’s	   the	   conversational	   purpose	   which	  determines	  whose	   stakes	   are	   relevant	   and	   this	   can	   vary	   between	   the	  attributer	  and	  the	  subject.	  John	  Greco	  (2010),	  for	  instance,	  has	  notably	  
                                                87	  See	  Lackey	  (2008)	  for	  an	  overview.	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defended	   a	   very	   flexible	   view	   on	   which	   even	   the	   interests	   of	   a	   third	  party	  can	  be	  the	  ones	  that	  matter.	  Will	  this	  kind	  of	  manoeuvre	  help	  the	  contextualist	   here?	   Alas,	   the	   answer	   is	   ‘no’.	   Here	   is	   why:	   think	   of	  DeRose	   in	   the	   high	   stakes	   bank	   case	   again:	   everything	   stays	   fixed,	  except	   that,	   after	   DeRose	   denies	   knowledge	   to	   himself,	   his	  wife	   asks:	  ‘How	  about	  calling	  Stew?	  He	  also	  has	  an	  account	  here,	  maybe	  he	  knows	  whether	   the	   bank	   is	   open	   on	   Saturdays”.	   Now,	   say	   that,	   as	  matter	   of	  fact,	   Stew	   has	   the	   exact	   same	   warrant	   as	   DeRose	   to	   believe	   that	   the	  bank	   is	   open	   on	   Saturdays:	   he’s	   been	   there	   two	  weeks	   ago.	   Say,	   also,	  that	  DeRose	  is	  aware	  of	  this.	  It	  looks	  as	  though,	  then,	  the	  natural	  thing	  to	  answer	  would	  be	  ‘No,	  he	  doesn’t	  know	  either’.	  Given	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  conversation,	   the	  stakes	  are	  definitely	  high.	  But	  now	  imagine	  that,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  Stew	  is	  in	  a	  low	  stakes	  bank	  case.	  Surely,	  it	  is	  perfectly	  fine	  for	  him	  to	  assert	  that	  the	  bank	  will	  be	  open	  on	  Saturday.	  Again,	  the	  contextualist	  divorces	  knowledge	  attribution	  from	  assertability.	  	  	   	  
2.	   Parsimony:	   SK	   champions	   are	   in	   need	   of	   explanations	   involving	  overriding	   norms	   anyway,	   for	   explaining	   further	   data.	   Given	   this,	   the	  account	  defended	  here	  is	  the	  most	  parsimonious.	  	   First,	   in	  situations	   in	  which	  the	  stakes	  of	   the	  hearer	  are	  higher,	  1)	   pragmatic	   encroachment	   needs	   to	   employ	   some	   explanation	  involving	  overriding	  anyway,	  in	  order	  to	  account	  for	  impropriety,	  while	  2)	  the	  explanation	  offered	  by	  contextualism	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  stand	  up	  to	   further	   linguistic	  scrutiny.	  To	  see	   this,	   take	   Jessica	  Brown’s	  AFFAIR	  case	  again;	  let	  us	  start	  with	  champions	  of	  pragmatic	  encroachment;	  first	  of	  all,	  what	  these	  philosophers	  will	  have	  to	  say	  about	  this	  case	   is	   that,	  given	   his	   low	   stakes,	   Friend	   does	   indeed	   know,	   and	   is	   therefore	   in	   a	  perfectly	  fine	  position	  to	  assert.	  If	  you	  are	  still	  not	  convinced,	  imagine	  a	  variation	   of	   the	   case	   where	   the	   knowledgeable	   individual	   is	   but	   an	  indifferent	  neighbour.	  Still,	  even	  so,	  it	  looks	  as	  if	  she	  should	  not	  assert	  it	  to	  poor	  Husband’s	  face	  for	  want	  of	  sufficiently	  strong	  evidence.	  	   Now,	  according	  to	  the	  functionalist	  picture	  I	  have	  put	  forth,	  this	  is	   but	   a	   straightforward	   case	   where	   the	   prudential	   function	   takes	  precedence	  over	  the	  epistemic	  one.	  Of	  course,	  there	  is	  nothing	  keeping	  pragmatic	  encroachers	  from	  explaining	  this	  case	  in	  a	  similar	  way.	  Note,	  however,	  that	  insofar	  as	  an	  account	  of	  overriding	  is	  employed	  anyway,	  it	   is	   not	   clear	   why	   we	   should	   not	   prefer	   a	   uniform,	   independently	  motivated	  picture	  like	  the	  one	  proposed	  here.	  After	  all,	   the	  alternative	  is	  a	  mixed	  account	  that	  still	  owes	  us	  an	  explanation	  as	  to	  why	  some	  of	  the	  cases	  put	  forth	  are	  cases	  of	  overriding,	  while	  others	  are	  cases	  where	  practical	  stakes	  affect	  whether	  you	  know.	  	   Let	   us	   then	  move	   on	   to	   contextualism.	   According	   to	   this	   view,	  what	  is	  going	  on	  in	  AFFAIR	  is	  that	  the	  relevant	  context	  to	  measure	  the	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propriety	   of	   Friend’s	   assertion	   against	   is	   one	   that	   is	   also	   partly	  ‘infected’	   by	   Husband’s	   stakes,	   which	   explains	   the	   epistemic	  impropriety	  of	  the	  assertion.	  	  	   Recall,	   though,	   that	   contra	   contextualism,	   my	   explanation	   in	  terms	   of	   prudential	   considerations	   stepping	   in	   and	   overriding	   the	  epistemic	   ones	   seems	   to	   also	   be	   supported	   by	   further	   linguistic	  considerations:	  surely,	  […]	  Friend	  […]	  has	  enough	  warrant	  to	  be	  pretty	  sure	   that	   she	  might	   be	   having	   an	   affair.	   Still,	   it	   still	   looks	   like	   Friend	  would	   better	   abstain	   from	   asserting	   the	   latter	   in	   the	   presence	   of	  Husband	  also	  (McGlynn	  2014,	  126).	  	  
	   Furthermore,	   second,	   SK	   champions	   will	   also	   be	   unable	   to	  explain	   urgency	   situations	   without	   appealing	   to	   overriding.	   Here	   is	  why:	   note	   that,	   roughly	   speaking,	   SK	   offers	   a	   directly	   proportional	  scheme	   for	   the	   association	   between	   stakes	   and	  knowledge/assertability.	   That	   is,	   the	   higher	   the	   stakes,	   the	   more	  warrant	   seems	   to	   be	  needed	   according	   to	   these	   views	   for	   knowledge,	  and	   therefore	   assertability,	   to	   be	   in	   place.	   Think,	   however,	   of	  Williamson’s	   TRAIN	   case:	   here,	   the	   relationship	   between	  stakes/urgency	  and	  assertability	  seems	  to	  work	  the	  other	  way	  around,	  that	   is,	   it	   looks	   as	   if	   assertability	   varies	   inversely	   proportionally	  with	  stakes/urgency.	  The	  more	  urgent	  it	  is	  for	  you	  to	  get	  to	  your	  destination,	  the	  lower	  the	  amount	  of	  warrant	  I	  need	  for	  making	  the	  corresponding	  assertion.	  	   As	  far	  as	  I	  can	  see,	  there	  is	  nothing	  in	  the	  SK	  scheme	  that	  enables	  them	  to	  explain	  this	  phenomenon.	  As	  such,	  again,	  it	  looks	  as	  if	  they	  will	  need	   an	   explanation	   in	   terms	   of	   overriding	   here	   and	   so	   are	   bound	   to	  sacrifice	  on	  two	  counts:	  parsimony	  and	  the	  general	  motivation	   for	   the	  view.	  	  	  
6.2	  WAMs	  	  For	   several	   people	   who	   like	   classical	   invariantism	   about	   knowledge	  attributions,	   the	   move	   from	   variation	   in	   assertability	   with	   stakes	   to	  contextualism	  or	  pragmatic	  encroachment	  seems	  rushed.	  As	  such,	  these	  authors	  venture	  to	  account	  for	  the	  Shiftiness	  Intuition	  under	  a	  classical	  invariantist	   umbrella	   by	   arguing	   for	   the	   context-­‐sensitivity	   of	   proper	  assertability.	   This	   move	   has	   become	   known	   in	   the	   literature	   as	   a	  Warranted	  Assertability	  Maneuver,	  or	  WAM	  for	  short.	  	  	   Now,	  there	  are	  two	  extant	  ways	  of	  being	  a	  WAM-­‐er:	  one	  can,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  hold	  the	  epistemic	  norm	  of	  assertion	  fixed	  –	  say,	  defend	  KNA	  –	   and	   argue	   that	   the	   source	   of	   variability	   pertains	   to	   what	   is	  pragmatically	   conveyed	   by	   the	   assertion	   in	   question	   rather	   than	   by	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what	   is,	   strictly	   speaking,	   said	   (e.g.	   Rysiew	   (2001),	   Brown	   (2006)).	  According	  to	  this	  view,	  in	  DeRose’s	  high	  stakes	  bank	  case,	  for	  instance,	  DeRose	   does,	   in	   fact,	   know	   that	   the	   bank	   will	   be	   open	   on	   Saturday.	  However,	   given	   the	   presumption	   of	   relevance,	   saying	   that	   he	   knows	  pragmatically	   conveys	   that	   he	   is	   able	   to	   exclude	   all	   the	   counter-­‐possibilities	  salient	  at	  the	  context	  –	  like,	   for	  instance,	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  bank	  having	  changed	  its	  hours.	  That,	  of	  course,	  would	  be	  false;	  this,	  according	   to	   the	   defenders	   of	   this	   line,	   is	   the	   source	   of	   the	  unassertability	  intuition	  in	  high	  stakes	  scenarios.	  Let	  us	  call	  this	  view	  a	  Pragmatic	  WAM.	  	   Alternatively,	  one	  can	  go	  for	  an	  epistemic	  WAM.	  The	  thought	  is,	  roughly,	   to	   explain	   the	   intuitive	   variability	   in	   propriety	   from	   one	  ASPIRIN	   case	   to	   the	   other	   by	   keeping	   the	   standards	   for	   knowledge	  fixed,	  and	  allowing	  that	  the	  degree	  of	  warrant	  for	  epistemically	  proper	  assertion	   varies	   with	   context	   (henceforth	   Assertion	   Sensitivism,	   or	  SA).88	  	  	   In	   this	   respect,	   thus,	   according	   to	   SA,	   although	   the	   speaker’s	  epistemic	   status	   remains	   unchanged	   in	   the	   two	   ASPIRIN	   cases,	   the	  assertion	  ‘I	  have	  aspirin	  at	  home’	  would	  not	  be	  epistemically	  proper	  in	  ASPIRIN	   2	   due	   to	   change	   in	   the	   relevant	   contextual	   features,89	  most	  likely	   related	   to	   the	   relevant	   stakes.	   That	   is,	   while	   the	   speaker	   does	  know	  that	  he	  has	  aspirin	  at	  home	  in	  both	  ASPIRIN	  1	  and	  ASPIRIN	  2,	  due	  to	  changes	  in	  context,	  it	  is	  only	  in	  the	  former	  that	  his	  relevant	  assertion	  would	  be	  epistemically	  proper.	  	  	   Now,	  note	  that,	  at	  first	  glance,	  the	  relevance	  of	  pragmatic	  WAMs	  to	   this	   thesis	   is	  somehow	  unclear;	  after	  all,	  what	   the	  defenders	  of	   this	  view	   want	   to	   say	   mainly	   concerns	   cases	   of	   assertions	   featuring	  knowledge	   attributions	   and	   tabled	   error	   possibilities.	   	   It	   is	   DeRose’s	  claim	   to	   know	   in	   conjunction	   with	   the	   raised	   counter-­‐possibility	   of	  changing	  hours	  that	  supposedly	  pragmatically	  conveys	  a	  falsehood,	  and	  
                                                88	  SA	   also	   comes	   in	   more	   than	   one	   variety;	   first	   there	   are	   people	   thinking	   that	  assertion	   is	   governed	   by	   a	   single	   epistemic	   norm,	   which	   stipulates	   that	   the	  appropriate	   amount	   of	   warrant	   for	   epistemically	   proper	   assertion	   varies	   with	  contextual	   features	   (e.g.	   Brown	   (2010),	   Gerken	   (2012),	   Goldberg	   (2015)	  McKinnon	  (2013),	   Rescorla	   (2009)).	   Another	   way	   to	   be	   a	   sensitivist	   about	   assertion	   is	   to	  stipulate	  several	  epistemic	  norms	  governing	  assertion,	  depending	  on	  the	  context	  (e.g.	  Greenough	   (2011),	  Levin	   (2008),	   Stone	   (2007)).	  The	   subtle	  differences	  between	   the	  above	   views	   are,	   however,	   to	   a	   large	   extent,	   irrelevant	   for	   now	   (but	   see	   the	   next	  section	   for	   refinements).	   That	   is	   because	   this	   paper	   dwells	   at	   a	   higher	   level	   of	  generality:	   what	   I	   am	   concerned	   with	   is	   the	   claim	   that	   epistemically	   proper	  assertability	   varies	   with	   practical	   stakes,	   no	   matter	   what	   triggers	   the	   variation	   in	  propriety	  in	  question.	  Insofar	  as	  these	  authors	  stand	  by	  this	  claim,	  they	  are	  the	  proper	  target	  of	  my	  argument.	  89	  It	   is	   fair	   to	   say	   that	   defenders	   of	   SA	   part	   ways	   on	   what	   the	   relevant	   contextual	  determiners	  are;	  that	  is,	  for	  some	  of	  them,	  practical	  concerns	  figure	  higher	  on	  the	  list	  (e.g.	   Gerken	   2012),	   while	   others	   (e.g.	   Goldberg	   2015)	   focus	   more	   on	   non-­‐practical	  context	  sensitivity.	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therefore	   triggers	   the	   impermissibility	   intuition.	   We	   have,	   however,	  seen	  that	   the	   intuition	  generalizes	   to	  merely	  asserting	   the	  proposition	  embedded	   in	   the	   knowledge	   attribution,	   and	   to	   high	   stakes	   cases	  featuring	  no	  tabled	  error	  possibilities.	  As	  such,	  one	  could	  think	  that	  we	  can	  leave	  the	  pragmatic	  WAM	  line	  aside.	  	  	   I	  will	  do	  just	  that,	  and	  focus	  on	  the	  epistemic	  incarnation	  of	  the	  view,	  shortly.	  However,	  before	  doing	  so,	  I	  want	  to	  consider	  one	  possible	  line	   the	   pragmatic	   WAM-­‐er	   might	   take	   in	   order	   to	   explain	   the	  generalized	  data.	  	  	  	  
6.2.1	  Pragmatic	  WAMs	  	  Consider,	   again,	   the	  ASPIRIN	   cases:	   say	   that,	   in	  ASPIRIN2,	   against	   the	  common	  sense	   intuition,	  you	  were	  to	  go	  on	  and	  tell	  your	  sister	   	   ‘don’t	  worry,	   I	  have	  aspirin	  at	  home’	  when	  it	   turns	  out	  her	  baby	  has	  a	   fever.	  Now,	   if	   knowledge	   is	   the	   norm	   of	   assertion,	   it	   is	   reasonable	   for	   your	  sister	  to	  believe	  that	  you	  know	  the	  content	  of	  your	  assertion.	  But	  then,	  if	  the	  pragmatic	  WAM-­‐ers	  are	  right,	  this	  implicature	  in	  itself	  should	  be	  able	   to	   generate	   the	   expectation	   that	   you	   can	   eliminate	   all	   error	  possibilities	  that	  are	  relevant	  at	  the	  context.	  Of	  course,	  none	  are	  strictly	  speaking	  tabled:	  no	  talk	  of	  counter-­‐possibilities	  is	  featured	  in	  the	  case.	  However,	   the	   WAM	   line	   could	   go,	   the	   set	   of	   relevant	   counter-­‐possibilities	  need	  not	  be	  made	  explicit,	  since	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  assume	  an	  implicit	  common	  set	  thereof,	  dependent	  on	  stakes.	  For	  instance,	  one	  obvious	  error	  possibility	  that	  plausibly	  becomes	  implicitly	  salient	  at	  the	  ASPIRIN2	  context	  is	  that	  you	  misremember	  having	  bought	  aspirin.	  	  	   Long	   story	   short,	   according	   to	   the	   envisaged	   pragmatic	   WAM	  generalized	   line,	   what	   happens	   in	   ASPIRIN2	   is	   that,	   by	   asserting	   that	  you	  have	  aspirin	  at	  home	  you	  imply	  you	  know	  that	  you	  have	  aspirin	  at	  home,	   which	   pragmatically	   conveys	   that	   you	   are	   able	   to	   dismiss	   the	  counter-­‐possibility	  of	  misremembering	  having	  bought	  it.	  Since	  it	  is	  false	  that	   you	   are	   in	   a	   strong	   enough	   position	   to	   dismiss	   this	   counter-­‐possibility,	  your	  assertion	  is	  improper,	  hence	  the	  intuition.	  	  	   A	   few	   things	  about	   this:	   first,	   if	   the	  pragmatic	  WAM-­‐er	   is	   right,	  miscommunication	  involved	  in	  high	  stakes	  linguistic	  exchanges	  should	  be	   an	   extremely	   common	   event.	   That	   is	   because,	  while	   it	   is	   plausible	  that	  some	  of	  the	  relevant	  counter-­‐possibilities	  brought	  into	  play	  in	  high	  stakes	   cases	   are	   going	   to	   constitute	   common	   ground	   for	   the	   parties	  involved,	  it	  is	  far	  from	  clear	  that	  everyone	  is	  going	  to	  entertain	  one	  and	  the	  same	  set	  thereof,	  and	  even	  less	  plausible	  that	  there	  is	  an	  objective	  matter	  of	  fact	  as	  to	  exactly	  which	  error	  possibilities	  become	  salient	  at	  a	  context,	  which	  we	  are	  all	  aware	  of	  implicitly.	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   Second,	  let	  us	  abstract	  for	  a	  bit	  from	  the	  nits	  and	  grits	  of	  this	  line	  in	  order	  to	  note	  that,	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  day,	  proper	  assertability	  does	  not	  seem	   to	   have	  much	   in	   common	  with	   error	   possibilities	   to	   begin	  with,	  but	  rather	  seems	  to	  vary	  with	  stakes	  alone.	  We	  have	  already	  seen	  that	  the	   necessity	   claim	   involved	   in	   this	   way	   of	   generalizing	   pragmatic	  WAMs	  runs	  into	  difficulties:	  unassertability	  seems	  to	  persist	  even	  in	  the	  absence	   of	   explicitly	   tabled	   error	   possibilities,	   and	   the	   attempt	   to	  rescue	  the	  view	  by	  going	  implicit	  seems	  empirically	   implausible.	  What	  about	   the	   corresponding	   sufficiency	   claim?	   To	   answer	   this	   question,	  consider	  the	  following	  cases	  adapted	  from	  (Turri	  2010,	  88):	  	  
High	   Door:	   Our	   family	   has	   just	   pulled	   out	   of	   the	   driveway,	   on	   the	  beginning	   of	   a	   week-­‐long	   vacation	   to	   New	   Hampshire’s	   White	  Mountains.	  We	   live	   in	   a	   relatively	   safe	   neighbourhood,	   but	   there	   has	  been	  a	  rash	  of	  burglaries	  lately.	  As	  we	  near	  the	  corner	  of	  our	  block,	  my	  wife	  asks,	  “Is	  the	  door	  locked?”	  I	  respond,	  “Yes,	  it’s	  locked.	  I	  remember	  turning	   the	   key	   and	   feeling	   it	   click.”	   “Maybe	   you’re	  mistaken;	   you	   do	  sometimes	   make	   mistakes,”	   she	   remarks,	   “so	   .	   .	   .	   I	   ask	   again:	   Is	   it	  locked?”	   “I	   think	  it’s	   locked,	  but	   I’d	  better	  go	  back	  and	  check,”	   I	   reply.	  “All	  right,”	  she	  says.	  	  	  
Low	   Door:	   Our	   family	   is	   taking	   a	   short	  walk	   to	   the	   corner	   to	   place	   a	  letter	   in	  the	  mailbox,	  which	  is	  within	  plain	  sight	  of	  our	  front	  door.	  We	  have	  a	  policy	  of	  locking	  our	  door	  when	  we	  leave	  the	  premises,	  and	  we	  prefer	   to	   follow	   through	   on	   our	   policies.	   As	   we	   reach	   the	   end	   of	   the	  driveway	  on	  our	  way	  to	  the	  mailbox,	  my	  wife	  asks,	  “Is	  the	  door	  locked?”	  I	   respond,	   “Yes,	   it’s	   locked.	   I	   remember	   turning	   the	   key	   and	   feeling	   it	  click.”	  “Maybe	  you’re	  mistaken;	  you	  do	  sometimes	  make	  mistakes,”	  she	  remarks	  “so	  .	  .	  .	  I	  ask	  again:	  Is	  it	  locked?”	  “It’s	  locked,”	  I	  reply.	  “All	  right,”	  she	  says.	  	  	  	   I	   share	   John	  Turri’s	   intuition	   that,	   in	  Low	  Door,	  both	  Turri	  and	  his	  wife	   are	   right	   to	  put	   the	  matter	   to	   rest.	   If	   that	   is	   true,	  however,	   it	  looks	   as	   though,	   at	   least	   in	   some	   cases,	   tabled	   error	   possibilities,	   in	  absence	  of	  raised	  stakes,	  are	  not	  very	  good	  at	  doing	  the	  work	  needed	  by	  pragmatic	  WAM-­‐ers,	   i.e.	  at	   triggering	  unassertability	   intuitions.	   Jessica	  Brown	   (2006)	   makes	   a	   similar	   point	   with	   regard	   to	   knowledge	  attributions:	  “[T]he	  likelihood	  and	  success	  of	  [an]	  attempt	  to	  resist	  the	  knowledge-­‐undermining	   tendency	  of	   a	  mentioned	   error	   is	   affected	  by	  whether	  the	  issue	  in	  question	  is	  practically	  important.”	  	  	   This,	   of	   course,	   should	  hardly	   come	  as	   a	   surprise:	   just	   because	  sceptical	  worries	  are	   ’in	  the	  air’	  while	  I	  write	  this	  epistemology	  thesis,	  for	   instance,	   it	   hardly	   follows	   I	   do	   not	   know	   and	   cannot	   assert	   that	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there	   is	   a	   computer	   in	   front	   of	   me.	   More	   is	   needed	   to	   trigger	  unassertability.	  	  	   In	  sum,	  the	  picture	  looks	  as	  follows:	  tabled	  error	  possibilities	  are	  neither	   necessary	   nor	   sufficient	   in	   generating	   unassertability.	   In	  contrast,	  stakes	  alone	  seem	  to	  do	  the	  trick.	  If	  that	  is	  the	  case,	  however,	  a	  plausible	  pragmatic	  WAM	  explanation	  of	  the	  generalized	  data	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  forthcoming;	  if	  that	  is	  the	  case,	  the	  relevance	  of	  the	  view	  for	  this	  thesis	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  minimal.	  	  	  
6.2.2	  The	  Real	  Problem	  with	  Epistemic	  WAMs	  	  Let	  us,	  then,	  move	  on	  to	  its	  epistemic	  cousin,	  assertion	  sensitivism.	  To	  begin	  with,	  here	  is	  a	  more	  precise	  version	  of	  the	  SA	  claim:90	  	  
Assertion	   Sensitivism	   (SA):	   The	   degree	   of	   warrant	   necessary	   for	  epistemically	   proper	   assertion	   varies	   with	   features	   of	   the	   practical	  context,	   while	   the	   degree	   of	   warrant	   necessary	   for	   knowledge	   stays	  fixed.	  	  And	   recall	   the	   fairly	   uncontroversial	   value-­‐theoretic	   claim	   concerning	  the	   relation	   between	   the	   axiological	   and	   the	   deontic	  we	   have	   seen	   in	  Chapter	  #1:	  	  
The	  Value	  Individuation	  Thesis	  (VIT):	  Norms	  of	  type	  X	  are	  associated	  with	  goods	  of	  type	  X.	  	  	   This	   section	   argues	   that,	   surprisingly	   enough,	   in	   spite	   of	   the	  widespread	   support	   they	   enjoy,	   SA	   and	   VIT	   are	   incompatible.	   To	   do	  this,	  I	  first	  look	  at	  the	  data	  that	  are	  taken	  to	  motivate	  SA.	  Further	  on,	  I	  spell	  out	  what	  the	  SA	  claim	  amounts	  to	  when	  taken	  in	  conjunction	  with	  VIT.	  As	   it	   turns	   out,	   if	   VIT	  holds,	   SA	   is	   untenable,	   for	   it	   collapses	   into	  knowledge	   sensitivism,	   which	   is	   what	   its	   champions	   were	   trying	   to	  avoid	   in	   the	   first	   place.	   Given	   just	   how	   popular	   VIT	   is	   among	   value	  theorists,	  I	  take	  this	  result	  to	  be	  especially	  worrying	  for	  the	  defender	  of	  SA;	  as	  such,	  I	  will	  then	  consider	  several	  ways	  out	  she	  might	  take.	  I	  argue	  they	  all	  fail.	  	   Let	   us	   start	   by	  noting	   that,	   according	   to	  VIT,	   prudential	   norms	  will	   be	   associated	   with	   prudential	   goods,	   moral	   norms	   will	   be	  
                                                90	  Again,	  many	  of	  the	  SA	  supporters	  (e.g.	  Gerken	  2012,	  Goldberg	  2015)	  do	  not	  restrict	  their	  claim	  to	  mere	  practical	  context;	  many	  other	  contextual	  determiners	  are	  taken	  to	  potentially	   affect	   the	   propriety	   of	   a	   given	   assertion.	   For	   the	   purposes	   of	   this	  dissertation,	  however,	  I	  am	  only	  discussing	  the	  more	  restricted	  claim.	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associated	  with	  moral	  goods,	  etc.	  Epistemic	  norms	  will	  thus	  go	  together	  with	  epistemic	  goods.	  	  Recall	   that	   VIT	   is	   pretty	   uncontentious	   from	   a	   value-­‐theoretic	  perspective.	  That	  is	  because	  the	  mere	  association	  claim	  between	  norms	  and	   goods	   of	   the	   same	   type	   does	   not	   imply	   any	   substantial	   value-­‐theoretic	   commitment;	   it	   holds	   on	   both	   the	   most	   notable	   views	  regarding	   the	   relationship	   of	   the	   good	   to	   the	   deontic.	   The	   teleologist	  explains	  the	  ‘ought’	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  ‘good’;	  according	  to	  this	  philosopher,	  the	  following	  is	  true:	  	  
VIT-­‐Teleology:	  Norm	  of	  type	  X	  are	  there	  to	  guide	  us	  in	  reaching	  goods	  of	  type	  X.	  	  	  The	  deontologist	  reverses	  the	  order	  of	  explanation:	  according	  to	  ‘Fitting	  Attitude’	  accounts	  of	  value,	  	  	  
VIT-­‐Deontology:	  Goods	  of	   type	  X	  are	  only	  valuable	  because	  norms	  of	  type	  X	  give	  us	  reasons	  to	  favour	  them.	  	  	  	   Anyhow,	  one	  way	  or	  another,	   the	  mere	  association	   claim	  holds.	  Let	   us	   now	   take	   a	   closer	   look	   at	   the	   SA	   proposal	   concerning	   the	  normativity	   of	   assertion	   and	   at	   how	   it	   fares	   in	   conjunction	  with	   VIT.	  First,	  what	  we	  are	  talking	  about	  is	  the	  epistemic	  norm	  of	  assertion.	  The	  question,	   then,	   becomes:	   what	   is	   the	   relevant	   epistemic	   good?	   Many	  authors	  (e.g.	  David	  (2005))	  regard	  truth	  as	  the	   fundamental	  epistemic	  good.	   The	   most	   prominent	   rival	   view	   in	   the	   literature	   takes	   it	   to	   be	  knowledge	  (Williamson	  (2000)).	  For	  our	  purposes	  here,	  in	  order	  to	  stay	  on	   the	   safe	   side,	   we	   will	   test	   the	   plausibility	   SA	   for	   both	   candidate	  goods.91	  Note,	  also,	   that	   the	  epistemic	   interest	  at	  stake	  can	  be	   thought	  to	  be	  both	  at	  the	  speaker	  and	  at	  the	  hearer’s	  end.	  As	  such,	  we	  will	  have	  to	  look	  on	  both	  sides.	  	  	   Let	  us	  start	  with	  teleological	  order	  of	  explanation.	  By	  VIT,	  then,	  SA	  proponents	  will	  also	  be	  committed	  to:	  	  	  
SA-­‐Teleology:	  The	  SA	  norm	  is	  there	  to	  guide	  one	  in	  reaching	  epistemic	  goods.	  	  	  	  
                                                91	  Note,	  also,	  that	  the	  argument	  can	  be	  run	  in	  a	  parallel	  fashion	  for	  a	  justification	  goal	  (and	  the	  results	  are	  likely	  to	  coincide	  with	  the	  results	  for	  the	  knowledge	  goal,	  insofar	  as	  what	   is	  meant	   is	   knowledge-­‐level	   justification).	  Also,	   see	   ‘Objections	   and	  Replies’	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  what	  is	  the	  case	  on	  the	  assumption	  of	  an	  epistemic	  goal	  that	  itself	  varies	  with	  practical	  stakes,	  such	  as	  ‘providing	  actionable	  information’.	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   Spelling	  out	  the	  norm,	  and	  on	  a	  truth	  goal	  assumption,	  then,	  we	  get:	  	  
SA-­‐Teleologytruth	   One	   should	   proportion	   the	   degree	   of	   warrant	  supporting	  one’s	  assertion	  to	  features	  of	  the	  practical	  context	  to	  the	  aim	  of	  making	  a	  true	  assertion/	  generating	  true	  belief	  in	  one’s	  hearer.	  	  	   But	   surely	  SA	  proponents	  would	  not	  want	   to	   stand	  behind	   this	  formulation,	   since	   it	   is	   blatantly	   false:	   pragmatic	   factors	   do	   not	  influence	   truth-­‐conduciveness.	   Also,	   here	   is	   Gerken,	   for	   one:	  “…epistemic	  warrant	  is	  determined	  by	  traditional	  truth-­‐related	  factors	  and	  not	  by	  pragmatic	  factors	  (Gerken	  2012,	  377).	  	   In	  the	  light	  of	  all	  this,	  maybe	  we	  should	  just	  move	  on;	  maybe	  the	  real	  problem	  is	   the	  truth	  goal.	  Let	  us	   take	  knowledge92	  to	  be	   the	  main	  epistemic	   good,	   then,	   and	   plug	   it	   into	   the	   SA-­‐Consequentialism.	   This	  will	  give	  us:	  	  
SA-­‐Teleologyknowledge	   One	   should	   proportion	   the	   degree	   of	   warrant	  supporting	  one’s	  assertion	  to	  features	  of	  the	  practical	  context	  to	  the	  aim	  of	  making	   a	   knowledgeable	   assertion/	   generating	   knowledge	   in	   one’s	  hearer.	  	  	   Unfortunately	   for	   the	   SA	   proponent,	   this	   formulation,	   although	  not	  strikingly	  false,	  amounts	  to	  what	  she	  was	  trying	  to	  avoid	  in	  the	  first	  place;	   that	   is,	   context	   sensitivity	   of	   knowledge.	   Here	   is	   how:	   in	   the	  speaker’s	  case,	  the	  route	  to	  SK	  is	  pretty	  straightforward:	  if,	   in	  order	  to	  come	  to	  know,	  the	  speaker	  is	  in	  need	  of	  more	  epistemic	  support	  in	  high-­‐stakes	   contexts	   than	   in	   low-­‐stakes	   ones,	   we	   are	   back	   in	   the	   SK	   yard.	  While	  on	  the	  hearer’s	  side	  a	  similar	  result	  might	  be	  less	  obvious,	  notice	  that	  what	   the	   claim	  amounts	   to,	   as	   a	  matter	  of	   fact,	   is	   that	   the	  hearer	  needs	   an	   epistemically	   better	   source	   in	   high-­‐stakes	   scenarios	   than	   in	  low	   stakes	   ones	   in	   order	   to	   gain	   knowledge.	   Surely,	   given	   the	   strict	  invariantist	  motivations	  behind	  SA,	  this	  is	  an	  unacceptable	  result,	  since	  it	   again	   collapses	   it	   into	   SK;	  what	   the	   SA	   claim	  would	   amount	   to	   is	   a	  view	  according	  to	  which	  one	  needs	  a	  degree	  of	  warrant	  that	  is	  suitable	  to	  one’s	  practical	  context	  in	  order	  to	  be	  knowledgeable.	  	   If	  that	  is	  the	  case,	  SA	  seems	  to	  not	  be	  very	  nicely	  compatible	  with	  a	  teleological	  value-­‐theoretic	  framework.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  this	  is	  rather	  unfortunate;	   after	   all,	   ideally,	   one	   does	   not	   want	   one’s	   preferred	  account	   of	   the	   normativity	   of	   assertion	   to	   commit	   one	   to	   very	  
                                                92	  Note	   that	   prominent	   defenders	   of	   CA	   (e.g.	   Goldberg	   2015)	   explicitly	   support	  generating	  testimonial	  knowledge	  as	  the	  main	  epistemic	  role	  of	  assertion.	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substantive	  value-­‐theoretic	  claims.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  some	  think	  that	  consequentialism	  is	  implausible	  on	  independent	  grounds,	  in	  which	  case	  the	   SA	   champion	   should	   not	   worry	   too	   much.	   Let	   us	   change	   the	  framework,	   then,	   and	   go	   for	   the	   deontological	   incarnation	   of	   the	  Association	  Claim.	  Consider,	  first:	  	  
SA-­‐Deontologytruth:	   Truth	   is	   an	   epistemic	   good	   because	   the	   SA	   norm	  gives	  us	  reason	  to	  favour	  it.	  	  It	   is	   a	   bit	  mysterious	   in	   virtue	   of	   what	   exactly	   SA	   gives	   us	   reason	   to	  favour	   truth	   rather	   than,	   say,	   falsehood.	   After	   all,	   it	   looks	   as	   though,	  independently	  of	  whether	   I	  am	  right	  or	  wrong	  about	  whether	  p	   is	   the	  case,	  according	  to	  SA,	  the	  important	  thing	  is	  that	  I	  don’t	  assert	  it	  unless	  I	  have	  a	  contextually	  appropriate	  amount	  of	  warrant.93	  As	  such,	  SA	  seems	  to	   be	   completely	   indifferent	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   whether	   I	   am	   in	  possession	   of	   the	   truth	   or	   not,	   and	   therefore	   fails	   to	   favour	   it	   in	   any	  way.	  	  	  
SA-­‐Deontologyknowledge:	   Knowledge	   is	   an	   epistemic	   good	   because	   the	  SA	  norm	  gives	  us	  reason	  to	  favour	  it.	  	  	  Again,	  this	  formulation	  is	  either	  false,	  or	  it	  collapses	  SA	  into	  SK.	  Recall	  that	  SA	  asks	  for	  less	  warrant	  in	  low	  stakes	  scenarios	  and	  more	  warrant	  in	   high	   stakes;	   as	   such,	   it	   gives	   us	   no	   particular	   reason	   to	   favour	  classical	   invariantist	   knowledge	   over	   other	   epistemic	   standings	  characterized	   by	   less,	   respectively	   more	   warrant. 94 	  If,	   however,	  knowledge	   itself	   is	   sensitive	   to	  practical	   context,	   as	   SK	  would	  have	   it,	  the	  SA	  norm	  is	  able	  to	  provide	  us	  with	  reason	  to	  favour	  it.	  	   To	   sum	   up,	   then:	   if	   the	   (extremely	   plausible	   and	   value-­‐theoretically	   innocent)	   VIT	   holds,	   SA	   comes	   out	   untenable.	   On	   both	  available	   VIT	   directions	   of	   explanation,	   in	   a	   truth-­‐goal	   framework,	   its	  claims	   turn	   out	   false,	   or,	   at	   least,	   highly	   implausible.	   In	   a	   knowledge-­‐goal	   framework,	   the	   position	   collapses	   into	   context	   sensitivity	   of	  
                                                93	  Of	  course,	  the	  SA	  champion	  could	  argue	  that,	  given	  that	  warrant	  is	  truth	  conducive,	  SA	  does	  give	  us	   (indirect)	   reason	   to	   favor	   truth.	  Note,	   though,	   that	   this	   reply	  would	  not	  do,	  in	  virtue	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  SA	  requirement	  is	  stronger	  than	  that:	  it	  does	  not	  merely	   ask	   for	   warrant,	   it	   asks	   for	   a	   contextually	   appropriate	   amount	   of	   warrant.	  However,	   given	   that	   the	   context	   under	   discussion	   is	   practical	   context,	   it	   is	   far	   from	  clear	  why	  this	  requirement	  gives	  us	  any	  reason	  in	  particular	  to	  favor	  truth.	  	  94	  Furthermore,	  given	  what	  we	  have	  seen	  above	  when	  discussing	  the	  truth-­‐involving	  formulation,	   not	   only	   does	   SA	   not	   give	   us	   reason	   to	   favor	   knowledge	   over	   other	  epistemic	  standings	  characterized	  by	  more	  or	  less	  warrant,	  but	  it	  even	  fails	  to	  give	  us	  reason	  to	  favor	  it	  over	  ‘bad’	  epistemic	  standings,	  such	  as,	  for	  instance,	  weakly	  justified	  false	  belief.	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knowledge,	  which	  was	  what	  its	  proponents	  were	  reacting	  against	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  	   Note,	   also,	   that	   if	   the	   SA	   proponent	  wants	   to	   take	   the	   obvious	  route	  out	  –	  i.e.,	  denying	  that	  VIT	  holds	  –	  she	  will	  either	  have	  to	  engage	  with	  a	  whole	  lot	  of	  value	  theory	  literature	  on	  the	  matter,95	  or	  she	  owes	  us	  very	  strong	  reasons	  to	  believe	  that	  epistemic	  normativity	   is	  special	  in	  this	  respect.	  	  	  	  
6.2.3	  Objections	  and	  Replies	  	  	  One	   reply	   that	  might	   come	   from	   the	   SA	   camp,	   though,	   could	   go	   along	  the	  following	  lines:	  the	  SA	  champion	  could	  argue	  that	  the	  variability	  in	  warrant	   is	  required	   for	  belief	  generation.	   In	  high	  stakes	  scenarios,	   the	  thought	  would	  go,	  the	  hearer	  might	  be	  extremely	  cautious	  and	  ask	  the	  speaker	   to	   back	   her	   assertion.	   In	   this	   case,	   being	   in	   possession	   of	   an	  amount	  of	  warrant	  appropriate	  to	  the	  situation	  would	  put	  the	  speaker	  in	   a	   position	   to	   be	   able	   to	   meet	   this	   demand,	   and	   thus	   successfully	  generate	  the	  relevant	  belief	  in	  her	  hearer.	  	  	   The	   problem	  with	   this	   move,	   however,	   is	   that,	   on	   the	   present	  formulation	   of	   SA,	   it	   will	   not	   do.	   That	   is,	   as	   it	   stands,	   SA	   only	   asks	  speakers	  to	  be	  in	  the	  possession	  of	  the	  relevant	  degree	  of	  warrant,	  not	  to	   also	   have	   access	   to	   it	   so	   as	   to	   be	   able	   to	   back	   their	   assertion	   if	  needed.	  	  	   Notice,	   also,	   that	   adding	   the	   necessary	   access	   requirement	  would	  render	  the	  view	  fairly	  implausible;	  after	  all,	  surely	  small	  children	  can	   produce	   epistemically	   proper	   assertions,	   in	   spite	   of	   the	   fact	   that	  they	  don’t	  have	  very	  well	  developed	  reflective	  capacities.	  Furthermore,	  most	  of	  our	  knowledge	  is	  stocked	  in	  memory	  and,	  for	  most	  of	  it,	  we	  do	  not	   really	   remember	   how	  we	   came	   to	   acquire	   it	   to	   begin	   with.	   I,	   for	  instance,	  surely	  do	  not	  remember	  how	  I	  got	  to	  know	  that	  Berlin	  is	  the	  capital	   of	   Germany.	   Does	   that	   mean	   I	   cannot	   make	   the	   relevant	  assertion?	  The	  answer,	  according	  to	  this	  new	  version	  of	  SA	  will	  have	  to	  be	  ‘no’.	  	  One	  option	  still	  available	  to	  the	  SA	  defender	  at	  this	  point	  would	  be	  to	  make	  the	  need	  for	  discursive	  justification	  context-­‐dependent	  also.	  Gerken’s	   view,	   for	   instance,	   explicitly	   requests	   that,	   in	   some	   contexts,	  but	  not	  all,	  one	  should	  be	  able	  to	  back	  one’s	  assertion	  with	  appropriate	  support.	  	  There	   are,	   however,	   good	   reasons	   to	   believe	   that	   Gerken’s	  prospects	  of	  avoiding	  the	  above	  problem	  for	  SA	  in	  this	  way	  are	  dim.	  To	  
                                                95	  For	  a	  nice	  overview,	  see	  Schroeder	  (2012).	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see	  this,	  let	  us	  take	  another	  look	  at	  the	  envisaged	  SA	  champion’s	  reply:	  the	   variability	   in	  warrant	   is	   required	   for	   belief	   generation,	   not	   for	   its	  truth.	  In	  high	  stakes	  scenarios,	  the	  hearer	  might	  be	  extremely	  cautious	  and	  ask	  the	  speaker	  to	  back	  his	  assertion.	  Were	  the	  speaker	  not	  able	  to	  do	  so,	  the	  hearer	  would	  not	  believe	  the	  content	  of	  the	  assertion,	  and,	  as	  such,	  the	  aim	  of	  generating	  of	  true	  belief/knowledge	  would	  be	  missed.	  Now,	  note	  that,	   for	  all	   is	  said	  above,	  we	  are	  dealing	  with	  a	  descriptive,	  empirical	  claim:	  the	  thought	  is	  that,	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  there	  is	  a	  chance	  that	   the	   hearer	   requests	   discursive	   justification	   for	   believing.	   But,	   of	  course,	  this	  cannot	  be	  what	   is	  meant	  to	  be	  relevant	  to	  the	  normativity	  claim	  of	  SA;	  after	  all,	  maybe	  hearers	  are	  not	  in	  their	  epistemic	  right	  to	  do	  so,	  in	  which	  case	  no	  obligation	  for	  the	  speaker	  should	  follow.	  Surely	  the	   SA	   defender	   does	   not	   want	   to	   say	   that	   any	   absurd	   claim	   hearers	  might	   have	   is	   going	   to	   affect	   the	   content	   of	   the	   epistemic	   norm	  governing	  speaker’s	  speech	  acts.	  	  	   What	   seems	   to	   be	   needed	   is	   a	   normative	   claim	   alongside	   the	  descriptive	   one;	   for	   any	   obligation	   to	   follow	   on	   the	   speaker’s	   side,	   it	  must	  be	  the	  case	  that,	  on	  top	  of	  them	  being	  in	  the	  habit	  to	  do	  so,	  hearers	  are	  also	  epistemically	  permitted	  to	  ask	  for	  discursive	  justification.	  This,	  however,	  will	   easily	  drive	   the	  SA	  defender	  back	   in	   the	   trouble	  he	  was	  trying	   to	  avoid	   to	  begin	  with.	  Here	   is	  how:	   the	  question	   that	  arises	   is:	  why	   is	   it	   that	   in	   high	   stakes	   scenarios,	   but	   not	   in	   low	   stakes,	   is	   the	  hearer	   permitted	   to	   ask	   for	   additional	   discursive	   warrant	   from	   the	  speaker	   in	   order	   to	   come	   to	   believe	   her	   assertion?	   Long	   story	   short,	  why	   is	   it	   that	   less	   warrant	   is	   sufficient	   for	   belief	   generation	   on	   the	  hearer’s	  side	  in	  low	  stakes	  than	  in	  high	  stakes?	  The	  answer	  needs	  to	  be:	  because	  such	  are	  the	  requirements	  of	  the	  norm	  of	  belief.	  Note,	  though,	  that,	  given	  that	  knowledge	  implies	  belief,	  from	  a	  pragmatic,	  shifty	  view	  of	  the	  norm	  of	  belief	  to	  knowledge	  sensitivism	  is	  but	  a	  short	  way	  to	  go.	  	  	   What	  SA	  seems	   to	  need	   is	  a	   complementary	  pluralistic	  account	  regarding	   the	  epistemic	   goal,	   tightly	   connected	   to	   contextual	  practical	  determiners.96	  That	   is,	   roughly,	   a	   view	   on	   which	   the	   epistemic	   goal	  varies	  with	  practical	  stakes,	  such	  as:	   the	  goal	  of	  assertion	   is	  providing	  actionable	  information.	  On	  such	  a	  view,	  variation	  in	  warrant	  for	  proper	  assertion	   would	   just	   track	   the	   variation	   in	   epistemic	   goal,	   which,	   in	  turn,	  would	   track	   the	   variation	   in	   epistemic	   needs	   given	   the	   practical	  context.	  To	  my	  knowledge,	  this	  view	  is	  still	  in	  need	  of	  defence	  in	  its	  own	  right,	  though,	  and	  thus,	  as	  things	  stand,	  it	  can	  hardly	  be	  employed	  to	  the	  support	   of	   SA.	   Furthermore,	   a	   few	   worries	   arise	   even	   from	   just	   this	  rough	  sketch.	  For	  instance,	  the	  defender	  of	  such	  an	  account	  will	  want	  to	  
                                                96	  Or,	   alternatively,	  on	   the	  deontological	   reading,	   an	  account	  where	  propriety	  by	   the	  epistemic	  norm	  co-­‐varies	  with	  propriety	  by	  the	  prudential	  one.	  Nothing	  hinges	  on	  this	  here:	  the	  problems	  identified	  for	  the	  teleological	  reading	  generalize.	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avoid	   the	   following	   result:	  on	  her	  view,	  given	   that	  epistemic	   concerns	  go	   hand	   in	   hand	   with	   practical	   concerns,	   asserting	   a	   falsehood,	   or	  something	   one	   has	   no	   justification	   whatsoever	   for,	   in	   return	   for	   1	  million	   dollars	  would	   be	   epistemically	   perfectly	   fine.	   That	   surely	   does	  not	   sound	   right.	   What	   the	   defender	   of	   this	   account	   will	   need,	   then,	  would	   be	   a	   principled	   way	   to	   separate	   the	   ‘good’	   prudential	  considerations	   from	   the	   ‘bad’	   ones.	   I	   submit	   that	   there	   is	   no	   easy	  answer	  for	  this	  problem	  I	  sight.	  	   Furthermore,	  holding	  this	  practical-­‐context	  sensitive	  view	  about	  the	   epistemic	   goal	   in	   general	   will,	   again,	   get	   SA	   into	   trouble	   when	   it	  comes	   to	  belief;	   that	   is,	   SA	  will,	   once	  more,	  be	   in	  danger	  of	   collapsing	  into	   SK,	   if	   the	   goal	   of	   belief	   also	   varies	  with	   practical	   factors.	   On	   the	  other	   hand,	   restricting	   the	   view	   to	   assertion	   seems	   like	   an	   ad	   hoc	  manoeuvre.	  	  	   One	   last	   option	   for	   the	   SA	   defender	   that	   still	   needs	   to	   be	  discussed	  is	  her	  possible	  retreat	  from	  direct	  to	  indirect	  practical	  stakes	  sensitivity.	   According	   to	   this	   account,	   the	   reason	   why	   we	   need	  more	  warrant	   in	   high	   stakes	   than	   in	   low	   stakes	   is	   because	   more	   error	  possibilities	   become	   salient.	   As	   such,	   proper	   assertability	   is	   only	  indirectly	  sensitive	  to	  practical	  stakes,	  through	  its	  being	  sensitive	  to	  the	  (genuinely)	   epistemic	   need	   for	   dismissing	   salient	   error	   possibilities.	  Patrick	  Greenough	  (2011)	  defends	   this	  view.	  According	   to	  Greenough,	  assertion	  is	  governed	  by	  different	  norms	  in	  high	  stakes	  and	  low	  stakes	  scenarios.	   That	   is,	   in	   high	   stakes,	   but	   not	   in	   low	   stakes,	   the	   speaker	  must	   also	   be	   able	   to	   cite	   explicit	   evidence	   against	   all	   contextually	  salient	  not-­‐p	  possibilities.	  	  	   The	   assumption	   that	   needs	   be	   discussed	   here,	   however,	   is	   the	  claim	   that	   this	   need	   is	   a	   genuinely	   epistemic	   one.	   To	  what	   epistemic	  aim,	  does	  one	  need	  to	  be	  able	  to	  dismiss	  the	  relevant	  error	  possibilities?	  One	   plausible	   answer	   is	   that	   the	   latter	   constitute	   themselves	   in	  normative	  defeaters	  and,	  as	  such,	  the	  hearer	  (epistemically)	  should	  not	  believe	   the	   speaker’s	   assertion	   unless	   suitable	   defeater	   defeaters	   are	  offered.	   This	   reply,	   indeed,	   seems	   to	   steer	   clear	   of	   any	   pragmatic	  normative	   consequences	   for	  belief.	  Note,	   however,	   that	   this	   reply	  will	  not	  do	   its	   job	   in	  supporting	  SA’s	  claim	  against	  KNA,	   i.e.	   the	  claim	  than	  more	   than	   knowledge	   is	   needed	   in	   high	   stakes	   context	   for	   proper	  assertability.	  After	  all,	  plausibly	  enough,	  the	  same	  normative	  defeaters	  that	  forbid	  the	  hearer	  from	  believing	  will	  also	  (normatively)	  act	  on	  the	  speaker’s	   epistemic	   standing.	  As	   such,	   the	  defender	  of	  KNA	  can	  easily	  help	  herself	  to	  the	  same	  explanation	  of	  the	  Shiftiness	  Intuition	  here:	  the	  reason	   why	   the	   speaker	   needs	   to	   be	   able	   to	   dismiss	   relevant	   error	  possibilities	  constituting	  themselves	  in	  normative	  defeaters	  is	  because,	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otherwise,	  he	  fails	  to	  have	  knowledge,	  and	  therefore	  is	  not	  permitted	  to	  assert	  by	  KNA.	  	  	   One	   last	   thing	   about	   this:	   the	   SA	   conflict	   with	   VIT	   is	   hardly	  benign	  and	  isolated:	  its	  consequences	  loom	  large	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  SA	   fit	  with	   the	   general	   theory	   of	   the	   normativity	   of	   action.	   Recall,	   for	  instance,	   that	  we	   have	   seen	   that,	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   action	   in	   general,	  overriding	   norms	   can	   either	   make	   my	   token	   action	   all-­‐things-­‐considered	   inappropriate,	   even	   though	   the	   norm	   we	   are	   concerned	  with	   is	   respected	   (Override	   1),	   or	   else	   modify	   the	   standards	   for	   all-­‐things-­‐considered	   proper	   token	   action	   up	   or	   down,	   when	   what	   is	   at	  stake	   is	   a	   gradable	   property	   (Override	   2).	   Also,	   uncontroversially,	  assertion	  is	  a	  type	  of	  action,	  and	  justification	  is	  a	  gradable	  property.	   If	  that	  is	  the	  case,	  again,	  unless	  we	  are	  given	  good	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  epistemic	   normativity	   differs	   from	   other	   types	   of	   normativity	   in	   this	  respect,	  we	  should	  expect	  norms	  pertaining	  to	  the	  normativity	  of	  action	  in	   general,	   like	   prudential	   or	  moral	   norms,	   to	   be	   able	   to	   override	   the	  epistemic	   norm	   we	   are	   talking	   about	   in	   both	   ways	   identified	   above.	  And,	  indeed,	  that	  is	  exactly	  what	  my	  account	  predicts.	  	  	   Note	  that	  the	  champion	  of	  SA	  will	  have	  trouble	  accommodating	  Override	  2.	  After	  all,	   according	   to	   this	   fellow,	   it	   is	   the	  epistemic	  norm	  that	   asks	   for	  more	  warrant	   in	   high	   stakes	   rather	   than	   low	   stakes.	   As	  such,	   the	  epistemic	  and	  the	  prudential	  norm	  go	  hand	  in	  hand	  in	  being	  sensitive	   to	  practical	  matters.	   	  This,	  however,	  seems	  to	   turn	  epistemic	  normativity	   into	   an	   odd	   bird;	   as	   such,	   the	   SA	   proponent	   owes	   us	   an	  explanation	  of	  this	  oddness.	  	  	  
6.3	  The	  KK	  Strategy	  	  In	  the	  Introduction	  to	  Chapter	  1,	  I	  mentioned	  that,	  while	  a	  vast	  majority	  of	   philosophers	   assume	   the	   sensitivity	   dilemma,	   there	   are	   also	   a	   few	  exceptions	  to	  the	  rule.	  One	  strategy	  to	  defend	  an	   invariantist	  KNA	  has	  been	   to	   argue	   for	   a	   need	   of	   higher	   order	   knowledge	   in	   contextualist	  cases.	   Tim	  Williamson	   (2005a,	   2005b),	   notably,	   defends	   such	   a	   view.	  Roughly,	  the	  thought	  is	  that	  high	  stakes	  require	  one	  to	  stay	  on	  the	  safe	  side	   and	   know	   that	   they’re	   meeting	   the	   condition	   for	   proper	  assertability	   before	   going	   ahead	  with	   it.	   Since	   knowledge	   is	   the	   norm	  for	  assertion,	  what	  is,	  according	  to	  Williamson,	  expected	  from	  speakers	  in	   high	   stakes	   scenarios	   is	   that	   they	   know	   that	   they	   know	   before	  making	  an	  assertion	  (henceforth	  KK).	  	  	   In	   a	   similar	   vein,	   John	  Turri	   (2010)	   argues	   that,	   in	   high	   stakes	  contexts	  the	  speech	  act	  that	  is	  in	  fact	  being	  performed	  is	  no	  longer	  mere	  assertion,	  but	  an	  epistemically	   ‘more	  expensive	  one’,	   the	  speech	  act	  of	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guaranteeing.	   The	   proper	   performance	   of	   the	   latter,	   Turri	   (2014)	  argues,	  requires	  more	  than	  just	  knowledge:	  one	  needs	  to	  know	  that	  one	  knows	  in	  order	  to	  be	  in	  a	  proper	  epistemic	  position	  for	  guaranteeing.	  	  	   This	  section	  takes	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  the	  KK	  strategy;	  since	  whether	  the	   need	   of	   KK	   is	   sourced	   in	   speech	   act	   variation	   or	   not	  makes	   little	  difference	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	   this	   paper,	   I	   will	   only	   look	   at	   the	  Williamsonian	  view.	  However,	  a	  vast	  majority	  of	  the	  results	  below	  –	  in	  particular	  the	  necessity	  and	  sufficiency	  worries	  in	  section	  6.1.2,	  equally	  apply	  to	  the	  Turri	  line.	  	   One	   thing	  before	  we	  go	  ahead:	  note	   that,	   strictly	   speaking,	   this	  thesis	   assumes	   an	   extremely	   friendly	   position	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   all	  invariantist	   KNA-­‐friendly	   accounts.	   After	   all,	   as	   announced	   from	   the	  very	   introduction,	   the	   aim	  here	   is	   to	   escape	   the	  dilemma,	   and	   thus	   to	  show	  that	  we	  can	  reap	  all	  the	  theoretical	  benefits	  of	  both	  KNA	  and	  CI.	  If	  it	  turns	  out	  there	  is	  more	  than	  one	  workable	  path	  out	  of	  the	  shiftiness	  worry,	   so	   much	   the	   better.	   And	   indeed,	   in	   what	   follows,	   rather	   than	  trying	  to	  knock	  down	  my	  opponents,	  what	  I	  will	  do	  is	  try	  to	  show	  why	  the	  account	  put	  forth	  here	  enjoys	  a	  higher	  degree	  of	  plausibility.	  	  	  
6.3.1	  Williamson’s	  ‘No	  Luminosity’	  	  	  According	  to	  Tim	  Williamson,	  contextualist	  cases	  are	  but	  a	  symptom	  of	  the	   good	   old	   lack	   of	   luminosity	   problem	   for	   knowledge.	   Here	   is	   how:	  according	  to	  Williamson	  (2000),	  any	  non-­‐trivial	  condition	  –	  knowledge	  included	   –	   is	   non-­‐luminous,	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   it	   allows	   for	   borderline	  cases	  where	  it	  barely	  obtains,	  such	  that	  one	  is	  not	  in	  a	  position	  to	  know	  that	   it	  does.	  When	  I	  barely	  make	  the	  threshold	  for	  knowledge,	   I	   fail	   to	  know	   that	   I	   know	   it	   due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	  my	  belief	   that	   I	   do,	   although	  true,	  is	  unsafe:	  it	  could	  have	  easily	  been	  false.	  	   Now,	  according	  to	  (Williamson	  2005a),	  this	  failure	  of	  luminosity	  is	   precisely	   what	   the	   contextualist	   exploits	   with	   the	   cases	   she	   puts	  forth.	   In	  the	  both	  of	  the	  bank	  cases,	   for	   instance,	  while	  having	  been	  to	  the	  bank	   last	  Saturday	   is	  good	  enough	  warrant	   to	  know	  that	   the	  bank	  will	   be	   open	   this	   Saturday	   too,	   it	   only	   barely	  meets	   the	   standard	   for	  knowledge.	  	  	   Now,	   according	   to	   Williamson,	   strictly	   speaking,	   all	   that	   is	  needed	   for	   proper	   action	   –	   assertion	   included	   –	   is	   first	   order	  knowledge.	  However,	  when	  the	  stakes	  are	  high,	  we	  tend	  to	  find	  people	  who	  act	  without	  knowing	  that	  they	  meet	  the	  condition	  for	  proper	  action	  blameworthy	  for	  so	  doing:	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How	  harshly	   should	  we	   judge	   practical	   reasoning	   in	  which	  the	  agent	  relies	  on	  an	  appropriate	  premise	  without	  being	  in	  a	  position	   to	  know	  that	   it	   is	  appropriate?	  A	  natural	  answer	  is:	   it	  depends	  on	  how	  much	   is	  at	  stake.	   If	  not	  much,	   then	   it	  seems	  unreasonably	  pedantic	  to	  condemn	  the	  reasoning.	  But	  if	  matters	  of	   life	  and	  death	  are	  at	  stake,	   the	  charge	  that	   the	  agent	  was	   not	   in	   a	   position	   to	   know	   that	   the	   premise	  was	  appropriate	  becomes	  more	  serious	  (Williamson2005a,	  232).	  	  	  Furthermore,	  even	  second	  order	  knowledge	  might	  not	  be	  enough,	  if	  the	  relevant	   stakes	   are	   sufficiently	   high:	   the	   higher	   the	   stakes,	   the	   more	  iterations	   of	   knowledge	   may	   be	   expected	   from	   agents,	   on	   pain	   of	  blameworthiness.	  Now,	  he	  case	  of	  assertion	  is,	  according	  to	  Williamson,	  but	  an	   instance	  of	   the	  above.	  Therefore,	   in	  what	   follows,	   I	  will	  restrict	  my	  discussion	  accordingly.	  	  	   Let	   us	   unpack	  Williamson’s	   explanation,	   for	   easiness	   of	   use;	   it	  looks	  as	  though	  there	  are	  two	  conjoined	  claims	  at	  work	  in	  his	  account:	  	  
No	  Luminosity:	  Contextualist	  cases	  are	  borderline,	  non-­‐luminous	  cases	  of	  knowledge.	  	  
Blameworthiness:	   Agents	   who	   assert	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   the	  contextually	   appropriate	   higher	   order	   knowledge	   that	   they	   meet	   the	  condition	  for	  proper	  assertion	  are	  blameworthy	  for	  so	  doing.	  	  	  According	   to	   Williamson,	   No	   Luminosity,	   in	   conjunction	   with	  Blameworthiness,	   explains	   the	   Shiftiness	   Intuition.	   Strictly	   speaking,	  you	  know	  that	  you	  have	  aspirin	  at	  home	  in	  both	  the	  ASPIRIN	  cases.	  As	  such,	   according	   to	   the	   norm	   of	   assertion,	   you	   are	   permitted	   to	   assert	  that	   you	   have	   aspirin	   at	   home.	  However,	   your	  memorial	   belief	   barely	  makes	  the	  threshold	  for	  knowledge,	  and	  thus,	  in	  both	  cases,	  you	  fail	  to	  know	  that	  you	  know,	  and	  therefore	  you	  fail	  to	  know	  that	  your	  assertion	  is	   appropriate.	   Now,	   in	   Williamson’s	   view,	   it	   would	   be	   rather	  unreasonable	  to	  insist	  that	  you	  should	  have	  second	  order	  knowledge	  in	  the	  low	  stakes	  ASPIRIN	  case.	  However,	  given	  that	  you	  don’t	  know	  that	  you	   are	   meeting	   the	   condition	   for	   properly	   asserting,	   it	   seems	  unacceptable	  to	  do	  so	  in	  ASPIRIN	  2,	  where	  your	  nephew’s	  health	  hinges	  on	  it.	  	  	   Here	   are	   some	   general	   worries	   I	   have	   about	   Williamson’s	  strategy.	  Recall	  that	  according	  to	  Williamson,	  the	  higher	  the	  stakes,	  the	  higher	   the	   order	   of	   knowledge	   that	   is	   required	   for	   blamelessly	  acting/asserting.	   Furthermore,	   according	   to	   him,	   in	   practice	  we	   often	  have	  enough	  iterations	  of	  knowledge	  to	  withstand	  the	  interrogations	  to	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which	   it	   is	   reasonable	   to	   respond.	   Now,	   one	   question	   that	   arises	  concerns	  the	  empirical	  plausibility	  of	  this	  picture;	  that	  is,	  how	  plausible	  is	   it	   that	   humans	   have	   such	   an	   extended	   capacity	   for	   higher	   order	  thought,	  as	  to	  cover	  the	  full	  range	  of	  stakes	  variability?	  Sure,	  one	  might,	  on	  most	   occasions,	   have	   warrant	   to	   believe	   that	   one	   knows	   that	   one	  knows	  that	  one	  knows	  that	  one	  knows,	  for	  instance;	  how	  plausible	  is	  it,	  though,	   that	   we	   actually	   have	   the	   mental	   capacity	   to	   form	   the	  corresponding	   belief?	   But	   if	   it	   turns	   out	   that	   human	   higher	   order	  capacities	  are	  limited	  to	  a	  small	  number	  of	  iterations	  of	  knowledge,	  one	  question	  that	  arises	  is	  whether	  the	  Williamsonian	  picture	  is	  rich	  enough	  to	  cover	  a	  plausibly	  fine	  grained	  scale	  of	  stakes.	  	  	  	  	  
6.1.2	  KK:	  Necessity	  and	  Sufficiency	  Worries	  	  For	  now,	  let	  us	  leave	  the	  issue	  of	  empirical	  adequacy	  aside,	  though,	  and	  look	  more	  closely	  at	  the	  two	  claims	  that	  we	  have	  identified	  above.	  Take,	  first,	  No	  Luminosity:	   note	   that,	   crucially,	   the	   only	   reading	   on	  which	   it	  will	  be	  able	  to	  do	  the	  intended	  work	  is	  a	  necessity	  claim:	  contextualist	  cases	   need	   be	   borderline	   cases	   of	   knowledge	   in	   order	   to	   trigger	   the	  Shiftiness	   Intuition.	   Otherwise,	   if	   the	   Shiftiness	   Intuition	   persists	   for	  clear	   cases	   of	   knowledge,	   the	   entire	   non-­‐luminosity	   argument	   falls	  apart,	   since	   it’s	   no	   longer	   plausible	   that	   second	   order	   knowledge	   is	  really.	  	  	   However,	  on	  this	  reading,	  No	  Luminosity	  loses	  a	  lot	  of	  its	  appeal;	  Jessica	  Brown	   (2005)	  puts	   forth	   clear	   cases	  of	  knowledge	   that	   trigger	  the	   same	   intuition	   of	   variability	   with	   stakes.	   Of	   course,	   if	   the	  contextualist	  employs	  such	  a	  case,	  we	  have	  little	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  subject	  knows	  without	  knowing	  that	  she	  knows.	  Here	  is	  Brown:	  	  
LO:	  [S]uppose	  that	  Lo	  truly	  believes	  that	  the	  seaweed	  in	  front	  of	  her	  is	  correctly	   classified	   as	   of	   type	   F,	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   testimony	   of	   an	  accompanying	   expert.	   She	   has	   no	   reason	   to	   doubt	   the	   expert's	  competence	  and	  the	  expert	  is	  in	  fact	  reliable	  (Brown	  2005,	  323).	  	  	  According	  to	  Brown,	  LO’s	  warrant	  is	  well	  above	  the	  ordinary	  standards	  for	   knowledge.	   Therefore,	   on	   a	   non-­‐sceptical	   invariantist	   view,	   Lo	  knows	   that	   the	   seaweed	   is	   of	   type	   F	   and,	   since	   her	   knowledge	   is	   not	  borderline,	   it	   is	  also	  plausible	   to	   think	  that	  she	  knows	  that	  she	  knows	  this.	  It	  also	  seems	  correct	  for	  her	  to	  say	  'I	  know	  that	  the	  seaweed	  is	  of	  type	  F'	  and	  to	  use	  the	  relevant	  proposition	  in	  practical	  reasoning.	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HI:	  Hi	  is	  in	  the	  same	  epistemic	  position	  as	  Lo;	  she	  truly	  believes	  that	  the	  seaweed	  in	  front	  of	  her	  is	  correctly	  classified	  as	  of	  type	  F	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	   testimony	   of	   an	   accompanying	   [reliable]	   expert	   […].	   However,	   [in	  her	   context],	   […]	   seaweed	  F	   could	   rapidly	   come	   to	  dominate	   the	   local	  seaweed	  population,	   leading	   to	   loss	   of	   the	  marine	  diversity	   for	  which	  the	  area	  is	  internationally	  renowned.	  The	  only	  way	  to	  prevent	  this	  loss	  would	  be	  a	  hugely	  expensive	  clean-­‐up	  programme	  which	  would	  require	  closure	  of	  nearby	  tourist	  resorts.	  Further,	  in	  Hi's	  context,	  various	  error	  possibilities	  have	  been	  raised,	  such	  as	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  expert	  is	  mistaken	  ('Experts	  do	  sometimes	  make	  mistakes')	  (Brown	  2005,	  323).	  	  	  It	  looks	  as	  though	  in	  HI,	  but	  not	  in	  LO,	  it	  is	  inappropriate	  to	  assert	  ‘The	  seaweed	  is	  of	  type	  F'	  or	  to	  rely	  on	  the	  proposition	  that	  the	  seaweed	  is	  of	  type	  F	  in,	  say,	  deciding	  whether	  to	  close	  the	  local	  resort.	  Furthermore,	  it	  looks	  as	  though	  Hi	  should	  make	  further	  checks	  by	  asking	  one	  or	  more	  other	  experts	  for	  their	  opinion.	  	   Now,	  Williamson	  suggest	  that	  his	  account	  is	  able	  to	  handle	  such	  cases	  by	  making	  use	  of	  the	  contextual	  variability	  of	  needed	  higher	  order	  knowledge.	   That	   is,	   in	  Brown’s	   cases,	   in	   spite	   of	   being	   in	   a	   fairly	   nice	  epistemic	  situation,	  Hi	  still	  misses	  the	  contextually	  appropriate	  amount	  of	   iterations	  of	  knowledge:	  “[...]	   if	   the	  stakes	  are	  high	  enough,	  prudent	  human	   agents	  will	   engage	   in	   third-­‐order	   reasoning	   about	  whether	   to	  trust	   their	   second-­‐order	   reasoning	   about	  whether	   to	   trust	   their	   first-­‐order	  reasoning”	  (2005,	  233).	  	  	   One	   problem	  with	   this	   reply,	   however,	   is	   that	   it	   leads	   straight	  into	  scepticism	  about	  actionability	  and	  assertability	  alike.	  After	  all,	  Hi’s	  warrant	  seems	  to	  be	  way	  above	  the	  ordinary	  threshold	  for	  knowledge.	  We	   do	   not	   usually	   know	  what	  we	   know	   from	   experts	   in	   the	   relevant	  fields:	  I	  don’t	  know	  I	  live	  close	  to	  the	  train	  station	  from	  an	  expert	  in	  the	  geography	  of	  my	  town,	  nor	  do	  I	  know	  that	  I	  am	  wearing	  a	  coat	  from	  a	  fashion	  expert.	  But	   if	  Hi’s	  epistemic	  position	  is	  much	  better	  than	  mine	  ordinarily	   is,	   and,	   in	   spite	   of	   this,	   she	   still	   misses	   the	   appropriate	  iteration	  of	  knowledge	  to	  act/assert	  in	  high	  stakes	  contexts,	  then	  so	  do	  I.	  As	  such,	  if	  Williamson	  is	  right,	  I	  cannot	  tell	  you	  I	  am	  wearing	  a	  coat	  in	  a	  context	  where	  the	  stakes	  are	  high	  (or,	  to	  be	  more	  precise,	  as	  high	  as	  in	  HI),	  nor	  can	  I	  count	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  I	  live	  close	  to	  the	  station	  in	  deciding	  when	   to	   leave	   the	   house.	   This,	   to	   say	   the	   least,	   does	   not	   sound	  intuitively	  right.	  	  	   On	  top	  of	  all	  this,	  in	  spite	  of	  its	  initial	  plausibility,	  at	  a	  closer	  look,	  Williamson’s	  Blameworthiness	  thesis	  does	  not	  stand	  so	  tall	  either.	  First	  and	  foremost,	  there	  are	  reasons	  to	  believe	  that	  it	  is	  much	  too	  strong,	  for	  reasons	   pertaining	   to	   actionability/assertability	   in	   the	   case	   of	  cognitively	   unsophisticated	   agents.	   Take	   small	   children,	   for	   instance:	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their	  capacity	  for	  second	  order	  thought	  is,	  to	  say	  the	  least,	  questionable,	  and	  anything	  higher	  than	  second	  order	  is	  highly	  unlikely	  to	  be	  present.	  However,	  it	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  the	  case	  that	  they	  cannot	  assert	  in	  high	  stakes	  scenarios.	  	  	   One	  way	  for	  Williamson	  to	  avoid	  this	  result97	  would	  be	  to	  claim	  that	   (1)	  one	  cannot	  assert	  without	  having	   the	  concept	  of	  knowledge	  –	  maybe	  in	  virtue	  of	  KNA	  being	  constitutive	  of	  assertion	  –	  	  and	  (2)	  insofar	  as	   the	   child	   in	  question	  has	   the	   concept	  of	  knowledge,	   she	  has	  higher	  order	   capacities	   too;	   after	   all,	   if	   she	   can	   predicate	   knowledge	   about	  third	  parties,	  she	  should	  be	  able	  to	  predicate	  it	  about	  herself.	  Here	  are	  two	   worries	   about	   this	   reply,	   however;	   first,	   the	   account	   stands	   and	  falls	  with	  the	  above	  non-­‐trivial	  theses;	  as	  such,	  it	  requires	  independent	  defence	   thereof,	   and	   taking	   on	   board	   all	   the	   relevant	   theoretical	  commitments.	  Second,	  note	  that	  the	  conjunction	  of	  (1)	  and	  (2),	  together	  with	   the	   plausibility	   of	   late	   development	   of	   the	   capacity	   for	   higher	  order	   thought,	   paint	   a	   fairly	   skeptical,	   counterintuitive	   picture	  concerning	   scarcity	   of	   assertion	   in	   young	   children.	   Furthermore,	   this	  seems	   to	   conflict	   with	   the	   generous	   Williamsonian	   landscape	   in	   this	  regard;	   according	   to	  Williamson	   (2000,	   258)	   himself,	   assertion	   is	   our	  default	  use	  of	  declarative	  sentences;	  if	  that	  is	  the	  case,	  one	  would	  think,	  it’s	   an	   easy	   to	   encounter,	   fairly	   non-­‐pretentious	   speech	   act.	   This,	  however,	  seems	  incompatible	  with	  the	  fairly	  strong	  thesis	  above	  –	  that	  is,	   that	   one	   is	   able	   to	   assert	   if	   and	   only	   if	   one	   has	   second	   order	  capacities.98	  	  	   It	  is	  also	  not	  clear	  that	  taking	  this	  controversial	  view	  on	  board	  is	  going	   to	   help	   much	   to	   begin	   with.	   To	   see	   this,	   note,	   first,	   that	  Williamson	  will	  surely	  not	  want	  to	  say	  that	  third	  order	  thought	  is	  also	  required	  for	  children’s	  speech	  acts	  to	  count	  as	  assertions.	  However,	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  construct	  a	  case	   in	  which	   it	   looks	  as	   though	   it	   is	  perfectly	   fine	  for	  a	  child	  to	  assert	  in	  scenarios	  parallel	  to	  HI,	  although,	  by	  stipulation,	  the	  child	  lacks	  third	  order	  knowledge	  in	  virtue	  of	  her	  age.	  If	  that	  is	  the	  case,	  one	  could	  wonder	  why	  HI	  needs	  third	  order	  knowledge	  in	  order	  to	  properly	  assert	  and	  the	  child	  does	  not.	  Consider	  a	  modified	  version	  of	  the	  HI	  scenario;	  	  	  
MARY:	  Same	  as	  in	  HI,	  only	  this	  time	  HI	  finds	  out	  that	  (weirdly	  enough)	  the	  relevant	  sample	  of	  seaweed	  is	  of	  type	  F	  if	  and	  only	  if	  there	  is	  a	  table	  
                                                97	  For	  the	  record,	  I	  doubt	  this	  is	  a	  way	  out	  Williamson	  is	  likely	  to	  endorse.	  98	  A	   side	  note:	  one	  might	  wonder	  how	  compatible	   such	  a	   claim	   is	  with	  Williamson’s	  general	  externalist	   leanings.	  After	  all,	  over-­‐intellectualization	  charges	  are	  among	   the	  main	   motivations	   against	   internalism,	   and	   thus	   favoring	   externalist	   accounts	   of	  justification.	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in	   the	   room	   where	   her	   seven	   year	   old	   daughter	   Mary	   is,	   and	   not	  otherwise.	  Also,	  Mary	  is	  aware	  of	  all	  this.	  	  	  Surely,	  it’s	  perfectly	  fine	  for	  Mary,	  when	  asked	  by	  her	  mother	  whether	  there	   is	   a	   table	   in	   the	   room,	   to	   assert	   that	   there	   is	   one	   based	   on	   her	  corresponding	  piece	  of	  perceptual	  knowledge.	  Note,	  however,	   that	   the	  relevant	   stakes	   are	   held	   fixed,	   and	   Mary	   fails	   to	   have	   third	   order	  knowledge	  of	  the	  asserted	  proposition	  in	  virtue	  of	  her	  lack	  of	  cognitive	  sophistication.	  As	  opposed	  to	  HI,	  however,	  she	  seems	  to	  be	  able	  to	  make	  permissible	  assertions.	  	  	   If	   that	   is	   the	   case,	   it	   looks	   as	   though	   some	   other	   difference	  between	  HI	   and	  Mary	   is	   the	   relevant	   one	   in	   explaining	   the	   case.	   One	  plausible	  thought	  that	  readily	  comes	  to	  mind,	  of	  course,	   is	  that,	  contra	  Williamson,	   the	   difference	   lies	   in	   the	   amount	   of	   warrant	   for	   the	   first	  order	   belief:	   Mary’s	   belief	   enjoys	   more	   warrant	   than	   HI’s,	   maybe	   in	  virtue	  of	  having	  a	  perceptual	  rather	  than	  a	  testimonial	  belief,	  or	  simply	  in	  because	  her	  inquiry	  enjoys	  a	  lesser	  degree	  of	  difficulty.	  	  	   Now,	   one	  way	   in	  which	  Williamson	  might	  want	   to	   reply	   to	   the	  objection	   featuring	   non-­‐sophisticated	   agents	   is	   by	   appealing	   to	   their	  general	   excusability	   for	   norm	   violation,	   related,	   indeed,	   to	   their	   very	  lack	   of	   sophistication.	   The	   thought	   would	   be	   that,	   in	   the	   case	   above,	  while	  both	  Mary	  and	  HI	  lack	  third	  order	  knowledge,	  Mary,	  but	  not	  HI	  is	  blameless	   for	   asserting	   in	   virtue	   of	   her	   limited	   cognitive	   capacities.	  After	  all,	  we	  often	  find	  children	  blameless	  and	  adults	  blameworthy	  for	  one	  and	  the	  same	  deed;	  take,	  for	  instance,	  breaking	  an	  expensive	  vase.	  Or,	  even	  better,	  making	  false	  assertions.	  	   Note,	  though,	  that	  the	  case	  under	  discussion	  seems	  importantly	  disanalogous:	   if	   both	   HI	   and	   Mary	   break	   an	   expensive	   vase,	   or	   say	  something	   false,	   it	   seems	   plausible	   that,	   although	   something	   bad	  happened	   in	   both	   cases,	   we	   are	   going	   to	   find	   Mary,	   but	   not	   HI,	  blameless	  for	  it,	  in	  virtue	  of	  her	  young	  age.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Mary	  asserting	  that	  there’s	  a	  table	  in	  the	  room,	  however,	  it	  does	  not	  seem	  like	  anything	  wrong	  happened	  to	  begin	  with,	  for	  which	  Mary	  might	  be	  in	  need	  of	  an	  excuse.	  	   Last	   but	   not	   least,	   here	   is	   another	   related	   worry	   about	   the	  necessity	   claim	   involved	   in	   the	   KK	   account.	   Recall	   that	   Williamson	  wants	   to	   say	   that	   his	   picture	   has	   a	   fair	   degree	   of	   generality:	   in	  contextualist	   cases	  and	  beyond,	  we	   tend	   to	  harshly	   judge	  people	  who,	  when	  a	  lot	  is	  at	  stake,	  act	  without	  knowing	  that	  they	  meet	  the	  condition	  for	  proper	  action.	  The	  story	  about	  norm	  satisfaction	  and	  knowledge	  of	  norm	  satisfaction	  looks	  nice	  and	  generally	  plausible.	  Note,	  though,	  that	  it	   is	   not	   clear	   that	   the	   story	   will	   work	   for	   further	   iterations	   of	  knowledge,	  since	  it’s	  not	  clear	  that	  the	  requirement	  for	  more	  than	  two	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iterations	  of	  knowledge	  has	  the	  same	  degree	  of	  generality.99	  After	  all,	  it	  looks	  as	  though,	  if	  you	  driving	  50	  km/hour	  and	  you	  know	  that	  you	  are,	  that’s	   all	   one	   could	   ever	   ask	   for	   proper	   driving.	   If	   you	   are	   driving	   at	  proper	  speed,	  and	  you	  know	  that	  you	  are,	  what	  is	  missing?	  	  	   	  	  
6.1.3	  Blameworthy,	  Why?	  
	  The	  section	  above	  outlined	  some	  worries	  regarding	  both	  the	  necessity	  and	  the	  sufficiency	  of	  higher	  order	  knowledge	  for	  assertability	   in	  high	  stakes	   scenarios.	  This	  brings	  us	   to	   the	   last	   and	  most	   serious	  worry	  of	  this	   section:	   what	   is	   the	   normative	   source	   of	   all	   this	  blameworthiness/blamelessness	   talk	   Williamson’s	   account	   of	   the	  shiftiness	  data	  comes	  with?	  One	  option	  that	  Williamson	  considers	  and	  rejects	  –	  with	  what	  I	  take	  to	  be	  good	  reason	  –	  is	  that	  it	  is	  the	  norm	  for	  action/assertion	  itself:	  	   The	   insensitive	   invariantist	   could	   try	   to	   build	   variation	   in	  the	   required	   number	   of	   iterations	   of	   knowledge	   into	  appropriateness	  itself,	  with	  a	  corresponding	  revision	  of	  [the	  knowledge	  norm	  of	  action/assertion]:	  in	  some	  cases	  q	  would	  be	   appropriate	   iff	   one	   knew	   q,	   in	   others	   iff	   one	   knew	   that	  one	   knew	   q,	   and	   so	   on,	   depending	   on	   the	   stakes.	   If	   such	   a	  move	   is	   acceptable,	   it	   provides	   the	   insensitive	   invariantist	  with	   a	   systematic	   response	   to	   arguments	   from	   practical	  differences	   to	   shifting	   semantic	   standards	   for	   epistemic	  terms.	  However,	  the	  move	  does	  not	  guarantee	  the	  epistemic	  accessibility	   of	   appropriateness,	   for	   the	   anti-­‐luminosity	  argument	  is	  quite	  general	  (Williamson	  2005,	  233).	  	  	  In	  sum,	  the	  thought	  is	  that,	  as	  things	  stand	  right	  now,	  on	  KNA,	  the	  non-­‐luminosity	   of	   knowledge	   makes	   possible	   cases	   where	   you	   obey	   the	  norm	  but	  you	  fail	  to	  know	  that	  this	  is	  the	  case	  –	  and	  are,	  therefore,	  by	  Williamson’s	   lights,	   blameworthy	   for	   making	   the	   corresponding	  assertions	  in	  high	  stakes	  scenarios.	  Similarly,	  however,	   if	  one	  modifies	  the	  norm	  as	   to	  stipulate	   that	  you	  not	  only	  have	   to	  know,	  but	  you	  also	  need	   to	   have	   the	   higher	   order	   knowledge	   appropriate	   to	   your	   stakes,	  that	   condition	   can	   fail	   to	   be	   luminous	   too	   –	   like	   any	   other	   non-­‐trivial	  condition.	   	   That	   is,	   you	   can	   know	   that	   p,	   and	   have	   the	   contextually	  appropriate	  higher	  order	  knowledge	  also,	  but	  fail	  to	  know	  that	  you	  do.	  
                                                99	  Unless,	  of	  course,	  one	  takes	  the	  KK	  requirement	  to	  be	  a	  second	  norm,	  which,	  itself,	  stipulates	  a	  condition	  that,	  in	  sufficiently	  high	  stakes,	  one	  needs	  to	  know	  one	  meets.	  And	  so	  on.	  For	  problems	  with	  a	  picture	  along	  these	  lines,	  see	  section	  #6.1.3.	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In	   this	   case,	   again,	   Williamson	   will	   have	   to	   say	   that	   you	   are	  blameworthy	  for	  asserting,	  given	  that	  you	  didn’t	  know	  you	  had	  a	  strong	  enough	  epistemic	  position.	  And	  so	  on.	  	  	   I	   agree	  with	  Williamson	  on	   this	   count.	  The	  question,	   though,	   is	  whether	   leaving	   the	   requirement	   for	   contextually	   appropriate	   higher	  order	  knowledge	  out	  of	   the	  norm	  for	  action/assertion	  helps	  avoid	   the	  above	  problem.	  	  	   To	   see	   the	   worry,	   note	   that	   the	   following	   principle	   seems	  uncontroversially	  true:	  	  
BLAME:	  Blameworthiness	  implies	  norm	  violation.	  	  BLAME	   seems	   to	   be	   a	   fairly	   safe	   assumption	   to	   go	   on;	   after	   all,	   it	   is	  plausible	  to	  believe	  that	  one	  cannot	  be	  blameworthy	  if	  one	  has	  not	  done	  anything	  wrong;	  furthermore,	  trivially,	  one	  cannot	  do	  something	  wrong	  without	  braking	  a	  norm,	  i.e.	  wrongness	  implies	  norm	  violation	  of	  sorts.	  Together,	  these	  two	  claims	  imply	  BLAME.100	  	  	   If	   that	   is	   the	   case,	   however,	   one	   question	  Williamson	   needs	   to	  answer	  on	  pain	  of	  ad-­‐hoc-­‐ness	   is:	  what	   is	   the	  normative	  source	  of	   the	  blameworthiness	  claim	  involved	  in	  his	  explanation	  of	  the	  contextualist	  data?	  What	  norm	  makes	  it	  such	  that	  one	  should	  proportion	  one’s	  higher	  order	  knowledge	  to	  one’s	  stakes?	  Of	  course,	  it	  need	  not	  be	  the	  norm	  we	  are	  interested	  in.	  After	  all,	  more	  than	  one	  norm	  can	  –	  and	  usually	  will	  –	  govern	  one	   token	  action.	  Take	  assertion:	   it	   is	  plausible	   that,	  on	   top	  of	  KNA,	   it	  will	  also	  be	  governed,	  say,	  by	  Gricean	  relevance	  requirements.	  As	   such,	   one	   can	   be	   blameworthy	   for	   making	   an	   otherwise	  knowledgeable,	  but	  irrelevant	  assertion.ϖφφ	  	   Still,	   the	   said	   blameworthiness	   needs	   a	   specified,	   plausible	  normative	  source,	  on	  pain	  of	  ad-­‐hoc-­‐ness.	  Now,	  if	  Williamson	  does	  not	  want	   the	   source	   to	  be	   the	  main	  norm	  at	   stake,	   presumably,	  what	  will	  need	   to	  be	   the	  case	   is	   that	  he	  stipulates	  a	  supplementary	  norm	  which	  triggers	   the	   blameworthiness	   in	   question.	   As	   such,	   the	   normative	  picture	   that	   we	   get	   is	   one	   where,	   on	   top	   of	   KNA,	   assertion	   is	   also	  
                                                100	  To	   be	   clear:	   the	   claim	   here	   is	   not	   that,	   just	   because	   you	   are	   blameworthy	   for	  acting/asserting,	  you	  are	  in	  breach	  of	  the	  norm	  for	  action/assertion	  we	  are	  interested	  in.	   That	   is	   because,	   first	   of	   all,	   for	   any	   non-­‐unique	   norm	   N	   governing	   φ-­‐ing	   φ-­‐ing,	  blameworthiness	   for	   acting/asserting	   can	   be	   sourced	   in	   a	   complementary	   norm	  governing	   φ-­‐ing.	   To	   use	   Jessica	   Brown’s	   example	   once	   again,	   I	   can	   be	   prudentially	  blameworthy	  for	  telling	  my	  boss	  he	  is	  bald,	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  I	  am	  perfectly	  well	  warranted	  to	  do	  so	  from	  an	  epistemic	  perspective:	  I	  know	  he’s	  bald.	  Furthermore,	  for	  any	  norm	  N	  governing	  Φ-­‐ing,	   if	  one	  is	  blameworthy	  for	  Φ-­‐ing	  in	  breach	  of	  N,	   it	  need	  not	  be	   that	   the	   source	  of	  blameworthiness	   is	   the	  breach	  of	  N.	  To	   see	   this,	   recall	   the	  case	   of	   indirect	   blameworthiness	   discussed	   in	   Chapter	   #4:	   one	   can	   be	   indirectly	  blameworthy	  for	  Φ-­‐ing	  in	  breach	  of	  N	  by	  being	  blameworthy	  for	  φ	  -­‐ing,	  of	  which	  Φ-­‐ing	  is	  the	  consequence.	  Kvanvig’s	  Billy	  Bob	  is	  a	  case	  in	  point.	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governed	  by	  a	  second	  norm,	  call	  it	  the	  Luminosity	  Norm,	  asking	  for	  an	  appropriate	   level	   of	   higher	   order	   knowledge	   relative	   to	   the	   stakes	   in	  place:	  	  
The	  Luminosity	  Norm	  for	  Assertion	  (LNA):	  One’s	  assertion	  that	  p	  is	  permissible	   iff	   one	   has	   the	   contextually	   appropriate	   number	   of	  iterations	  of	  knowledge	  of	  p.	  	  	   While	   the	   resulting	   normative	   picture	   might	   look	   less	   simple	  than	  what	  we	  started	  with	  –	  and	  therefore,	  arguably,	  theoretically	  less	  satisfactory	  –	   it	  need	  not	  be	   that	   its	   complexity	  affects	   its	  plausibility.	  After	   all,	   we	   have	   just	   seen	   that,	   plausibly,	   assertion	   is	   governed	   by	  many	  other	  norms	  –	  like,	  for	  instance	  the	  Gricean	  maxims;	  if	  that	  is	  the	  case,	  why	  not	  think	  of	  LNA	  just	  as	  one	  of	  these	  other	  norms	  governing	  assertion	  on	  top	  of	  KNA?	  	  	   Unfortunately,	  though,	  complexity	  considerations	  aside,	  once	  the	  normative	  structure	  is	  made	  clear,	  two	  fairly	  serious	  problems	  arise	  for	  the	   Williamsonian	   line:	   first,	   consider	   Williamson’s	   further	   lack	   of	  luminosity	  worry.	  Recall	  that	  the	  reason	  why	  Williamson	  did	  not	  just	  ad	  the	   requirement	   for	   contextually	   appropriate	  higher	  order	  knowledge	  to	   the	   norm	   for	   assertion	   itself	   was	   that,	   like	   any	   other	   non-­‐trivial	  condition,	   this	   condition	   too	   can	   fail	   to	  be	   luminous.	   	  That	   is,	   you	   can	  know	   that	   p,	   and	   have	   the	   contextually	   appropriate	   higher	   order	  knowledge	   also,	   but	   fail	   to	   know	   that	   you	   do.	   In	   this	   case,	   again,	  Williamson	   will	   have	   to	   say	   that	   you	   are	   blameworthy	   for	   asserting,	  Note,	   though,	   that	   it’s	   not	   clear	   what	   will	   be	   gained	   by	   having	   two	  separate	   norms.	   After	   all,	   insofar	   as	   LNA	   is	   also	   a	   norm	   governing	  assertion,	   on	   top	   of	   KNA,	   one	   can	   fail	   to	   know	   that	   the	   conditions	  thereby	   specified	   obtain,	   and,	   arguably	   be	   blameworthy	   for	   asserting	  under	  these	  circumstances	  in	  high	  stakes	  scenarios.	  	  	  	   Second,	  more	   importantly,	  what	   becomes	   less	   than	   clear	   is	   the	  status	   of	   the	   sufficiency	   claim	   involved	   in	   KNA;	   after	   all,	   if	   LNA	   also	  governs	   assertion,	   it	   looks	   as	   though,	   as	   a	   matter	   of	   fact,	   being	  knowledgeable	  is	  not	  sufficient	  for	  proper	  assertion.	  	   	  	   As	  far	  as	  I	  can	  see,	  there	  are	  two	  ways	  out	  for	  Williamson	  a	  this	  point:	   indexing	  to	  subjects	  or	   to	   types	  of	  norms.	   I	  will	   look	  at	   them	  in	  turn.	  	   On	   the	   first	   option,	   LNA	   governs	   a	   different	   entity	   than	   KNA:	  while	  the	  latter	  is	  a	  norm	  for	  the	  speech	  act,	  i.e.	  stating	  what	  it	  takes	  for	  an	  assertion	  to	  be	  a	  good	  assertion,	  the	  former	  stipulates	  what	  it	  takes	  for	   a	   speaker	   to	   be	   a	   good	   speaker.	   	   Williamson	   (Forthcoming)	   puts	  forth	  a	  normative	  framework	  for	  blameless	  believers	  meant	  to	  address	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the	   New	   Evil	   Demon	   problem	   for	   externalism,101	  which	   might	   prove	  useful	   here.	   According	   to	   Williamson,	   a	   given	   norm	   N	   typically	  generates	   derivative	   norms,	   which	   render	   subjects	   who	   violate	   the	  primary	  norm	  blameless	  for	  so	  doing:	  	   For	   example,	   there	   is	   the	   secondary	   norm	   DN	   of	   having	   a	  
general	   disposition	   to	   comply	   with	   N,	   of	   being	   the	   sort	   of	  person	   who	   complies	   with	   N.	   […]	   There	   is	   also	   a	   tertiary	  norm	  ODN	  of	   doing	  what	   someone	  who	   complied	  with	  DN	  would	   do	   in	   the	   situation	   at	   issue	   (‘O’	   for	   ‘occurrent’)	  (Williamson	  Forthcoming,	  6-­‐7).	  	  Correspondingly,	  maybe	  LNA	  is	  a	  derivative	  norm	  of	  KNA	  and	  what	   is	  going	  on	  in	  the	  contextualist	  cases	  is	  that	  we	  have	  a	  correct	  assertion	  –	  an	  assertion	  that	  meets	  KNA,	   the	  primary	  norm	  -­‐	  with	  a	  blameworthy	  speaker,	  in	  virtue	  of	  her	  being	  in	  breach	  of	  the	  derivative	  norm	  LNA.	  	  	   Now,	  the	  problem	  with	  this	  is	  that	  translating	  blamelessness	  talk	  into	  blameworthiness	  talk	  is	  not	  as	  straightforward	  as	  one	  might	  think.	  To	  see	  why,	  let’s	  first	  look	  at	  DN:	  while	  complying	  with	  it	  might	  get	  one	  off	   the	   hook	   for	   having	   broken	  N,	   it	   is	   not	   clear	   that,	   if	   you	  meet	   the	  conditions	  for	  N-­‐compliance,	  breaking	  DN	  implies	  blameworthiness.	  To	  see	  this,	  take	  the	  case	  of	  someone	  who	  does	  not	  break	  any	  traffic	  norm	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  she	  has	  a	  psychological	  condition	  that	  keeps	  her	  from	  having	   the	   disposition	   to	   comply	  with	   traffic	   norms.	   It	   does	   not	  seem	  like	  there’s	  much	  in	  the	  way	  of	  blame	  deserved	  by	  this	  person;	  to	  the	  contrary,	  I	  submit.	  In	  a	  nutshell,	  the	  problem	  is	  that	  meeting	  DN	  or	  ODN	   is	   –	   if	   at	   all	   -­‐	  	  merely	   sufficient	   for	   blamelessness,	   not	   necessary.	  Conversely,	  one	  need	  not	  be	  blameworthy	  for	  breaking	  them.	  	   Similarly,	  DN	  and	  ODN	  aside,	   the	  thought	  that	   failing	  to	  comply	  with	  LNA	   is	  enough	   to	  make	  a	   speaker	   into	  a	  bad	  speaker	   is	  also	   less	  than	   plausible.	   To	   see	   this,	   note,	   first,	   that	   LNA	   is	   a	   fairly	   strongly	  externalist	  norm.	  As	   such,	   complying	  with	   it	   is,	   to	  a	  very	   large	  extent,	  dependent	   on	   world	   friendliness;	   this,	   however,	   makes	   it	   into	   an	  implausibly	   strong	   condition	   to	   impose	   on	   speakers	   on	   pain	   of	  blameworthiness.	  Furthermore,	  recall	  that,	  according	  to	  the	  normative	  picture	   proposed	   in	   Chapter	   #4,	   one	   can	   break	   norms	   blamelessly	   in	  various	  ways	   (lack	   of	   control,	   lack	   of	   awareness	   etc.).	   LNA,	   of	   course,	  
                                                101	  This	   case	   has	   been	   put	   forth	   in	   (Lehrer	   and	   Cohen	   1983)	   against	   reliabilist	  accounts	   of	   justification,	   but	   they	   generalize	   to	   many	   externalist	   views,	   including	  Williamson’s	  J=K	  account.	  Suppose	  that	  an	  evil	  scientist	  kidnaps	  Philip,	  a	  normal	  adult,	  and	  hooks	  his	  brain	  up	  to	  a	  super	  computer	  that	  is	  programmed	  to	  induce	  the	  kind	  of	  sensory	  experiences	  he	  would	  have	  had	  if	  he	  had	  not	  been	  kidnapped.	  The	  thought	  is	  that,	  intuitively,	  Philip	  is	  as	  justified	  after	  envattment	  as	  he	  was	  beforehand,	  although,	  in	  fact,	  his	  cognitive	  processes	  hardly	  ever	  deliver	  truths,	  not	  to	  mention	  knowledge.	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will	   make	   no	   exception.	   Last	   but	   not	   least,	   note	   that	   Williamson’s	  framework	  for	  blamelessness	  itself	  can	  be	  easily	  employed	  to	  vindicate	  this	  thought:	  after	  all,	  one	  can	  fail	  to	  comply	  with	  LNA	  but	  still	  do	  well	  by	  the	  corresponding	  derivative	  norms,	  call	  them	  DLNA	  and	  ODLNA.	  	  	   As	   far	   as	   I	   can	   see,	   there	   is	   one	   way	   out	   still	   available	   for	  Williamson	   at	   this	   point:	   indexing	   to	   types	   of	   norms;	   that	   is,	   arguing	  that	  KNA	  is	  an	  epistemic	  norm	  for	  assertion,	  while	  LNA,	  i.e.	  the	  source	  of	  blameworthiness,	   is	   a	  practical	  norm	  governing	   this	   speech	  act.	  On	  this	  picture,	   knowledge	   is	   epistemically	   speaking	   sufficient	   for	  proper	  assertion;	   however,	   practical	   considerations	   ask	   for	   contextually	  appropriate	   higher	   order	   knowledge	   on	   top	   of	   the	   epistemic	  requirement.	  This	  reply	  seems,	  indeed,	  quite	  plausible,	  and	  also	  helps	  to	  explain	  the	  otherwise	  somehow	  weird	  status	  of	  LNA:	  when	  your	  life	  is	  at	  stake,	  prudentially,	  is	  good	  to	  check	  more	  on	  the	  status	  of	  your	  base	  for	  asserting.	  	  	   Note,	   however,	   that	   what	   the	   resulting	   picture	   amounts	   to	   is	  extremely	  close	   to	   the	  view	  defended	   in	   this	   thesis.	  According	   to	  both	  this	   further	   specified	   Williamsonian	   line	   and	   my	   functionalist	   KNA	  picture,	  epistemically,	  knowledge	  is	  necessary	  and	  sufficient	  for	  proper	  assertion,	  and	  what	  explains	  the	  shiftiness	  intuition	  is	  a	  practical	  norm	  stepping	   in	   and	   raising	   the	   bar.	   The	   only	   difference	   between	   the	  Williamsonian	  and	  myself	  at	  this	  point	  seems	  to	  consist	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  she	  makes	  a	  specific	  claim	  about	  what	  this	  ‘raising	  the	  bar’	  amounts	  to	  –	  i.e.	  need	  for	  higher	  order	  knowledge	  –,	  while	  I	  remain	  at	  a	  higher	  level	  of	   generality.	   According	   to	   the	   Williamsonian,	   higher	   stakes	   ask	   for	  higher	   orders	   of	   knowledge.	   According	   to	   me,	   they	   just	   modify	   the	  appropriate	   level	   of	   warrant,	   whatever	   that	   might	   consist	   in	   and	   no	  matter	  the	  order	  thereof.	  	  	   To	   take	   stock:	   the	   Williamsonian	   KK	   line	   needs:	   (a)	   An	  empirically	   questionable	   assumption	   to	   the	   effect	   that	   we	   have	   fairly	  rich	   capacities	   of	   higher	   order	   thought,	   (b)	   A	   fairly	   sceptical	   view	  regarding	   assertability/actionability,	   on	  which	   our	   everyday	   pieces	   of	  knowledge	   are	   often	   inappropriate	   to	   use	   in	   practical	  reasoning/assertion,	   (c)	   A	   fairly	   sceptical	   view	   regarding	   presence	   of	  assertion	   in	   young	   children	   and	   (d)	   To	   stipulate	   a	   further	   norm	   for	  proper	   assertion.	   Even	   if	   we	   grant	   all	   this	   to	   the	   defender	   of	   the	  Williamson	  line,	  I	  have	  argued,	  there	  still	  remain	  worries	  about	  (e)	  The	  Blameworthiness	   claim	   (the	   MARY	   case)	   and	   (f)	   The	   further	   lack	   of	  luminosity	   concerning	   the	   newly	   specified	   condition	   for	   proper	  practical	   reasoning/assertability.	   Also,	   in	   the	   end,	  what	  we	   effectively	  get	   is	   but	   a	   more	   specific	   version	   of	   the	   picture	   defended	   in	   this	  dissertation.	  Note,	   though,	   that	  given	  that	  my	  proposal	  does	  not	  share	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in	   any	   of	   the	   weaknesses	   mentioned	   above,	   it	   will	   be	   the	   preferable	  view	  on	  both	  empirical	  and	  theoretical	  grounds.	  	  	   Before	  closing	  the	  discussion,	  just	  one	  more	  consideration:	  recall	  that	   Williamson	   also	   employs	   explanations	   featuring	   practical	  overriding	  with	  first	  order	  warrant	  variation	  anyway	  –	  to	  explain	  cases	  of	   urgency,	   like	   his	   TRAIN	   case.	   But	   then,	   one	   question	   that	   arises	   is	  why	  not	   stick	   to	   the	  more	   general	   explanation	   for	   all	   cases?	  After	   all,	  norms	   modifying	   the	   all	   things	   considered	   appropriate	   degree	   of	   a	  gradable	   property	   for	   proper	   action	   can	   work	   both	   upwards	   and	  downwards:	   the	   moral	   norm,	   for	   instance,	   can	   modify	   the	   proper	  maximum	  speed	  set	  by	  the	  traffic	  norm	  both	  upwards	  and	  downwards.	  If	   that	   is	   the	   case,	   we	   get	   a	   nice	   parallel	   picture	   for	   assertion,	   when	  considering	  the	  TRAIN	  and	  the	  ASPIRIN2	  case.	  	  	  	  
6.4	  Conclusion	  	  This	   last	   chapter	   has	   compared	   the	   extant	   explanations	   of	   the	  contextualist	  data	  on	  theoretical	  grounds.	  	  	   The	   view	   defended	   in	   this	   thesis	  was	   shown	   to	   do	   better	   than	  knowledge	   sensitivism	   on	   theoretical	   considerations	   pertaining	   to	  parsimony	  and	  prior	  plausibility.	  Further	  on,	  I	  have	  looked	  at	  pragmatic	  and	  epistemic	  WAMs	  and	  pointed	  out	  some	  fairly	  serious	  problems	  they	  are	  facing,	  concerning	  generality	   in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  former	  and	  fit	  with	  mainstream	  value	  theory	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  latter.	  	   The	  KK	  strategy	  was	  shown	  to	  commit	  its	  champions	  to	  a	  set	  of	  fairly	   problematic	   theoretical	   assumptions.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   doubts	  about	  both	  the	  necessity	  and	  the	  sufficiency	  claim	  at	  stake	  in	  the	  KK	  line	  were	  put	  forth.	  Finally,	  I	  went	  on	  a	  rescue	  mission	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  KK	  champion,	   and	   argued	   that,	   in	   its	   most	   plausible	   incarnation,	   the	   KK	  account	  will	  come	  down	  to	  a	  slightly	  more	  specific	  version	  of	  the	  view	  defended	  in	  this	  dissertation.	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